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İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk (1919~1938)

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ATATÜRK
(1919-1938)**

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ÖNSÖZ VE GİRİŞ

1919-1938 yıllarını kapsayacak biçimde tasarlanmış olan *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk* dizisinin ilk dört cildi, Türk Tarih Kurumu tarafından 1973-1984 yılları arasında yayımlanmış ve daha sonra bunların ikinci baskıları da yapılmış idi. Uzun yıllardan sonra şimdi kitabın bu beşinci cildini de okuyuculara ve araştırmacılara sunuyoruz. Dizinin tamamı sekiz cilt tutabilecektir. Daha fazla gecikmeden son ciltleri de yayına hazırlamaya çalışıyoruz.

Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin ellinci yılında yayımına başlanmış olan kitabın ilk dört cildi Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı dönemini kapsamış, Nisan 1919'dan başlayıp Ekim 1922 tarihine kadar gelmiş idi. Bu beşinci cilt, Ekim 1922 - Aralık 1925 dönemiyle ilgili belgeleri içermektedir. Bu dönem, XX. yüzyıl tarihimizde çok önemli bir geçiş dönemidir. Uzun savaş döneminden nihayet barış dönemine, Sevr antlaşmasından Lozan barış sistemine geçilmektedir. Türkiye, İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete, teokrasiden laikliğe geçmektedir. Türk tarihinin bir dönüm noktasıdır bu dönem.

Cildin kapsadığı zaman dilimi içinde, yani Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı sonundan 1925 yılı sonuna kadarki dönemde, hem içerde, hem dışarda birbirinden önemli gelişmeler yaşanmaktadır. Bütün gelişmelerin orta yerinde yeni devletimizin kurucusu Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa vardır. Gelişmeleri kısaca hatırlatalım:

Dış ilişkiler bakımından başlıca şu gelişmeler görülür: Mudanya Mütarekesi imzalanır ve Mütareke hükümlerinin uygulanmasına geçilir; Doğu Trakya'yı teslim almakla görevlendirilen Refet Paşa (Bele) İstanbul'a girer ve orada işgal kuvvetleriyle ilişkiler ve sürtüşmeler başlar; Doğu Trakya peyderpey teslim alınır; İsmet Paşa (İnönü) Dışişleri Bakanı olur ve bu sıfatla Lozan Barış Konferansına Türkiye Başdelegesi atanır; son Padişah ve Halife Vahdettin "İngiltere devlet-i fehmanesine" sığınır ve bir İngiliz savaş gemisiyle yurt dışına kaçır; işgal kuvvetleriyle işbirliği yapmış olan birçok kişi de İngiltere Yüksek Komiserliği'ne sığınır ve yurt dışına gönderilir; Lozan Barış Konferansı toplanır ve çetin müzakereler başlar; yabancı diplomatlarla ilişkileri yürütmek üzere İstanbul'da Hariciye Vekâleti Murahhaslığı kurulur ve bunun başına Dr. Adnan (Adıvar) Bey atanır; Lozan'da müzakereler tükânır ve barış konferansına ara verilir; İsmet Paşa Ankara'ya döner; Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi gizli oturumlarında

barış şartlarını tartıŖır; Lozan'a götürülecek Türk karŖı teklifleri hazırlanır; Türk heyeti Lozan'a döner ve barış konferansının ikinci dönemi bařlar; Lozan Barış antlařması imzalanır, onaylanır ve imzalanmasından bir yıl kadar sonra yürürlüğe girer; yabancı işgal kuvvetleri Türk bayrağını selamlayarak İstanbul'u boşaltır ve Türkiye'yi terk ederler; eski düşman devletlerle yeniden diplomatik ilişkiler kurulur; diğerk devletlerle teker teker dostluk antlařmaları imzalanır ve normal diplomatik ilişkiler bařlar; Türkiye Cumhuriyetine atanan ilk yabancı Elçiler birer birer Ankara'ya gelip Çankaya'da Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pařa'ya törenle güven mektuplarını sunarlar; bu törenlerde karřılıklı söylevler verilir ve çeřitli konulara parmak basılır; Ankara'da Elçilik binaları inşa etmeleri için yabancı ölkelere arsalar verilir ve bařkentimizde birer ikiye Elçilik binaları kurulmaya bařlanır; bařta İngiltere olmak üzere Batılı Devletler, Türkiye'nin yeni bařkentine karřı direnirler ve Elçiliklerini Ankara'ya taşıtmamak için ayak sürerler; Lozan Barış antlařmasının uygulanmasında bazı pürüzler çıkar, Türkiye-Irak sınırı konusunda Türkiye-İngiltere görüřmeleri bařlar ve Musul sorunu güncelliğini korur; Yunanistan ile nüfus mübadelesi yapılır; Osmanlı borçlarının ve borç faizlerinin ödenmesi gündemdedir vs. vs. Yeni Türkiye'nin dış ilişkileriyle ilgili bu gelişmeler bu cildin kapsadıđı üç küsur yıllık dönemi doldurmaktadır.

Aynı dönemde *Türkiye iş politikasında da tarihi gelişmeler yaşanır. Şöyle ki: Sadrazam Tevfik Pařa (Okday), Lozan barış konferansına İstanbul ve Ankara Hükümetlerinin birlikte gitmelerini TBMM Başkanlığına önerir; bunun üzerine TBMM saltanatı kaldırır ve son padiřah Vahdettin yalnız halife sıfatıyla kalır; son sadrazam İngiliz ve Fransız Yüksek Komiserlerine danıřarak görevinden istifa eder ve İstanbul Hükümeti tarihe karışır; İstanbul'da TBMM Hükümeti yönetimi bařlar; Vahdettin'in yurt dışına kařması üzerine TBMM onu Halifelikten düşürür ve yerine Şehzade Abdölmecid Efendiyi Halife seçer; İzmir İktisat Kongresi toplanır; TBMM, genel seçim kararı alır ve Birinci Meclisin görevi sona erer; Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk-ı Milliye Cemiyeti yavaş yavaş siyasi partiye dönüřtürölür ve Halk Fırkası kurulur; TBMM'nin ikinci yasama dönemi bařlar; Rauf Bey (Orbay) İcra Vekilleri Heyeti Reisliğinden istifa eder; Fethi Bey (Okyar) İcra Vekilleri Heyeti Reisliğine seçilir; TBMM Lozan Barış Antlařmasını onaylar; İşgal kuvvetlerinin çekilmeleri üzerine Şükrü Naili Pařa (Gökberk) komutasındaki Türk birlikleri İstanbul'a girerler; "Ankara Şehrinin Türkiye Devletinin Hükümet Merkezi Kabul Edilmesine Dair Kanun" TBMM'nde kabul edilir ve Ankara resmen bařkent olur; Yunanistan ile nüfus mübadelesi göz önünde tutularak "Mübadele, İmar ve İřkân Vekâleti" kurulur; Fethi Bey (Okyar) Hükümeti istifa eder; Cumhuriyet ilân edilir ve Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pařa ilk Cumhurbaşkanı seçilir; İsmet Pařa (İnönü) Cumhuriyetin ilk hükümetini kurar...1922 yılı son aylarından 1923 yılı sonuna kadar Türkiye'de görölen bařlıca gelişmeler bunlardır.*

1924 yılında da önemli iç gelişmeler birbirini izler. Şöyle bir hatırlayalım: Bir grup kalbur üstü gazeteci İstanbul İstiklâl Mahkemesinde yargılanır ve beraat ederler; mahkûm olan gazeteciler de affedilirler; Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa İstanbul gazetecilerinin ileri gelenlerini İzmir'e davet eder ve orada kendilerine demeçler verir; Başbakan İsmet Paşa, Genelkurmay Başkanı Mareşal Fevzi Paşa (Çakmak) ve üst düzey komutanlar İzmir'de Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa Başkanlığında, "harp oyunları" için diyerek toplanırlar ve Halifelığın kaldırılması konusunu görüşürler; Halifelik kaldırılır ve son Halife Abdülmecid Efendi ve yakınları yurt dışına çıkarılır; "Hilafetin İlgasına ve Hanedan-ı Osmaninin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Memaliki Haricine Çıkarılmasına Dair Kanun" gereğince Osmanlı hanedanı üyeleri de on gün içinde yurt dışına gönderilir; Halifelığın kaldırılmasından sonra Fener Rum Patrikliği'nin, Ermeni Patrikliği'nin ve Yahudi Hahambaşılığı'nın da kaldırılması konusu konuşulmaya başlanır; eğitim öğretimi birleştiren "Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu" çıkarılır; Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekâleti ile Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Vekâleti kaldırılır; Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı kurulur; laikleşme hareketi çerçevesinde Şeriye Mahkemeleri kaldırılır ve mahkemeler birleştirilir; yeni Anayasa Mecliste görüşülür ve kabul edilir; Anadolu Demiryolları satın alınır ve T.C. Devlet Demiryolları kurulur; Başkomutanlık Meydan Muharebesi'nin ikinci yıldönümünde Dumlupınar'da büyük bir tören yapılır, Türkiye'de ilk Meşhul Asker anıtının temeli atılır ve bu törende Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa önemli bir konuşma yapar; tanınmış komutanlardan Kâzım Karabekir, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) ve Cafer Tayyar (Eğilmez) Paşalar askerlikten istifa edip siyaseti seçerler ve açıkça muhalefete geçerler; Refet Paşa (Bele), Rauf (Orbay), Dr. Adnan (Adıvar) ve arkadaşları Halk Fırkasından istifa ederler ve askerlikten ayrılan ünlü komutanlarla birlikte Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkasını kurarlar; İsmet Paşa (İnönü) Başbakanlıktan çekilir ve Fethi Bey (Okyar) tekrar Başbakan olur; Bahriye Vekâleti kurulur... Bunlar da 1924 yılındaki gelişmelerdir.

1925 yılındaki gelişmeler de şöyle sıralanabilir: Şubatta gerici Şeyh Said ayaklanması patlak verir, bunun üzerine doğu illerinde sıkıyönetim ilân edilir; "Hiyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu"na dinin politikaya alet edilemeyeceğine dair bir madde eklenir; Mart başında Fethi Bey (Okyar) Kabinesi istifa eder; İsmet Paşa Kabinesi kurulur; Fethi Bey (Okyar) Paris Büyükelçiliğine atanır; Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu yürürlüğe girer; biri Ankara'da diğeri isyan bölgesinde olmak üzere iki İstiklâl Mahkemesi çalışmaya başlar; isyanın elebaşları ve bazı kışkırtıcıları yakalanıp mahkeme önüne çıkarılır; bu arada Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası'nın bazı şubelerinde aramalar yapılır ve bu parti irticayı yüreklendirdiği gerekçesiyle Hükümet tarafından kapatılır (3 Haziran); 26 Haziran'da Şeyh Said ve adamları Diyarbakır İstiklâl Mahkemesi'nce idama mahkûm edilir ve temyizi olmayan bu hükümler ertesi gün infaz edilir. 1925 yılının ilk yarısı bu idamlarla noktalanır.

Yılın ikinci yarısında laiklik ve çağdaşlaşma ile ilgili atılımlara devam edilir: Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 23 Ağustos günü elinde yazlık bir şapkayla Kastamonu'ya gelir; orada çağdaşlaşma, uygarlaşma konusunda bir konuşma yapar: "Medeniyet öyle kuvvetli bir ateştir ki ona bigâne olanları yakar ve mahveder" der; Gazi, 27 Ağustos'ta İnebolu'da ünlü kılık kıyafet ve şapka söylevini verir ve elindeki yazlık şapkayı halka göstererek "Bu serpuşun ismine şapka denir" diye vurgular; üç gün sonra Kastamonu Halk Fırkası merkezinde de "Efendiler ve ey millet, iyi biliniz ki Türkiye Cumhuriyeti şeyhler, dervişler, müritler, mensuplar memleketi olamaz. En doğru ve en hakikî tarikat, tarikat-ı medeniyedir" diye konuşur; 2 Eylül'de "Tekke, zaviye ve türbelerin kapatılmasına, din görevlilerinin kıyafetlerine ve memurların şapka giymelerine dair" Bakanlar Kurulu kararı kabul edilir; 25 Kasım'da Şapka kanunu çıkarılır, beş gün sonra da Tekke ve Zaviyelerin kapatılmasına ve türbedarlıklar ile bir takım unvanların kaldırılmasına dair kanun TBMM'nde kabul edilir; şapka giyilmesi ve tekkelerin kapatılmasına karşı yer yer tepkiler görülür, yılın sonuna doğru uluslararası saat ve takvim kabul edilir ve 1925 yılı böyle sona erer.

Zaten bilinen ve burada hafızalarımızı tazelemek için tekrarlanmış olan yukarıdaki gelişmeler, Türkiye'deki İngiliz diplomatları ve gizli ajanları tarafından yakından izlenmiş, değerlendirilip yorumlanmış ve sürekli olarak Londra'ya rapor edilmiştir. İngiliz diplomatlarının ve gizli istihbarat servisi elemanlarının ülkemizle ilgili rapor ve telgraflarının bir çoğu bu ciltte yer almaktadır. Bu belgelerin hemen her birinde Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın adı geçmektedir. Daha doğrusu olaylar Onun etrafında dönmektedir.

İngilizler, Türkiye ile ilgili iç ve dış gelişmelerin yanısıra Mustafa Kemal'in kendisini de izlemeye almışlardır. Onun hareketleri, konuşmaları, demeçleri, özel yaşamı, sağlık durumu, yakın çevresi, dostları, hasımları vs. adeta mercek altında tutulmuştur. Türkiye'deki İngiliz görevlileri, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin daha ilk yılında Mustafa Kemal sonrası üzerinde de zihin yormaya başlamışlar ve akıllarından geçenlerin bir birçoğunu kâğıtlara dökmüşlerdir. Bu kâğıtların da bazıları bu ciltte bulunacaktır.

•

Buradaki belgeler Mudanya konferansı günlerinden başlıyor. Birkaçına değinelim. İngilizler, işgal etmiş oldukları İstanbul ve Boğazlar bölgesini "Tarafsız bölge" diye nitelendirmekte ve Türk askerinin bu bölgeye girmesini önlemeye çalışmaktadırlar. Başkomandan Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa ise, "tarafsız bölge"yi tanımamaktadır. Mudanya görüşmelerinde bu konu gündeme gelir. İngiliz İşgal Orduları Başkomutanı General Harington, "Mustafa Kemal herhangi bir 'tarafsız bölge' tanımadığı için 'Müttefik işgalindeki bölgeler' diyorum" diye rapor etmektedir (No. 4).

Mütareke görüşmelerinde Atatürk'ün bir başka itirazı, Rum tutsakları konusundadır. Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında, Türk vatandaşı olan bazı Rum gençleri

Yunan ordusuna katılmış ve Türk askerine kurşun sıkmışlardır. Sonunda Türk askerinin eline düşen Türkiyeli bu Rumlar, hukuki bakımdan, "savaş esiri" değil, "vatan haini" durumunda idiler. İngilizler bunları da "savaş esiri" sayıp kurtarma telaşı içindedirler. İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Curzon, İstanbul'daki Yüksek Komiserine talimat verir: "Mustafa Kemal, Yunan ordusuna katılmış Rum esirleri hain saymak niyetindeymiş. Bunlar yargılanırsa kurşuna dizilebilir. İtalyan ve Fransız meslektaşlarınızla birlikte girişimde bulununuz." der (No. 1). Girişimler devam eder, İtilaf Devletleri Milletler Cemiyetini ve Dr. Nansen'i de devreye sokarlar (No. 10).

Mudanya Mütarekesinin imzalanmasından sonra General Harington Londra'ya şunları telliyor:

"Mustafa Kemal'den 18 Ekim (1922) tarihli bir mektup aldım. Mudanya'da İsmet Paşa ile aramızdaki ilişkiden hoşnut kaldığını söylüyor ve barış çabalarının da başarıya ulaşacağı umudunu dile getiriyor. İsmet Paşa'dan da benzer bir mektup aldım." (No. 16).

Mustafa Kemal ve İsmet Paşaların General Harington'a göndermiş oldukları mektupları arşivlerde bulamadık.

Mudanya Mütarekesi gereğince Doğu Trakya'nın Türkiye'ye geri verilmesi eski müttefikimiz Bulgaristan'ı da rahatsız etmiştir. Bulgaristan Başbakanı Aleksandr Stambulyki, Mütarekenin imzalanmasından bir hafta sonra Sofya'daki İngiliz Elçisi Erskine'i kabul etmiş ve kendisine "Türkleri neden Avrupa'dan atmadınız" diye sitemde bulunmuştur. Elçi, "Stambulyiski ile görüştüm. İngiltere'nin Türkleri Avrupa'dan atmamış olmasına üzüldüğünü söyledi. Türklerin Trakya'ya geri dönme olasılığından dolayı kaygılanıyor. Stambulyiski, birkaç gün önce yaptığı bir konuşmada ise Mustafa Kemal'in zaferini övmüştü." diye rapor ediyor (No. 12). Bulgar tarihçileri aynı Stambulyiski'yi bizlere "Türk dostu" olarak tanıtmışlardı.

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Lozan Konferansı arifesinde İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Sir H. Rumbold, "Sevres antlaşması ölmüştür, şimdi Misakı Milli ile boğuşacağız" diyor ve özetle şunları yazıyor:

"Kemalistler Anadolu'da Yunanlıların hesabını gördükten sonra, gelişmelerin ağırlık merkezi Boğazlar'a ve Trakya'ya kaydı ve Mudanya Konferansına gidildi. Kemalistler savaşmadan Doğu Trakya'yı kazandılar, karşılığında verdikleri taviz ise kalıcı değildir. Türkler Misakı Milliden taviz vermek niyetinde değildir. Ama karşılarında İngiltere vardır. Sevr antlaşması ölmüştür, şimdi Müttefikler Misakı Milli ile boğuşmak durumundadırlar: Sınırlar çizilirken Kemalistler Batı Trakya'da plebisit isteyecekler, Musul'u geri almak isteyecekler, Suriye sınırında düzeltme yapılsın diye direnecekler, Boğazlar sorusunda İstanbul'un güvenliğini öne sürecekler, mali ve ekonomik kontrole karşı çıkacak-

lar, kapitülasyonlar konusunda hiç boyun eğmeyecekler ve hep Türkiye egemen ve bağımsız olmalıdır diye cevap vereceklerdir. Bu durumda İngiltere bölgedeki kuvvetlerini azaltmamalı, Yunanistan da Batı Trakya'daki kuvvetlerini arttırmalıdır. Barış konferansından önce İstanbul Hükümetinin salınenen çekilmesi belki hayırlı olacaktır, yoksa Padişahın durumu ciddi sorun yaratacaktır. Misakı Milliye gerçekleştirmek Türklerin ilk hedefidir. Ondan sonra federal esasa göre Türk İmparatorluğunu diriltmeyi ve İslam hegemonyası kurmayı düşünen liderler vardır. Şu sırada Türkiye, Rusya ile Batı arasında, orta yerdedir. Mustafa Kemal, Ruslarla işbirliğinde dikkatli davranmıştır ve Ruslar, Ankara'ya dış politika dikte edecek kadar bir nüfuz kazanamamışlardır." (No. 11).

Saltanatın kaldırılması üzerine son Sadrazam Tevfik Paşa İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Rumbold'a gidip akıl danışmış. Rumbold, bu görüşmeyi özetle şöyle rapor ediyor:

"4 Kasım saat 11'de Sadrazam bana geldi. Lozan Konferansına Ankara ve İstanbul Hükümetlerinin birlikte gitmeleri için Mustafa Kemal'e gönderdiği telgraf üzerine yaşanan gelişmelere değindi. Barış konferansına davet edildiklerini, Ankara Hükümetinin ise İstanbul Hükümetini "gayri meşru" ve hatta "hain" saydığını belirtti ve konferansa daveti kabul edip etmeme konusunda benim görüşümü sordu. Bu konuda bir tavsiyede bulunamayacağımı bildirdim. Sadrazam, cevabıma şaşırmadı. Hükümeti istifa ederse Müttefik Yüksek Komiserlerinin İstanbul'un yönetimini üstlenip üstlenemeyeceklerini sordu. Böyle bir görevi üstlenemeyeceğimizi söyledim. Görüşmede padişahın durumu konuşulmadı. Sadrazam, iki saat sonra Fransız Yüksek Komiserine gitmiş. İstifa etmeye hazır olduğunu Mustafa Kemal'e telgrafla bildirmiş ve işleri kime devredeceğini sormuş. Padişahın tahttan inmeye niyeti olmadığını da bildirmiş. Refet Paşa, İstanbul'da yönetimi eline almak için bir hükümet darbesi hazırlıyor. Böylece 600 yıl hüküm sürmüş olan bir kurum tarihe karışıyor..." (No. 24).

İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliği, saltanatın kaldırılmasıyla altı yüzyıllık Osmanlı Devletinin tarihe karıştığını, aynı zamanda Türkiye'de Mustafa Kemal'e karşı muhalefetin arttığını belirlemektedir. O yıllarda Türkiye'deki İngiliz görevlilerinin en çok üzerine durduğu konulardan biri Mustafa Kemal'e karşı muhalefet konusu olmuştur. Bu konuyla ilgili olarak bu ciltte birçok belge bulunmaktadır. İngilizler, daha 1921 yılında Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi içinde Mustafa Kemal'in "Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Milliye" grubunun (Birinci Grup) karşısında "İkinci Grup" adı verilen bir muhalefet gurubu oluştuğunu tespit etmişlerdir. Fakat Türklerin 'savaşta milli birliklerini korumak, barışta ise birbirleriyle boğuşmak' gibi bir huyları veya zaafı olduğu iddiasındadırlar. Bu iddia doğrultusunda Mustafa Kemal'e karşı muhalefetin de asıl Lozan barış anlaşması imzalandıktan sonra ciddi boyutlara ulaşacağını düşünmekte ve beklemektedirler.

Bu dönemde Mustafa Kemal taraftarlarıyla karşıları arasında ilk önemli kavga, 1923 Mart başlarında, barış antlaşması tasarısının Meclis gizli oturumlarında görüşülmesi sırasında yaşanmıştır. İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Rumbold, 7 Mart 1923'te bunu özetle şöyle rapor ediyor:

"İstanbul'dan bakınca Mustafa Kemal Meclis'e hakimdir. Onun taraftarlarıyla karşıları arasında tam bir çizgi çizmek zordur. Onun iki büyük sloganı "Misak-ı Milli" ve "Millî Hakimiyet"tir. Misak-ı Milli'nin yorumunda ise mebuslar arasında görüş ayrılıkları görülmektedir. Mustafa Kemal'in taraftarları onun şahsına bağlı olan mebuslarla Misak-ı Milliye bağlı olanlardır. Bunlar beraberce Mecliste Birinci Grubu oluşturuyorlar. Mustafa Kemal'in başıca örgütü "Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti"dir. Bir de Halk Partisi kurma çalışmaları başlatılmıştır. Mustafa Kemal'in karşıları ise çeşitli gruplardan oluşmaktadır. Eski İttihatçılar, Saltanatçılar ve irili ufaklı çeşitli gruplar. İttihatçıları Kemalistlerin içine çekmek için çeşitli girişimler olmuşsa da bu çabalardan pek az sonuç alınabilmiştir. İttihatçılar asıl muhalefeti oluşturuyor ve bunlar barış yapılırca ülkeye hükmeden kuvvet olabilirler. Hangi kategoriye girecekleri belli olmayan başka muhalifler de vardır. Bütün Mustafa Kemal karşıları Mecliste "İkinci Grubu" oluşturuyorlar. Son olarak barışa karşı olanlar da ortaya çıkmıştır ki bunların başında Fevzi Paşa'nın bulunduğu söyleniyor. Mustafa Kemal'den sonra Mecliste en önemli şahsiyet olan Rauf Bey ise dikkatli bir oyun oynamaktadır. Kendisi dış politikada barışçıdır, iç politikada ise İttihatçılardan yanadır. Mustafa Kemal kesin bir tutum takınmadan barış teklifleri konusunda Meclisin nasıl şekilleneceği belli değildir. 'Karaağaç'sız ve Musul'suz barışa hayırl' sesleri yükseliyor..." (No. 92).

Bir hafta sonra Yüksek Komiser Rumbold raporunu şöyle tamamlıyor:

"Barış teklifleri konusunda Mecliste günlerdir devam eden (gizli) tartışmaların sonunda Mustafa Kemal söz almış ve Hükümet tekliflerinden yana bütün ağırlığını koymuştur. Böylece gürültücü muhalefeti çöktürmüştür. Anlaşılan Mustafa Kemal barışın gerekli olduğuna karar vermiştir ve barış yapılırca içeride bayındırlık projelerine dönecektir. Büyük tartışma sırasında Mecliste olup bitenler hakkında dışarıya pek az şey sızmıştır. Söylendiğine göre müzakerelerde 275 mebus bulunmuş, bunlardan 75'i oylamaya katılmamış, 175'i Hükümet teklifleri lehinde, 20'si aleyhinde oy kullanmış. Barış yapılırsa Kemalistler ile anti-Kemalistler arasında şiddetli bir boğuşma olacaktır. Bu boğuşma pek kendini beğenmiş olan Türkiye'yi zayıf düşürecektir. Şimdilik en acil sorun, barış veya savaş sorunudur..." (No. 93) ¹.

¹Lozan Barış Konferansı ile ilgili Türk belgeleri için bkz. Bülent N. Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları. Türk Diplomatik Belgelerinde Lozan Barış Konferansı, Cilt I (Kasım 1922-Şubat 1923)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını, Ankara: 1990; *Cilt II (Şubat-Ağustos 1923)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını, Ankara: 1994; Lozan barış şartlarıyla ilgili olarak Mart 1923'te TBMM'de yapılan gizli görüşmeler bu cildin giriş bölümünde bulunacaktır. Cilt II, s. IX-L. Lozan Barış Konferansıyla ilgili İngiliz diplomatik belge-

Lozan'da ikinci dönem barış görüşmeleri devam ederken Türkiye'de genel seçimler yapılmıştır. TBMM, seçimin yenilenmesi için 1 Nisan 1923'te karar almıştır. Ondan sonra iç politikada gelişmeler hızlanmıştır. 7 Nisan'da Mustafa Kemal Başkanlığındaki bir toplantıda, Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetinin "Halk Fırkası" adıyla siyasal partiye dönüştürülmesine karar verilmiştir. Ertesi gün Mustafa Kemal Paşa, seçim bildirisi niteliğindeki 9 Umdeyi yayımlamıştır. 11 Nisan'da İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri "Mustafa Kemal durumunu pekiştirmektedir ve Halk Partisi'nin seçimi kazanma şansı yüksektir" diye rapor etmiş ve eklemiştir: "Muhalefet ise dağınıktır, muhalefetin içinde en derli toplu grup İttihatçılardır. Onlar da bir karşı bildiri yayınlamayı düşünüyorlarmış ama onların Mustafa Kemal'e karşı ortaya atılmaları kolay değildir." (No. 105).

1923 seçimleri ve muhalefet konusunda bu ciltte birçok İngiliz raporu yer almaktadır. 18 Nisan'da İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri şunları yazıyor:

"Mustafa Kemal ve taraftarları seçimleri kazanmaya kararlıdılar. "Müdafaa-i Hukuk" örgütü, yeni Meclis seçilince "Halk Partisi" adını alacak. Bunlar şimdi öncelikle İttihatçıların kalesi sayılan İstanbul'u hedef alıyorlar. 12 Nisan günü Mustafa Kemal İstanbul halkına bir bildiri yayınladı. Önde gelen Kemalistler seçimlerde İstanbul'dan aday gösterilecekler. Onları seçtirmek için çeşitli önlemler alınıyor. "Tanin'de Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) İttihatçıları destekliyor. İkinci Grubun da bildiri yayınlayacağı havadisleri geldi, ama aslı çıkmadı. 15 Nisan'da Kemalistler, muhalefete en büyük darbeyi indirdiler: Hiyanet-i Vatanıye kanunun 1. Maddesini değiştirdiler ve Saltanatın kaldırılmasıyla ilgili 1 Kasım 1922 tarihli kararın eleştirilmesi vatana ihanet suçu sayıldı." (No. 109).

Saltanat propagandasının yasaklanması muhalefetin sesini kısmıştır. Ama yine de muhalefet seçime hazırlanmıştır. İngiliz raporlarında çeşitli parti veya grupların adları anılıyor: Müdafaa-i Hukuk (Birinci Grup), Müdafaa-i Hukuk (İkinci Grup), Milli Müdafaa Fırkası (Muhaliif), İttihat ve Terakki ve Emekçiler, ayrıca bağımsızlar. Muhaliiflerin bazıları iktidar partisi listesinden seçime girmişlerdir. İlerde açıkça muhalefete geçecek olan Rauf Bey (Orbay), Kâzım Karabekir ve Refet (Bele) Paşalar gibi tanınmış simalar da iktidar partisi durumundaki Müdafaa-i Hukuk Partisi (Halk Partisi) listesinden seçime girip kazanmışlardır. Muhalefetin asıl merkezi İstanbul'du. Seçim öncesinde İkinci Grup da Ankara'daki karargâhını bırakıp İstanbul'a yerleşmiştir. Anadolu'da Trabzon, Samsun ve Erzurum yörelerinde muhalefet görülmüştür. Diğer yerlerde Mustafa Kemal ve taraftarları ciddi bir muhalefete karşılaşmamışlardır. Kadınların henüz seçilme hakları yoktu. Öyle olduğu halde ilk defa 1923 se-

leri de şu ciltte toplanmış bulunmaktadır: *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, Volume XVIII*, Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert; Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London: 1972.

çinlerinde kadınlara oy verenler de olmuş. İzmir'de Latife Hanım'a ve Halide Edip Hanım'a (Adivar) 1'er oy verilmiş. Konya'da ise Latife hanıma 39 oy çıkmış.

25 Temmuz'da İngiliz Yüksek Komiser Vekili Henderson Mustafa Kemal'in bu seçimleri kazandığını rapor ediyor, ona karşı "gerçek tehlikeli muhalefetin Lozan antlaşmasından sonra, dış sorunlarla birlikte ortaya çıkacağını" söylüyor ve şöyle devam ediyor: "Mustafa Kemal'in partisi şimdi de seçimlerde zafer kazanmıştır. Yeni Mecliste 280 küsur milletvekilinden 240 kadarı seçildi, bunlar içinde Müdafaa-i Hukuk üyesi olmayan sadece bir kişi vardır. Mustafa Kemal Ankara'dan oybirliğiyle seçildi. İsmet Paşa Malatya'dan aday gösterildi...Mebus seçilen ordu komutanları, ancak askeri görevlerinden ayrıldıktan sonra Meclis'te görüşmelere katılabilecekler..." (No. 141).

O zamanki seçim uzun sürüyor ve ancak Temmuz sonunda tamamlanıyor. Henderson, İsmet Paşa'nın Lozan'dan dönmek üzere olduğu günlerde, 31 Temmuzda şunları yazıyor: "Seçimler hemen hemen tamamlandı, 260'tan fazla milletvekili seçildi. 30 kadar milletvekili "Saltanatçı Parti"den imiş ve saltanatın kaldırılmasıyla ilgili kanunu değiştireceklermiş. Mustafa Kemal İzmir'e gitti, Rauf Bey seçim bölgesine gidecekmiş...Lozan antlaşmasının Meclisten ne zaman geçeceği belli değil. Hükûmete karşı asıl ciddi saldırılar, işgal kuvvetleri çekilip Türkler kendi kendilerine kaldıktan sonra başlayacak."(No. 142).

Londra'da İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı yetkilisi bu raporun altına not düşüyor:

"Çok ilginç. Mustafa Kemal'in sorunları başlıyor. Muhalefet için "Saltanatçı Parti" adı, onun en aziz prensiplerine karşı doğrudan bir meydan okumadır."

İkinci Meclis açılır. 13 Ağustos günü Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa TBMM Başkanlığına seçilir ve kürsüye çıkıp önemli bir konuşma yapar. Şunları söyler:

"Efendiler, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin ikinci intihap devresine dahil olmuş bulunuyoruz... Bu devrei intihabiye, aynı zamanda yeni Türkiye devletinin, yeni tarihinde mesut bir intikal zamanına tesadüf ediyor... Filhakika dört senelik istiklâl mücadelemiz, milletimizin şanına layık bir sulh ile neticelenmiştir... Efendiler! İlk Meclisimiz memleketi düşman ayaklarında kurtarmak, milleti hayatbahş bir sulha götürmek gayesine yürürken aynı zamanda yeni Türkiye Devletinin bünyanını (yapısını) tesis ve tarsin ediyordu... Vazifesini hüsnü ifa etmiş ve sureti umumiyede vatan ve millet için mucibi halâs ve hayat olmuştur... Sulh müzakeratının cereyanında da tesadüf ettiğimiz müşkilât pek çoktur. Fakat ben bunu pek tabii buluyorum. Çünkü bu sulh müzakeratında tasfiye olunan hesabat dört senelik değil, dört yüz senelik bir devrin mirası seyyiâtı (kötü mirası) idi. Müşkilât, muvaffakiyetle iktihâm olundu. (Zorluklar başarıyla göğüslendi)... Efendiler, şarkta Trabzon'u, cenupta Adana'yı ihtiva e-

decek (içine alacak) büyük Ermenistan'dan eser kalmamıştır. Ermeniler tabii olan hudutları dahilinde bırakılmıştır... Şimalde Karadeniz'in en güzel ve en zengin sahilleri üzerinde tesis edilmek (kurulmak) istenilen Pontus hükümeti taraftarlarıyla beraber tamamen bertaraf edilmiştir... Milletın azım ve celâdeti karşısında Türkiye'yi parçalamanın ham bir hayal olduğu kabul ettirilmiştir... Efendiler! Bu güne kadar istihsal eylediğimiz muvaffakiyat, bize ancak terakki ve medeniyete doğru bir yol açmıştır... Bize ve ahfadımıza düşen vazife, bu yol üzerinde tereddütsüz ilerlemektir... Sonra Efendiler, Türkiye Devletinin istiklali mukaddesdir. O, ebediyyen müemmen ve masun olmalıdır..."

Yeni dönemde Fethi Bey (Okyar) Başbakan olur. İsmet Paşa Lozan'dan dönmüştür. Yeni Meclis, ilk iş olarak Lozan Barış Antlaşmasını görüşür ve 23 Ağustos günü Antlaşmayı onaylar. Aynı gece, Barış Antlaşmasının onaylandığı İtilaf Devletleri Yüksek Komiserlerine bildirilir, çünkü işgal kuvvetlerinin İstanbul'u boşaltmaları buna bağlıdır.

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İngiliz, Fransız ve İtalyan işgal kuvvetleri Türkiye'yi terk edince, 13 Ekim 1923 günü Ankara şehri yeni Türkiye Devletinin başkenti yapılır, iki hafta sonra 29 Ekim 1923'te de Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ilan edilir ve Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa Türkiye'nin ilk Cumhurbaşkanı seçilir.

Türkiye'de Cumhuriyetin ilanına İngiliz belgelerinde az yer verilmiştir. İngiliz diplomatları, bu tarihi gelişmeyi daha ziyade iktidar-muhalefet ilişkileri açısından değerlendirmişlerdir. İngiliz Yüksek Komiser Vekili Henderson, 20 Kasım 1923'te özetle şunları rapor etmiştir:

"Cumhuriyetin ilanının ardından giddetli tartışmalar başladı. Mustafa Kemal'e karşı olan muhalefet liderleri kendi aralarında toplanıyor ve İstanbul'da yeterli destek buluyorlar. Ama Mustafa Kemal Ankara'ya hakim. 10 Kasım'da Kâzım Karabekir Paşa İstanbul'a geldi ve onun buradaki hareketlerine basın geniş yer verdi. Karabekir Paşa 12 Kasım'da Halifeyi ziyaret etti. Ertesi gün Rauf Bey ve Refet Paşa ile buluştu ve her üçü başna demeçler verdiler... Halifelik konusu ve bugünkü Halifenin durumu kamuoyunu meşgul ediyor. Mustafa Kemal kamuoyunu sınıyor ve şimdilik gelişmeleri seyrediyor. Halifenin aylık ödenğini 26.000 liradan 50.000 liraya çıkarılmasını istediği söyleniyor... Ankara ile İstanbul arasındaki sürtüşme devam ediyor... Cumhuriyetin ilanı ile-riye doğru atılmış ihtilâlcı bir adım olmakla beraber, anayasa açısından Kabine sistemine dönüştür ki, iki yıl önce Mustafa Kemal bu sisteme karşıydı..." (No. 162).

Henderson, 9 Ocak 1924 günü de şu değerlendirmeyi yapıyor:

"TBMM 1 Kasım 1922'de Saltanatı kaldırma kararı verirken risk de üstlendi ve gelişmeler bu cüreti haklı çıkardı. Türk halkı kararı kabul etti. Türklerin aydın sınıfı şimdi "millî hakimiyet", "cumhuriyet", "liberal" ve son olarak da

"laik" kavramları etrafında fikirlerini kristalleştirmiştir. 1908 tipi meşrutî saltanat artık gericilik sayılıyor. Böyle olunca bir yıl içinde saltanatın kaldırılması ve Cumhuriyetin ilanı Mustafa Kemal için pek zor olmamıştır. Kendisi büyük bir adamdır, gerçek bir yurtseverdir, ama hırs ve endişe kendisini aşırlığa itmştir demek, pek haksızlık olmaz. Endişesi, kısmen Batılı Devletlerden, kısmen de Halifelikten kaynaklanmaktadır. Zira Batı, isterse Türkiye'yi ezebilecek güçtedir; Halifelik ise bütün tutucu güçlerin merkezi durumundadır. Dolayısıyla Halifeliğin İslam dünyasında Türkiye'ye sağladığı prestijden vazgeçilmektedir...Ekonomik bakımdan Türkiye zorluklar içindedir...Sorunların çözümü için yapıcı politika gerekiyor ki bu da Mustafa Kemal'den bekleniyor. Onun da sağlık sorunu ve siyasi zorlukları var. Ankara ile İstanbul arasında süren zıtlasma yüzünden İstanbul basını Ankara'nın her yaptığına karşı çıkıyor, Mustafa Kemal sağlığına kavuşursa ülkeyi toparlayabilir." (No. 167).

15 Ekim 1923 tarihinde, Ankara şehri Türkiye'nin başkenti oldu; eski پایتخت İstanbul bırakıldı. O tarihten beri Ankara, Türkiye Devletinin başkentidir ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasına da değişmez başkent olarak geçmiştir. Cumhuriyet ile Cumhuriyetin başkenti, gün farkıyla yaptırılır.

Türkiye başkentinin İstanbul'dan Ankara'ya kaydırılması, İngiliz diplomasisini çok meşgul etmiştir. Yabancı Elçiler ve Elçilik personeli Devletin başkentinde otururlar, oturmak durumundadırlar; Devletler Hukuku kuralları ve teamül bunu gerektirir. Türkiye'de görevli İngiliz diplomatları ise İstanbul'u bırakıp Ankara'ya taşınmak istememişler, taşınmamak için ellerinden geleni yapmışlardır. Bağımsız bir devletin kendi başkentini seçmesi, o devletin egemenlik hakkıdır, kendi iç işidir. İngilizler bu hukuk kuralını da gözardı ederek Türkiye'nin yeni başkentine karşı açıkça cephe almışlar, başka devletlere de Ankara'yı boykot etmeleri için baskı yapmışlardır. 1923-1925 yıllarında çiçeği burnundaki Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Büyük Britanya ve müttefikleri arasında nota değiş-tokuşu yoluyla bir "Ankara Savaşı" yaşanmıştır. "İkinci Ankara Savaşı". Bilindiği gibi Birinci Ankara Savaşı, 15. Yüzyıl başında Osmanlı Padişahı Yıldırım Beyazıt ile Özbek Hakanı Timur arasında olmuştu. Ondan beş yüzyıl sonra İngiltere ile yapılan İkinci Ankara Savaşını Türkiye kazanmıştır. Bu konudaki İngiliz belgelerini daha önceki yayınlarımda kullanmışım². Bu ciltte de Ankara'nın başkent oluşuyla ilgili bir düzine kadar belge yer almaktadır³.

²Bülal N. Şimşir, *Ankara... Ankara: Bir Başkent'in Doğuşu*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara: 1988; "Ankara'nın Başkent Oluşu", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Cilt VII, Sayı 20, Ankara: Mart 1991, s. 189-222; "Cumhuriyetin Başkenti Ankara", *Uluslararası Konferans: Atatürkçülük ve Modern Türkiye*, Ankara, 22-23 Ekim 1998, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayını, No. 582, Ankara: 1999, s. 475-486; *Ankara'nın Başkent Oluşu*, Ankaralılar Vakfı Yayınları No. 1, Ankara: 2001.

³Bkz. Belge No. 154, 155, 161, 190, 192, 194, 200, 208, 210, 240, 250, 263.

Evet, Ankara'nın başkent oluşu, yabancı elçilikler konusunu gündeme getirdi. Türkiye'ye atanmış ve atanacak olan yabancı diplomatik temsilciler Ankara'ya ne zaman taşınacaklardı? Türkiye'de yeni başkentini seçtiği ve Cumhuriyetin ilan edildiği sırada, Ekim 1923'te, Ankara'da yalnız Afganistan ve Sovyet Rusya Büyükelçilikleri vardı. Bir de Mougin adlı bir Fransız Albay, bir çeşit temsilci sıfatıyla Ankara'da oturuyordu. Öteki yabancı diplomatik temsilcilerinin hemen hepsi İstanbul'daydı. Şimdi bunların Ankara'ya taşınmaları gerekiyordu.

İngiltere, aylar öncesinden işe koyulmuş, başkent Ankara'ya karşı cephe almaya hazırlanmıştı. Bunun ötesinde İngiltere, müttefiklerini de yanına çekip Ankara'ya karşı bir ortak cephe oluşturmağa çalışıyordu. İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Curzon, 24 Ekim 1923 günü Paris, Roma, Washington ve Tokyo Büyükelçilerine bir şifre talimat gönderdi ve Müttefiklerin Ankara'ya karşı anlaşip birlikte hareket etmelerini istedi. İngiltere'nin Türkiye'ye bir Büyükelçi atayacağını, fakat Büyükelçinin Ankara'da değil, İstanbul'da oturacağını bildirdi. "*Majesteleri Hükümeti, her halükarda Ankara'ya bir Büyükelçi göndermemeye kararlıdır*" dedi. Öteki Hükümetlerin de böyle yapmaları için girişimde bulunulmasını istedi.

İstanbul'daki İngiliz Yüksek Komiser Vekili Henderson da İngiltere'nin Ankara'da Büyükelçilik açmayacağını söylüyordu. 3 Kasım 1923 günü Dışişleri Bakanlığının İstanbul temsilcisi (Murahhası) Dr. Adnan Beye (Adıvar), "*Majesteleri Hükümeti, Ankara'da en küçük bir ev bile almak niyetinde değildir*" diyordu. Hendereson, Ankara'ya Büyükelçi gönderilmemesini savunuyor ve 20 Kasım'da Londra'ya da şunları yazıyordu:

"Ben bugünkü (Türkiye) Büyük Millet Meclisinin iki yıllık ömrü olacağını ve Ankara'nın da iki yıl başkent kalacağını sanıyorum...Majesteleri temsilciliklerinin Ankara'ya taşınması Türk Hükümetini ve Mustafa Kemal'i elbette çok memnun edecektir. Ama bu taşınma, Majesteleri Hükümetinin tatsız ve aşağılayıcı bir taviz vermesi anlamına gelir kanısındayım."

İngiliz diplomatı Türkiye Cumhuriyetine iki yıllık ömür biçiyor, birkaç yıl içinde saltanatın tekrar diriltileceğini ve o zaman başkentini yine İstanbul'a taşıacağını ileri sürüyordu. Şubat 1924'te İstanbul'a Ronald Charles Lindsay adında bir İngiliz Elçisi gönderildi. Bu elçi gelir gelmez, ilk iş olarak, Ankara'nın başkent kalamayacağını Londra'ya şöyle rapor etti:

"Başkent işinin nereye varacağı üzerinde kehanette bulunmaktan hiç hoşlanmam, ama şunu cesaretle söyleyebilirim: Günün birinde İstanbul'un tekrar payitaht olacağı kesindir."

Bir diplomatın, görevli olduğu ülkeyle ilgili önemli bir konuda, bu kadar kesin konuşarak kendi Hükümetini yanılınası için, doğrusu, yalnız "cesaret" değil, aynı zamanda epeyce "cehalet" gerekir. Anlaşılan Mr. Lindsay, Mustafa Kemal'i ve Türkleri hiç tanıyamamıştı.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonunda İngiltere'nin Türkiye politikasının iflas etmesini bir türlü işlerine sindirememiş olan megaloman ve ukala İngiliz diplomatları, şimdi başkent Ankara'ya taşınma işini bir prestij meselesi yapıyor ve adeta körükörüne direniyorlardı. Mustafa Kemal'in büyük zaferini İstanbul'da yaşamış olan Nevile Henderson, Londra'da hazırladığı 30 Mart 1924 tarihli raporunda, Ankara'ya Büyükelçi göndermemek gerektiğini şöyle savunuyordu:

"İstanbul'da oturacak Büyükelçinin temsilcisi olarak Ankara'ya bir diplomatik sekreter atanarak Türk Hükümetiyle ilişki sağlanabilir..."

" Sorunun bir başka yönü de vardır. Mustafa Kemal,...kendi prestijini arttırmak için Büyükelçileri Ankara'da oturmaya zorlamak da isteyebilir. Söylemeye gerek yoktur ki (Mustafa) Kemal'in prestijini artıran her şey, bizim prestijimizi azaltır....Temsilciligimiz bir gün Ankara'ya taşınacaksa (Büyükelçilik derecesinden) Elçilik derecesine indirilmelidir."

İngiliz diplomatı, aklı sıra, Ankara'da oturmak durumunda kalacak olan İngiliz Büyükelçisinin rütbesini düşürerek Türkiye'yi ve Mustafa Kemal'i küçük düşürmüş ve bu yolla İngiliz prestijini yükseltmiş olacaklarını düşünüyordu. İşin şaşılacak tarafı şu ki, Mr. Henderson'un bu zavallı raporu, Dışişleri Bakanından ve Başbakan'dan geçerek Kral George'a kadar çıkarılmış ve Kral tarafından da onaylanmıştı. Kral, 5 Nisan 1924 günü, *"İkametgâhı İstanbul'dan Ankara'ya taşınırsa Türkiye'deki İngiliz misyonu Elçilik derecesine indirilecektir"* diye buyurmuştur. (No. 194).

İngiltere, bu buyruk doğrultusunda bir politika benimsedi ve başkent Ankara'ya karşı cephe aldı. Fransa ile İtalya'yı da buna ikna etti. Lozan Barış Antlaşması yürürlüğe girdikten hemen sonra, 1 Mart 1925 günü, İngiliz ve İtalyan Büyükelçileri, İstanbul'daki Türkiye Dışişleri Delegeşi Nusret Bey'e, birer nota verdiler; Fransa Büyükelçisi de aynı doğrultuda sözlü bildirimde bulundu. Her üçü de, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Büyükelçilik düzeyinde yeniden diplomatik ilişki kuracaklarını, ancak Büyükelçilerin (başkent Ankara'da değil) İstanbul'da oturacaklarını resmen Türkiye'ye bildirdiler.

Türkiye Dışişleri Bakanı Dr. Tevfik Rüştü (Aras), 19 Mart'ta cevap verdi. Devletler hukuku ilkelerine ve uluslararası teamüle göre, ülkelerini Türkiye'de temsil edebilmeleri için *"Büyükelçilerin ancak Türkiye'nin başkenti olan Ankara'da resmî ikametgâhları olabilir. Bu genel kuralın Türkiye için değiştirilmesine hiçbir neden ve imkân yoktur"* dedi ve *"bu misyonların mümkün olan en kısa zamanda Ankara'ya taşınacaklarını umarım"* diye ekledi.

Bu cevap üzerine İngiliz Büyükelçisi Lindsay, Ankara'ya karşı sonuna kadar direnmeyi Londra'ya önerdi. Üç Büyük Devlet direnişlerini gevşetmezlerse, öteki devletlerin de yan çizemeyeceklerini, yani Ankara'da Elçilik açamayacaklarını söyledi. *"Şu halde en önemli nokta cephe birliğidir (unity of front)"* dedi.

İngiltere, Fransa ve İtalya'nın direnmeleri sonunda Mustafa Kemal rejiminin devrilebileceğini de ima etti:

"Bu ortak direnişle ne elde edilebilecektir, sorusu akla geliyor...Direnmekle herhalde zaman kazanmış oluruz ve bu tek adam (Mustafa Kemal) rejiminin ne kadar ömrü olduğunu kimse söyleyemez." Diye yazdı.

İngiltere, başkent Ankara'ya karşı "cephe birliğini" ayakta tutabilmek için Fransa ve İngiltere'yi baskı altında tutmağa çalıştı. Kendi başkentini seçmiş olmaktan başka bir "suçu" olmayan Türkiye'yi cezalandırmayı da önerdi: Türk Hükümeti, Büyükelçilerin Ankara'da oturmaları için ısrar ederse, o takdirde Türkiye ile diplomatik ilişkiler elçilik düzeyine indirilecek, yani Türkiye küçük birliği" çattı ve sonra çöktü. İngiltere yalnız kaldı. Daha sonra, Lindsay'ın halefi Büyükelçi Sir George Clerk, inatla direnmenin saçmalığını anlayacak ve gelip başkent Ankara'ya yerleşecekti.

Yakın tarihte başkentlerini değiştiren başka ülkeler de olmuştur. Örneğin Pakistan'ın başkenti Karac'i'den İslamabad'a, Brezilya'nın Rio de Janeiro'dan Brasília'ya, Kazakistan'ın başkenti de Almatı'dan Astana'ya taşınmıştır. Başkent değiştiren devletlerin yeni başkentlerine karşı İngiltere'nin veya başka bir devletin direndiğini veya yeni başkentleri boykot ettiğini hiç duymadık. İngiltere, yalnız Türkiye'ye karşı inatla direnmıştır. Direnişini sürdürmekle saltanatçıları yüreklendireceğini ve gencecik Türkiye Cumhuriyeti rejimini devirebileceğini de düşünebilmiştir! İstanbul'daki İngiliz diplomatları, Türkiye Cumhuriyetine ve Ankara'nın başkentlik statüsüne iki yıllık ömür biçecek kadar körleşebilmişlerdir.

Ankara'da, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı binasının önünde bir yazıt vardır. Orada, mermer üzerine kazınmış, Atatürk'ün şu sözleri okunur:

"Ankara merkez-i hükümettir ve ebediyyen merkez-i hükümet kalacaktır."

1924 yılında söylenmiş olan bu sözler, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin çok yaşamayacağını ve Ankara'nın da başkent olarak kalamayacağını söyleyen Nevile Henderson gibi, Ronald Lindsay gibi cahil ve ukala İngiliz diplomatlarına bir cevap niteliğindedir. Bu sözleriyle Atatürk, iktidara gelirlerse başkenti Ankara'dan İstanbul'a taşımayı hayal etmiş olan bazı Terakkiperver Fırka kodamanlarına da dolaylı bir cevap vermiş, kimse ham hayal kurmasın, bilinsin ki Ankara sonsuza kadar Türkiye'nin başkenti kalacaktır, demek istemiştir.

*

Halifelik kaldırılması başlı başına çok önemli bir olaydır ve İngilizlerce yakından izlenmiştir. Bu konudaki İngiliz belgelerinin bir bölümümü daha ön-

ceki yayımlarımda kullanmıştım⁴. Bu ciltte de Halifelikle ilgili epeyce belge bulunacaktır⁵.

Britanya İmparatorluğu büyük Müslüman kitlelerini de kapsıyordu. Çünkü Pakistan, Hindistan, Bangladeş, Malezya gibi ülkeler hep İngiliz sömürgeleriydi. Bu nedenle İngiltere, kendisini "dünyanın en büyük İslam devleti" sayıyor ve dolayısıyla Halifelik konusuyla yakından ilgileniyordu.

Birinci Dünya Savaşının başlarında, 31 Ekim 1914 günü, Kahire'deki İngiliz Temsilcisi Lord Kitchener, Mekke Şerifi Hüseyin'e bir mesaj göndererek, "Gerçek Arap soyundan birinin Mekke veya Medine'de Halifeliği üzerine almasını" salık verdi. O tarihte İngilizler, Arapları Osmanlı devletine karşı ayaklandırma hazırlığı içindeydiler. Şerif Hüseyin'i can damarından yakalamışlardı, ona, başka vaatler yanında, Halifeliği de teklif etmişlerdi. Şerif Hüseyin hem Arap soyundandı hem de Peygamber ahfadından. Yani Halifeliği üstlenmesi için biçilmiş kaftandı. Nasıl Hazreti Muhammed Arap soyundan idiyse, Halife de "gerçek Arap soyundan" olmalı, İslamın kutsal topraklarında, yani Mekke veya Medine'de oturmalıydı; kozmopolit İstanbul'da değil!

1915 yılında İngilizler, Şerif Hüseyin'e Halifelik sözlerini yinelediler. Sir H. Mc Mahon, 30 Ağustos 1915 günü Şerif Hüseyin'e bir mektup gönderdi ve "Lord Kitchener'in mesajını teyid ederiz. Gerçek Arap soyundan birinin Halifeliği üzerine almasının İngiltere Hükümetince memnuniyetle karşılanacağını bir defa daha belirtiriz" dedi. Düşmanlarımız, Halifeliği Türklere karşı bir silah olarak kullanıyorlardı.

Türk askeri, "İslamın kılıcı" olarak Mekke ve Medine'yi savunmağa çalışırken, İslam kardeşlerinin kılıcını sırtından yedi. Halife olmak emeline kapılan Mekke Şerifi Hüseyin, Osmanlı Halife-Padişahına karşı ayaklandı ve Türk askerini arkadan vurdu. 1 Kasım 1916 günü, "Kible ulemanın artık Türk halifeyi tanımamaya karar verdiğini" açıkladı.

Ekim 1918'de Mustafa Kemal, 7. Ordu Komutanı olarak Suriye'den çekilirken hazin bir manzarayla karşılaştı: İngiliz uçakları Türk askerinin üzerinde uçurken Halep'te evlerden de çekilmekte olan Türk askerinin üzerine ateş ediliyordu. Ateş edenler, Osmanlı vatandaşı Araplardı. Halifenin cihat çağrısı Halep'te bile etkisiz ve geçersizdi. Arap ayaklanması Anadolu kapısına kadar uzanmış ve savaşı İngilizler kazanmıştı.

Halifelik entrikaları İstiklal Savaşında da devam etti. Ankara Hükümetine karşı İngilizlerin de teşvikiyle Anadolu'da çıkarılan Anzavur ayaklanması,

⁴Bilâl N. Şingir, "Halifesiz Efs Yılı", Cumhuriyet gazetesi, 18 Mart- 4 Nisan 1974 ve "Halifesiz 75 Yılı", Mülkiye Dergisi, Ankara: Mart-Nisan 1999, Cilt XXIII, s. 7-28.

⁵Bkz. Belge No: 120, 153, 157, 158, 159/1-3, 163, 165, 167, 174, 177, 179, 182, 184, 185, 186, 189.

Kuvayı İnzibatiye ayaklanması gibi çeşitli isyanlarda Halifelik silahı Türkiye'nin aleyhine sık sık kullanılmıştır.

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 1 Kasım 1922 günü Saltanatı kaldırdı. Hakimiyet, tek elde, TBMM'de toplandı. Bu Meclisin üstünde başka hiçbir kuvvet olamazdı. Saltanatın kaldırılması, din ve dünya işlerinin birbirinden ayrılması demekti. O zamana kadar Osmanlı Padişahı, hem devlet otoritesini, hem de din otoritesini temsil ediyordu. Hem Padişah, hem Halifeydi. Bu kararla Halifenin Padişahlık sıfatı kaldırılmış ve Vahdettin yalnız Halife olarak bırakılmıştı. Halifelikle Saltanatın birbirinden ayrılması ve Saltanatın kaldırılması kararı, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin Halifelik konusunda karar vermeye yetkili olduğunu kanıtladı ve bu karar, daha sonraki kararlar için bir emsal oldu.

Vahdettin, Padişahlık sıfatı kaldırıldıktan ve yalnız Halife sıfatıyla bırakıldıktan sonra, ancak bir defa Cuma selâmlığı töreninde görüldü. İkinci selâmlık törenini göze alamadı. İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Rumbold, 10 Kasım 1922 günü, "Ali Kemal'in öldürülmesi üzerine, Padişahın güvenliği konusu beni düşündürüyor... Müttefik Generaller, Padişahın can güvenliğini sağlamanın güç olduğunu belirtiyorlar. İtalyan Generali sorumluluğu paylaşmak istemiyor" diyordu. Ve halife Vahdettin, 17 Kasım 1917 günü İngilizlere sığındı ve "Malaya" adlı İngiliz zırhlısına binip yurt dışına kaçtı. TBMM, hem kaçan Vahdettin'in Halifelik sıfatını kaldırdı, hem de onun yerine Şehzade Abdülmecid Efendi'yi Halife seçti. 24 Kasım günü törenle Halifelik tahuna çıkan Abdülmecid Efendi, birçok ülkede Halife olarak tanındı ve hutbelerde artık onun adı zikredilmeğe başlandı. Yeni Halife Hicaz gibi bazı yerlerde ise tanınmadı.

Lozan Konferansı devam ederken, Mayıs 1923'te, Halife Abdülmecid, ya-
veri Edip Beyi Ankara'ya gönderdi, Halifelığının bütün İslam ülkelerince tanınmasını sağlamak amacıyla, İslam ülkelerinden heyetler davet edilmesini istedi. Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa, o sırada heyetler davet etmeyi uygun bulmamış ve barıştan sonra Hilafet sorununu da çözeceğini söylemişti (No. 120).

Abdülmecid Efendinin Halife seçilmesinden sonra Halifelik entrikaları durmadı. Hindistan'daki İsmaililerin başı Aga Han ile Emir Ali, 24 Kasım 1923 günü Başvekil İsmet Paşa'ya bir mektup gönderdiler ve Halifenin nüfuz ve şerefının Papanın nüfuz ve şerefi düzeyine çıkarılmasını istediler. Yani bir ayını bile dolduramamış taptaze Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin içişlerine karışarak Halifeye siyasi bir statü istemeye kalkıştılar. Ve mektup İsmet Paşa'nın eline geçmeden muhalif İstanbul gazetelerinde yayınlandı.

Aralık 1923'te, Filistin Araplarının üç lideri Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya mektuplar yazmış, onlar da Halifelik makamının itibarının korunmasını istemişlerdir. Bu Araplar daha da ileri giderek, yoksa İslam dünyasının Halifelik makamına Kral Hüseyin gibi başka bir Halife adayı çıkaracağını söylemişlerdir. Mısır ulemasından da benzer "uyarılar" gelmiştir.

Arkasından Halife Abdülmecid Efendi, bütçesinin artırılması, "Hazine-i Hilafet" vs. hakkında bazı isteklerde bulunmak üzere, Başkâtibini Ankara'ya göndermek istedi. Bunun üzerine Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa, 22 Ocak 1924 günü Başvekil İsmet Paşa'ya şunları yazdı:

"...Halife ve bütün cihan, kati olarak bilmek lâzımdır ki, mevcut ve mahfuz olan Halife ve Halife makamının, hakikatte, ne dinen ne de siyaseten hiçbir mâna ve hikmet-i mevcudiyeti yoktur. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti safasatlarla mevcudiyetini, istiklâlini tehlikeye maruz bırakamaz. Hilâfet makamı, bizce en nihayet tariht bir hâtura olmaktan fazla bir ehemmiyeti haiz olamaz..."

Hicaz Kralı Hüseyin Halifelik iddialarını sürdürüyordu. Bazı esrarengiz İngiliz subaylarının yardımıyla, Ürdün'de veya Irak'ta bir Halifelik Kongresi toplanmağa çalışılıyordu. Bu kongreye tahundan indirilmiş ve yurt dışına kaçmış olan Vahdettin'in de katılacağı söyleniyordu. Bu hareketin arkasında İngiltere'nin bulunduğu tahmin ediliyordu. Ankara merak ve kuşku içindeydi. Ne oluyordu? İngilizler 1915'lerde Arapları Osmanlı Devletine karşı ayaklandırmak için Halifelik silahını kullanmışlardı. Şimdi aynı silahı gencecik Türkiye Cumhuriyetine karşı da mı kullanacaklardı?

2 Ocak 1924 günü İzmir'e girmiş olan Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal, orada 4 Şubat günü İstanbul gazeteleri başyazarlarını kabul etti ve ertesi gün onlara akşam yemeği verdi. Gazetecilerden sonra 11 Şubat günü Başbakan İsmet Paşa, Genelkurmay Başkanı Mareşal Fevzi Paşa, yardımcısı Asım Paşa ve bütün ordu komutanları İzmir'e gittiler. Aynı gün eski Mısır Hidivi Abbas Hilmi Paşa yatıyla İzmir'e geldi ve Cumhurbaşkanı ile görüştü. 15-20 Şubat günleri İzmir'de "Harp Oyunları" görünümü altında komutanlarla gizli toplantılar yapıldı. Bu toplantılar Halifeliğin kaldırılmasına hazırlık toplantılarıydı. İstanbul'daki İngiliz diplomatları toplantıları pek merak ettiler, fakat burada neler konuşulduğunu tam olarak öğrenemediler. İstanbul'a yeni gelmiş olan İngiliz diplomatik temsilcisi Lindsay - ki henüz Elçi unvanı taşımıyordu - , 20 Şubat günlü raporunda, "Mustafa Kemal Paşa, yeni atılımlar için ordunun desteğinden emin olmak istiyor. Halifeyi daha zayıf düşürmeyi ve meselâ onu İstanbul'dan çıkarmayı düşünüyor olabilir" dedi (No. 179). Ama Halifenin İstanbul'dan çıkarılınca Bursa'ya gönderileceğini sanıyordu.

İngiliz temsilcisi Lindsay, 12 Şubat günü İstanbul'a gelmişti. Gelir gelmez, Halife Abdülmecid Efendiyi ziyaret etmek istemişti. 25 Şubat günü Halife ile görüşme isteğini yineledi. Kendisine, "*Halifelik konusunda bazı değişiklikler düşünülmekte olduğu, şu sıralarda siyasi kişilerin Halifeyi ziyaretlerinin hoş karşılanmayacağı*" yolunda cevap verildi. Bu cevap üzerine Lindsay Londra'ya, "*Halifenin Anadolu'ya sürülebileceğini ve statüsünün de küçültülebileceğini*" yazdı. İngiltere Dışişleri Türkiye masası müdürü Osborne da yazının altına not düştü: "*Mustafa Kemal, bahtsız halifeyi daha da aşırı Vatikanlaştırmayı düşünüyor galiba*" dedi.

"Varılanlaştırma", Halifelige, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti içinde bir "Devlet" statüsü vermek demek olurdu. İtalya Krallığı içindeki "Vatikan" Devleti gibi. Yani devlet içinde devlet! Oysa Mustafa Kemal ve yakın arkadaşları, ulusal egemenliği Halife ile paylaşmağa hiç niyeti değillerdi. Paylaşmak veya devlet içinde devlete razı olmak şöyle dursun, devletin bütünlüğünü, bölünmezliğini gölgeleyebilecek her kalıntıyı silip süpürmek kararındaydılar. İsmet Paşa, İzmir toplantısından döndükten sonra, 27 Şubat 1924 günü, Türkiye'nin dış temsilciliklerine şifre telgrafla şu bilgiyi verdi:

"Bütçe müzakeresi esnasında Cumhuriyetin bircümle esasat-ı medeniyeye istinat ederek seri ıslahata teşebbüs etmesi lüzumu Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinde hararetle mevzuubahs ve müzakere edilmiştir... Hilâfet esasen hükûmet demek olup Cumhuriyet idaresinde ise bir makam-ı Hilâfetin sebebi dahi kalmamış olduğu iddia ve Hanedanın Türkiye'de ikameti ebediyyen memnu (yasak) olması ve evlâd-ı zükûrun (erkek çocukların) derhal ihraçları dermeyer ediliyor. Kezalik Erkânı Harbiye-yi Umumiye ve Şeriye Vekâletlerinin Kabineden ihracı ve şeriye umurunun (din işlerinin) bir Başmüftrülüğe tevdi mevzuu bahistir. Memlekette terbiye ve tedrisat-ı umumiyenin tevhid-i eğitimin birleştirilmesi dahi iltizamı mütalea olunuyor. Reisicumhurun sene başı nutkunda (mali yılbaş, yani 1 Mart günü yapacağı konuşma kastediliyor) bu esasata temas edilecektir. Meclisin birkaç güne kadar bir karar-ı katiye (kesin karara) varması memuldür. Şimdilik mahrem tutulmak üzere arz-ı malûmat ederim. - İSMET."

Bu gizli telgrafın Türkiye'nin dış temsilciliklerine çekildiği gün, eski Maliye Nazırı Cavit Bey, haberi İngilizlere yetiştirdi. İstanbul'daki İngiliz diplomatik temsilcisi Lindsay, 27 Şubat 1924 günü Londra'ya özetle şunları yazdı:

"Yeni Anayasa taslağında Halifeye yer verilmediğini yazmıştım. Cavit Bey, Ankara liderlerinin Halifeyi kovacaklarını Sir Adam Block'a haber vermiş. Başka bir kaynaktan da Mustafa Kemal'in Halifeyi ve bütün ailesini sınır dışı edeceğini öğrendim. İzmir'de gazetecilerle ve paşalarla yapılan toplantılar buna hazırlıkmış. 'Laik'lik eğilimi gitgide daha fazla ortaya çıkıyor. Cumhuriyet, kendisini dini kavramlardan arındırıyor. Basın, Halifelğin gereksiz bir yük olduğunu aruk açık açık yazıyor. Çağdaş bir cumhuriyette şeriat mahkemelerine ve dini okullara da yer olmadığı söyleniyor. Mustafa Kemal, 1 Martta yapacağı konuşmada herhalde cumhuriyetin laik özelliğini vurgulayacaktır. İsmet Paşa, paşalarla İzmir'de yapılan toplantıda, Halife sınır dışı edilince, Türkiye'nin Panislamizm politikası izlediği yolundaki İngiliz kuşkularının da azalacağı umudunda olduğunu söylemiş" (No. 182).

Halifeligi kaldıracak kanun TBMM'de görüşölmeğe başlandı. Bazı kim-seler, bu makamu bir siyasi "kuvvet" veya koz olarak elde tutmak gerektiğini söylüyorlardı. Başvekil İsmet Paşa, öyle düşünenlere özetle (ve sadeleştirilmiş olarak) şu cevabı verdi:

"Halifelik konusunun dinî ve siyaset iki yönü vardır. Dinî bakımdan, Halifelik kalkınca hiçbir eksiklik, hiçbir boşluk hissedilmeyecektir. Din hükümleri yine uygulanacaktır. Zaten dört yıldır Anadolu'da Halifelîğin hiçbir olumlu etkisi olmamıştı...

"Kurtuluş Savaşını 'Halifelîği kurtaracağız' sözleriyle yaptığımızı söyleyenler çıkmıştı. 'Bu sözler, yatan şehitlere hürmetsizlik olur.' Milletler, kutsal ülkülerle, yüce ülkülerle kurtuluş savaşı yaparlar; böyle boş sözlerle değil.

" 'İstanbul, Halifelîğin merkezi olduğu için Türklere bırakıldı' diyenler oldu. Gerçi İstanbul Türklere bırakıldı. Ama, Halifelîğin merkezi olduğu için değil; Türk askeri Yunan ordularıyla Halife ordularına karşı başarı kazandı için Türklere bırakıldı.

" Halifelîğin dış politikada yararı olacağını ileri sürenler oldu. Halifelik bütün devletlere hakim mi olacaktır? Bağımsız olan devletlerin Halifelik makamına bağlılıkları nedir ki?... Makam-ı Hilafet bizdedir diye diğer milletlere bir vazife-yi siyasiye mi tevdi edeceğiz? Bu kadar tecrübelerden sonra bunu nasıl ümit edebiliriz? Vezâif-i hariciyemizde Hariciye Vekâletinden başka bir makamın alâkadar olmasını nasıl kabul edebiliriz? "

İsmet Paşa sözlerini şöyle düğümledi:

"Türkiye'yi dahili ve harici siyasetinde iki başlı olmaktan kurtarmak için makam-ı Hilafeti ilga etmelidir... Ahkâm-ı diniye ile mutabık olan bu karar Türk milleti için vesile-i saadet olacaktır."

Ve 3 Mart 1924 günü Halifelik kaldırıldı. Ertesi gün Hariciye Vekili İsmet Paşa, Halifelîğin kaldırıldığını, Halifenin sınır dışı edilmek üzere olduğunu şu telgrafla Türkiye'nin dış temsilciliklerine bildirdi:

"Hilafetin İlga Kanunu Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin tasdikına iktiran etmiştir. Sabık Halife ile azası Bern'e gitmek üzere bu akşam hareket edecektir. Sakıt Hanedanın diğer mensubini on gün zarfında gideceklerdir."

İstanbul'da İngiliz diplomatik temsilci vekili Henderson, Halifelîğin kaldırıldığını 5 Mart 1924 günü Londra'ya özetle şöyle rapor etti:

"Halifelîğin kaldırılması, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin laik karakterinin vurgulanması ve ordunun politikadan ayrılması, yani 'inkılabın tamamlanması', son hafta içinde kamuoyunun dikkatini en fazla çeken gelişmeler oldu. Biraz açayım: Son günlerde İstanbul basınında Halife aleyhindeki yayınlar çoğalmıştı. Kamuoyunun önemli gelişmelere hazırlandığı anlaşıyordu. 'Radikal reformlar' sözleri günün parolasıydı. 26 Şubat'ta Mustafa Kemal ve İsmet Paşa, Şeriye Vekili Mustafa Fevzi Efendi ile bir toplantı yaptılar. 29 Şubat gecesi Cumhurbaşkanlığı köşkünde bir toplantı yapıldı. Mustafa Kemal'in 1 Mart günlü konuşması Başkanlık Mesajı karakterindeydi. 2 Mart günü Halk Partisi tekrar toplandı. Dört kanun tasarısı hazırlandı. Bunlar, Halifelîğin kaldırılması, Şeriye Vekâletinin kaldırılması, millî eğitimin birleştirilmesi (Tevhid-i Tedrisat), Genelkurmay

Başkanının Kabine dışında bırakılması idi. Parti toplantısında bu kanun tasarıları bütün gün tartışıldı ve pek az değişiklikle kabul edildi. Parti toplantısında bir ara Mustafa Kemal'in kendisi, prenseslerin sınır dışı edilmemelerini önerdi, ama öneri kabul edilmedi. Türkiye'ye altı yüzyıl hükmetmiş olan Osmanlı hanedanına Türkiye'yi terk etmesi için 10 günlük süre tanındı. Halifenin kendisine ise yola çıkması için sadece birkaç saatlik zaman verildi. 4 Şubat sabahı (ne gariptir ki Miraç tatiline rastlamıştır) Halife ve ailesi otomobille alelacele Çatalca istasyonuna götürülmüş, oradan Simplon ekspres trenine bindirilip İsviçre'ye gönderilmiştir. Ankara Hükümetinin bu cüretkâr kararının etkileri hakkında bir şey söylemek için henüz erkendir. İçerde açık bir muhalefet görülmemiştir. Halife ve kalabalık yakınlarının yurt dışında geçimleri konusu ciddi bir sorun olacaktır. Zira kanun yalnız yol paralarından bahsediyor." (No. 184).

12 Mart günü İngiliz diplomatik temsilcisi Lindsay, yukarıdaki raporu şöyle tamamladı:

"Osmanlı Hanedanı üyelerinin sınırdışı edilmeleri tamamlandı. Artık bu aileden Türkiye'de kimse kalmadı. Halifenin kardeşi Şehzade Seyfeddin Mısır'a gitmek istedi. Türk makamları da bir şehzadeyle eşinin Mısır'a gitmek istediklerini bildirdi. Mısır Hükümeti, Halifenin yakınlarını Mısır'a kabul edemeyecekleri yolunda cevap verdi. Ben bir şehzadeyi İngiliz makamlarına tavsiye ettim, kendisine bir tavsiye mektubu verdim. Türk makamları Halifenin sınırdışı edilmesini etkin biçimde tamamladılar. Halifenin eline "Abdül Aziz oğlu Abdülmecid" diye bir pasaport verdiler. Bunun diplomatik vizelik olmadığını da İtalya Büyükelçiliğine bildirmişler. 7 Mart günü Cuma namazı hutbelerinde Halifenin adının zikredilmemesi için önlem alındı. Söylendiğine göre Topkapı sarayı müze yapılacak. Yıldız ve Dolmabahçe sarayları hakkında bir karar alınmamış. Emaneti mukaddese hakkında bir haber yok. Kral Hüseyin'in Halifeliliğini ilanıya ilgili haberlere basında genişçe yer verildi, ama bu konuda bir yorum yapılmadı... Halifelikten sonra Patrikhanelerin ve Hahambaşılığın da lağvedilmesi yönünde basında kampanya var ama bu kampanyanın arkasında resmi destek yok..." (No. 189).

4 Mart günü Doğu Ekspresiyle sınırdışı edilen son Halife Abdülmecid Efendinin yanında iki karısı, oğlu, kızı ve beş kişi daha vardı. Bu on kişilik kafiye 7 Mart günü İsviçre'ye vardı; Bern'e değil, Leman gölü kıyısındaki Territet kasabasına indi. Orada "Grand Hôtel" e yerleşti. Abdülmecid Efendi, otelin terasına çıkıp Fransız *L'illustration* dergisi fotoğrafçısına poz verdi...

Halifeliliğin kaldırıldığı duyulur duyulmaz, İngiliz basınında büyük bir yaygara koptu. En büyük gürültüyü çıkaran da Lloyd George'un yayın organı *Daily Telegraph* oldu. Bu gazete, Londra Mümessili Yusuf Kemal Bey'in ifadesiyle, "minelkadim Türk aleyhtarı" idi. Türkiye'ye ateş püskürdü. Sanki Mustafa Kemal, Halifeliliği değil de Canterbury Başpiskoposluğunu kaldırmıştı. İngiliz gazetesi küplere binmişti. Sipsivri diliyle Türklere verip veriyordu: "6 mil-

yonluk Türkiye, Halifelik sayesinde Büyük Devletler arasında sayılıyordu. Bundan sonra bu devlet, artık 'üçüncü sınıf bir Tatar devletiği' derekesine düşecekti. Mustafa Kemal, 'minyatür bir Napoléon' olarak kalacaktı. Anadolu halkına, 'Ben bir Müslümanım' demek yerine, 'Ben bir Türküm' dedirtmeğe çalışıyorlardı. Ama dedirtebilecekler miydi bakalım..."

Halifelik konusunda İngiliz basınında çıkmış olan yazılara bu ciltte yer verilmedi. Çünkü Halifeliğin kaldırılmasıyla ilgili olarak İngiliz gazetelerinde ve dünya basınında çıkmış olan yazılar, *Dış Basında Atatürk ve Türk Devrimi. Bir Laik Cumhuriyet Doğuyor* başlıklı kitabımda zaten toplanmış bulunuyor. Kitap, Atatürk'ün doğumunun 100. yılında, Türk Tarih Kurumu tarafından yayımlanmıştı⁶. Çok kapsamlı ve yabancı dilde olan bu kitabımdan seçme bazı yazılar Türkçeleştirildi ve Türk Tarih Kurumu Başkanlığının izniyle ayrıca yayımlandı⁷. Arzu eden araştırmacı ve okuyucular o kitaplara da başvurabilirler.

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Halifeliğin kaldırılmasının üzerinden bir yıl bile geçmeden, Şubat 1925'te Doğu Anadolu'da Şeyh Said ayaklanması patlak verdi. Bu ayaklanma, Türkiye'de laikleşme hareketine ve Halifeliğin kaldırılmasına karşı bir başkaldırıydı. Bazı İngiliz Belgelerinde bir "Kürt ayaklanması" olarak da geçmektedir. İngiltere, öteden beri Kürtlerle ilgilenmiş bir ülkedir. Sèvres antlaşmasının baş mimarıydı ve bu antlaşmada Kürtlerle ilgili hükümler de vardı. O dönemde İngiltere, mandater devlet sıfatıyla Irak'ın yönetimine katılıyordu ve orada Kürtlerle içiçeydi. 1925 yılında İngiltere ile Musul kavgamız devam ediyordu. Sonra, Kürtlerin yaşadığı bölge bir petrol bölgesiydi ve İngiltere, petrol çıkan her bölgeye ilgi duymaktaydı. Dolayısıyla İngiliz diplomasisi Kürtleri her zaman yakında izlemiştir. Türkiye'de görülen Şeyh Said ayaklanması gibi olayları İngiliz diplomatları acaba nasıl izleyip yorumlamışlardı? Bu soru zihnimi kurcalamış ve bana araştırılmaya değer görünmüştü. Londra'da maiyette Başkonsolos olarak görevli olduğum 1970-1974 yıllarında İngiliz diplomatik arşivlerinde Şeyh Said, Ağrı ve Dersim ayaklanmaları hakkında araştırmalar yapmış ve 1975 yılında bir kitap yayımlamıştım. Daha sonra kitabın ikinci baskısı da yapılmış idi⁸.

O kitapta yer alan İngiliz belgelerini burada tekrarlamadık. Ancak bu ciltte de Şeyh Said ayaklanması ile ilgili bazı belgeler bulunmaktadır. Bunlar daha ziyade içlerinde Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in adı geçen belgeler-

⁶Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Dış Basında Atatürk ve Türk Devrimi. Cilt 1 : 1922-1924, Bir Laik Cumhuriyet Doğuyor / Presse Étrangère sur Atatürk et La Révolution Turque. Volume 1 : 1922-1924. La Naissance d'une République Laïque*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını, Ankara: 1981.

⁷Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Dış Basında Laik Cumhuriyetin Doğuşu*, Türkçesi Cüneyt Akalın, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara: 1999.

⁸Bilâl N. Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye'de "Kürt Sorunu" (1924-1938) : Şeyh Said, Ağrı ve Dersim Ayaklanmaları*, İkinci basım, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara: 1991.

dir. 1924-1925 yıllarında Gazi Mustafa Kemal'e ve kurduğu rejimine karşı İstanbul'da odaklanan muhalefet hareketi ile Doğudaki ayaklanma kıpırdanışları eş zamanlıdır ve İngiliz belgelerine öyle yansımıştır. Yani Türkiye'deki muhalefet hareketleri ve özellikle Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası ile Şeyh Said ayaklanması birlikte değerlendirilmiştir.

İstanbul'daki İngiliz Maslahatgüzarı Henderson, daha Temmuz 1924'te eski İttihatçıların kalıntılarıyla doğudaki Kürt guruplarının Ankara Hükümeti aleyhine gizliden gizliye çalışuklarını haber veriyordu. Eylül 1924'te doğudaki kıpırdanışların bariz bir hal aldığını yazıyordu. Ekim sonunda İngiliz diplomatik temsilcisi Lindsay, "Muhalefet henüz kendisini toparlayıp partileşemedi. Muhalefetin liderleri olarak Rauf (Orbay), İsmail Canpolat ve Dr. Adnan (Adivar) gösteriliyor; bu isimlere son zamanlarda Kâzım Karabekir de eklendi. Yakında sansasyonel gelişmeler olacağı söylentileri var. Mustafa Kemal duruma hakim görünüyor." diyordu. Londra'da bu rapora "Mustafa Kemal rejimine karşı henüz ciddi bir tehdit belirtisi yok" diye not düşülmüştü (No. 225).

4 Kasım'da Lindsay şunları yazıyordu:

"TBMM on beş gün önce toplanmıştı ama, Mustafa Kemal, 1 Kasım günlük konuşmasıyla yasama döneminin resmi açılışını yaptı. Konuşmasında, yapılan işleri övdü, bazı güçlükler bulunduğunu da itiraf etti... Meclis çalışmalarına devam ediyor. Fethi (Okyar) Bey Meclis Başkanı seçildi. Kâzım Karabekir, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), Cafer Tayyar (Eğilmez) ve Cevat (Çobanlı) Paşalar ordudan istifa edip Mecliste yerlerini aldılar. Fevzi (Çakmak), Fahrettin (Altay), İzzeddin (Çalışlar), Ali Hikmet (Ayerdem) ve Şükrü Naili (Gökberk) Paşalar ise askerlik mesleğini tercih edip mebusluktan istifa ettiler..."

İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nda bu defa şu yorum yapılmıştı:

"Türk generallerin politika sahnesinde boy göstermeleri, (Mustafa) Kemal'e ve İsmet'e (Paşa) sıkıntı yaratabilir" (No. 226).

Politikayı seçen bu paşalar ile Rauf Orbay ve Dr. Adnan (Adivar) gibi bazı milletvekilleri 9 Kasım'da Halk Partisinden istifa ettiler ve 17 Kasım'da Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkasını kurdular. Bunun başına Kâzım Karabekir Paşa geçti. Bu yeni partinin programında, sanki saatli bomba gibi, "Fırka efkâr ve itikad-ı diniyeye hürmetkârdır" kaydı vardı. 21 Kasım'da İsmet Paşa, yorgunluk nedeniyle, Başbakanlıktan istifa etti. Yeni kabineyi Fethi (Okyar) kurdu. İngiliz diplomatik temsilcisi Lindsay, 24 Kasım'da şunları yazdı:

"Yeni kurulan Terakkiperver Partiden kimse Hükümete alınmamıştır. Ama Bakanlardan üçü son zamanlarda Halk Partisine kafa tutmuş ve istifalarına ramak kalmış kimselerdir. Yeni Kabine bir geçiş Kabinesidir. Resmen kurulmuş olan Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, etkili olabilmek için çaba harcıyor. Ancak şimdiye kadar sadece 30 kadar milletvekili Halk Partisinden istifa etmiştir. Yeni parti karakter bakımından muhafazakârdır. Halk Partisinden ayrılmış olan

mebuslar çok çeşitli kategorilerdendir. İçlerinde, "dini prensiplerim Halk Fırkasında kalmama manidir" diyen Erzurumlu Hoca gibi Hilâfetçiler vardır. Üçüncü bir hareket de vardır ve bunlar mutlakîyetçi eğilimde olan kimselerdir. Rauf Bey Hilâfetçilikle suçlanmaktadır..." (No. 230).

O günlerde Cumhurbaşkanı Mustafa Kemal Paşa, İngiliz "Times" gazetesine verdiği demeçte şunları söylüyor:

"Terakkiperverlerin samimiyetinden emin değilim. Yayınlanan programlarının onların gerçek amaçlarını ve ihtiraslarını ifade ettiğine kani değilim. Rauf Beyin Mecliste Hilâfet hakkında söylediklerini, Cumhuriyetin ilanı üzerine İstanbul basınına verdiği demeci unutamıyorum. Kâzım Karabekir Paşa da Cumhuriyetin ilanından hoşlanmadığını gizleme zahmetine girmemişti. Yeni Partinin liderlerinden biri olan Sabit Bey de Cumhuriyetin ilanının aceleye getirilmesini Mecliste protesto etmiş ve 'Neden iki ayağımızı bir pabuca sokuyorsunuz?' diye sormuştu... Cumhuriyetçi olduklarını söylüyorlar. Biz de cumhuriyetçiyiz... Öyleyse neden bizi terk ettiler?..." (No. 231/1).

Atatürk, bu görüşlerini Nutuk'ta ayrıntılarıyla tekrarlar ve Şeyh Sait ayaklanmasının başlıca sebepleri arasında Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkasının din propagandasını da sayar. Şöyle der:

"Yeni fırka, efkâr ve itikad-ı diniyeye hürmetkârdır perdesi alunda; biz hilâfeti tekrar isteriz; biz yeni kanunlar istemeyiz; bize meclle kâfidir; medreseler, tekkeler, cahil softalar, şeyhler, müridler, biz sizi himaye edeceğiz; bizimle beraber olunuz. Çünkü Mustafa Kemal'in fırkası hilâfeti lâğvetti. İslâmiyeti rahnedar ediyor. Sizi gâvur yapacak, size şapka geydirecektir diye bağırıyor muydu? ...

"Bu fırka, memlekette suikastçilerin, mürtecilerin tahassungâhı, ümid-i istinadı oldu; harici düşmanların, yeni Türk devletini, taze Türk Cumhuriyetini mahvetmeğe matuf planlarını suhulet-i tatbikatına hizmete çalıştı. Tarih; (mürettep, umumî, irtical) olan Şark İsyanı esbabını, tetkik ve taharri ettiği zaman, onun mühim ve bariz sebepleri meyanında Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası'nın dinî mevaidini ve şarka gönderdikleri kâtib-i mesullerinin teşkilât ve tahrikatını bulacaktır."

Şeyh Sait ayaklanması, 13 Şubat 1925 günü, Bingöl (Genç) ilinin Ergani ilçesine bağlı Piran köyünde patlayan silahlarla başladı. On gün sonra İngiliz temsilcisi Lindsay, "Hareket, başlangıçta gösterildiğinden daha ciddidir. Bir habere göre Şeyh Said, Türkiye'de şeriatı yerleştirmek için ilahl bir misyonu olduğunu ileri sürüyormuş. İsmet Paşa Ankara'ya gitti..." diye yazıyor. Ertesi gün de özette şunları bildiriyor:

"İsmet Paşa 21 Şubat'ta Ankara'ya vardı ve istasyonda Cumhurbaşkanı tarafından karşılandı. Başbakan Fethi Bey karşılamada yoktu. Güney-Dogu Anadolu'da sıkıyönetim ilan edildi. Şeyh Sait hareketi büyük boyutlara ulaştı. Ba-

sın, ayaklanmada yabancı entrikaların (İngiltere kastediliyor) rolünden bahsediyor, ama hareketin dini duygulardan kaynaklandığı açıktır. Bu, bugünkü Türk rejiminin laik özelliğine karşı ilk açık harektir..." (No. 241).

Lindsay, 3 Mart'ta da şunları rapor ediyor:

"Hareket dinidir ve cumhuriyete karşıdır. Halen Berut'ta sürgünde yaşayan Abdülhamid'in oğlu Selim Efendi, asiler tarafından Padişah ilan edilecekmiş. Vatana ihanet kanununda değişiklik yapıldı. Dini duyguları siyasi amaçlarla istismar edenlerin iki yıldan idama kadar varan cezalara çarptırılması öngörü-lüyor...Durum, Mustafa Kemal ile İsmet Paşa'nın kontrolü altındadır. İlimli tutumda olan Fethi Bey ise 2 Mart'ta Halk Partisi içinde sert baskılara uğradı ve istifa etmek zorunda kaldı. Terakkiperver Partiden de taşra teşkilatını kapatması isteniyor. Bu akşam İsmet Paşa'nın Kabinayı kurmakta olduğu ve Gazi'nin istediği politikayı uygulamaya hazırlandığı bildiriliyor." (No. 245).

Bir hafta sonra da Lindsay şu bilgileri Londra'ya sunuyor:

"4 Mart sabahı Halk Partisi meclisi yine toplandı ve yeni Hükümetin programını onayladı. İsmet Paşa, günün ihtiyaçları için iki önlem alındığını açıkladı: Biri Takrir-i Sükun kanununun çıkarılması, diğeri iki İstiklâl Mahkemesinin kurulması. Terakkiperver Parti her iki önleme de şiddetle karşı çıktı ama nafiye. Her iki önlem aynı gün kanunlaşa. İstiklâl Mahkemelerinden biri Ankara'da kuruluyor, diğeri isyan bölgesinde çalışacaktır. Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu, iki yıl boyunca Hükümete istediğini yapma yetkisi veriyor..." (No. 247)

Bu arada Ankara'ya gidip 16 Mart günü Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal'e güven mektubunu sunan İngiliz Büyükelçisi Lindsay, eski Başbakan Fethi Beyin (Okyar) Paris'e Büyükelçi atandığını ve bu atanmadan dolayı memnun olduğunu rapor ediyor. Londra'da, "Fethi Bey Ankara'dan uzaklaşmakla akıllılık etmektedir; zira Kürt ayaklanmasından ona da sorumluluk payı düşebilirdi" yorumu yapıyor (No. 251).

Şeyh Sait ayaklanması bastırılıyor, elebağları yargılanıp cezalandırılıyor ve yeni Türkiye'nin ilk muhalefet partisi olan Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası 3 Haziran 1925 günü Hükümet tarafından kapatılıyor. İngiltere Dışişlerinde Hazırlanan "Mustafa Kemal ve Yeni Türkiye" başlıklı bir belgeye göre, Atatürk, bir arkadaşına demiş ki:

"Bizim halkımız henüz demokratik rejime alışık değil; halkımızı yetiştirmek Cumhuriyetin kurucuları olarak bize düşen bir görevdir. 10-15 yıl boyunca Devlet işleriyle bizler meşgul olmalıyız. Ondan sonra Türk halkı siyasi partiler kurar. Ama bu arada halkımız kendisini, tehlikeli politik oyunlara değil, tarıma, ticarete ve sanayiye vermeli." (No. 264).

Şeyh Sait ayaklanmasının bastırılmasından ve Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası'nın kapatılmasından sonra, çağdaşlaşma ve laikleşme atılımlarına hızla

devanı edilir. İngiliz Büyükelçisi Lindsay, 1 Eylül 1925 günlü raporunda, "Cumhurbaşkanı son on gününü Kastamonu yöresini ziyaretle geçirdi. Burada çeşitli konuşmalar yaptı, milletin çağdaşlaşması gerektiğini vurguladı ve özellikle kılık kıyafet üzerinde durdu... Muhalefetten kurtulan Gazi, önümüzdeki dönemde kendisini yoğun bir modernleşme kampanyasına verecek görünüyor" diyordu (No. 259).

Dediği gibi oluyor. Gazi, İnebolu'da yaptığı konuşmada, çağdaş giyim kuşam kullanılmasını savunurken, tekke ve zaviyelere de değiniyor. Ankara'ya döner dönmez de O'nun başkanlığında toplanan Bakanlar Kurulu üç kararname kabul ediyor. Bunlar, tekke, zaviye ve türbelerin kapatılması; din görevlilerinin kıyafetleri ve memurların şapka giymeleriyle ilgili kararnamelerdi.

İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında hazırlanan 23 Eylül 1925 tarihli ve "Mustafa Kemal ve Yeni Türkiye" başlıklı bir notta şöyle deniyordu:

"Türkiye'nin batılaşması devam ediyor. Dr. Rıza Nur, 'Amacımız, Türkiye'yi modernleştirerek ikinci bir Japonya yapmaktır' demişti. Son yapılan reformlar bu doğrultudadır ve reformların arkası gelecektir. Sırada evlilik reformu (Medeni Kanun), alfabe reformu var gibidir. Ama Türkiye'nin temel taşı Cumhurbaşkanının (Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in) kendisidir. Temel taşı çöker veya yerinden kayarsa bütün bina yıkılır. Bunu gören İsmet Paşa, Mustafa Kemal'i bir kalp krizinden korumak, sakinleştirmek için Latife Hanımla işbirliği yapmış, boşanmayı önlemeye çalışmıştır. Halen Mustafa Kemal duruma hakimdir. Onun önünde iki risk vardır: sağlığının bozulması ve siyasi düşmanları tarafından kendisine suikast düzenlenmesidir." (No. 264).

İngiliz diplomasisi, İzmir suikastından dokuz ay kadar önce, Gazi Paşa'ya karşı bir suikast ihtimali üzerinde zihin yormaya başlamıştı. İngilizler daha 1925 yılında Gazi Paşa'dan sonrasını düşünmeye başlamışlardı.

Gazi, bütün enerjisiyle reformlara devam ediyordu. 1925 Cumhuriyet bayramı öncesinde yoğun bir şapka kampanyası yürütülmüş ve Türkiye sokaklarında fesli, sarıklı, külahlı bir kimse kalmamıştı. Şapka giymeye karşı ufak tefek cılız bazı direnişler olmuştu. İstanbul'da bir hoca, "Şapka ve Frenk Mukallidliği" başlıklı bir broşür yayınlamış, Rize'de bir başka hoca, "Ankara'da ihtilâl çıktı, Mustafa Kemal üç yerinden yaralandı, dindar bir paşa başa geçti" diye söylentiler çıkarıp halkı kışkırmıştı. Bu gibi cılız kıpırdanışlar da çabucak bastırılmıştı. 1925 yılı böyle sona ermişti.

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Bu ciltteki belgeler arasında bir de Türkiye hakkında Yıllık Rapor vardır. Başlıbaşına küçük bir kitap olabilecek kadar uzun bir rapordur bu. İstanbul'daki İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğince hazırlanmıştır. 1922 yılıyla ilgilidir, ama 7 Kasım 1923 tarihli bir refakat yazısıyla Londra'ya gönderilmiş olduğu için, kronolojik

sıraya göre 1923 yılındaki belgeler arasında yer almaktadır (Bkz. Belge No. 159'a Ek).

İlginc bir belge olan bu kapsamlı raporun tamamına yakını burada bulunacaktır. Raporda, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşının son yılında Türkiye'deki gelişmeler, çok yönlü olarak ele alınmakta ve İngiliz gözüyle değerlendirilmektedir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinin hangi şartlar altında nasıl kurulmuş olduğu üzerinde biraz durup düşünmek için bu belgenin gözden geçirilmesi yararlı olur.

Raporun Giriş bölümünde, "Mustafa Kemal, bir elinde kılıç, diğer elinde Misak-ı Milli ile, pan-Helenizmin yıkınları üzerinde yeni Türkiye'yi yarattı. Bunun etkileri derin olacaktır. Türkiye'nin yeniden doğuşunun ve Avrupa'ya dönüşünün çeşitli nedenleri hakkındaki hükmü Tarih verecektir" diyor. Doğru söze ne denir.

Tarihçe bölümünde, İngilizlerin girişiyle Mart 1922'de hazırlanmış ve Türkiye ile Yunanistan'a sunulmuş olan mütareke ve barış önerilerine değiniliyor. Yunan askerinin Anadolu'yu boşaltmasını, fakat Edirne'nin ve doğu Trakya'nın büyük bölümünün Yunanistan'a verilmesini öngören bu önerileri Yunanistan'ın kabul ettiği, Ankara Hükümetinin ise şartlar öne sürdüğü belirtiliyor. Sonra Büyük Taarruz'dan Lozan Konferansı'na kadarki gelişmeler anlatılıyor. Burada İngilizler biraz da günah çıkarmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Ankara Hükümeti, Büyük Taarruz'dan önce, nabız yoklaması ve mümkünse görüşmeler yapması için Londra'ya gönderdiği Fethi Bey (Okyar) oradan eli boş dönmüştü. Raporda, "Müttefikler yazışmalarla oyalanırken Türk milliyetçileri askeri hazırlıklarını tamamladılar. Temmuz'da Londra'yı ziyaret eden Fethi Bey, Lord Curzon tarafından kabul edilmedi. 4 Ağustos'ta Lloyd George'un Avam Kamarasında yaptığı konuşma da Türkleri askeri harekâta doğru itti" diyor. Mudanya'da "Türkler, tek mermi atmadan Doğu Trakya'yı kazandılar" diye ekleniyor.

Rapor devam ediyor (Özet): "19 Ekimde Refet Paşa (Belc) İstanbul'a geldi ve İstanbul'a millî idareyi empoze etti. TBMM, İstanbul Hükümetince 1920'den beri imzalanmış olan bütün anlaşma ve sözleşmeleri geçersiz saydı. İstanbul Hükümeti de barış konferansına çağırılınca, Refet Paşa 29 Ekimde Padışaha çıktı ve İstanbul Hükümetini azletmesini istedi. Padışah, nazırlarıyla görüşeceğini söyledi. 1 Kasım'da TBMM saltanau kaldırdı ve İstanbul Hükümeti tarihe karıştı. Refet Paşa *de facto* İstanbul Valisi oldu. 6 Kasım'da Ali Kemal kaçırıldı ve İzmir'te öldürüldü. Bunun üzerine hayatını tehlikede gören 150 kadar Türk, İngiliz Büyükelçiliği bahçesine sığındı. Osmanlı Hristiyanları ve Rumlar da İstanbul'dan göç etmeye başladı. O zaman Osmanlı Padışahı da İstanbul'dan kaçma zamanının geldiğine karar verdi. Padışah, 16 Kasım günü General Harington'a gönderdiği özel bir mektupla, İstanbul'da hayatının tehlikede olduğundan İngiltere'ye sığındığını bildirdi ve en kısa zamanda başka bir yere götürülmesini istedi. 17 Kasım sabahı saat 08.00'de Yıldız Sarayı'nın yan kapısından alınan Padışah, Tophane deniz üssündeki "Malaya" gemisine bindirildi

ve Malta adasına gönderildi. İstanbul'u terk etmeden önce Padişah tahtan feragat etmediğini de açıkça belirtti. TBMM ertesi gün Veliaht Şehzade Abdülmecid Efendiyi Halife seçti... Lozan Konferansında zorluklarla karşılaşıldı ve altı haftalık müzakerelerden sonra Konferansın kesilmesi ihtimali arttı. Türkiye, Misak-ı Milli'yi tam olarak gerçekleştirmek istiyor ve söylentilere göre geniş çaplı askeri hazırlıklar yapıyor."

Raporun diğer bölümleri: Dış ilişkiler, İç politika, Panislamizm, İstanbul'daki Ruslar, Fener Rum Patrikhanesi, Ekonomik ve Ticari İşler, Çalışma hayatı, Adli sorunlar, Askeri olaylar ve Donanma başlıklarını taşıyor. Ankara Hükümetinin dış politikasının, Misak-ı Milli'yi tam olarak gerçekleştirme hedefine yönelik olduğu belirtiliyor. İngiltere'nin baş düşman sayıldığı, Sèvres antlaşmasından, Yunanlıların İzmir'e ayak basmasından, İstanbul'un işgalinden ve Malta sürgünlerinden İngiltere'nin sorumlu tutulduğu söyleniyor.

İç politika bölümünde Atatürk'ün durumu üzerinde duruluyor: Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile TBMM arasında zaman zaman sürtüşmeler olduğu, 1921 sonuna doğru Mecliste görülen Gazi Paşa'ya karşı muhalefet üzerinde duruluyor. "Mustafa Kemal'in en ciddi rakibi olan Rauf Bey Meclis Başkanlığına seçildi. Mustafa Kemal'in prestiji azalmağa başlıyordu. Yunanistan'a karşı kazanılan zafer, Mustafa Kemal'in prestijini yeniden yükseltti" deniyor ve "Türkiye'yi tek adam yönetecekse Mustafa Kemal rakipsizdir" diye notlanıyor.

Raporun 1922 yılında Türkiye'deki ekonomik ve ticari işler bölümü a) İstanbul Hükümeti rejimi, b) Yunan işgal yönetiminin ekonomik duruma etkisi ve c) Ankara Hükümeti rejimi diye üç başlık altında ele alınıyor. İstanbul Hükümeti işgal kuvvetleri sayesinde ayakta duruyordu ve işgal kuvvetleri bu Hükümete istedikleri yasaları dikte ediyorlardı. Raporda bu hususa da şöyle değiniliyor:

"İstanbul Hükümeti rejiminde karşılaşılan çeşitli ekonomik sorunlardan biri, Yabancı Sivilianın Depolanması kanun tasarısıyla ilgiliydi. Bu tasarı Müttefik delegelerce hazırlanıp İstanbul Hükümetine sunuldu. Ankara'nın gölgesini hissederek İstanbul Hükümeti, bu tasarıyı yayınlamakta pasif davrandı. Yüksek Komiserler sonunda 15 Ekim'e kadar süre tanıdılar...Diğer bir sorun belediye vergileri sorunuydu...Müttefik delegelerden ve Dünyu Umumiye delegelerinden oluşan Karma Komisyon, çeşitli kamu tasarılarını inceledi. 1922 yılında yeni vergiler yürürlüğe girdi...Yeni vergilerin toplanmasında bazı güçlüklerle karşılaşıldı..."

1922 yılında Yunan (İşgal) Yönetiminin Ekonomik Duruma Etkisi şöyle özetleniyor:

"Anadolu ve Trakya'daki Yunan işgali, ticareti doğrudan etkiledi. İşgal edilen bölgelerde vergilerin toplanması işi Dünyu Umumiyeye bırakıldı. Trakya'nın tahıl ürünlerinin tamamı Yunanistan'a götürüldü. Karadeniz limanlarıyla

İstanbul arasında çalışan Türk gemilerine Yunan donanması müdahale etti. Yunan işgal makamları, Marmara'nın Anadolu kıyılarında toplanan gümrük vergilerine ve Ayyavıcı zeytin yağına el koydu ve drahmîyi zorla tedavül ettirdi. Bu konularda Yüksek Komiserler zaman zaman girişimlerde bulundular."

Bu satırları okurken Türk Tarih Kurumu'nun eski Başkanlarından rahmetli Enver Ziya Karal hocanın bir sözünü hatırladım. "Biz İstiklâl Harbi tarihimizin henüz yalnız iskeletini biliyoruz" derdi ve yapılacak yeni yeni araştırmalarla bunun içinin doldurulması gerektiğini söylerdi. Örneğin Batı Anadolu'da ve Trakya'da üç buçuk yıl süren Yunan işgali döneminde ekonomik ve sosyal yaşam bizde henüz yeterince araştırılmamış bir alandır.

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti idaresindeki ekonomik ve ticari işlerle ilgili olarak da Raporda şunlar not edilmiştir:

"Anadolu'da kurulan Kemalist rejim, ekonomik bakımdan İstanbul Hükümetinin idaresi altındaki bölgeleri yabancı bir ülke gibi saydı ve oralardan gelen mallara ağır gümrük tarifeleri ve hatta yasaklar uyguladı. TBMM 1921 yılında korumacı bir eğilim gösterdi ve birçok maldan özel gümrük vergisi alındı".

Büyük Zafer'den sonra İstanbul'da TBMM rejiminin kurulmasının ekonomiye ve ticarete etkileri konusunda İngiliz raporundan özetle aktarılan şu birkaç satır da ilginçtir:

"Anadolu'daki Yunan bozgunu yalnız Yunanlılar için değil, aynı zamanda yabancı tüccar ve girişimci için de bir felâket oldu...Refet Paşa'nın İstanbul'da yaptığı ilk işlerden biri, TBMM tarafından çıkarılmış olan kanunları orada derhal yürürlüğe koymak oldu. Bu uygulama ticaret çevrelerinde şaşkınlık yarattı ve birçok zarara sebep oldu. TBMM kanunları İstanbul'da uygulatınca birçok ithal malın gümrük vergileri kat kat artırıldı, "lüks malların" ithali yasaklandı, yabancı okullara ve dini kuruluşlara tanınmış olan vergi bağışıklıkları kaldırıldı, kapitülasyonlar yok sayılınca tüccar depolarında ve yabancı gemilerde kaçak mal aramalarına olanak sağlandı...TBMM, Nisan 1922'de tüketim vergileriyle ilgili yasalarda değişiklikler yapmıştı. Buna göre, şeker, kahve, çay, benzin, kibrit, balımmu, sigara kâğıtlarından alınan tüketim vergileri artırıldı...Un, buğday gibi mallara da tüketim vergisi ve yüksek gümrük vergisi uygulamaları bir ara şehirde panik yarattı, fakir halk fırınlara hücum etti. Bunun üzerine zaruri ihtiyaç maddelerinden alınan vergiler değiştirildi ve bunun sonucu ekmek fiyatları düştü...

"Yabancı şirketlerin, Kasım 1914 tarihli geçici kanun gereğince tescil ettirilmeleri istendi. Yüksek Komiserler, kapitülasyonlar var oldukça yabancı şirketlerin Türk kanunlarına göre tescilinin istenemeyeceğini belirttiler...

"İstanbul Hükümetinin 16 Mart 1920'den beri tescil etmiş olduğu 100 patent hakkı ile 583 adet ticaret marka sertifikası geçersiz sayıldı ve iptal edil-

di...TBMM'nin çıkarmış olduğu aşırı harp kazançlarıyla ilgili 25 Ekim 1920 tarihli kanun gereğince, Türkiye'de iş yapmış yabancılardan da aşırı harp kazancı vergisi almak istiyorlar. İstanbul'da 110 Yunan ve 21 Ermeni şirketi kapandı. Milliyetçi rejim, yabancı şirketlere ve yabancı mallara karşı başka önlemler de aldı: Gayri Müslim aracı ve komisyoncuların tasfiyesi, Türk kanunlarına uymayan ve Türkçe kullanmayan yabancı şirketlerin boykot edilmesi vs. gibi. Ayrıca yabancı ve gayri Müslim şirketlerin yerini almak üzere yeni Türk ithalat ve ihracat şirketleri kuruluyor. İzmir İktisat Kongresi dolayısıyla da "Ekonomik Misak-ı Milli"den bahsediliyor..."

Kısacası, 1922 yılında yurdumuzdaki gelişmeler Yıllık Raporda değişik açılardan ele alınıyor ve Atatürk dönemine epeyce ışık tutuluyor. Ama bu kadarı yeterli değildir ve bu alanda yeni yeni araştırmalar yapılması gerekir. Yapılacak araştırmalarda siyasi ve askeri gelişmelerin yanı sıra, ekonomik, ticari ve sosyal olaylara da ağırlık verilerse bu dönem çok boyutlu olarak, daha iyi aydınlatılmış olacaktır.

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Buradaki belgeler arasında, ilgi çekici olmakla birlikte başka belgelerle doğrulanması gerekli olanlar da vardır. Bir örnek: İngiliz Gizli İstihbarat Servisinin 3 Mart 1923 tarihli bir yazısında, Türkiye'deki Azerbaycan Elçisi İbrahim Abilov'un, İzmir'de, Mustafa Kemal'in bir ajanı tarafından öldürüldüğü iddia edilmektedir (Belge No. 90).

Abilov, Sakarya Savaşından sonra Türkiye'ye atanmış ve Ankara'da Azerbaycan Temsilciliğini açmıştı. Ankara'nın Cebeci semtinde açılan Azerbaycan Temsilciliğine 18 Kasım 1921 tarihinde törenle bayrak çekilmişti. Bu törende Başkumandan Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa da hazır bulunmuş ve sıcak bir konuşma yapmıştı⁹.

Azerbaycan Elçisi, İktisat Kongresini izlemek üzere İzmir'e gitmiş ve 28 Şubat 1923 günü orada ölmüştü. Hariciye Vekili İsmet Paşa, aynı gün, Türkiye'nin Bakü temsilciliğine şu telgrafi çekmişti:

"Azerbaycan Sefiri İbrahim Abilov Bey bu sabah İzmir'de saat yedide vefat etmiştir. Hükümet-i mahalliye nezdinde Hükümetimiz namına beyan-ı taziyet etmeniz rica olunur."¹⁰

Bu telgrafta Abilov'un nasıl öldüğü hakkında bir bilgi yoktur. Biz Azerbaycan Elçisinin kalp krizinden öldüğünü sanıyorduk. İngiliz Gizli İstihbaratı ise onun, Mustafa Kemal'in bir adamı tarafından öldürüldüğünü, fakat kaza sonucu ölmüş gibi gösterildiğini iddia ediyor. Güya Abilov, Türkiye'deki komünist

⁹Ankara'daki Azerbaycan Temsilciliğine bayrak çekme töreni ve bu törende Atatürk'ün yaptığı konuşma için bkz: Bülal N. Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Yabancı Devlet Başbakanları*, Cilt I, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını, Ankara: 1993, s. 409-411.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, s. 413.

hücrelerden sorunuşuymuş ve Doğu Anadolu'da bir komünist ayaklanma hazırlığı içindeymiş. Bu yüzden ortadan kaldırılmış imiş.

Mustafa Suphi vak'asını hatırlatan bu iddiayı doğrulayacak başka bir belgeye rastlamadık. 1923 yılında Türkiye'de bir komünist ayaklanması ihtimalini düşünmüyoruz ve dolayısıyla İngiliz iddiası bize pek inandırıcı görünmemekte ise de bu gibi belgelerin yeni araştırmalarla doğrulanması veya çürütülmesi gerekir.

İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk kitabının, Atatürk araştırmalarını özendireceğini ve meraklı araştırmacıların bu alanda yeni yeni belgeler ortaya çıkaracaklarını umarım.

Kitabı yayımlayan Türk Tarih Kurumu Başkanı Sayın Prof. Yusuf Halaçoğlu'na, kitabın basımında emekleri geçmiş olan Türk Tarih Kurumu ve Basımevi çalışanlarına içten teşekkürlerimi sunarım.

Ankara, 17 Eylül 2001
BİLAL N. ŞİMŞİR

BELGELERDE VE DİPNOTLARDA GEÇEN KISALTMALAR

A.C.	: Army Corps (Kolordu)
a. m.	: <i>ante meridiem</i> (öğleden önce)
B.M.A.	: British Military attaché (İngiliz Askerî Ataşesi)
CAB	: Cabinet (İngiliz Kabinesi Arşivi)
C.B.	: Companion of Bath (İngiliz asalet unvanı)
C. G. S.	: Chief of the General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanı)
C-in-C.	: Commander-in-Chief (Başkomutan)
C.M.G.	: Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George (İngiliz asalet unvanı)
C.U.P.	: Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Komitesi)
D.B.F.P.	: <i>Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. First series</i> (İngiliz Dış-politikası Üzerine Belgeler, 1919-1939, Birinci dizi)
Div.	: Division (Tümen)
E.	: <i>Eastern</i> (İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Doğu Dairesinin arşiv rumu- zu)
F.O.	: <i>Foreign Office Archives</i> (İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivleri)
—/ 371	: İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin <i>General Correspondence</i> (Genel Yazışmalar) serisi...
—/ 424	: İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivlerinin <i>Confidential Print</i> (Gizli Yayınlar) serisi...
G. H. Q.	: General Headquarters (Genel Karargâh)
G.O.C-in-C.	: General Officer Commander - in - Chief (Başkomutan)
H. C.	: House of Common (Avam Kamarası)
H. L.	: House of Lords (Lordlar Kamarası)
H. M.	: His Majesty (Zat-ı Şahane, Haşmetlü, İngiliz Kral (lığı))
H. M. S.	: His Majesty's Ship (İngiliz Gemisi)
L.T.	: Livre Turque (Türk Lirası)
M.	: Monsieur (Bay)
M.A.	: Military Attaché (Askerî Ataşe)
M.I.	: Military Intelligence (Askerî İstihbarat)
M. P.	: Member of Parliament (Parlamento Üyesi, Milletvekili)
N.	: North (Kuzey)
N.N.W.	: North-North West (Kuzey-Kuzey Batı)

N.W.	: North-West (Kuzey Batı)
p. m.	: <i>post meridiem</i> (öğleden sonra)
P.R.O.	: Public Record Office (İngiltere Devlet Arşivleri)
sic	: Aslında yanlış
S.I.S.	: Secret Intelligence Service (Gizli İstihbarat Servisi)
SS	: Steam Ship (Vapur)
Vol.	: Volume (Cilt)
W.O.	: War Office (İngiltere Harbiye Bakanlığı)

BELGELERDE GEÇEN BAZI YER ADLARI VE KARŞILIKLARI

Adrianople	: Edirne
Aleppo	: Halep
Alexandretta	: İskenderun
Angora	: Ankara
Anatolia	: Anadolu
Antioch	: Antakya
Aya Soluk	: Selçuk
Brousse	: Bursa
Brussa	: Bursa
Castamouni	: Kastamonu
Chimishghezeh	: Çemişgezek
Cilicia	: Çukurova (Kilikya)
Constantinople	: İstanbul
Dardanelles	: Çanakkale (Boğazi)
Gallipoli	: Gelibolu
Golden Horn	: Haliç
Halki	: Heybeli Ada
Kianghri	: Çankırı
Kerasund	: Giresun
Magnesia	: Manisa
Meander (Valley)	: Menderes (Vadisi)
Melazgird	: Malazgirt
Mitilene	: Midilli
Ohrida	: Ohri
Old Seraglio	: Topkapı Sarayı
Panderma	: Bandırma
Prinkipo Islandı	: İstanbul Adaları (Prens Adaları)
Rodosto	: Tekirdağ
Salonica	: Selânik
Sarajevo	: Saray Bosna
Seraglio Point	: Sarayburnu
Skopije	: Üsküp
Smyrna	: İzmir
Therapia	: Tarabya
Trebizond	: Trabzon
Yanina	: Yanya

BELGELERİN LİSTESİ VE ÖZETLERİ

<u>No</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
	1922		
1	8 Ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'DAN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR H. RUMBOLD'A TEL. NO. 481. ÇOK ACELE..... Savaş esirleri, İngiltere, esirleri veya rehineleri serbest bırakması için Yunanistan'a baskı yapamaz. Mustafa Kemal, Yunan ordusuna katılmış olan Rum esirleri hain saymak niyetindeymiş. Bunlar yargılanırsa kurşuna dizilebilir. İtalyan ve Fransız meslektaşlarımızla birlikte girişimde bulununuz.	1
2	8 Ekim	MUDANYA'DA GENERAL HARİNGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. YILDIRIM..... Mütareke görüşmeleri. İsmet Paşa, bütün askeri hareketi durdurmayı Mustafa Kemal adına saahhüt etti. Nihai Protokolü bugün imzalamayı umuyoruz. Yerel komutanlara duyurulması.	2
3	8 Ekim	MUDANYA'DA GENERAL HARİNGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. YILDIRIM..... Mütareke görüşmeleri. Hükümet talimatını aldım. İsmet Paşa, Mustafa Kemal ile görüşecek. Bu gece protokolü imzalayabiliriz. Tarafsız bölge konusunda İsmet Paşa'yı uyardım.	2
4	9 Ekim	MUDANYA'DA GENERAL HARİNGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. YILDIRIM..... Mütareke görüşmeleri. İtalyan ve Fransız general-leri Hükümetlerinden henüz talimat almadıkları için Türk tarafıyla bugünkü toplantı ertelendi. Mütareke anlaşması hazır. Mustafa Kemal herhangi bir "tarafsız bölge" tanımadığı için "Müttefik iş-galindeki bölgeler" diyorum.	3
5	9 Ekim	YUNANİSTAN'IN LONDRA ELÇİLİĞİNDEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA NOTA. NO. 3298/St./22. ACELE. GİZLİ..... Trakya cephesi. Fransa Atina'da girişimde bulundu ve mütareke görüşmelerine zarar verir' diye Yunanistan'ın Trakya cephesini takviye etmesini is-	3

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		tedi. Fransızlara, Mustafa Kemal'in saldırı niyetlerine karşı tedbir alıyoruz diye cevap verildi. Yoksa Yunanistan Türklerin insafına terk edilmiş olur. Fransa, Kemalist orduların Trakya'ya geçmeyeceklerini söylüyor. Ama Türklerin Trakya'ya çıkarma hazırlığı yaptıkları yolunda duyumlar var.	
6	10 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 883. Mustafa Kemal'in konuşması. M. Kemal, zaferden sonra ilk defa 4 Ekim günü TBMM'de bir konuşma yaptı. Mesajı ilimlidir.	5
Ek	9 Ekim	"STAMBOUL" GAZETESİ'NİN 9 EKİM GÜNLÜ KESİTİ: MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'NIN MECLİSTEKİ KONUŞMASININ FRANSIZCA ÖZETİ. Büyük taarruz. Siyasi durum.	6
7	13 Ekim	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN KOLONİLER BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. <i>Sevr Antlaşması ve Misakı Milli.</i> Mustafa Kemal ve TBMM, Misakı Milli'nin 1. Maddesine göre, Musul bölgesini de geri almayı amaçlıyor. Bu konuda Koloniler Bakanı Churchill'in görüşleri nedir? Sevr'in mali ve ekonomik hükümlerinin revizyonu konusu ise Bakanlıklararası toplantıda zaten görüşülmüş ve bu toplantıda Koloniler Bakanlığı da temsil edilmiş idi.	8
8	13 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 560. Mr. Ryan bugün Hariciye Nazırı ile görüştü. Nazır, Rusya'nın barış konferansına yalnız Boğazlar konusunda katılmasını istiyor. Konferans yeri olarak Fransa'nın İzmir'i kabul edebileceğini söylemiş. Mustafa Kemal, İstanbul Hükümetinin barış konferansına katılmasına karşıdır.	9
9	16 Ekim	FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI R. POINCARRE'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI.	10

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Mustafa Kemal, barış konferansı İzmir'de toplanır- sa buna kendisinin de katılabileceğini Franklin Bouillon'a söylemiş. Fransa İzmir'e karşı. Ama Lausanne da Türklere çok uzak görünüyor.	
10	16 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİ- SERİ RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 573..... İtalyan ve Amerikan meslektaşlarımla ve Dr. Nansen ile görüştük. Bu işin Milletler Cemiyetine bırakılmasına karar verdik. Mustafa Kemal ile şah- sen görüşecek olan Dr. Nansen, esirler konusunda bir anlaşma sağlamaya çalışacak.	10
11	17 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİ- SERİ SİR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 909..... <i>Türkiye'de genel durum:</i> Kemalistler Anadolu'da Yu- nanlıların hesabını gördükten sonra, gelişmelerin ağırlık merkezi Boğazlar'a ve Trakya'ya kaydı ve Mudanya konferansına gidildi. Kemalistler savaş- madan Doğu Trakya'yı kazandılar, karşılığında verdikleri taviz ise kalıcı değildir. Türkler, Misakı Milliden taviz vermek niyetinde değildirler. Ama karşılarında İngiltere vardır. Sevr antlaşması öl- müştür ancak şimdi Müttefikler Misakı Milli ile boğuşmak durumundadırlar: Sınırlar çizilirken Kemalistler Batı Trakya'da plebisit deyecekler, Musul'u geri almak isteyecekler, Suriye sınırında düzeltme yapılsın diye direnecekler, Boğazlar so- rununda İstanbul'un güvenliğini öne sürecekler, mali ve ekonomik kontrole karşı çıkacaklar, kapi- tülasyonlar konusunda hiç boyun eğmeyeceklerdir ve hep Türkiye egemen ve bağımsız olmalıdır diye cevap vereceklerdir. Bu durumda İngiltere bu böl- gedeki kuvvetlerini azaltmamalı, Yunanistan da Batı Trakya'daki kuvvetlerini artırmalıdır. Barış konferansından önce İstanbul Hükümetinin sah- neden çekilmesi belki hayırlı olacaktır, yoksa Padi- şahın durumu ciddi sorun yaratacaktır. Misakı Milliyi gerçekleştirmek Türklerin ilk hedefidir. Ondan sonra federal esasa göre Türk İmparator-	11

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		luğunu diriltmeyi ve İslam hegemonyası kurmayı düşünen bazı liderler vardır. Bunlar İngiltere'nin Doğu'daki durumunu çökertmek arzusunda dırlar. Şu sırada Türkiye, Rusya ile Batı arasında, orta yerdedir. Mustafa Kemal, Ruslarla işbirliğinde dikkatli davranmıştır ve Ruslar, Ankara'ya dış politika dikte edecek kadar bir nüfuz kazanamamışlardır.	
12	20 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN SOFYA ELÇİSİ ERSKİNE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 300. Stambuliyski ile görüştüm. İngiltere'nin Türkleri Avrupa'dan atmamış olmasına üzüldüğünü söyledi. Türklerin Trakya'ya geri dönme olasılığından dolayı kaygılanıyor. Stambuliyski, birkaç gün önce yaptığı bir konuşmada ise Mustafa Kemal'in zafelerini övmüştü. Bulgar lider ayrıca Bulgaristan'ın Ege denizine çıkışı konusunda değişimi ve Dedeagaç'ın Bulgaristan'a bırakılmasını istedi. Bulgaristan'ın, Rusya ve Türkiye'yi de arkasında alarak, Romanya'ya saldıracağı yolundaki kaygı yersizdir.	15
13	20 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN BERN ELÇİSİ RUSSEL'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 261. Bütün Yakın Doğu krizi boyunca İsviçre basını taraf tutmamış ve haberleri yorumsuz vermekle yetinmişti. Yalnız bugünkü <i>Journal de Genève</i> gazetesi özetle şu görüşlere yer verdi: Türklerin Boğazlar bölgesine girmelerini önlemekle Lloyd George haklı olduğunu, İngiltere'ye karşı riskli bir harekâtı Mustafa Kemal'in göze olamayacağını yazdı. Bu görüş Hükümet çevrelerince de paylaşıyor.	17
14	21 Ekim	LONDRA'DA ÇIKAN "PALL MALL GAZETTE" NİN YAZISI. General Townsend'in ifşaatı: Generalin eski Başbakanlara verdiği muhtıra. Yakın Doğuda israf edilen paralar. Ağır suçlamalar. Lloyd George, Yunanistan'ın Anadolu'yu istila etmelerinden sorumludur. İngiltere prestij kaybına uğramıştır. Mustafa Ke-	18

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		mal ve Bakanları İngiltere ile barış yapmak istiyorlar.	
15	22 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 2468..... <i>Esirler.</i> Mustafa Kemal'in Rum esirleri hain olarak yargılama niyetine karşı girişimde bulunmak konusunda M. Poincaré'den alınan nota örneği eklidir.	26
Ek.	21 Ekim	FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI POINCARE'DEN İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E İMZALI NOTA..... Mustafa Kemal'in, Yunan ordusuna katılmış Anadolu kökenli (Osmanlı vatandaşı) Rum esirleri, hainlik suçuyla yargılamak niyeti. Bu esirler lehinde Ankara Hükümeti katında ortak girişime Fransa da katılmaktadır.	27
16	24 Ekim	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARİNGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL 2833. GİZLİ..... Mustafa Kemal'den 18 Ekim tarihli bir mektup aldım. Mudanya'da İsmet Paşa ile aramızdaki ilişkiden hoşnut kaldığını söylüyor ve barış çabalarının da başarıya ulaşacağı umudunu dile getiriyor. İsmet Paşa'dan da benzer bir mektup aldım.	27
17	31 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 638..... İstanbul Hükümeti, Barış Konferansına davet edildiğini Mustafa Kemal'e bildirdi. Şimdi cevap bekliyor. Rafet Paşa, Padişahla görüşmesinde İstanbul Hükümetinin feshedilmesini istemiş. Padişah, Nazırlarıyla görüşeceğini söylemiş.	28
18	31 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 957..... <i>Ankara Hükümeti ve yabancılar.</i> Müttefik meslektaşlarım, Ankara Hükümetinin Türkiye'deki yabancı-	29

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		lara ve yabancı işletmelere karşı kısıtlayıcı önlemlerinden yakınıyorlar. Ağırılar Millet Meclisine de hakim olmuşlar. Fransız Yüksek Komiseri, bu konularda Müttefiklerin ortak bir tutum takınmalarını M. Poincaré'ye önermiş, ama görüşünü kabul ettirememiş. Mustafa Kemal seçime gidecekmış, çünkü bugünkü Meclis yeterince onun etkisinde değildir. Refet Paşa'nın nutukları İstanbul Türkleri üzerinde kötü bir izlenim yarattı. Resmi çevreler, İstanbul'da Kemalist rejimin kurulmasına pek hevesli görünmüyorlar, çünkü işlerinden birçoğu işlerinden olacaktır.	
19	31 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 960. İsmet Paşa, Dışişleri Bakanı oldu ve Barış Konferansında Ankara heyetine Başkanlık edecek. Dr. Rıza Nur ikinci delegedir. Mustafa Kemal ve İsmet Paşalar 28 Ekim'de Bursa'dan Ankara'ya gittiler. İstanbul Hükümeti, Ankara Hükümetiyle birlikte barış konferansına katılmaya istekli. Refet Paşa, 29 Ekimde Padişahı ziyaret etti. 30 Ekimde Sadrazam Mustafa Kemal'e bir telgraf çekti. Padişah ve İstanbul Hükümeti, Büyük Millet Meclisinin Türkiye'yi temsil etmesini kabul etmelidir. Yoksa büyük zorluk çıkabilir. Ankara Hükümeti, İngiltere'ye karşı daha elverişli bir hava yaratmaya çalışıyor; Bolşeviklere güvenmiyor ve Türkiye'nin Avrupa'ya yayılmasına karşı Balkan ülkelerinin direnişinden de çekiniyor.	31
Ek	28 Ekim	"AKŞAM" GAZETESİNİN HABERİ.(ÇEVİRİ) Barış Konferansında Türk heyetinin savunacağı bazı görüşler : Toprak sorunları, Askeri sorunlar, İç Sorunlar, Jandarma konularındaki görüşler.	33
	2 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN BERLİN BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD D'ABERNON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI MÜSTEŞARI SIR E. CROWE'A YAZI. GİZLİ..... Yakın Doğu ile ilgili gizli bir notu ilişikte sunuyorum.	34

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Ek	2 Kasım	BERLİN'DEKİ İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİNİN BİR ÜYESİNİN BİLDİRDİKLERİ. GİZLİ..... Türkiye Millet Meclisinde eski Suriye mebusu Emir Şekib Arslan'ın söyledikleri: Suriye Milliyetçileri Ankara Hükümetine güçlük çıkarmayacak, barış konferansında Fransızlarla birlikte Ankara Hükümetini güçlendirmeye çalışacaklar. Franklin-Bouillon, Suriye'de sert Fransız rejiminin yumuşatılacağı yolunda Mustafa Kemal'e söz vermiş. Barış konferansında kapitülasyonlar sorunu pek önemli bir yer tutacaktır.	34
21	5 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 564. YILDIRIM..... <i>Mme Gaulis.</i> M. Poincaré'nin odasında Türk dostu Mme Gaulis'e rastladım. Türkiye'den yeni dönmüş ve Mustafa Kemal ile uzun uzun görüşmüş. Söylediklerine göre, Türkler, barış konferansında istediklerini elde edemezlerse savaşa devam edeceklermiş ve Bolşeviklerce destekleneceklermiş. Türkiye'de bir Turancılık akımı da varmış ve Orta Asya'dan ve Afganistan'dan destek görecekmış. M. Poincaré, barış konferansında Fransa ile İngiltere'nin ortak bir cephe oluşturmaları gerektiğini söylüyor.	35
22	6 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 663..... <i>Ali Kemal.</i> Türk makamları "Peyam-ı Sabah" editörü Ali Kemal'i yakaladılar. Yüksek Komiserler İstanbul'da siyasi zulümlere izin vermeyecekler ve Müttefik generallerden gerekli önlemleri almalarını istediler.	36
23	7 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 572 <i>Barış girişimleri.</i> M. Poincaré'den bir nota aldım: Barış girişimlerinin çabuklaştırılmasını istiyor; Türk ordusunun ve halkının sabırsızlandığını, her geçen günün güçlükleri artırdığını belirtiyor.	37

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		Türkleri yatıştırmak için bir ön-barış yapılmasını öneriyor. Mustafa Kemal'in de buna taraftar olduğunu söylüyor. Konferans tarihi olarak 13 Kasım değiştirilmezse Türklerin elinde bahane kalmayacağını ekliyor.	
24	7 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 984. <i>Saltanatın kaldırılması.</i> 4 Kasım saat 11'de Sadrazam bana geldi. Lozan Konferansına Ankara ve İstanbul Hükümetlerinin birlikte gitmeleri için Mustafa Kemal'e gönderdiği telgraf üzerine yaşanan gelişmeler. Sadrazam, barış konferansına davet edildiklerini, Ankara Hükümetinin ise İstanbul Hükümetini "gayri meşru" ve hatta "hain" saydığını belirtti ve konferansa daveti kabul edip etmeme konusunda benim görüşümü sordu. Bir tavsiyede bulunamayacağımı söyledim. Hükümetinin istifa etmesi mi gerektiğini sordu. Bu konuda da bir tavsiyede bulunamayacağımı bildirdim. Sadrazam, cevabına şaşırmadı. Hükümeti istifa ederse Müttefik Yüksek Komiserlerinin İstanbul'un yönetimini üstlenip üstlenemeyeceklerini sordu. Böyle bir görevi üstlenemeyeceğimizi söyledim. Görüşmede Padişahın durumu konuşulmadı. Sadrazam, iki saat sonra Fransız Yüksek Komiserine gitmiş. İstifa etmeye hazır olduğunu Mustafa Kemal'e telgrafla bildirmiş ve işleri kime devredeceğini sormuş. Padişahın tahttan inmeye niyeti olmadığını da bildirmiş. Refet Paşa, İstanbul'da yönetimi eline almak için bir hükümet darbesi hazırlıyor. Böylece 600 yıllık hüküm sürmüş olan bir kurum tarihe karışıyor. Türkiye için iyi mi olacağını zaman gösterecek.	39
25	8 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 573. M. Poincaré, Türkiye'den aldığı telgrafları size iletmemi istedi.	41

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		<p><i>Tel. 1:</i> Albay Mougin Ankara'dan bildiriyor: İsmet Paşa, barış konferansının ertelenmemesi için ısrar ediyor.</p> <p><i>Tel. 2:</i> İsmet Paşa ile birlikte İstanbul'a gelen Albay Mougin, Mustafa Kemal'in de sabrının taşmak üzere olduğunu bildiriyor. İsmet Paşa'ya verilen talimatta Misakı Milli'den ödün verilmeyeceği belirtiliyor. Durum pek nazik.</p>	
26	8 Kasım	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 2605.....</p> <p>Lozan Konferansının ertelenmesiyle ilgili olarak M. Poincaré'den alınan nota örneği ilişikte sunuldu.</p>	43
Ek	7 Kasım	<p>FRANSA DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI M. POINCARÉ'DEN İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDİNGE'E İMZALI NOTA.....</p> <p>Lord Curzon, Lozan konferansının 13 Kasım'dan 27 Kasım'a kadar ertelenmesini öneriyor. Oysa ben, Konferansın bir önce toplanmasını istiyorum ve bu konuda Hükümetinizin dikkatini çekmesi için Londra Büyükelçimize talimat veriyordum. Çünkü gecikme, Türk ordusunu sabırsızlandırıyor ve bu yüzden Müttefikler yeni olupbittiler karşısında kalabilirler. Mart ayında Paris konferansına sunduğum öneri kabul edilseydi barış daha çabuk ve daha elverişli koşullarda gerçekleşirdi. Şimdi konferansın tarihini geciktirmek işlerimizi kolaylaşturmaz. Bu bakımdan konferansın en geç 20 Kasım'da toplanması için özellikle ısrar ediyorum. Bu arada bir ön-barış antlaşmasının tezelden imzalanması yerinde olur.</p>	43
27	9 Kasım	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 684.....</p> <p>Ali Kemal'in İzmit'te linç edilmesini Yüksek Komiserler protesto ettiler.</p>	45

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28	10 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN ROMA BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR GRAHAM'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 362..... Roma'daki Ankara Temsilcisi Celâlettin Arif, barış konferansında Türkiye'nin bütün isteklerini kabul ettirmek için dayatacağını, Mustafa Kemal'in sivil lükatta 50 bin askeri İstanbul'a sokacağını söylemiş.	46
29	10 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 693. <i>Padişahın güvenliği.</i> Ali Kemal'in öldürülmesinden sonra, Padişahın güvenliği konusu beni düşündürüyor. General Harington'a dün resmen yazdım ve Müttefik generallerle de görüşmesini bildirdim. Yüksek Komiserler ve Generallerle konuyu görüştük. Generaller, Padişahın can güvenliğini sağlamanın güç olduğunu belirtiyorlar. İtalyan generali sorumluluğu paylaşmak istemiyor. <i>Dipnot:</i> Ali Kemal'in tutuklanması işgalcilerle işbirliği yapmış olanlar arasında panik yaratmış. 150 kişi İngiliz Büyükelçiliği bahçesine sığınmış, asker eskortuyla Taşkışla'ya götürülmüş. Başka sığınmalar da beklenmektedir.	46
30	10 Kasım	HİNDİSTAN GENEL VALİSİNDEN HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL.YILDIRIM. KİŞİYE ÖZEL..... Hindistan'da Osmanlı Padişahına karşı sempati beslenmiyor. Onun tahtan indirilmesi burada sükûnetle karşılanacak. Mustafa Kemal ise kurtarıcı ve İslam şampiyonu olarak görülüyor ve onun Halife konusundaki ihtilalci önerileri bir olupbitti olarak kabul edilecek. Padişahın bize sığınması kuşku yaratacaktır. Ancak mecbur kalırsak geçici olarak sığınma hakkı tanıyabiliriz.	47
31	12 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARINGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞINA TEL. YILDIRIM. GİZLİ.....	48

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		En güvendiği yaveri aracılığıyla, kişisel güvenliği konusunda Padişahın görüşünü aldım. Kendisi şimdilik ülkeyi terk etmek istemiyor.	
32	14 Kasım	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU NO. 959. GİZLİ..... Ankara'nın politikası. Mustafa Kemal, Bursa'daki bir konuşmasında, 15 Aralık tarihinde İstanbul'a gireceğini, Boğazlar bölgesinin ve Musul'un kurtarılacağını söylemiş.	49
33	14 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 710. ÇOK GİZLİ Franklin-Bouillon entrika çeviriyor ve Mustafa Kemal ile haberleşmeyi sürdürüyormuş. Fransa'nın Türklere karşı savaşmayacağını Mustafa Kemal'e bildirmiş. Fransa Başbakanı ile buradaki Yüksek Komiseri arasında, Mudanya günlerinde sert yazışmalar olmuş.	49
34	15 Kasım	TÜRKİYE İLE YUNANİSTAN ARASINDA NÜFUS MÜBADELESİYLE İLGİLİ OLARAK MİLLETLER CEMİYETİ GENEL SEKRETERİNİN GENELGE NOTASI. Dr. Nansen raporunun ilk bölümünü Konseyin ve üyelerin dikkatine sunuyorum. Raporun ikinci bölümü de yakında sunulacaktır.	50
Ek	4 Kasım	TÜRKİYE İLE YUNANİSTAN ARASINDA İRK AZINLIKLARININ KARŞILIKLI OLARAK MÜBADELESİ HAKKINDA DR. NANSEN'İN RAPORU. Bölüm I: Milletler Cemiyeti Asamblesi tarafından Yakın Doğu'daki mültecilerin durumlarını incelemekle görevlendirilince ilk iş olarak 27 Eylül'de Mustafa Kemal'e bir telgraf çektim. Ankara makamlarıyla görüşmek istediğimi bildirdim. TBMM'nin İstanbul temsilcisi Hamid Bey ile çeşitli sorunları görüştüm. Yüksek Komiserler bana nüfus mübadelesi için bir anlaşmaya hazırlanmamı tavsiye ettiler. 22 Ekimde Mustafa Kemal'den bir telgraf aldım. Mübadelenin ilke olarak kabul edilece-	50

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		ğini, ancak Hükümetler arasında görüşülmesi gerektiğini bildirdi. Türk Hükümeti, Batı Trakya hariç, nüfus mübadelesini ilke olarak kabul edeceklerini bildirdi. Hamid Bey ile görüştüm, ama Ankara Hükümetiyle müzakerelerde bulunamadım.	
35	17 Kasım	MALTA VALİSİNDEN İNGİLTERE KOLONİLER BAKANLIĞINA TEL Biraz önce Harington'dan bir telgraf aldım. Padişahın Malta'ya gönderildiğini bildiriyor. Hükümetin talimatı nedir?	55
36	17 Kasım	İNGİLTERE KOLONİLER BAKANLIĞINDAN KANADA, AVUSTRALYA, YENİ ZELANDA VE GÜNEY AFRIKA GENEL VALİLERİNE VE NEWFOUNDLAND YÖNETİCİSİNE TEL GİZLİ. Başbakandan mesaj: Padişah, dün hayatının tehlikede olduğunu bildirerek Harington'a sığındı. Kendisi, Malaya gemisiyle Malta'ya gönderiliyor.	55
37	20 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN SOFYA ELÇİSİ ERSKİNE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 77. Batı Trakya. Söylendiğine göre, Türk ve Bulgar çeteleri Batı Trakya'nın özerkliği için harekete geçiyorlarmış. Bazı Bulgar subayları çeteleri yönetmek için Mustafa Kemal'in hizmetine girmişler. Bulgaristan, Nevrokop ve Kırcaali taraflarına asker göndermiş.	56
38	24 Kasım	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU NO. 974. (KİSMEN)..... Mustafa Kemal, Türk ordusuna Alman subayları ve assubayları almak için Albay Nuri Bey gibi bazı subayları Almanya'ya göndermiş. Bir kasabadan 240 kişi Türkiye'ye gönderilmiş. Bir başka yerden 450 kişi daha gönderilecekmış.	57
39	30 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN BELGRAD ELÇİSİ SİR A. YOUNG'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 503 Son gelişmelerle ilgili Saraybosna ve Üsküp Konsolosları raporları ilişiktir. Mustafa Kemal,	57

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		Müslüman kamuoyunda heyecan ve beklentiler yaratmıştır.	
Ek.	24 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN ÜSKÜP KONSOLOSU BİRD'DEN BELGRAD ELÇİSİ SIR A. YOUNG'A YAZI. NO. 41 Güney Sırbistan Müslüman basını kriz konusunda ılımlı yayın yapmıştı. Mustafa Kemal'in zaferi ise heyecanla karşılandı, ama gürültülü gösteriler yapılmadı. Zafer, camilerde kutlandı. Zafer sonucu Türkiye'nin Avrupa kıtasında tutunması Müslümanları pek sevindirdi. Türkçe "Hak" gazetesi haberleri ancak Belgrad'dan alabiliyor. Halife konusunda Müslümanlar henüz görüşlerini belli etmediler ama Mustafa Kemal'in hareketi herhalde olumlu karşılanacaktır.	58
40	1 Aralık	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU. NO. 985. GİZLİ..... Halifelik. Saltanatın kaldırılması kararı kolay alınmamıştır. Yeni Halife ancak 148 oyla seçilmiştir.	59
41	1 Aralık	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 2821..... Bu sabahki "Matin" gazetesi, Lloyd George'un Yunan politikasını eleştiren uzun bir yazı yayınladı. F.O.'in notu: Gazetenin ifşaatı Venizelos iktidarı zamanıyla ilgilidir. Yayımlanan belgeler bazı Yunanlılar tarafından gazeteye satılmıştır.	60
Ek.	1 Aralık	PARİS'TE YAYINLANAN "LE MATIN" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI Lloyd George, Yunanistan'ı nasıl Anadolu macerasına itti. Yunan harekâtının ve bozgununun gizli belgelerle gerçek hikâyesi. Fransa ve İtalya Yunanistan'ı uyarmışlar, İngiltere ise Yunanistan'ı maceraya itmiştir. Venizelos da Sevr antlaşmasını Türklere silah zoruyla empoze etmek için Mustafa Kemal'in ordularını ezmeye kalkmıştır. Venizelos'un gizli yazışmaları.	62

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42	2 Aralık	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD HARDINGE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. No. 2833..... Lloyd George'un Yunan politikası konusunda bugünkü "Matin" gazetesinde de bir yazı yayınlandı. Eklidir.	67
Ek	2 Aralık	PARİS'TE YAYINLANAN "LE MATIN" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI. Fransa, Anadolu macerasına kalkışmaması için Yunanistan'ı uyarmıştı. Ama Yunanistan Lloyd George'a kulak vermiş ve bozguna sürüklenmiştir. "Matin" gazetesinin ifşaatı Londra' da heyecan yarattı. Kanıtlar.	68
43	9 Aralık	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ MÜSTEŞARI SIR E. CROWE'A TEL. NO. 760. TBMM'de bir olay: Seçim kanunu görüşülürken, seçilebilmek için Misakı Milli sınırları içinde beş yıl oturma şartı getirilmek istendi. Bu madde kabul edilseydi Mustafa Kemal Paşa mebus seçilemeyecekti. Paşa bunu doğrudan kendisine karşı bir saldırı olarak gördü. Mustafa Kemal'e karşı muhalefet güçlendi.	71
44	11 Aralık	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 1111. TBMM ve Seçim Kanunu: Meclisteki muhalifler, Misakı Milli sınırları dışında doğmuş olanların mebus seçilemeyecekleri yolunda bir hükmü seçim kanununa koymak istiyorlar. Bu madde kabul edilseydi Mustafa Kemal seçilemeyecekti. Hedef alınan Mustafa Kemal, gitgide büyüyen muhalefetle uğraşmak durumunda kalıyor. Saltanatın kaldırılması muhalefeti güçlendirmiştir. Meclisteki muhalefet, Mustafa Kemal'in önünde Halife-Padişah'tan daha büyük bir engeldir.	71

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67	3 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD CREWE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 138.	107
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		<i>Ankara'da muhalif guruplar:</i> TBMM'de Muhafazakar din adamlarından ve "İslahat Fırkası" mensuplarından oluşan muhalefet, Mustafa Kemal'e sıkıntı yaratıyor. Bunlar, bir an önce barış yapılmasını. Mustafa Kemal'in yetkilerinin kısıtlanmasını istiyor ve "Tan" adlı bir muhalif gazete çıkarmaya hazırlanıyorlar. Bazı kişiler tutuklanmıştır.	

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72	12 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 80. ÇOK ACELE. Adnan Bey, İzmir zorluğunun Müttefiklerce ve özellikle İngiltere tarafından giderilmesini istedi. İzmir'de bulunan Mustafa Kemal'den ve ayrıca Rauf Bey'den telgraflar almış. Mondros Mütarekesini tanıyamayacaklarını belirtti. Ben de Müttefiklerin prensip konusunda geri adım atamayacaklarını söyledim. İngiltere savaş gemilerini geri çekebilir diyor. İzmir iktisat kongresi açılmadan önce bir çözüm bulunması yerinde olur.	112

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73	12 Şubat	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN İSTANBUL'DA YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'A TEL. NO. 83. Türklerin bir bölümü ılımlı ve İngiltere ile anlaşmadan yanadır. İstanbul'dan geçerken İsmet Paşa ile görüşüp dostluk mesajımızı kendisine sununuz. Barış anlaşmasının imzalanması için belki Mustafa Kemal'i ikna edebilir.	113
74	13 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 83. Mustafa Kemal dün İzmir'de İngiliz Başkonsolos Vekilini kabul etmiş ve kendisine dostça davranmıştır.	114
75	13 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 108. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Hindistan Hilafet Merkez Komitesi Başkanı Junani'ye (Chotani) gönderdiği mektup. Bu konudaki Anadolu Ajansı haberi ilikte sunulmuştur. Bugünkü Konjonktürde bunu yayınlamakla İngiltere'ye baskı yapılmak isteniyor kanısındayım. (Bkz. No. 87 ve 117).	114
Ek	11 Şubat	ANADOLU AJANSI HABERİ <i>Başkomutan Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşadan Hindistan Hilafet Merkez Komitesi Başkanı Junani'ye (Chotani'ye) mektup:</i> Büyük Zaferimizi kutlayan konuşmanızı yeni okudum. Bu Büyük Zafer yalnız Türkiye'nin kaderini etkilemekle kalmayacak, aynı zamanda mazlum milletleri de onların bağımsızlıklarını tehdit eden zorbalara karşı harekete geçmeye özendircektir. Kazandığımız zaferde Hindistan'ın da şeref payı vardır. Desteginizin devam etmesi barış yapılmasını çabuklaştıracaktır. Yunanlıların vahşice yakıp yıkmalarından sadece canlarını kurtarabilmiş olan Türkiye Müslümanları, Hindistanlı din kardeşlerinin yardımlarına muhtaçtır. (Bkz. No. 117).	115

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76	14 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN İNGİLTERE DİŞ-İŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 85. İstanbul'da barıştan yana bir hava var. Barış, Mustafa Kemal'e bağlıdır.	116
77	14 Şubat	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU NO. 1077. <i>Türkiye ve Macaristan: Karachoni ve Torbai adlarında iki Macar delegesi Türkiye'ye gelmiş ve İzmit'te Mustafa Kemal tarafından da kabul edilmişler. Türkiye-Macaristan ilişkileri görüşülmüştür.</i>	116
78	16 Şubat	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU NO. 1083. <i>Anadolu'da genel durum. Barış görüşmelerini etkileyen faktörler: Türkler, Rusya'nın açılımlarını kuşkuyla karşılamış, Bulgarlarla anlaşmaya varamamış ve Fransa'nın tutumundan düş kırıklığına uğramışlardır. Basın, "düşmanımız yalnız İngiltere değilmiş, Fransa da bizim düşmanımız" demektedir. Muhalif grupların faaliyetleri: Saltanatın kaldırılması çeşitli muhalif grupları pekiştirmiş; seçim kanunu dolayısıyla doğrudan Mustafa Kemal hedef alınmıştır. Halifenin hak ve yetkileri konusu gündeme getirilmektedir. Hükümet ciddi zorluklarla karşı karşıyadır. Milliyetçi-İttihatçı işbirliği sorunu: Ocak sonunda Milliyetçilerle İttihatçılar bir anlaşmaya varmışlar, ama Şubat başında Meclisteki İttihatçılar bu anlaşmayı reddetmişlerdir. Sonunda barışa ve seçimlere kadar işbirliği yapılması kararlaştırılmıştır. Musul yöresinde faaliyetler: Cevat Paşa İran'la anlaşmaya varmış. Türk-İran sınırında düzeltme yapılması karşılığında İran, Türkiye'nin Musul politikasını destekleyecektir. Musul taraflarında Türklerin faaliyetleri devam ediyor.</i>	117
79	18 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ORDULARI BAŞKOMUTANI GENERAL HARİNGTON'DAN İNGİLTERE SAVAŞ BAKANLIĞINA ŞİFRE TEL. 3649. GİZLİ.	122

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarifi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Japon Büyükelçisi, Mustafa Kemal ile İsmet Paşa'nın gerçekten barıştan yana olduklarını, Aralof'un ise barışı engellemeye çalıştığını söyledi. Meclis çoğunluğunun da Mustafa Kemal'i desteklediğini ekledi.	
80	20 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 99. Mustafa Kemal ile İsmet Paşa, 19 Şubat'ta Eskişehir'de buluştular ve Ankara'ya gittiler. Mustafa Kemal 17 Şubat'ta uzun bir konuşma ile İzmir İktisat Kongresini açtı. Müttefiklerin Lozan'daki tutumlarını eleştirdi, ama konuşması barışa karşı değildir. Aralof da oradaydı.	122
81	20 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 116..... Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmesi hakkında İzmir Başkonsolos Vekilinden alınan iki rapor ilişiktir.	123
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Ek 2	14 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOS VEKİLİ URQUHART'TAN YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'A YAZI NO. 26..... Mustafa Kemal 26 Ocak'ta İzmir'e geldi. Balıkesir'e gidip 11 Şubat'ta döndü. 12 Şubat günü kendisini ziyaret ettim. Bornova kilisesinin halini konuştum. Kilisenin durumunun düzeltileceğini söyledi. Diğer konulara geçti. Barışın gecikmesine üzüldüğünü, fakat barışın Türkiye'nin tam bağımsızlığını sağlaması gerektiğini, barışı engelleyenin Fransa olduğunu, kapitülasyonların asla kabul edilmeyeceğini söyledi. Sonra "Times" muhabiri Peder Bouvier'yi kabul etti.	124

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82	21 Şubat	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU. Barış ihtimali açısından bakınca Türkiye'de şunlar tespit edildi: (a) İçerde siyasi birlik yok, Mustafa Kemal'e karşı muhalefet var, yeniden savaşılmaya karşı muhalefet güçlenmektedir, (b) Türkiye'nin mali sıkıntıları vardır, (c) Ordu, yeniden savaşa girmeye pek hevesli değildir, (d) Türkiye'nin İslam ülkeleriyle ilişkileri pekiştirilmiş değildir, (e) Türkiye'nin Irak üzerine yürümesi için şartlar elverişli değildir, (f) Türkiye ile Rusya arasında askeri bir anlaşma yapılmamıştır ve Türkiye'nin Rusya'dan askeri destek alma ihtimali yoktur. Türk liderler arasında barış isteği kuvvetlidir, fakat barış için son kararı iç politika şartları belirleyecektir.	126
83	26 Şubat	BOMBAY VALİLİĞİNDEN HİNDİSTAN GENEL VALİLİĞİNE YAZI. No. 784-A..... <i>Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya para transferi: Bombay'daki "Netherlands Trading Society" adlı kuruluş, Karaçi Hilafet Komitesi adına Ankara'da Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya 10.000 İngiliz lirası göndermek için Bombay Hükümetinden izin istiyor.</i>	133
84	26 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN BÜKREŞ ELÇİSİ SIR H. DERİNG'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 45..... <i>Ankara'dan Bükreş'e gelen "Times" muhabiri Brown'un anlattıkları: Mustafa Kemal, Meclis çoğunluğunu barış için kazanacak, sonra Meclisi feshedecektir. Ankara Hükümeti barış anlaşmasını kabul edecektir.</i>	134
85	26 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN BÜKREŞ ELÇİSİ SIR H. DERİNG'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 46..... İlgi: No. 45: Mustafa Kemal ve İsmet Paşa'nın Meclis'te 110 taraftarı var. Bunlar Lozan hükümlerini aynen kabul	135

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		etmek istiyor. 150 kişilik bir mebus grubu ise anlaşmada değişiklik istiyor. Fevzi Paşa grubu ise anlaşmaya karşı imiş. (Bkz. No. 86).	
86	27 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 122..... İligi No. 84 ve 85. Brown, İstanbul'da Chicago "Daily News" muhabiridir. Ankara'ya hiç gitmemiştir. Verdiği bilgiler yanıltıcıdır.	135
87	27 Şubat	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDAN HINDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI NO. 1979/44..... İligi No. 75. Mustafa Kemal'in Hindistan Merkez Hilafet Komitesi Başkanına göndermiş olduğu mektupla ilgili olarak İstanbul Yüksek Komiserliğinden alınan yazının örneği ilişikte sunulmuştur.	136
88	28 Şubat	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU NO. 1096..... <i>Türkiye'nin Panislamizm politikası: Cemiyet-ül İslam.</i> Mustafa Kemal, İslam birliği politikası izliyor, Cemiyet-ül İslam adlı dernek Anadolu'da bir İslam Kongresi toplamak istiyor. Bu kongrede, Türkiye'nin baş rolü oynayacağı bir İslam Milletler Cemiyeti kurulması da görülecek. Cemiyet-ül İslam Hükümet tarafından desteklenmektedir ve bu derneğin kurulmasına bizzat Mustafa Kemal önayak olmuştur. İslam ülkelerine heyetler gönderilmiştir.	137
89	2 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL NO. 132..... Mustafa Kemal dün Meclis'te uzun bir konuşma yapmıştır. Konuşması, ölçülü olmakla birlikte barışçı değildir, içinde tehdit de vardır. Arap cephesinde askeri hazırlıkla ilgili sözleri şiddetle alkışlanmıştır. Konuşmanın son bölümü muhalefete yöneliktir. Siyasi durum belirsizdir, Meclisin kararını tahmin etmek imkânsızdır (Bkz. No. 91).	138

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90	3 Mart	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA YAZI. GİZLİ. CX/676 la..... <i>Abilov. İstanbul'dan şimdi alınan bir telgrafa göre, Aralov ile birlikte İzmir Konferansına katılmış olan Azerbaycan temsilcisi Abilov, orada, Mustafa Kemal'in bir ajanı tarafından öldürülmüştür. Abilov, komünist hücrelerden sorumluydu ve doğu vilayetlerinde bir komünist ayaklanma hazırlıyordu. Abilov'un ölümü basına kaza olarak bildirilmiştir.</i>	139
91	4 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 140. <i>İlgi. 89: Mustafa Kemal'in Musul cephesinde askeri hazırlıkla ilgili sözleri fazla tehditkâr değil. Konuşmanın büyük bölümü iç politikaya ayrılmıştır.</i>	139
92	7 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 147. <i>Genel siyasi durum. İstanbul'dan bakınca Mustafa Kemal Meclis'e hakimdir. Onun taraftarlarıyla karşıtları arasında tam bir çizgi çizmek zordur. Onun iki büyük sloganı "Misakı Milli" ve "Milli Hakimiyet" tir. Misakı Millinin yorumunda mebuslar arasında görüş ayrılıkları görülmektedir. Kemal'in taraftarları (i) onun şahsına bağlı olan mebuslar ve (ii.) Misakı Milliye bağlı olanlardır. Bunlar beraberce Mecliste Birinci Grubu oluşturuyorlar. Mustafa Kemal'in başlıca örgütü Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetidir. Bir de Halk Partisi kurma çalışmaları başlatılmıştır. Karşıtlar ise çeşitli guruplardan oluşmaktadır. Eski İttihatçılar, Saltanatçılar ve irili ufaklı çeşitli gruplar. İttihatçıları Kemalistlerin içine çekmek için çeşitli girişimler olmuşsa da bu çabalardan pek az sonuç alınabilmektedir. İttihatçılar asıl muhalefeti oluşturuyor ve barış yapılırca ülkeye hükmeden kuvvet olabilirler. Hangi kategoriye girecekleri belli olmayan başka muhalifler de vardır. Bütün Mustafa Kemal karşıtları Mecliste "İkinci Grubu" oluşturuyorlar. Son olarak barışa karşı o-</i>	140

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lanlar da ortaya çıkmıştır ki bunların başında Fevzi Paşa'nın bulunduğu söyleniyor. Mustafa Kemal'den sonra Mecliste en önemli şahsiyet olan Rauf Bey ise dikkatli bir oyun oynamaktadır. Dış politikada barışçıdır, iç politikada ise İttihatçılardan yanadır. Mustafa Kemal kesin bir tutum takınmadan barış teklifleri konusunda Meclisin nasıl şekilleneceği belli değildir. "Karaağaç'sız ve Musul'suz barışa hayır" sesleri de yükseliyor. Mustafa Kemal'in tutumunda iki tehlike var: Barış konusunda fazla oyalanırsa Meclis'te kontrolü elinden kaçırabilir veya şahsen barış isterken savaş taraftarlarına boyun eğebilir. Muhaliflere gelince onların barış konusunda ortak bir politikaları olduğunu sanmıyorum. Basında, "Tanin" gazetesi barıştan yanadır. Öteki İstanbul gazetelerinin hepsi milliyetçidir ama Ankara'da ne olup bittiğini pek bilmediklerinden barış konusunda kesin bir tutum takınmıyorlar. (Bkz. No. 93).

93 13 Mart

İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 160.....

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İlgi No. 92. Barış teklifleri konusunda Meclis'te günlerdir devam eden tartışmaların sonunda Mustafa Kemal söz almış ve Hükümet tekliflerinden yana bütün ağırlığını koymuştur. Böylece gürültücü muhalefeti çöktürmüştür. Anlaşılan Mustafa Kemal barışın gerekli olduğuna karar vermiştir ve barış yapılıncaya kadar bayındırlık projelerine dönecektir. Büyük tartışma sırasında Mecliste olup bitenler hakkında pek az şey sızmıştır. Söylendiğine göre müzakerelerde 275 mebus bulunmuş, bunlardan 75'i oylamaya katılmamış, 175'i Hükümet teklifleri lehinde, 20'si aleyhinde oy kullanmış. Barış yapılırsa Kemalistler ile anti-Kemalistler arasında şiddetli bir boğuşma olacaktır. Bu boğuşma pek kendini beğenmiş olan Türkiye'yi zayıf düşürecektir. Şimdilik en acil ve hayati sorun barış veya savaş sorunudur. Türk karşı-teklifleri konusunda elastiki davranmayı öneriyorum. Türk gazeteleri Hükümetten yana tutum takındılar. Yalnız "Tevhid-i Ef-

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		kâr" karşısıdır. "Tanin", 27 Şubat'ta "Ekonomik ve Mali Sorunlar" başlıklı uzun bir yazı yayınladı. Bu yazıda Fransız etkisi var. Cahit Bey imzalı bu yazıya burada genişçe yer ayırdım, yararlı olabilir. İsmet Paşa yine Heyet Başkanı olacak ve daha küçük bir heyetle Lozan'a gidecek. Öteki Türk delegeleri belki Hasan Bey ve Rıza Nur olabilir.	
94	15 Mart	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU NO. 1111. <i>Mart başlarında barış konusu:</i> İsmet Paşa Meclis'te barış antlaşması taslağının kabulünü savundu. Mustafa Kemal, aşırı bazı mebuslara, Musul'u silahla geri almaya kalkışmakla bir şey kazanılmayacağını söyledi. Türkiye'de iç siyasi durum. İstanbul'daki Makedon temsilci, Türkiye'nin saldırgan bir harekette bulunmayacağını rapor etti. Barış yapıldıktan sonra Türkiye'de siyasi kavgalar başlayacağını yazdı.	149
Ek		İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİNİN DERLEDİĞİ İSTİHBARAT. 1. İsmet Paşa'nın tutumu, 2. Musul sorunu 3. Türkiye'nin iç politik durumu, 4. İstanbul'daki Makedonya temsilcisinin görüşleri koularında istihbarat.	150
95	20 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 182. TBMM'de barış antlaşmasıyla ilgili görüşmelere katılan mebusların bir çoğu İstanbul'da döndü. Onlardan sızan bilgilere göre, İsmet Paşa'nın 6 Mart'ta yaptığı konuşma Meclisi etkilemiş. 15 Mart günü "Akşam"da çıkan başyazı. Mustafa Kemal Paşa Çukurova'yı dolaşıyor.	154
96	21 Mart	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU NO. 1115. <i>Barış ihtimali:</i> Türkiye'nin karşı teklifleri, İsmet Paşa'nın tutumu, Mustafa Kemal'in niyetleri konularında derlenen istihbarat bilgileri.	156

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97	21 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS MASLAHATGÜZARİ PHİPPSTEN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 322..... Mareşal Foch ve General Weygand, Mustafa Ke- mal'in Suriye mandasıyla ilgili sözlerinden rahatsız olmuşlardır. "Echo de Paris" gazetesi, Fransa'nın Lozan'da Türkiye'ye karşı zayıf tutumunu eleştirir- yor.	157
98	23 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİ- SERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 186..... Mustafa Kemal'in Adana konuşmasından sonra Türk basınında Antakya ve İskenderun hakkında bir kampanya başladı. Oralardaki Müslümanlara Fransızların yaptıkları zulümler eleştiriliyor. Ga- zeteler ayrıca Lozan'da Fransız delegesi Bompard'ı da eleştiriyorlar. İtalya'nın Meis adasını Türkiye'ye geri vermeyeceği haberleri de Türk gazetelerini rahatsız etti. Mustafa Kemal'in eşi kadın özgürlükleri için kam- panya başlattı, ayrıca siyasi işlere de karışmış. Afgan Emiri, Mustafa Kemal'e bir kaftan gönder- miştir.	158
99	30 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİ- SERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 206..... Türk basını, Müttefikleri Lozan'da barış şansını yok etmekle suçluyor.	160
100	31 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİ- SERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 211..... Trabzon mebusu Ali Şükrü Bey esrarengiz biçimde kaybolmuştur. Politik bir cinayete kurban gittiği söyleniyor. Mustafa Kemal'in taraftarları, muhalif- leri tehdit ediyorlar.	161
101	31 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN HALEP KONSOLUSU SMART'TAN DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 27.....	161

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarih</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özet</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<i>Mustafa Kemal'in Adana gezisi.</i> Mustafa Kemal, Çukurova-Kuzey Suriye demiryolu müdürü Folliet'yi Konya'da kabul etmiş, onunla birlikte Adana'ya gelmiş ve orada, mateni bayraklarına bürünmüş olan İskenderun ve Antakya heyetlerini kabul etmiştir. Bu heyetler, kurtarılmak ve Türkiye ile birleşmek istemişlerdir. Mustafa Kemal kendilerine cevap vermiştir. Folliet'nin bu konudaki görüşleri. Yöredeki Türkler son aylarda İngiliz aleyhtarlığından Fransız aleyhtarlığına döndüler. Türkiye-Suriye sınırında çeteler görülmeye başlandı. Bunlar, galiba Fransızları rahatsız etmek için Türkiye tarafından organize ediliyorlar.	
102	3 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 203. <i>Ankara'da son olaylar.</i> Trabzon mebusu Ali Şükrü Bey 27 Mart'ta kayboldu, 1 Nisan'da cesedi bulundu, ertesi gün katil olduğu anlaşılan Laz çete başı Osman Ağa jandarma tarafından vuruldu. Bu olayda Mustafa Kemal veya Ankara'nın herhangi bir devlet adamı suçlanamaz. Bu, aslında Lazlar arasında bir kan davası olayıdır. Muhalefet ayağa kalktı. Mustafa Kemal ve taraftarları, durumu kendi lehlerine çevirme düşüncesiyle iki ay içinde genel seçimlere gitmeye karar verdiler. Yani barış ve savaş konusunda son kararı yeni Meclis verecektir. Mustafa Kemal ve yakın arkadaşları barış istiyor, İsmet Paşa'nın en kısa zamanda Lozan'a gitmesini arzuluyor. Lozan'da Müttefiklerin kabul edecekleri her şey Ankara'da yeni Meclisin önüne gelecektir. Mustafa Kemal, kendi programını destekleyen bir Meclis oluşturabilirse bu barış şansını arttıracaktır. (Bkz. No. 105, 106).	163
103	10 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS MASLAHATGÜZARI PHIPPSTEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 383. Poincaré, Lozan'da İngiliz Başdelegesinin kim olacağını sordu. Sir Horace Rumbold dedim. Fransız Başdelegesi de General Pellé olabilecektmiş.	168

<u>No</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Poincaré, Ankara'da Mustafa Kemal'in muhafızları arasında yaşanan olaylar yüzünden barış konusunda karamsar görünüyor. (Bkz. No. 104).	
104	11 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS MASLAHATGÜZARI PHIPPS'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 385. <i>İlgi No. 103.</i> Poincaré'nin barış konusundaki karamsarlığı bugün "Echo de Paris" gazetesinde yankı buldu. Gazete, Mustafa Kemal ve arkadaşlarının hareket serbestilerini muhafaza etmek, Fransa'nın ve Müttefiklerin meşru haklarını tanımamak niyetinde olduklarını yazıyor ve "Lozan'a gitmenin yararı nedir?" diye soruyor. "Journal des Débats" gazetesi de Fransa'nın yanlış politikasını, Türkler karşısındaki zaafını eleştiriyor. Türkler, Fransa'yı kullandıktan sonra şimdi İngiltere'ye dönüyorlarmış.	169
105	11 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 219. <i>İlgi No. 102.</i> Türkiye'de iç politik durum: TBMM, genel seçimlere gidilmesini henüz kabul etmemiştir. Seçim kanunu değiştirilecektir: 20.000 erkek nüfusa 1 mebus seçilecek, 18 yaşını bitirmiş erkekler oy kullanabilecek, yeni Meclis'te 400 kadar mebus olacaktır. Mustafa Kemal'in Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti henüz parti olmamıştır. Muhalefler de henüz parti değildir ve sadece Meclis'te "İkinci Grup" olarak anılmaktadır. 7 Nisan'da Mustafa Kemal Başkanlığındaki bir toplantıda, Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetinin "Halk Partisi" adıyla partileştirilmesine karar verilmiştir. Karar, ertesi gün Mustafa Kemal imzasını taşıyan bir bildiriyle açıklandı. Basın, eski İttihat ve Terakki'nin diriltilmek istenmesini ülke için bir tehlike olarak görüyor ve eleştiriyor. Mustafa Kemal durumunu pekiştirmektedir ve Halk Partisinin seçimi kazanma şansı yüksektir. Muhalefet dağınıktır, muhalefetin içinde en derli toplu grup İttihatçılardır. Bir karşı bildiri yayınlamayı düşünüyorlarmış ama onların Mustafa Kemal'e karşı ortaya atılmaları kolay değildir.	170

<u>No</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
106	11 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 220. <i>İlgi No. 102. Ali Şükrü Beyin öldürülmesi olayıyla ilgili ek bilgiler. (Topal) Osman Ağa, hayatını tehlikede görerek Mustafa Kemal'i rehin almaya niyetlenmiş. Bunu sezen Mustafa Kemal, eşini alıp otomobille uzaklaşmış. Osman Ağa'nın evi sarılmış, onunla birlikte Mustafa Kemal'in muhafızlarından beş kişi vurulmuş.</i>	173
107	12 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN MİDİLLİ VİSKONSOLOSU HADKINSON'DAN ATİNA MASLAHATGÜZARİ BENTINCK'E YAZI. NO. 6. <i>Midilli'de Çerkez çeteleri. Çerkezler, Anadolu'da dağıtılmak üzere, Mustafa Kemal aleyhinde iki bildiri bastırdılar. Birinde Mustafa Kemal'in ve eşinin fotoğrafı da yer alıyor. Yunan askeri makamları, Anadolu'da Mustafa Kemal'e karşı isyan çıkarmak üzere 1400 kişiyi eğitiyorlar. Bunların çoğu Çerkez. Eğitilenlerin 600 kadarı Yunan destroyeri "Aspis" ile üç dört gün içinde Anadolu'ya gönderilecek. Bunların başında Kuşçuzade Eşref Bey var. Yakında Anadolu'ya gönderilecek 600 kişinin başında Anzavur'un oğlu Kadri Bey bulunacak. Diğer çeteler ve elebaşıları. Çete başları Yunan subayları gibi maaş alıyor, adamlarına ise yeme içme dışında günlük 9'er drahmi ödeniyor. Dört ay önce Şevket Bey adlı Çerkez, 28 adamıyla Sarımsaklı'ya çıktı ve içerlerlere yürüdü. Etrafına 1700 kişi toplamış ve çarpışmış. Öteki çeteler dört koldan Anadolu içlerine yürüyecekler. (Bkz. No. 110 ve 115).</i>	174
108	17 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN SOFYA ELÇİSİ ERSKİNE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 92. <i>Batı Trakya ve Mustafa Kemal. Varna Viskonsolosunun yazısı ilâşikte sunuldu. Batı Trakya'nın özerkliğini savunmadığı için Mustafa Kemal'in eleştirildiğini rapor ediyor.</i>	175
Ek.	12 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN VARNA VİSKONSOLOS- LUĞUNDAN SOFYA ELÇİLİĞİNE YAZI.	175

<u>No</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Edirne'de "Arda" adlı yeni bir Türk gazetesi çıkmaya başladı. Mustafa Kemal aleyhine şiddetli bir kampanya yürütüyor. Onu, Batı Trakya'nın özerkliğini savunmamakla suçluyor. Aynı yönde Varna Türk cemaati de Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya bir protesto gönderdi.	
109	18 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ SIR RUMBOLD'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 239..... <i>İç politika.</i> Mustafa Kemal ve taraftarları seçimleri kazanmaya kararlıdır. "Müdafaa-i Hukuk" örgütü, yeni Meclis seçilince "Halk Partisi" adını alacak. Bunlar şimdi öncelikle İttihatçıların kalesi sayılan İstanbul'u hedef alıyorlar. 12 Nisan günü Mustafa Kemal İstanbul halkına bir bildiri yayınladı. Önde gelen Kemalistler seçimlerde İstanbul'dan aday gösterilecekler. Onları seğürmek için çeşitli önlemler alınıyor. "Tanin" de Hüseyin Cahit İttihatçıları destekliyor. İkinci Grubun da bir bildiri yayınlayacağı havadisleri geldi, ama aslı çıkmadı. 15 Nisanda Kemalistler, muhalefete en büyük darbeyi indirdiler: Hiyanet-i Vatanîye kanununun birinci maddesini değıştirdiler ve Saltanaun kaldırılmasıyla ilgili 1 Kasım 1922 kararın eleştirmesi vatana ihanet suçu sayıldı. Şeriye Vekili istifa ettirildi.	176
110	20 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA MASLAHATGÜZARI BENTINCK'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 148. <i>İlgi No. 107.</i> Yunan askeri makamlarının, Mustafa Kemal'e karşı isyan çıkartmak için Anadolu'ya gönderilecek 1400 kişi eğittiklerini öğrendim. Özel olarak Yunan Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın dikkatini çekiyorum. (Bkz. No. 115 ve ekleri).	179
111	24 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 248. <i>İç politika.</i> Vatana ihanet konusundaki yasada değışiklik Mustafa Kemal'in muhaliflerini bogdu. Son hafta içinde İkinci Grubun sesi çıkmaz oldu. İtti-	179

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		hatçıların seçime katılmayacakları söyleniyor ama Kemalist kisvesiyle bazı adamlarını herhalde Meclise sokacaklardır. Hakim parti seçim hazırlıklarını sürdürüyor. Türk olmayanların seçime karşı tutumlarını tahmin etmek güçtü. Anadolu'daki Hristiyanların "Müdafaa-i Hukuk" partisini destekleyecekleri bildiriliyor. İstanbul Rumları Patrikten işaret bekliyor. Museviler ve Ermeniler Kemalistleri destekleyecek. Ermeniler bu kararlarını telgrafla Mustafa Kemal'e bildirdiler.	
112	24 Nisan	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU NO. 1140. <i>Seçimler.</i> İstanbul'da seçim kampanyası hızla devam ediyor. Mustafa Kemal İstanbul'a birçok mebus ve propagandacı gönderdi. "Halk Fırkası"nı oluşturmaya çalışıyor. En aktif partiler şunlardır: Müdafaa-i Hukuk (Birinci Grup), Müdafaa-i Hukuk (İkinci Grup), Milli Müdafaa Fırkası (muhalif), İttihat ve Terakki ve Emekçiler. İttihatçılar gizli çalışıyorlar. Birinci ve İkinci Grupta da İttihatçılar var. Keza Bağımsızlar arasında da. İttihatçılar birçok kasaba ve şehirde kazanmayı ve bir sürpriz yapmayı umuyorlar. Ama iktidardaki grup de kör değil.	182
113	30 Nisan	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD CREWE'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 443. "Matin" gazetesinde Pellé, Lozan'daki Türk heyetinin barış istediğini söylüyor ve Mustafa Kemal'in Adana konuşmalarını kuşkuyla karşılıyor.	183
114	1 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 265. <i>Seçim hazırlıkları.</i> Mustafa Kemal'in partisi seçime hazırlanıyor, Bayram sonrası kavga başlayacak. Aday listeleri tamamlanmak üzeredir. İkinci Grup Ankara'daki karargâhını bıraktı. İstanbul muhalefetin ana merkezi olacaktır. Seçmenler Mustafa Kemal'i İstanbul'a davet ettiler, ama o vatanın kurtarılmasının henüz tamamlanmadığını söyleyerek davet geri çevirdi.	184

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115	2 Mayıs	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA MASLAHATGÜZARI BENTINCK'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 344.</p> <p><i>İlgi No. 110. Çeteler.</i></p> <p>Yunan askeri makamlarının Mustafa Kemal'e karşı ayaklanma çıkarmak için Anadolu'ya çeteler gönderme hazırlıkları. Bu konuda Yunan Dışişleri ilgisine gönderdiğim iki mektubun örneklerini ilikte sunuyorum. Anadolu'ya silahlı çeteler sevk etmek çok ciddidir ve bana savaş fiili gibi görünmektedir. Politis, hemen bir soruşturma yaptıracağını söyledi ve Anadolu'ya komitacı göndermenin hiçbir askeri amaca hizmet etmeyeceğini ekledi. Daha sonra yazılı cevabını bana bildirdi ve işin en ciddi tarafını oluşturan Yunan destroyerinden hiç bahsetmedi. Yunan cevabının kafi olmadığına dair talimatınızı aldım ve Politis'e bir mektup daha gönderdim.</p>	185
Ek1	20 Nisan	<p>ATİNA'DA İNGİLİZ MASLAHATGÜZARI BENTINCK'TEN YUNANISTAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI SİYASİ DAİRE MÜDÜRÜ POLİTİS'E MEKTUP.</p> <p>Bir Yunan çetesinin Anadolu'ya saldırdığına dair sizinle görüşmüştüm. Bakanlığın bundan haberi olmadığını söylemişsiniz. Şimdi size Midilli'den aldığım bilgiler hakkında bir muhtıra sunuyorum. Bu bilgiler, ciddidir.</p>	187
Ek2	20 Nisan	<p>MUHTIRA.</p> <p>Çoğunluğu Çerkezlerden oluşan 1400 kişi, Midilli'de Yunan askeri makamlarınca hazırlanmaktadır. Bunlar, Mustafa Kemal aleyhinde isyan çıkartmak amacıyla Anadolu'ya sevk edileceklerdir. Yunan destroyeri "Aspis" bunların 600 kadarını Anadolu'ya çıkarmıştır. Aynı gemi daha önce de keşif için 35 kişiyi Anadolu'ya çıkarmıştır. Anılan 1400 kişi Yunan makamlarından maaş ve tayın almaktadırlar.</p>	187

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Ek3	25 Nisan	ATİNA'DA İNGİLİZ MASLAHATGÜZARI BENTINCK'TEN YUNANİSTAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI SİYASİ DAİRE MÜDÜRÜ POLİTİS'E MEKTUP. (ÖZEL). Türklerle karşı kullanılmak üzere Anadolu'ya gönderilen çeteler konusuna tekrar dikkatinizi çekeirim. Bu konuda size bir muhtıra daha sunuyorum. Bu haberler doğruysa Mudanya anlaşmasının ruhunun çiğnenmesi anlamı taşır. Hükümetime bildirmek üzere bana bilgi vermenizi rica ederim.	188
Ek4	25 Nisan	MUHTIRA. Çerkez çetelerinden başka Giritli ve Anadolu kökenli Rumlardan oluşan çetelerin de Anadolu'ya sevk edilmek üzere hazırlandığı öğrenilmiştir. İki Giritli çete Pire limanından yola çıkarılmıştır, üçüncü bir çete de Cumartesi günü sevk edilmiştir. Dördüncü çetenin bu hafta içinde gönderileceği, beşinci çetenin de hazırlanmakta olduğu haber verilmektedir.	189
Ek5	27 Nisan	YUNANİSTAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI SİYASİ DAİRESİ MÜDÜRÜ POLİTİS'TEN ATİNA'DA İNGİLİZ MASLAHATGÜZARI BENTINCK'E MEKTUP. Anadolu'ya gönderilmek üzere çeteler hazırlandığı yolundaki söylentilerin aslı esası yoktur. Genelkurmay, Trakya'daki ordumuzu takviye için Yunanlı, Ermeni ve Çerkez gönüllüler hazırlamaktadır. Bunlar Batı Trakya'ya gönderilecektir. Adalarda bulunan Çerkezlerin ise Anadolu'ya geçmelerine engel olunmaktadır.	189
Ek6	2 Mayıs	ATİNA'DA İNGİLİZ MASLAHATGÜZARI BENTINCK'TEN YUNANİSTAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI SİYASİ DAİRE MÜDÜRÜ POLİTİS'E MEKTUP.(ÖZEL). 27 Nisan günlü mektubunuzun içeriğini telgrafla Hükümetime iletim. Lord Curzon'dan cevap aldım. Cevabınızı katıyyen tatminkâr bulmuyor. Böyle çetelerin kurulması Lozan'da müzakerelerin devam ettiği şu sırada tehlikeli sonuçlar verebilir. Üzücü bir olay çıkarması halinde İngiliz Hüküme-	190

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		ti. Yunan çıkarlarına yardımcı olamayacaktır. Mektubunuzda "Aspis" gemisine hiç değinmemişsiniz.	
116	6 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 275 Genel durum. Türkiye'de zorluklar var. Memurların ve hatta askerlerin maaş ödemeleri gecikiyor. Seferberlik yüzünden bir ekim zamanı kaybediliyor. Hoşnutsuzluk artıyor. Kemalistler seçimleri kazanmak için önlemler alıyor. Dış ilişkilerde Türkiye zayıf düşüyor. Suriye, Irak, Kafkas ve Trakya cephelerinde güvensizlik var. Mustafa Kemal, bir toplantıda, bir an önce barış yapılması için ısrar etmiş. Rauf Bey ise Misak-ı Milli'yi tam sağlamayan bir barışı onaylamayacağını söylemiş. Savaş istenmiyor, çünkü savaş olursa Türkiye kazandıklarını da kaybeder. Türkler yine blöflerine devam edebilirler.	191
117	10 Mayıs	HİNDİSTAN GENEL VALİLİĞİ SEKRETERİ DAVIES'DEN HİNDİSTAN İŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI MÜSTEŞARINA YAZI. GİZLİ..... <i>İlgi No. 75. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'dan Bombay'da Merkez Hilafet Komitesi Başkanı Chotani'ye mektup. Hindistan Müslümanlarının önceki yardımlarına teşekkür, yeni yardımların devam etmesi isteği. Bu mektup Hilafet Komitesini ve Hindistan Müslümanlarını etkilemeyecek. Komite daha önce "Ankara" ve "İzmir" fonları için yardım toplamış ve bunlar 1922 sonunda gönderilmişti. Yeni bir yardım çağrısı ilgi çekmez. Mustafa Kemal'in zaferi Hindistan Müslümanlarını sevindirmişti. Bu mektup da hoşnutluk yaratır. Ama bunda anılan mektubun etkisi olmamıştır. (Bkz. No. 127).</i>	192
118	8 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN ATİNA MASLAHATGÜZARİ BENTINCK'TEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 161 Yunan Savunma Bakanı, eski bir İngiliz parlamentere, savaşmak niyetinden bahsetmiş ve dış yardım olmadan da Türkleri mağlup edebilecekleri-	193

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		rini söylemiş. Yunanistan'da savaş taraftarlığı artıyor. Dışişleri Bakanı General Pangalos'u da Lozan'a götürmek istiyormuş.	
119	22 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 310. Anadolu'daki durum hakkında yeterli bilgi alınmıyor. Bayram sonunda seçim kampanyası hızlanacak, ama seçimler Temmuz'dan önce yapılamaz. Trabzon bölgesinde Kemalist örgüt muhalefetle karışılıyor ve Ali Şükrü'nün ölümünden Ankara liderleri de sorumlu tutuluyor imiş. Trabzon'a Refik Şevket Başkanlığında bir teftiş heyeti gönderildi ve Mustafa Kemal Trabzon halkına bir bildiri yayınladı. Ama muhalefet faaliyetlerini sürdürüyormuş. Bitlis vilayeti mebusları da Kemalist partiye muhalefet etmeye karar vermişler. Diyarbakir'de sıkıyönetim ilân edildi.	194
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		kendisine hakaret eden mektupları alıyor, daha da endişeleniyor. Ankara'nın kendisine soğuk davranmasından da rahatsız oluyor. Mısırlı ihtilâlcî Abdul Aziz Shawish, Almanya'dan Ankara'ya geldi, fakat hareketleriyle kuşku uyandırdı ve gözden düştü.	
		<i>Seçimler. Milli Müdafaa Komitesine karşı tedbirler.</i> Genelkurmay Başkanı Fevzi Paşa liderliğindeki Milli Müdafaa Komitesi, Mustafa Kemal'e muhalefet eğiliminde göründü. Bunun üzerine bu komite adaylarının seçimlerden çekilmeleri istendi. Subayların siyasi derneklere üye olmaları yasaktır. Mustafa Kemal, Müdafaa-i Hukuk cemiyetini organize etmek için iki mebusu Trabzon'a gönderdi. Bunlar, Trabzon'da Hükümet aleyhinde bir hava bulunduğunu rapor ettiler.	
134	18 Haziran	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 359. <i>İlgi No. 131. Japon Büyükelçisi.</i> Japon Büyükelçisi Uchida ile görüştüm. Ankara'ya gidiş nedeni Anadolu'dan izlenimler edinmek ve Hükümetine rapor etmek olduğunu söyledi. Şimdiye kadar Ankara'ya giden bir Japon olmamış. Kendisi Mustafa Kemal'i de ziyaret edecektir. Ziyareti yararlı da olabilir.	217
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Ek	—	<p>MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA'DAN İSTANBUL HALKINA BEYANNAME.....</p> <p>Asil İstanbul halkı tarafından seçilmiş olan İstanbul Meclisi ve Belediye Başkanı, 28 Şubat günlü kararıyla bana verdikleri fahri hemşehriliğin beratını saygı ve heyecanla kabul ettim. Bütün Milli Mücadele boyunca İstanbul vatanperverlik gösterdi. Yüce vatanseverliğini şimdi tekrar sergilemektedir. Fahri hemşehriliğinden gurur duyduğum İstanbul, yeni bir mutlu döneme giriyor...</p>	223
137	4 Temmuz	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 387.</p> <p><i>Seçimler. İç politika. İstanbul'dan 15 Kemalist aday seçildi. Rauf Bey, seçime katılan toplam 1.232 seçmenin hepsinin oylarını aldı, muhalif Nureddin</i></p>	225

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		Paşa ise ancak 100 oy alabildi. Mustafa Kemal, Nureddin Paşa'nın adaylığından hoşlanmamıştı. Eski Meclis artık toplanmayacak. Seçilecek mebusların sayısı 290 olacak deniyordu, ama 300'ü aşacak gibi görünüyör. Musul da Meclis'e temsilci gönderecek, hatta Yemen de yeni Meclis'te temsil edilmek için başvurmuş. Bu başvuruya cevap verilmemiş. Trabzon'dan başka Ankara ve Adana'da bazı güçlükler çıkmış. Diyarbakır halkı da Feyzi Beyin adaylığına itiraz etmiştir.	
138	9 Temmuz	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU NO. 1196 <i>Türk dış politikası.</i> Mahmud Sadık Bey, Mustafa Kemal'in talimatıyla Budapeşte'ye ve Berlin'e gitti. Macar ve Alman basın temsilcileriyle görüşecek, Türkiye'ye destek arayacak. Panislamizm ve Asyalılık için de gizli çalışmalar yapılacak. Almanlardan ayrıca teknik donanım ve askeri personel yardımı sağlanmaya çalışılacak.	228
Ek	—	TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI İLE İLGİLİ OLARAK MAHMUT SADIK'IN MUSTAFA KEMAL'DEN ALDIĞI TALİMATIN ANA HATLARI a) İngiltere'ye karşı izlenecek tutum, b) Türklerin Panislamizm ve Asyalılık planları, c) Fransa'ya karşı izlenecek tutum, d) Dışta ortamın hazırlanması, e) Yunanistan'a karşı izlenecek tutum, f) Romanya'nın ve Sırbistan'ın etkilerini dengelemek: Macaristan ve Bulgaristan ile yakınlaşma, g) Almanya ile ilişkiler ve Siyonistlerin desteğini sağlama sorunu.	229
139	11 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 405. <i>Seçimler.</i> Son hafta içinde seçim kampanyası olaysız devam etti. Seçilen mebusların sayısı 200'e ulaştı. Seçilenlerin gecikmeden Ankara'ya yollanmaları istendi. Bu arada Lozan'da Barış Antlaşması imzalanırsa, Meclis'te yeterli çoğunluğun sağlanması isteniyor. Antlaşmanın onaylanması formaliteleri en geç 15 Ağustos'ta tamamlanacak gibidir. Eskişehir'de Müdafaa-i Hukuk listesi dışından Emin	233

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		Bey adında birisi seçildi. Giresun'da seçime katılma çok düşük kaldığından seçim yenilenecek. Trabzon'da bir ay kadar gecikme olacak. Samsun'da 15 komünist yakalandı. Ankara'da nihai seçim ertelendi. İlginçtir, Türk tarihinde ilk defa kadınlara da oy verildi: İzmir'de Mustafa Kemal'in ve Adnan (Adıvar) Beyin eşlerine 1'er oy verilmiş. Konya'da ise Latife Hanıma 39 oy çıkmış. Nureddin Paşa'nın durumu henüz belli değil. Mustafa Kemal ile İttihatçı liderler arasındaki müzakereler kesilmiş. İttihatçılar parti fonlarını devretmeyi reddetmişler.	
140	16 Temmuz	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ TÜRKİYE RAPORU NO. 1199. <i>Temmuz başında genel siyasal durum.</i> Mustafa Kemal, tam bağımsız bir Türkiye yaratmayı iyice kafasına koymuştur. Bu uğurda en yakın taraftarlarını dahi feda etmeye hazırdır. Seçimlerde muhalefet doğu illerinden geliyor. Mustafa Kemal muhaliflerini dişe getirmeye karardır. Ama İttihatçılar, Müdafaa-i Hukuk cüketi altında bazı adamlarını Meclise sokmayı başarmışlardır. Bürokratlar İstanbul'a dönmeyi arzu ediyor, ama yakın bir gelecekte Hükümet merkezinin Ankara'dan İstanbul'a taşınma ihtimali yoktur. Mustafa Kemal'in Panislamizm ve Asyalılık politikası devam ediyor.	235
Ek	—	1923 TEMMUZ BAŞINDA TÜRKİYE'DE GENEL SİYASAL DURUM RAPORU Mustafa Kemal'in taraftarları hakkındaki tutumu, Anadolu'da genel eğilimler: Hükümet Merkezi sorununu, Türkiye'nin Panislamizm ve Asya planları hakkında derlenen istihbarat bilgileri ve değerlendirmeler.	236
141	25 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 441 <i>İç politika.</i> Mustafa Kemal'in popülaritesi azalıyor görünmektedir, ama Milliyetçilerin ciddi bir tehdit altında olduklarını söylemek için henüz erken. Gerçek tehlikeli muhalefet, Lozan antlaşmasından sonra dış sorunlarla birlikte ortaya çıkacak. Mus-	239

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		<p>tafa Kemal'in partisi şimdi de seçimlerde zafer kazanmıştır. Yeni Meclis'te 280 küsur milletvekilinden 240 kadarı seçildi, bunlar içinde Müdafaa-i Hukuk üyesi olmayan sadece bir kişi vardır. Mustafa Kemal Ankara'dan oybirliğiyle seçildi. İsmet Paşa Malatya'dan aday gösterildi. Resmi adayı tanımak istemeyen Harput'ta karışıklıklar olmuş. Mebus seçilen ordu komutanları, ancak askeri görevlerinden ayrıldıktan sonra Meclis'te görüşmelere katılabilecekler. Meclis 2 Ağustos'ta toplanınca gereken çoğunluk sağlanabilecektir. Yeni Hükümetin kurulması biraz zaman alacak. Bakanlar, Meclise karşı tek tek sorumludurlar.</p>	
142	31 Temmuz	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 457.</p> <p><i>İç politika.</i> Yeni Türk Meclisinin toplanması ertelendi. Nedeni yabancı işgalinin devam etmesi olabilir. İsmet Paşa Lozan'dan dönmedi, orada Amerikalılarla görüşmeler yapıyor. Seçimler hemen hemen tamamlandı, 260'tan fazla milletvekili seçildi. Otuz kadar milletvekili "Saltanatçı Parti"den imiş ve saltanatın kaldırılmasıyla ilgili kanunu değiştirmek isteyeceklermiş. Mustafa Kemal İzmir'e gitti, 10 Ağustos'tan önce dönemeyecekmiş; Rauf Bey seçim bölgesine gidecekmiş. Meclis toplanınca Bakanların seçimine gidilecek. İstanbul basını anayasanın eksiklerini eleştiriyor. Lozan Antlaşması'nın ne zaman Meclis'ten geçeceği belli değil. Hükümete karşı asıl ciddi saldırılar, işgal kuvvetleri çekilip Türkler kendi kendilerine kaldıktan sonra başlayacaktır.</p> <p><i>F.O.'in notu:</i> Mustafa Kemal'in güçlükleri başlıyor.</p>	242
143	1 Ağustos	<p>İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 401.</p> <p>İsmet Paşa'nın dönüşü Amerikalılarla müzakerelere bağlı ama, bu hafta içinde Lozan'dan ayrılabilir. İstanbul'da birkaç gün kalıp Mustafa Kemal ile</p>	244

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		buluşmak üzere İzmir'e geçecektir. Türkler, Amerikalıların iki isteğini kabul etmeyeceklerdir.	
144	3 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 403: Mustafa Kemal Ankara'ya döndü. İsmet Paşa İstanbul'dan doğrudan Ankara'ya gidecek. Meclis 11 Ağustos'ta açılacak.	245
145	18 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 490: Mustafa Kemal'in 13 Ağustos günü TBMM'de yaptığı konuşmanın çevirisi ilişiktir. Konuşmanın büyük bölümü geçmişteki başarılarla ayrılmıştır. Mustafa Kemal, Padişah aleyhinde acı konuşmuştur. Konuşmada, anayasa sorunlarına hiç değinilmiyor. Gazi Paşa, Türkiye'nin emniyet ve bağımsızlığının tek garantisi ordudur, diyor. Anayasa reformunun ertelenmesine Halk Partisi toplantısında karar verilmiş olmalı. Rauf Bey belki bu yüzden çekilmiştir. Londra Büyükelçiliği teklifini de geri çevirmiş olan Rauf Bey üç ay izin alıp uzaklaşmıştır. Anayasa sorunu en az Lozan Antlaşmasının onaylanmasına değin geri bırakılmıştır. Mustafa Kemal'in millî birlik çağrısı boşuna değildir.	246
Ek	13 Ağustos	MUSTAFA KEMAL'İN 13 AĞUSTOS 1923 GÜNÜ TBMM'DE YAPTIĞI KONUŞMA. (ÇEVİRİ.) "Efendiler, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin ikinci intihap devresine dâhil olmuş bulunuyoruz...Bu devrei intihabiye, aynı zamanda, yeni Türkiye devletinin, yeni tarihinde mesut bir intikal zamanına tesadüf ediyor...Fihakika, dört senelik istiklâl mücadelemiz, milletimizin şanına lâyık bir sulh ile neticelenmiştir...Efendiler! İlk Meclisimiz memleketi düşman ayaklarından kurtarmak, milleti hayatbahş bir sulha götürmek gayesine yürürken aynı zamanda yeni Türkiye Devletinin bünyasını tesis ve tarsin ediyordu...Vazifesini hüsnü ifa etmiş ve sureti umumiyyede vatan ve millet için mucibi halâs ve hayat olmuştur...Sulh müzakeratının cere-	248

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yanında da tesadüf ettiğimiz müşkilat pek çoktur. Fakat, ben bunu pek tabii buluyorum. Çünkü bu sulh müzakeratında tesfiye olunan hesabat dört senelik değil, dört yüz senelik bir devrin mirası seyyiâtı idi. Müşkilat, muvaffakiyetle ikuham olundu... Efendiler, şarkta Trabzon'u, cenupta Adana'yı ihtiva edecek büyük Ermenistan'dan eser kalmamıştır. Ermeniler tabii olan hudutları dahilinde bırakılmıştır. 98 seferinde Türk vatanından cebren ayrılan Elviye Selâse tekrar sancagımız altına alınmıştır. Şimalde Karadeniz'in en güzel ve en zengin sahilleri üzerinde tesis edilmek istenilen Pontus Hükûmeti taraftarlarıyla beraber tamamen bertaraf edilmiştir. Cenupta nüfuz mıntukaları unvanı altında memleketimizi parçalamak ümidleri kâmilten kırılmış ve milletin azim ve celâdeti karşısında Türkiye'yi parçalamanın ham bir hayal olduğu kabul ettirilmiştir. Türkiye'ye, her medeni memleketin müstefit olduğu haklar tanattırılmıştır...Efendiler! Bu güne kadar istihsal eylediğimiz muvaffakiyat, bize ancak terakki ve medeniyete doğru bir yol açmıştır...Bize ve ahfadımıza düşen vazife bu yol üzerinde tereddütsüz ilerlemektir...Sonra Efendiler, Türkiye Devletinin istiklâli mukaddestir. O, ebediyyen müemmen ve masun olmalıdır..."

146 22 Ağustos

İNGİLTERE'NİN BERLİN BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİN-
DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A
YAZI. NO. 555.

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Mahmud Sadık Beyin Almanya ziyareti. Adı geçen Berlin'e gelmemiştir. Birinci Lozan Konferansından önce Kemalist Temsilci olarak Almanya'ya gelmiş ve sonra Cenevre'ye gitmiş olan binbaşı Nuri Bey de Berlin'e dönmemiş, zira başarılı olamamıştır. İşsiz kalan Alman subayları para kazanabilmek için her ülkede askeri işlerde çalışabilirler ama Türklerin onları çalışurmak isteyeceği şüphelidir. Dışişleri Bakanı Dr. Rosenberg'in Türkiye'ye Büyükelçi atanacağı söylentileri dolayıyor.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özet</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
147	28 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 438. Mustafa Kemal ve Bakanlar 9 Eylülde İzmir'i ziyaret edecekler. Bu tarihe kadar Müttefik savaş gemilerinin çekilmeleri yerinde olur.	257
148	28 Ağustos	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 514. Lozan. 21 Ağustos günü Lozan Antlaşması TBMM'nde görüşülmeğe başlandı. Dışişleri Komisyonu raporunda kapitülasyonların kaldırılmasının önemine parmak basılıyor, Osmanlı borç kuponlarının hangi parayla ödeneceğinin açık olmadığı belirtiliyor, Irak sınırı (Musul) konusunda Türk isteklerinin tatmin edileceği umudu dile getiriliyordu. Komisyon Başkanı Yusuf Kemal Bey, Lozan'da müzakereleri yürüten heyeti kutladı. Bazı mebuslar, Suriye sınırıyla ilgili hükümleri eleştirdiler ve Ankara Anlaşmasının Türkiye'nin bağımsızlığıyla bağdaşmadığını söylediler. Hamdullah Suphi sert bir konuşma yaptı ve Suriye sınırının barış için bir tehdit olduğunu savundu. Bu konuşma sırasında Albay Mougin de oradaydı. Trakya mebusları Batı Trakya üzerinde durdular ve bu toprakların Bulgarlara veya Yunanlılara değil, evlad-ı fatihan olan Anadolu Türklerine ait olduğunu söylediler. 22 Ağustos günlük oturumda, nüfus mübadelesi, borçların taksimi, ekonomik ve adli hükümler, Boğazlar sözleşmesi de tartışıldı, ama konuşmalar genellikle ılımlıydı. Bursa mebusu Necati Bey, Dünya Savaşı başında İngiltere'nin Türk gemilerine el koymuş olmasını, Çanakkale'de mezarlıklar konusunu eleştirdi, Musul'u terk edemeyiz dedi. 23 Ağustos günü İsmet Paşa uzun bir konuşma yaptı, Mustafa Kemal'e teşekkür etti, Antlaşmayı savundu.	258
149	5 Eylül	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ YETKİLİSİ SIR W. TYRRELL'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A SERVİS NOTU.	260

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		Ankara'da bir hafta geçirmiş olan tanınmış Amerikan gazetecisi Isaac Marcossan ile görüştim. Mustafa Kemal'in çok içtiği söylentilerinin doğru olmadığını; eşinin güzel, zeki, İngilizce ve Fransızca bilen ve siyasete katılmaya hevesli bir hanım olduğunu, kendisinin (Marcossan'ın) Mustafa Kemal'in vatansever kişiliğinden etkilendiğini söyledi. Mustafa Kemal, ülkesini kalkındırmak için Amerika'dan yardım umuyor, İngiltere'ye kuşkuyla bakıyormuş; Yeni Türkiye'nin gerçek kurucusunun Lloyd George olduğunu, onun İstanbul'a heykelini dikmek gerektiğini, çünkü Yunanlıları İzmir'e çıkarınca Türk milletinin vatani savunmak için ayaklandığını söylemiş. Amerikan gazeteci, Türkiye'deki yoğun vatanseverlik ve yabancı düşmanlığının Türkiye'nin ekonomik kalkınmasını destekleyeceğini, Ankara'nın başkent kalması için Mustafa Kemal'in ısrar edeceğini söylüyor.	
150	18 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 564. <i>General Townshend'in Türk basınına verdiği demec. Mustafa Kemal'e saygılarını sunmak için Ankara'ya gittiğini ve İstanbul'da bir yazlık satın alma niyetinde olduğunu söylüyor. General hakkındaki düşüncelerimi Adnan Bey'e bildirdim. Türk hükümetinin kendisine pek fazla önem vermediğini söyledi.</i>	262
Ek	15 Eylül	15 EYLÜL 1923 TARİHLİ "ORIENT NEW" GAZETESİNİN YAZISI. <i>General Townshend Türk basınına demec verdi. Türkiye'yi ziyaretinin ticari amaçlı olmadığını, Türkleri sevdiğini, Türk zaferinden sonra İngiltere'nin de şimdi "Turkophil" olduğunu ve ilerde Türkiye ile dost olmak istediğini, kapitülasyonların Türkiye'nin kalkınmasını desteklediğini söyledi. Townshend, Musul'un Türklere bırakılması gerektiğini vaktinde Hükümetine bildirdiğini de sözlerine ekliyor.</i>	263

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151	9 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 636. Mübadele Anlaşması gereğince Türkiye'ye gelecek Müslüman göçmenlere yardım için Mustafa Kemal İslam dünyasına çağrı yapmıştı. Bu defa Adnan Bey, yardım toplamak amacıyla Hindistan'a 2 veya 3 kişilik bir Kızılay heyeti göndermek için izin istediklerini bildirdi. Lozan Antlaşmasının İngiltere ve Dominyonları tarafından onaylanmasını beklemelelerini söyledim. Anlaşma yürürlüğe girince Türklerin bu isteği herhalde geri çevrilemez. Öyleyse şimdiden izin vermek yerinde olur. Adnan Bey heyetin insani amaçla gideceğini, politikaya karışmayacağını söyledi.	264
152	12 Ekim	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI DOĞU DAİRESİNE YAZI. NO. 6037/1A . GİZLİ <i>İsmet Paşa'ya saldırı. Mustafa Kemal, Adnan Bey'e bildiriyor: İsmet Paşa 20 Eylül günü kurdaki evinden zehre giderken, Maden Ocakları yanında saldırıya uğramıştır. Yolun iki tarafından çıkan birçok kişi tabancalarla Paşa'nın arabasına ateş etmişlerdir. Arabanın camları kırılmış, şoför hafif yaralanmış, İsmet Paşa ve yanında bulunan Maden Umum Müdürü Kenan Bey yara almadan kurtulmuşlardır. Saldırganlar, İsmet Paşa'nın arabasını benim (Mustafa Kemal'in) arabam sanmışlardır kanısındayım.</i>	265
153	16 Ekim	"SALTANAT" KOMİTESİ DELEGESİ (ESKİ) BURSA VALİSİ AZİZ NURİ BEY'DEN İNGİLTERE BAŞBAKANINA YAZI. ÖRNEK. Ankara'da Mustafa Kemal'in başkanlığında bir oligarşi kurmuş olanlar Osmanlılara zulmediyorlar. Siyasi nedenlerle ülkelerini terk etmiş olanların aileleri ülke içine sürülüyorlar. "Haccac-ı Zalim'e başkaldırmış olanların çocukları Türkiye'de zulüm görüyor. Komitemiz bu olayları uygar uluslara duyurarak protesto ediyor. Kemal'in boyunduruğu altında inleyen bir halkın çağrısına Hüküme-	266

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		tinizin sessiz kalmayacağını umarız. Bu yazımızın birer örneği Lozan Antlaşmasını imzalamış olan öteki ülkelere de gönderilecektir.	
154	17 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 663. <i>Ankara'nın başkent oluşu. Geçen hafta İsmet Paşa, Ankara'nın başkent yapılmasıyla ilgili bir karar tasarisını Meclise sundu ve tasarı 13 Ekim günü kabul edildi. İstanbul lehine pek az ses yükseldi. Yirmi mebus oylamada çekimser kaldı. Meclisin kararı yeni başkentte coşkuyla karşılandı. Şehir bayraklarla donatıldı, fener alayları düzenlendi ve 15 Ekim tarihi, "Ankara Günü" olarak resmen tatil ilan edildi. İttihatçı kalıntılarıyla Mustafa Kemal arasında işbirliği söylentileri doluyor. Bu arada her ikisi de Lozan Antlaşmasını onaylamış olan Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında maslahatgüzar düzeyinde diplomatik ilişkiler başlıyor. Böylece nüfus mübadelesi işi kolaylaşacak. Mübadele aslında başladı, 14 Ekim günü Midilli'den Ayvalık'a 1000 Müslüman mübadil geldi. Karadeniz kıyılarında da Yunanistan'a 3000 Rum gönderiliyor.</i>	267
155	17 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 665. <i>Ankara'nın başkent yapılması hakkında İsmet Paşa ve 11 arkadaşının 9 Ekim günü Meclise sundukları yasa tasarının gerekçesi. Meclis'te görüşülürken tasarıya karşı çıkan Gümüşhane mebusu Zeki Bey'in konuşması sık sık kesildi. Gelibolu mebusu Celal Nuri Bey, gelişmelerin Ankara'yı başkent yaptığını söyledi. İstanbul'un hür Türkiye'nin başkenti olmayacağını savundu. Tasarının kabul edilmesini istedi ve istediği oldu.</i>	269
156	31 Ekim	İNGİLTERE'NİN İSTANBUL YÜKSEK KOMİSER VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 702. <i>"Akşam" gazetesi, mübadiller için yardım toplamak üzere Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın bütün İslam ülkelere-</i>	271

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		rine Kızılay heyetleri göndermeye karar verdiğini, fakat şimdilik yalnız Hindistan'a ve Cava'ya bir heyet gönderileceğini yazdı.	
157	6 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİL-Cİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A TEL. NO. 515. GİZLİ. ... <i>Halife.</i> Ankara'nın talimatı üzerine Adnan Bey bugün Halifeyi ziyaret etti ve ona Bursa'ya veya Konya'ya gitmesini söyledi. Halife reddetti. Refet, Rauf gibi liderlerin son zamanlarda Halife ile yakın ilişki içinde olmaları Mustafa Kemal'i harekete geçirmiş olabilir. Görünüğe bakılırsa Mustafa Kemal, muhalefeti ezme istiyor.	271
158	7 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİL-Cİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 725. GİZLİ... <i>Halife.</i> Türkiye dışındaki Müslümanların yeni Halifeye bakışları. İngiltere'nin şu sırada Halifelik işine hiç karışmaması gerekir. Mustafa Kemal, Halife veya Padişah olmaz sanıyorum. Osmanlıların Halife üzerindeki hakları fetühlere dayanıyordu.	272
159	7 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİL-Cİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 729. GİZLİ... Türkiye hakkında 1922 için yıllık rapor ilişkide sunulmuştur.	273
Ek	—	İSTANBUL'DAKİ İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSER-LİĞİNCE HAZIRLANAN TÜRKİYE HAKKINDA 1922 İÇİN YILLIK RAPOR (KİSMEN) İçindekiler: i. Giriş, ii. Tarihçe: 1) Paris Mart teklifleri, İstanbul üzerinde Yunan darbesinin başarısızlığı, 2) Anadolu'da Yunan bozgunu ve Mudanya Anlaşması, 3). Saltanatın kaldırılması ve Merkezi Hükümetin devrilmesi. Padişahın kaçışı ve Milliyetçilerin İstanbul'u zaptetmeleri. Lozan Konferansı, iii. Dış ilişkiler, iv. İç politika, v. Panislamizm, vii. İstanbul'daki Ruslar, viii. Ökümenik Patrikhane, ix. E-	274

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kononomik ve ticari işler, x. Çalışma hayatı, xi. Adli sorunlar, xii. Askeri olaylar, xiii. Donanma.

I. Giriş:

Mustafa Kemal, bir elinde kılıç, öteki elinde Misak-ı Milli ile, pan-Helenizmin yıkıntıları üzerinde yeni Türkiye'yi yarattı. Bunun etkileri derin olacaktır. Türkiye'nin yeniden doğuşunun ve Avrupa'ya dönüşünün çeşitli nedenleri hakkındaki hükmü tarih verecektir.

II. Tarihçe:

Müttefikler, gecikmeyle ve güçlükle Paris'te vardıkları kararlar Mart 1922'de Türkiye'ye ve Yunanistan'a mütareke ve barış önerileri sundular. Önce mütareke yapılacak ve Yunanlılar İzmir'i boşaltmaya başlayacaktı. Edirne Yunanistan'da kalacaktı. Yunanistan kabul etti, ama Ankara Hükümeti şartlar öne sürdü, askeri kısıtlamaları ve Edirne'yi bırakmayı kabul etmedi. Haziran'da Yunan savaş gemileri Samsun'u bombaladılar. Temmuz'da Trakya'daki Yunan kuvvetleri İstanbul üzerine yürümeye kalkıştılar ve Müttefiklerin tepkiyle karşılaştılar. Yunanistan'ın bu darbe girişimi iflas etti.

Müttefikler yazışmalarla oyalanırken Türk milliyetçileri askeri hazırlıklarını tamamladılar; Yunanistan'ın Trakya'ya asker kaydırmasını da fırsat bildiler. Temmuz'da Londra'yı ziyaret eden Fethi Bey, Lord Curzon tarafından kabul edilmedi. 4 Ağustos'ta Lloyd George'un Avam Kamarası'nda yaptığı konuşma da Türkleri askeri harekate doğru itti. Mustafa Kemal, artık zamanı geldiğini düşünerek son darbeyi indirmeye karar verdi ve Türkler 27 (26 olacak) Ağustos sabahı taarruza geçtiler. Yunan Başkomutanı Tricoupis esir alındı ve Türk kuvvetleri 9 Eylülde İzmir'e girdiler, 11 Eylülde de Bursa "düştü". Yunan ordusu çekilirken geçtiği yerleri yakıp yıktı. Yunan bozgunu, Irak'ta, İstanbul'da ve Boğazlar bölgesinde İngilizleri tehlikeye soktu. Müttefikler, "tarafsız bölgenin" Türkler tarafından ihlal edilmesine göz yummayacaklarını açıkladılar.

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Türkler 16 Eylülde Bandırma'yı zapt ettiler, böylece Yunanlıların Anadolu'yu boşaltmaları tamamlanmış oldu. Aynı gün Başbakan (Lloyd George) gerektiğinde Türklere karşı kullanılmak üzere dominyonlardan asker istedi. Bu, hemen İngiliz-Fransız ilişkilerini elektriklendirdi. Fransa, Türklere karşı savaşa girmeyeceğini açıkladı, İngiliz Hükümetini savaş politikası gütmekle suçladı. İngiliz-Fransız tartışması günlerce sürdü, sonunda Müttefikler, mütareke için 23 Eylül'de Mustafa Kemal'e çağrı yaptılar ve Meriç'e kadar Trakya'nın ve Edirne'nin Türkiye'ye bırakılacağını da açıkladılar. 26 Eylül'de Yunanistan'da askeri darbe oldu. 3 Ekim'de Mudanya görüşmeleri başladı, 5 Ekim'de çıkmaza girdi, Müttefiklerin kendi aralarında görüşmeler yapıldı, sonra tekrar Türklere görüşmeler başladı ve 11 Ekim'de 'Mudanya Anlaşması' imzalandı. Yunanistan üç gün sonra yazılı bir deklarasyonla buna katıldı. Türkler, tek mermin atmadan Doğu Trakya'yı kazandılar. Müttefikler, Ankara Hükümetine Türkiye'nin gerçek hükümeti olarak kabul etmek zorunda kaldılar. Mudanya Anlaşması, Asya'nın Avrupa'ya karşı zaferi olarak görülebilir. Ama İngiltere direnmeseydi Yunan bozgunu Avrupa'ya da sıçratılırdı. Mütareke Anlaşması 15 Ekim'de yürürlüğe girdi.

Türk-Yunan savaşının ilk safhası böylece sona erince dikkatler Barış Konferansına çevrildi. Ankara Hükümeti, konferans yeri olarak İzmir'i, konferans tarihi olarak da 20 Ekim'i önerdi. Sonunda Lozan şehri ve 13 Kasım tarihi üzerinde karar kılındı ve İstanbul Hükümeti'ne de davetiye gönderildi. Ankara Hükümeti konferans davetini kabul etti, ama İstanbul Hükümeti katılırsa Ankara Hükümetinin katılmayacağını açıkladı. İngiltere, önceden Müttefikler arasında bir ortak cephe kurulması için konferans tarihini 20 Kasım'a erteletti ve Lozan Barış Konferansı bu tarihte açıldı. İstanbul'a gelince, Ankara Hükümeti önce İzmit bölgesinin kontrolünü ele geçirdi ve buradaki İstanbul Hükümeti memurlarını değiştirdi. 19 Ekim'de Refet Paşa İs-

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		<p>tanbul'a geldi ve İstanbul'a Millî İdareyi empoze etti. TBMM, İstanbul Hükümeti'nce 1920'den beri imzalanmış olan bütün anlaşma, sözleşme ve kararları geçersiz saydı. İstanbul Hükümeti de barış konferansına çağırılınca, Refet Paşa 29 Ekim'de Padişaha çıktı ve İstanbul Hükümeti'ni azletmesini istedi. Padişah, nazırlarıyla görüşeceğini söyledi. 1 Kasım'da TBMM saltanatı kaldırdı ve İstanbul Hükümeti tarihe karıştı. Refet Paşa <i>de facto</i> İstanbul Valisi oldu. 6 Kasım'da Ali Kemal kaçırıldı ve İzmir'te öldürüldü. Bunun üzerine hayatlarını tehlikede gören 150 kadar Türk, İngiliz Büyükelçiliği bahçesine sığındı. Osmanlı Hristiyanları ve Rumlar da İstanbul'dan göç etmeye başladı. O zaman Osmanlı Padişahı da İstanbul'dan kaçma zamanının geldiğine karar verdi. Padişah, 16 Kasım günü General Harington'a gönderdiği özel bir mektupla, İstanbul'da hayatını tehlikede gördüğünden İngiltere'ye sığındığını bildirdi ve en kısa zamanda başka bir yere götürülmesini istedi. 17 Kasım sabahı saat 08.00'de Yıldız Sarayı'nın yan kapısından alınan Padişah, Tophane deniz üssündeki "Malaya" gemisine bindirildi ve Malta adasına gönderildi. İstanbul'u terk etmeden önce Padişah tahtından feragat etmediğini de açıkça belirtti. TBMM ertesi gün Veliaht Şehzade Abdülmecid Efendi'yi Halife seçti. Refet Paşa'nın İstanbul'a gelişinden sonra, birkaç hafta içinde Saltanat lağvedildi, İstanbul Hükümeti devrildi, Padişah yurt dışına kaçmak durumunda kaldı ve İstanbul'da Müttefiklerin askeri yönetiminin yanında Ankara Hükümetinin sivil yönetimi kuruldu ve Müttefiklerin yönetimi git gide kısıtlandı. Kapitülasyonların tanınmamasına doğru gidildi. Yabancı şirketlerin Türk şirketler kanununa göre tescil edilmeleri, yabancıların belediye vergisi ödemeleri, yabancı savaş gemilerinin Türk limanlarına, özellikle İzmir limanına girmemeleri istendi. Lozan Konferansında da, zorluklarla karşılaşıldı ve altı haftalık müzakerelerden sonra konferansın kesilmesi ihtimali arttı. Türkiye, Misak-ı Milli'yi tam olarak gerçekleştirmek</p>	

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istiyor ve söylentilere göre geniş çaplı askeri hazırlıklar yapıyordu.

III. Dış İlişkiler:

Ankara Hükümetinin dış politikası, Misak-ı Milliye tanı olarak gerçekleştirmek hedefine yönelikti.

İngiltere: Baş düşman idi; Sevr antlaşmasından, Yunanlıların İzmir'e çıkarılmasından, İstanbul'un işgalinden, Malta sürgünlerinden sorumlu tutuluyordu. Kemalistler, Anadolu'da Yunanistan'a karşı kazandıkları zaferi aynı zamanda İngiltere'ye karşı da kazanılmış gibi gösterdiler. Yunan yenilgisi İngiliz prestijini de ciddi olarak sarıttı. Hristiyan azınlıkların kaderi de İngiliz prestijine ağır bir darbe oldu. İngiltere, İzmir'in "düşmesinden" sonraki sert tutumu ile kaybettiği prestijinin bir bölümünü tekrar kazandı. Türkiye'de sönmüş olan İngiliz taraftarlığı yeniden şekillenmeye başladı. Lloyd George'un devrilmesi ve İngiltere'de muhafazakârların iktidara gelmesi, İngiltere'nin Türkiye politikasının kökten değişeceğine dair Türkleri umutlandırdı. Yıl sonuna doğru İngiliz dostluğuna dönüş arzularının bazı belirtileri görüldü. Ama İngiltere'ye karşı nefret duyguları derin kök salmış olduğundan bunların değişmesi yıllar alacaktır.

Fransa: 1922 yılında Ankara-Paris ilişkileri dostça idi. Franklin-Bouillon 1921 yılında Ankara ile anlaşma imzalamakla Müttefikler arasında ayrılık tohumları attı. Fransa'nın Ankara'da, Ankara Hükümetinin de Paris'te gayri resmi temsilcileri vardı. (Albay Mougin ve Ferit Bey). Mustafa Kemal, İzmir'te, Claude Farrère'e demeç verdi. Eylül'de General Pellé, sonra Franklin Bouillon İzmir'de Mustafa Kemal'i ziyaret ettiler. Fransız Hükümeti, Afrika kolonilerinde Müslüman sorunlarından ürküyordu. Türk milliyetçileri ise amaçlarına ulaşınca Fransızların dostluğuna artık gerek duymaz oldular. Fransızları döneklilikle suçladılar. Yılın sonuna doğru Türk-Fransız ilişkilerinin havası değişti.

İtalya: Türkiye'ye karşı hiç düşmanca davranmadı; Yunanistan'dan nefret eden İtalyan kitleleri Mus-

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		<p>tafa Kemal'in yanındaydı. İtalya'nın tek amacı ekonomik avantajlar elde etmektir. Türk milliyetçilerine İtalya'dan askeri malzeme sağlandı.</p> <p><i>Diger ülkeler:</i> Ankara'nın diğer Avrupa ülkeleriyle temasları azdı (Rusya hariç). ABD ise faaldi ve Türkiye ile ticaretini geliştirmeye çalışıyordu. Amerikan eğitim ve misyoner kuruluşları da Anadolu'da faaliyetinde idi. 1922 başında Türk dış politikası Sovyet Rusya'ya dönmüştü, ama Moskova'nın Ankara'ya politika dikte etmesine de izin verilmiyordu. Türkiye'nin Sovyet parasına ve askeri malzemesine ihtiyacı olduğu sürece Rus ittifakı Türk dış politikasının temel taşıydı. Rus Büyükelçisi Aralov Ankara'da etkiliydi. Ama Türkiye, hareket serbestisini korudu, Türklerle Ruslar arasında sürtüşmeler de eksik olmuyordu ve Mayıs'ta Moskova'da bir olay yaşandı, Büyükelçi Ali Fuat Paşa geri çekildi. Aralov'un özür dilemesiyle olay kapandı. Yıl sonuna doğru Türkiye, Rusya'ya dönük politikasını terk etmeyi düşünmeye başladı. Yıl içinde Ankara ile Tahran arasında diplomatik ilişkiler başladı. İran Büyükelçisi Mümtaz-ed-Devlet, Mustafa Kemal'e güven mektubunu sundu. Kemalist temsilci olarak da Muhiddin Paşa Tahran'a atandı. Ankara Hükümeti ile Afganistan arasındaki ilişkiler, 1 Mart 1921 tarihli İttifak Antlaşması ile düzenlendi. Karşılıklı diplomatik temsilcilikler açıldı. TBMM Hükümeti ile Kafkas ülkeleri arasındaki ilişkiler 13 Mart 1921 günü imzalanan Kars antlaşmasıyla düzenlendi. Ama bu ülkeler gititçe Moskova'nın emrine girdiler. Şubat'ta Galib Paşa Buhara'ya Kemalist Büyükelçi olarak gönderildiyse de orada çok kalamadı ve Temmuz'da geri döndü. Bu arada Mart ayında Hamdullah Suphi Bey de Türkistan'a gönderilmek istendi, ama Ruslar onun Kafkasya'ya girişine izin vermediler. Azerbaycan Hükümetini Ankara'da İbrahim Abilov temsil etti. Ukrayna ile 2 Ocak'ta Antlaşma imzalandı ve 24 Haziran'da onay belgeleri Harkov'da teati edildi.</p>	

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Yılın ilk on ayında Türkiye'de iki hükümet vardı. Ankara'da *de facto* Hükümet ve İstanbul'da, Müttefiklerin *de jure* Hükümet saydıkları Padişahın Hükümeti. İstanbul Hükümeti, Müttefik işgali sayesinde avakta duruyordu ve Mudanya'da fiilen ömrünü tamamladı. 4 Kasım'da son sadrazam Tevfik Paşa'nın istifasıyla da İstanbul, yeni Türkiye'nin sıradan bir vilayet merkezi oldu. Ankara'daki iç durum iki ana faktörün etkisi altındaydı: a) Mustafa Kemal'in ihtirası ve b) zafere kadar milli birliği koruma zarureti. Birlik korunuyordu ama zaman zaman TBMM ile Mustafa Kemal arasında sürtüşmeler de oluyordu. 1921 sonuna doğru Mecliste Gazi Paşa'ya karşı muhalefet de bulunduğu ortaya çıktı. Parlamentoda üç parti olduğu anlaşıyordu: Kemalistler, Enverciler ve Saltanatçılar. Şubat'ta Mustafa Kemal yeniden TBMM Başkanı seçildi. Mayıs'ta da Başkomutanlık görevi teyid edildi. Bu arada istifalar da oluyordu. Mustafa Kemal'in en ciddi rakibi olan Rauf Bey de Meclis Başkanlığına seçildi. Mustafa Kemal'in prestiji azalmağa başlıyordu. Yunanistan'a karşı kazanılan zafer, Mustafa Kemal'in prestijini yeniden yüceltti. Onun en sadık adamı İsmet Paşa Mudanya'ya gönderildi ve sonra Dışişleri Bakanı yapıldı. 1 Kasım'da Saltanat kaldırıldı. Bu karar herkesi hoşnut etmedi ve Mustafa Kemal'in gizli karşıtlarının sayısını artırdı. Şerîye Vekili Abdullah Azmi Efendi istifa etti. Muhalefetin cüreti artı. Seçim kanunu değiştirilirken Mustafa Kemal'i seçilme hakkından mahrum bırakma girişimi oldu. Yine de Mustafa Kemal'in iradesi yıl boyunca Ankara'ya egemen idi. Türkiye'yi tek adam yönetecekse Mustafa Kemal rakipsizdir.

V. Panislamizm:

Arap ülkelerinin Türk hakimiyetinden kopmaları İslam dünyasını böldü. Ama Panislamizm düşüncesi yine de Türk milliyetçilerinin elinde başlıca silah idi. 1922 başında İran'da, Hindistan'da ve Mısır'da bir ölçüde başarı da kazandılar. 1921 yılında im-

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zalanın Türkiye-Afganistan anlaşmasıyla da İslam dünyasında Türkiye'nin liderliği tanındı. Rusya da İslam birliğinden kazanç sağlayabileceğini hesapladı ve bazı girişimlerde bulundu. Ankara Hükümeti, Ankara'da Mart ayında bir Pan-İslam kongresi toplama hazırlıkları yaptı, bütün İslam ülkeleri davet edildi, ama kongre gerçekleşmedi. Temmuz'da bir Pan-Asya kongresi toplama çalışmaları yapıldıysa da bundan bir sonuç çıkmadı. Bu arada Rusya, Panislamizmin kendisine karşı da kullanılabilceğini fark etti ve Baktı, Buhara, Semerkand ve Hive'deki Türk propaganda komitelerini ortadan kaldırdı ve Anadolu'da komünist propaganda kampanyasına ağırlık verdi. 1 Kasım'da Saltanatın kaldırılması, 17 Kasım'da Padişahın İstanbul'dan kaçması ve Abdülmecid Efendinin, dünyevi yetkileri olmayan Halife seçilmesi Sünni Müslümanların çoğunluğu tarafından bir olup-bitti olarak kabul edildi.

VII. İstanbul'daki Ruslar:

İstanbul'daki Rus mültecileri sorununu halletmek için hızlı gelişmeler oldu ve mültecilerin sayısı Kasım ayında 28.000'e düştü. Milletler Cemiyeti bu mültecileri başka ülkelere sevk cümeye uğraşırken İstanbul'da kalanlara da çeşitli kuruluşlarca yardım edildi. Ancak para sıkıntısı çekildi. ABD 30.000 dolar, İngiltere de 10.000 £ sağladı. Bu sayede bazı mülteci kampları boşaltıldı. Büyüka'daki kamp için ödenmesi gereken tazminat işi halen askıdadır.

VIII. Ökumenik Patrikhane:

Venizelos taraftarları 18 Aralık 1921'de Mgr. Meletios Metaxakis'i Patrik seçtirmeyi başardılar. Türk Hükümeti bu seçimi geçersiz saydı. Yine de Meletios, 6 Şubat'ta Patriklik tahuna oturdu. Ama Yunan Kilisesi bu sonucu tanımadı. Patrik, Venizelos taraftarları ile Kral Konstantin taraftarları arasındaki zıtlığı gidermeye çalıştı. Sonra dikkatini Anadolu Rumlarına çevirdi ve Yunan ordusunun Anadolu'yu boşatması tasarılarına karşı

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direnen "Küçükasya Hareketi"ne destek verdi. İngilizler tarafından uyarıldı. İstanbul Hükümetinin devrilmesi üzerine Patrik, yeni duruma ayak uydurmaya çalıştı, af diledi, yalnız Rumların değil, "Ortodoks Türklerin" de patriği olduğunu söyledi ve patrik olarak kaldı.

IX. Ekonomik ve Ticari İşler:

I. Aşama:

A) *İstanbul Hükümeti Rejimi*: Karşılaşılan çeşitli ekonomik sorunlardan biri, Yanıcı Sıvıların Depolanması kanun tasarısıyla ilgiliydi. Bu tasarı Müttefik delegelerce hazırlanıp İstanbul Hükümetine sunuldu. Ankara'nın gölgesini hisseden İstanbul Hükümeti, bu tasarıyı yayınlamakta pasif davrandı. Yüksek Komiserler sonunda 15 Ekim'e kadar süre tanıdı. Sonra bir İtfaiye vergisi tasarısı hazırlandı. Yangın sigortası yapan bazı şirketler toplanacak İtfaiye vergisi üzerinde hak sahibi olmak istediklerinden bu tasarıdan da sonuç çıkmadı. Diğer bir sorun Belediye Vergileri sorunuydu. Merkezi Hükümet, Ankara'dan çekindiği için, toplanacak vergi üzerinde her türlü Müttefik denetimine veya gözetimine karşı çıktı. Müttefik delegelerden ve Düyunu Umumiye delegelerinden oluşan Karma Komisyon, çeşitli kanun tasarılarını inceledi. 1922 yılında yeni vergiler yürürlüğe girdi, zaten var olan bazı vergi kanunlarında değişiklikler yapıldı. Yeni vergilerin toplanmasında bazı güçlüklerle karşılaşıldı. Uyuşturucu madde kontrolüyle ilgili olarak hazırlanan düzenlemeler Yüksek Komiserlerce onaylandı. Gümrük vergileriyle ilgili çeşitli talepler ve şikâyetler halledildi.

B) *Yunan (İşgal) Yönetiminin Ekonomik Duruma Etkisi*: Anadolu ve Trakya'daki Yunan işgali, ticareti doğrudan etkiledi. İşgal edilen bölgelerde vergilerin toplanması işi Düyunu Umumiye'ye bırakıldı. Trakya'nın tahıl ürünlerinin tamamı Yunanistan'a götürüldü, Karadeniz limanlarıyla İstanbul arasında çalışan Türk gemilerine Yunan donanması müdahale etti, Yunan işgal makamları, Marmara'nın

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Anadolu kıyılarında toplanan gümrük vergilerine ve Ayvacık zeytin yağına el koydu ve drahmiyi zorla tedavil ettirdi. Bu konularda Yüksek Komiserler zaman zaman girişimlerde bulundular.

C) *Kemalist Rejim*: Anadolu'da kurulan Kemalist rejim, ekonomik bakımdan İstanbul Hükümetinin idaresi altındaki bölgeleri yabancı bir ülke gibi saydı ve oralarından gelen mallara ağır gümrük tarifeleri ve hatta yasaklar uyguladı. TBMM 1921 yılında korumacı eğilimi gösterdi ve bir çok maldan özel gümrük vergisi alındı.

II. Aşama:

1) *İstanbul'da TBMM Rejiminin Kurulması*: Anadolu'daki Yunan bozgunu yalnız Yunanlılar için değil, aynı zamanda yabancı tüccar ve girişimci için de bir felaket oldu. Yürüyen Türk (Boğazlar bölgesinde) durdurulmamış olsaydı İstanbul'da durum daha da ciddiyet kazanacaktı. Refet Paşa'nın İstanbul'da yaptığı ilk işlerden biri, TBMM tarafından çıkarılmış kanunları derhal yürürlüğe koymak oldu. Bu uygulama ticaret çevrelerinde şaşkınlık yarattı ve birçok zarara sebep oldu. TBMM kanunları İstanbul'da uygulanınca birçok ithal malın gümrük vergileri kat kat artırıldı, "lüks malların" ithali yasaklandı, yabancı okullara ve dini kuruluşlara tanınmış olan vergi bağışıklıkları kaldırıldı, kapitülasyonlar yok sayılınca tüccarın depolarında ve yabancı gemilerde kaçak mal aramalarına olanak sağlandı, Türkiye'de depo edilmiş mallarını yurt dışına çıkarmak isteyen tüccardan depozito istendi...Yüksek Komiserlerin protestoları ve Lozan'daki girişimler sonucu uygulamada bazı yumuşamalar sağlanabildi. Fransızlarla karşılaştırmınca yeni rejimden İngiliz tüccarı daha az zarar gördü. TBMM, Nisan 1922'de tüketim vergileriyle ilgili yasalarda değişiklikler yapmıştı. Buna göre, şeker, kahve, çay, benzin, kibrit, balmumu, sigara kağıdından alınan tüketim vergileri artırıldı. Şu mallardan da tüketim vergisine tabi tutuldu: piring, margarin, mum, sabun, çuval, baharat, Bisküvi, çi-

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kolata, helva gibi mallardan da kilo başına 15 kuruş tüketim alınmaya başlandı. Un, buğday gibi mallara da tüketim vergisi ve yüksek gümrük vergisi uygulanması bir ara şehirde panik yarattı, fakir halk fırınlara hücum etti. Bunun üzerine zaruri ihtiyaç maddelerinden alınan vergiler değiştirildi ve bunun sonucu ekmeek fiyatları düştü.

2) *Yabancı Şirketlerin Tescili*: Kasım sonunda, basın aracılığıyla yabancı şirketlere tebligat yapıldı. Bu şirketlerin, Kasım 1914 tarihli geçici kanun gereğince tescil ettirilmeleri ve bunun için Ankara'daki İktisat Vekâleti ile temas etmeleri istendi. Yüksek Komiserler, kapitülasyonlar var oldukça yabancı şirketlerin Türk kanununa göre tescilinin istenemeyeceğini belirttiler ve toplantılar yaptılar. Şirketler arasında görüş ayrılıkları da vardı. Bazı Fransız şirketleri tescil ettirilmiş, tescil ettirilmeyen iki şirketin faaliyeti durdurulmuş idi. Çoğunluk tescilden yana idi. Şirketlere, çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket etmeleri tavsiye edildi. Aynı zamanda Yüksek Komiserler resmen protestoda bulundular ve şirketlerin bayanlarının Lozan'da imzalanan Barış Antlaşmasının ekonomik hükümlerini etkilemeyeceği belirtildi. Kasım 1914 tarihli geçici kanunun barış antlaşmasına kadar uygulanmaması istendi.

3) *Sıhhiye vergisi, Yabancı Markaların Tescili, Aşırı Satış Kazançları vergisi*. Aralık ayında yapılan açıklamayla, Anadolu'da uygulanmakta olan sıhhiye vergisinin İstanbul'da da uygulanacağı duyuruldu. Böyle bir vergi meşru değildi. Ama Deniz Ticaret Odası Başkanı M. Fonzi, buna karşı çıkmanın zor olduğunu belirtti ve dolayısıyla istenen vergiyi ödemeleri ilgili şirketlere tavsiye edildi. İstanbul'da yeni rejim kurulunca, İstanbul Hükümeti'nin 13 Mart 1920'den beri tescil etmiş olduğu 100 patent hakkı ile 583 adet ticaret marka sertifikası geçersiz sayıldı ve iptal edildi. Bu yeni durum Lozan'da Müttefik delegasyonların dikkatlerine sunuldu. Bu arada yaz saati uygulaması da 1923 yılında kaldırıldı. TBMM'nin çıkardığı kanunların arasında aşırı

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		rı harp kazançları vergisiyle ilgili 25 Ekim 1920 tarihli kanun da var. Buna dayanarak Türkler, savaş içinde Türkiye'de iş yapmış yabancı vatandaşlarından ve yabancı şirketlerden de aşırı harp kazancı vergisi almak istiyorlar. İstanbul'da 110 Yunan ve 21 Ermeni şirketi kapandı; birçok yabancı şirket ithalatını kısıtladı. Milliyetçi rejim, yabancı şirketlere ve yabancı mallara karşı başka önlemler de aldı: Gayri müslim aracı ve komisyoncuların tasfiyesi, Türk kanunlarına uymayan ve Türkçe kullanmayan yabancı şirketlerin boykot edilmesi vs. gibi. Ayrıca yabancı ve gayri müslim şirketlerin yerini almak üzere yeni Türk ihracat ve ithalat şirketleri kuruluyor. Durum halen bu merkezdedir. İzmir İktisat Kongresi dolayısıyla da "Ekonomik Misak-ı Milli" den bahsediliyor. "İleri" gazetesi, "Ekonomik misak" başlıklı bir makale yayınladı. İngilizler ve bütün yabancılar anlamalıdır ki, yeni Türkiye, savaş öncesindeki Türkiye'den çok farklı olacaktır, diyor.	

X. Çalışma Hayatı:

(1) *Hamallar Birliği*: Meşrutiyet'in ilk yıllarında gümrük hamalları İttihat ve Terakki saflarına kazandırılmış ve gümrük hamallığı işi Ermeni hamalların elinden alınmıştı. Bu birlik veya lonca, Kürt hamallardan oluşuyor ve son olarak işi daha da ileri götürdü ve yalnız gümrüktekileri değil, İstanbul'daki bütün hamallık işlerini ele geçirmeye ve bir tekel oluşturmaya yöneldi. Ama işlerinde bölünme oldu.

(2) *Mavnacılar Birliği*: Bu birlik veya lonca da çoğunlukla Karadenizli Lazlardan oluşuyor. Bu birlik, kendi özel mavnacıları olan yabancı şirketlere de musallat oldu. İrili ufaklı başka işçi birlikleri de var: Fırıncı, bakkal, kasap işçileri birlikleri gibi. Bunlar hepsi bir konfederasyon oluşturuyor. Bunlar, çalışma hayatını da Müslümanların tekeline almağa çalışıyorlar. Amele Birliğinin başında Mustafa Kemal'in dostu olduğu söylenen Mehmet Bey adında biri vardır. Bu birlik ayrıntılı bir prog-

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rama saldıptır. İttihat ve Terakki Partisi, kendi kontrolü altında güçlü işçi örgütlerinin yararlı bir faktör olduğu görüşündeydi. Aynı görüş herhalde Mustafa Kemal ve Halk Partisi tarafından da paylaşılmaktadır.

XI. Adli Sorunlar:

Müttefikler, kendi vatandaşları ile Türk vatandaşları arasındaki davalara bakmak üzere İstanbul'da bir Karma Adli Komisyon ve bir de Müttefiklerarası Askeri Mahkeme kurmuşlardı. Bu olağanüstü mahkemeler İngiliz, Fransız ve İtalyan yargıçlardan oluşuyordu. Ankara Hükümeti Hariciye Vekili 18 Ocak 1922 tarihli bir telgrafla bu mahkemeleri illegal saydıklarını bildirdi. Buna rağmen mahkemeler çalışmalarına devam ettiler. İstanbul'da TBMM rejimi kurulunca, yeni Hükümet, Karma Adli Komisyonun çalışmalarını 6 Kasım'da yasakladı. Müttefiklerle Kemalistler arasında varılan bir anlaşma gereğince Müttefiklerarası Askeri Mahkeme çalışmalarını sürdürdü, ancak artık Türk vatandaşlarını yargılayamıyor. Elllerinde tutuklu bulunan Türk vatandaşları Türk mahkemelerine devredildi.

XII. Askeri Olaylar:

Eylül 1921'de Türk ve Yunan kuvvetleri arasında çarpışmalar durmuş ve taraflar savunmaya çekilmişlerdi. Yunan kuvvetleri, Bursa grubu ve İzmir Grubu diye ikiye ayrılıyordu. Türk kuvvetleri de bunların 2-4 mil karşısında savunma mevzilerindeydi. Bu durgunluğu fırsat bilen Müttefikler, Şubat 1922'de diplomatik girişimlere başladılar ve mütareke teklifleri hazırladılar. Bu teklifler, barış yapıldıktan sonra Anadolu'nun Yunanistan tarafından boşaltulmasını ve doğu Trakya'nın bir bölümünün Türkiye'ye geri verilmesini öngörüyordu. Yunanistan teklifleri kabule hazır, Türkiye ise şartlar öne sürdü. Bu arada Yunan kuvvetleri komuta kademesinde değişiklikler oldu. General Papoulas'ın yerine General Hajianestis, Anadolu'da Yunan Başkomutanlığına getirildi ve Trak-

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ya'daki kuvvetler de kendisine bağlandı. Yeni Başkomutan, İstanbul'a karşı bir hareket yapma düşüncesiyle, Temmuz ayında iki kolorduyu Trakya'ya kaydırıldı. Türkler, artık harekete geçme zamanı geldiğine karar verdiler. 26 Ağustos'ta Afyonkarahisar cephesinde Türk taarruzu başladı ve başarıyla gelişti. 30 Ağustos'ta Yunan bozgunu tamamlandı. Müttefik kuvvetler Türk tehdidi karşısında kaldı. İzmir'den kuzeye yürüyen Türk kolordusu, 22 Eylül'de Çanakkale'de İngiliz kuvvetlerinin önüne geldi. Gergin anlar başladı, Türklerle İngilizlerin vuruşmalarına ramak kaldı. Gerginlik 5 Ekim'de Mudanya Konferansı ile sona erdi. Mütareke hükümleri gereğince Yunanistan, Meriç nehrine kadar doğu Trakya'yı boşalttı. Lozan'da barış yapıluncaya kadar İstanbul'un müttefik işgali altında kalması da kabul edildi.

XIII. Donanma:

4 Kasım'da Bahriye Nazırı Salih Paşa istifa etti, Nezaretin üst kademelerine Ankara yanlısı bahriyeliler getirildi ve bunlar Kaptan Nazmi Bey tarafından yönetiliyordu. Bu subay, Müttefik baskısı sonucu görevden alındı. Limanlarda Müttefik kontrolü devam etti. Ticaret gemilerine Müttefik kısıtlamaları yıl içinde gevşetildi. Yunan donanmasının İstanbul'da üslenmesi ve buradan harekete Karadeniz ve Marmara kıyılarında faaliyette bulunması Türklerin sürekli protestolarına neden oluyordu. Yunan donanması 7 Haziran'da da Samsun'u bombaladı. Mudanya Sözleşmesinden ve Yunan kuvvetlerinin doğu Trakya'yı boşaltmalarından sonra Yunan donanması nihayet İstanbul'u terk etti. Akdeniz'deki İngiliz donanması da İstanbul yakınlarında üsleniyordu. Bazı İngiliz savaş gemileri de İzmir'de bulunuyordu ve Kemalist kuvvetlerin İzmir'e girişleri sırasında İngiliz vatandaşlarının boşaltılmalarına yardımcı oldular.

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Ek:		<i>TBMM'nce Kabul Edilen 1 Kasım 1922 tarihli Karar Metni</i>	354
		Hilafet ve Saltanatın birbirinden ayrılarak Saltanatın lağı hakkında Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Kararının çevirisi. "Millet mukadderatını doğru- dan doğruya eline aldı ve millî saltanat ve hakimiyetini bir şahısta değil, bütün fertleri tarafından seçilmiş vekillerden oluşan bir Meclis-i Âlide temsil etti. İşte o Meclis, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisidir. Milletin saltanat ve hakimiyet makamı yalnız ve ancak Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisidir."	
160	9 Kasım	İNGİLTERE'NİN MIDILLİ VİSKONSOLOSUNDAN ATİNA MASLAHATGÜZARI BENTINCK'E YAZI. GİZLİ..... "Anadolu İhtilâl Komitesi". Bu komitenin başı Rafet Efendi adında bir Türk'tür. İzmir'de Kemalistler aleyhinde "Köylü" gazetesini çıkarmıştır. Hareketin karargâhı, eski Adliye Nazırı Hoca Vasfi efendinin yönetiminde Bükreş'e taşınmış. Komitenin İstanbul'daki önemli üyeleri Rauf Bey ile Rahmi Beydir. Atina'daki temsilcileri Eşref ve Reşit Beyler, Anadolu'dakiler de Nureddin Paşa ile Ali İhsan Paşadır. Rahmi Bey, barış yapıldıktan sonra Mustafa Kemal'i devirmek için harekete geçileceğini buradaki (Midilli'deki) Rafet Efendiye yazmıştır. Bu bilgiler, Midilli'de oturan Halil İbrahim adındaki bir Kıbrıslıdan edinilmiştir. Verdiği bilgiler oldukça güvenilirdir. Bunlar Midilli'deki bir Ermeni mülteci tarafından da kısmen doğrulanmıştır. Yunan Hükümeti, anti-Kemalist Türk mültecilerine cömertçe destek veriyor.	355
161	20 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 756..... Temsilciler ve başkent Ankara. Adnan Bey, Londra temsilcilğine atanan Yusuf Kemal Bey'e güven mektubu gerekip gerekmediğini sordu. Barış antlaşması onaylanıncaya kadar buna gerek olmadığını bildirdim. Ama Dışişleri Bakanından size bir mektup götüreceği anlaşılıyor. Adnan Bey, Türki-	357

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		ye'ye İngiliz temsilcisinin ne zaman atanacağını sordu. Temsilcinin yeni başkent Ankara'da mı oturmasının isteneceği konusundaki görüşlerini yokladım. Kesin bir şey söylemedi. Durum karmaşıktır. Bir yandan yabancı temsilcilerin ilke olarak başkentte oturmalarını, böylece Mustafa Kemal'in hoşnut edilmesini tercih edeceklerdir. Diğer yandan da başkent olarak Ankara'nın eksikleri de ortadadır ve fiziki imkansızlıklar apaçıktır. Adnan Bey, Elçilikler inşa etmeleri için yabancı ülkelere bedava arsa verileceğini tekrarladı. Mustafa Kemal başta kaldıkça Ankara'da yıllarca başkent olarak kalacaktır. Saltanat diriltilmezse Mustafa Kemal'den sonra bile belki Ankara başkent kalabilir. Bu geçiş döneminde Müttefiklerin önerileri ne olacaktır? Onların Türkiye'ye atayacakları temsilciler Elçi mi, Büyükelçi mi olacak? Bu temsilciler İstanbul'da mı oturacak, yoksa Ankara'ya mı taşınacaklar? Barış antlaşması yürürlüğe girince Ankara Hükümeti'yle yakın ilişki kurulacağından, Ankara'da arsa edinmeyi şimdiden düşünmek yerinde olur.	
162	20 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 757. <i>Cumhuriyetin ilanı ve genel siyasi durum. Cumhuriyet ilanının ardından şiddetli tartışmalar başladı. Mustafa Kemal'e karşı olan muhalefet liderleri kendi aralarında toplanıyor ve İstanbul'da yeterli destek buluyorlar. Ama Mustafa Kemal Ankara'ya hakim. 10 Kasım'da Kâzım Karabekir Paşa İstanbul'a geldi ve onun buradaki hareketlerine basın geniş yer verdi. 12 Kasım'da Halifeyi ziyaret etti. Ertesi gün Rauf Bey ve Refet Paşa ile buluştu ve her üçü de demeçler verdiler. Söylentilere göre, Refet Paşa Paris'e, Rauf Bey muhtemelen Washington'a, Rıza Nur da Berlin'e Büyükelçi atanacaklarını. Halifelik konusu ve bugünkü Halifenin durumu kamuoyunu meşgul ediyor. Mustafa Kemal kamuoyunu deniyor ve şimdilik gelişmeleri seyrediyor. Halifenin aylık ödeneğini 26.000 lira-</i>	361

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		dan 50.000 liraya çıkarılmasını istediği söyleniyor. Bu, Halifeyi gözden düşürmek için çıkarılmış bir söylenti de olabilir. Ankara ile İstanbul arasındaki sürtüşme devam ediyor. Son olarak Ankara Basın Müdürü Zekeriya Bey görevden alındı. Hükümette en az eleştirilen İsmet Paşa'dır. Yunanistan'da Müslümanlara baskı yapıldığı iddiası bütün Türk basınında yer alıyor. 15 Kasım'da Ankara'da bir protesto mitingi düzenlendi. 24 Kasım'da da İstanbul'da benzer bir miting öngörülüyor. Cumhuriyetin ilanı ileriye doğru atılmış ihtilalci bir adım olmakla beraber, anayasa açısından kabine sistemine döndürür ki, iki yıl önce Mustafa Kemal bu sisteme karşıydı. Ankara'da Türk-Arnavut müzakereleri aniden kesildi. Oysa antlaşma 18 Kasım'da törenle imzalanacaktı. Öte yandan Macarlar, Avusturyalılar ve Amerikalılar ile müzakereler devam ediyor. Türk kamuoyu, Lozan antlaşmasının onaylanmasındaki gecikmeden kaygılanıyor. Geri çekilmiş olan Erivan'daki Türk temsilcisinin geri döneceği ileri sürüldüyse de doğrulanmadı. Türk kamuoyu, dış ilişkilerle değil, daha çok iç sorunlarla ilgileniyor. Muhafızlar toparlanabilseler belki Mustafa Kemal'i devirebilirler, ama Mustafa Kemal değişen durumlara uyum sağlamakta uzadır.	
163	17 Aralık	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ RAPORU CX/ 9092 / 1 A. <i>Türkiye'nin Hilafet politikasına muhalefet.</i> Filistin Araplarının üç lideri Mustafa Kemal'e mektuplar yazmışlar ve Halifelik makamının itibarının korunmasını istemişler, yoksa İslam dünyasının bu makama, Kral Hüseyin gibi başka bir Halife adayı çıkaracağını söylemişlerdir. Filistin'den ve Mısır ulemasından bu gibi uyarılardan dolayı olacak, Ankara Hükümeti, bir İslam Kongresi toplanmasına gerek kalmadığını Türkiye dışındaki İslam kuruluşlarına duyurmuştur.	366
164	28 Aralık	HİNDİSTAN GENEL VALİLİĞİ SEKRETERİN- DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINA TEL.	366

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		Mustafa Kemal'i destekleyen mebuslardan Rasih Efendi Başkanlığındaki Türk Kızılay heyeti Hindistan'a hareket edebilir.	
	1924		
165	2 Ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 12. İstiklâl Mahkemesi 27 Aralık günü Lütfi Fikri Beyi beş yıl hapse mahkum etti. Suçu, Saltanat ve Hilafet ile ilgili 1 Kasım 1922 tarihli TBMM kararına karşı gelmektir. Gazetecilerin yargılanması 29 Aralık'ta tekrar başladı ve 31 Aralık'ta sona erdi. Aynı gün Maliye Vekili Hasan Fehmi Bey istifa etti. Gelecek yıl bütçenin 50 milyon lira açık vereceği sanılıyor. Mustafa Kemal 31 Aralık günü İzmir'e gitti. Not: Gazeteciler bugün beraat ettirildi.	367
166	2 Ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 14. Fener Rum Patriği ile dört metropolitin ihanet suçuyla yargılanacakları yolunda bir Selanik gazetesinde çıkan haber Anadolu Ajansı tarafından yalanlandı. Öte yandan Türk hükümeti yeni Patriği henüz resmen tanımadı. Mustafa Kemal, Patrik Gregorius'un kendisine gönderdiği telgrafa cevap verdi, ama kendisine Patrik diye hitap edip etmediği belli değil. Ben de (Henderson) Patriği kutladım.	369
167	9 Ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI. NO. 30. <i>Genel siyasi durum.</i> Bir yıldır Türkiye'nin iç durumu sürekli olarak Londra'ya arz ediyorum. Çünkü bu ülke önemlidir. TBMM 1 Kasım 1922'de Saltanatı kaldırma kararı verirken risk de üstlendi ve gelişmeler bu cüreti haklı çıkardı. Türk halkı kararı kabul etti. Türklerin aydın sınıfı şimdi "milli hakimi-	370

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yet", "cumhuriyet", "liberal" ve son olarak "laik" kavramları etrafında fikirlerini kristalleştirmiştir. 1908 tipi meşrutî saltanat artık gericilik sayılıyor. Böyle olunca bir yıl içinde saltanatın kaldırılması ve cumhuriyetin ilanı Mustafa Kemal için pek zor olmamıştır. Kendisi büyük bir adamdır, gerçek bir yurtseverdir, ama hırs ve endişe kendisini aşırılığa itmştir demek, haksızlık olmaz. Endişesi, kısmen Batılı Devletlerden, kısmen de Halifelikten kaynaklanmaktadır. Zira Bau, isterse Türkiye'yi ezebilecek güçtedir; Halifelik ise bütün tutucu güçlerin merkezi durumundadır. Dolayısıyla Halifelğin İslam dünyasında Türkiye'ye sağladığı prestijden vazgeçilmektedir. Türk hukuk sistemi modern yaşamın gereklerine uyum sağlayacaksa 19. Yüzyıl tipi İslam hukukundan tam olarak ayrılmak durumundadır. Ekonomik bakımdan Türkiye zorluklar içindedir, bütçe 50 milyon lira kadar açık verecektir. Anadolu'da sefalet ürünü eşkiyalık vardır. Sorunların çözümü için yapıcı politika gerekiyor ki bu da Mustafa Kemal'den bekleniyor. Onun da sağlık sorunu ve siyasi zorlukları var. Ankara ile İstanbul arasında süren zıtlasma yüzünden İstanbul basını Ankara'nın her yaptığına karşı çıkıyor. Mustafa Kemal sağlığına kavuşursa ülkeyi toparlayabilir.

168 11 Ocak

İNGİLTERE'NİN İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSU EDMONDS'DAN İSTANBUL'DA DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'A YAZI. NO. 4. Cumhurbaşkanı 2 Ocak günü İzmir'e geldi. Kendisi için Buca'da İngiliz vatandaşı David Forbes'in evi hazırlanmıştı. Mustafa Kemal ve eşi bir gece burada kaldıktan sonra ertesi gün aniden ayrıldılar ve Latife Hanımın babasının evine taşındılar. Mustafa Kemal'in Konsolosları kabul edip etmeyeceği soruşturuldu. Etmeyeceği anlaşılınca kart bıraktık. Cumhurbaşkanı ileri gelen Türkleri kabul etti, şehirde pek seyrek görüldü, istasyona ilk gelişinde kalabalığın içinden birisi kendisine tabanca çekmiş ve saldırgan oracıkta öldürülmüş. Halk İttihatçıları

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		bekliyor, ama onlarda da bir hareket görülmüyor. Mustafa Kemal'in hasta olduğu söyleniyor.	
169	16 Ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 55 Gazeteci (Hüseyin) Cahit Bey ile arkadaşlarının be- raat etmeleri, rahatlık yarattı ve cumhuriyet adale- tinin zaferi olarak alkışlandı. Mahkeme o günden beri ufak davalarla uğraşüyor. Halifenin yaveri tu- tuklu Ekrem Bey de serbest bırakıldı. Serbest kalan gazeteciler temkinli davranıyorlar. Bu arada Anka- ra'nın dikkati bütçeye ve Anadolu Demiryoluna çevrildi. Bütçe açığı 53 milyon lira olacak gibi gö- rünüyor. Anadolu Demiryolu işi, Hükümetle şirket arasında yapılması tasarlanan anlaşmaya Halk Partisi toplantısında itiraz edilmesiyle alevlendi. Nafia Vekili Muhtar Bey istifa etti. 14 Ocak günü İsmet Paşa Halk Partisi toplantısında genel politi- kası hakkında bir konuşma yaptı, ama Anadolu Demiryolu işine değinmedi. Maksat galiba dikkat- leri başka yöne çekmekti. Ertesi gün Parti bu işi de tartıştı. Fethi Bey Hükümeti eleştirdi. Konu orta- dadır. Halk Partisi içindeki ayrılıkların derin oldu- ğu ortaya çıktı ve İsmet Paşa'nın durumu zorlaşı- yor.	377
170	17 Ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSU EDMONDS'DAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİP- LOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'A YAZI NO. 8. İzmir Valisi Aziz Bey istifa etti, yerine Ankara Valisi Murat Bey atandı. Mustafa Kemal'in İzmir'e gelişi ve düzenlemelerden hoşnut kalmaması, İttihatçı olan Valinin istifasını çabuklaştırmıştır. Yeni Vali Aydın doğumludur.	380
171	23 Ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI LORD CURZON'A YAZI NO. 69 İstifa eden Nafia Vekili Muhtar Bey'in yerine İs- tambul mebusu Süleyman Sırrı Bey getirildi. Yeni vekil meslekten mühendistir ve politikacı olarak	381

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		sönüktür. İstanbul'da Mustafa Kemal ve Cumhuriyet aleyhtarı bazı kişilerin yargılanması İstiklal Mahkemesini meşgul ediyor.	
172	6 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI. NO. 104..... İstiklal Mahkemesi, Mustafa Kemal'e suikast hazırlayanların yargılanmalarına devam etti. 29 Ocak'ta Ali Osman adlı bir sanığı bir yıl hapse mahkum etti, diğer sanıkları serbest bıraktı. TBMM, İstanbul İstiklal Mahkemesinin görevine 30 Ocak'ta son verdi. Urfa Mebusu Ali Saib, "Vakit" gazetesinin Ankara muhabirine hakaret edince, gazete muhabirleri Meclisi boykot ettiler ve üç gün boyunca TBMM ile ilgili olarak İstanbul'a hiçbir haber geçmediler. Mustafa Kemal Paşa hala İzmir'de. Paşa'nın rahatsızlık haberleri kasten abartıldı. "İleri" gazetesi, 5 Şubat günü Halifelik aleyhinde sert bir yazı yayınladı. İstanbul gazeteleri editörleri İzmir'e davet edildiler. 4 Şubat günü Mustafa Kemal tarafından kabul edildiler. Meclis Anayasa Komisyonu, yeni bir Anayasa üzerinde çalışıyor.	382
173	7 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN BATAVIA (CAVA) BAŞKONSOLOSU CROSBY'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI. NO. 24. GİZLİ..... <i>Türk Kızılay Heyeti</i> . Mübadil Müslümanlar için yardım toplamak amacıyla Mustafa Kemal tarafından Hindistan'a ve Cava'ya bir Kızılay Heyeti gönderileceği haberi, buradaki çevrelerde epeyce heyecan yarattı. Heyeti karşılamak için hazırlık yapıldı. Hollanda polisi, heyetin, üç kişilik olacağını, yardım toplarken pan-İslam propagandası da yapacağını söyledi. Ekim ayında Batı Sumatra'da da "Ankara Fonu" için yardım toplanmak istenmiş.	386
174	9 Şubat	İZMİR'DE İNGİLİZ BAŞKONSOLOSU EDMONDS' DAN İSTANBUL'DA DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'A YAZI. NO. 19.....	387

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Cumhurbaşkanının İzmir'deki faaliyetleri hakkında pek az bilgi var. Mustafa Kemal'in ağır yaralı olduğu yolunda Yunan basınında çıkan haberleri yalanlamak için olacak, Türk basını Ocak ayı ortalarında Cumhurbaşkanının buradaki hareketleriyle ilgili bazı haberler yayınladı. Gazeteler, İstanbul gazetecilerinin İzmir ziyaretine geniş yer verdi. Mustafa Kemal, 4 Şubat günü, Velid Bey hariç, İstanbul gazetecilerini kabul etti. 5 Şubatta onlara akşam yemeği verdi ve Latife Hanımı tanıştırdı. Bir konuşma yaptı. (Hüseyin) Cahit Bey kendisine cevap verdi. Abdülhamid zamanından beri hayalini kurdukları her şeyin bugün gerçekleşmiş olduğunu söyledi. Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve eşi dün özel trenle Aya Soluk'ta (Selçuk), Mahmut Esat Bey'in çiftliğine gittiler. Kendisini yakından görmüş olanlar, bir yıl önceki haliyle bugünkü hali arasında bir fark olmadığını söylüyorlar. İsmet Paşa'nın da 11 Şubat'ta İzmir'e geleceği, 20 Şubat'ta Gazi ile birlikte Ankara'ya döneceği açıklandı.	
17 ^e	1 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ASKERİ ATAŞESİ ALBAY BAIRD'DEN DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'A YAZI. NO. 8..... <i>Fevzi Paşa ile görüşme.</i> Genelkurmay Başkanı Mareşal Fevzi Paşa, 4 Şubat günü Kadıköy'deki evinde beni kabul etti. Yakında İngiltere'yi ziyaret edecek Türk subayları konusunu açtım ve bazı noktalar hakkında Londra'dan cevap beklendiğini söyledim. "Yakında cevap alacaksınız" dedi. Ataşemiliterlerin temasları ve bilgi almaları için Milli Savunma Bakanlığının İstanbul'da bir temsilcisinin bulundurması dileğinde bulundum. Paşa, şimdi işlerin Ankara'da toplandığını ve oradan yürütüldüğünü söyledi. Görüşmemde özetle şu bilgileri edindim: (a) Mustafa Kemal hala Başkomutandır, (b) Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat ve Cevat Paşalar ordu kumandanları olarak değil, ordu müfettişleri olarak atanmışlardır, (c) Ordu halen barış düzenindedir, (d) Bazı tümenlerin 41., 57., 61. gibi yüksek rakamlar taşımaları Büyük Savaştan kalmıştır, (e) İhtiyaç fazlası eski subaylara iş bul-	390

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		mak zor bir sorundur, (f) Ankara çok hoş bir yerdir, konut sıkıntısı hızla giderilmektedir. Fevzi Paşa oldukça rahat Fransızca konuşuyor, 50 yaşlarında görünüyor, cesareti, fikirleri olan kararlı bir adamdır.	
176	11 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI. NO. 117..... <i>Avustralya Başbakanı Mr Bruce, general Fabian Ware ile birlikte, 6 Şubat günü İstanbul'a geldi. Günü İstanbul'un görülecek yerlerini ziyaretle geçirdi ve özel olarak Topkapı sarayı kendisine açıldı. 8 ve 9 Şubat günleri Çanakkale savaş mezarlıkları ziyaret edildi. Gelibolu kaymakamı, bu ziyareti kolaylaştırmak için Ankara'dan talimat aldığını bildirdi. Bu bildirimin iyi niyetli olduğuna inanıyorum. Ancak Türklerde bir kuşku da var, bu savaş yerlerinin ard niyetli bazı kötü niyetlerle ziyaret edildiği sanılıyor. Mr. Bruce, 10 Şubat günü Çanakkale bölgesinden ayrıldı ve "Calypso" gemisiyle Port Said'e hareket etti. Çanakkale savaş mezarlıklarında gördüğüm düzenlemelerden çok etkilendim.</i>	393
177	15 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ ASKERİ ATAŞESİ ALBAY BAIRD'DEN DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ LINDSAY'E YAZI. NO. 4..... <i>İzmir'de askeri konferans. İzmir'de bir askeri toplantı yapılıyor. Mustafa Kemal'in kendisi, İsmet Paşa, Genelkurmay Başkanı Mareşal Fevzi Paşa, yardımcısı Asım Paşa ve bütün ordu komutanlarının bu toplantıya katıldıkları bildiriliyor. Bu bakımdan toplantı önemli görünüyor. Savaş bittikten sonra böyle bir toplantı, bir yeniliktir. Yunanlılara karşı yürütülmüş askeri hareketin geriye dönük olarak gözden geçirileceği söyleniyor, ama buna inanmak zordur. Çeşitli söylentiler var. Fransız Başkonsolosu, Suriye'ye karşı bir hareket hazırlandığını Hükümetine yazmış. "Times" muhabiri, Rusya'ya karşı Kafkaslarda bir hareket başlatılacağını duymuş. Burada oturan bir İngiliz, toplantıda Musul ve Irak konularının görüşüldüğü kanısındadır. Yunan ve</i>	395

No.	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü	Sayfa
		Bulgar meslektaşlarını da, toplantının konusunun Türklerin Avrupa'ya yayılması olduğunu duymuşlardır herhalde. Toplantıda Türk ordusunun karşılaşılabileceği iç ve dış her sorunun görüşüleceğini sanıyorum.	
		Not: Mustafa Kemal toplantıyı açarken yaptığı konuşmada, görüşmelerin amacının "yurdun savunulmasında en büyük yararı sağlamak" olduğunu söylemiş. İsmet Paşa'nın konuşmasından sonra üç saat boyunca gizli görüşmeler yapılmış, bu sırada, komutanlar hariç herkes salondan çıkarılmıştır.	
178	16 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSU EDMONDS' DAN İSTANBUL DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'E YAZI NO. 23.....	397
		Mısır eski Hidivi 11 Şubat günü yatıyla İzmir'e geldi ve Mustafa Kemal Paşa tarafından kabul edildi. Aynı gün İsmet Paşa ve komutanlar da trenle İzmir'e geldiler ve Mustafa Kemal Paşa tarafından karşılandılar. Bu toplantının savaş oyunları amacıyla düzenlendiği açıklandı. 11-13 Şubat günleri telgraf haberleşmeleri sessizce kapatıldı. Bir şeyler hazırlandığı hissediliyor, ama ne olduğu belli değil. Bir habere göre, Halife Dolmabahçe Sarayını teslim etmediği için Mustafa Kemal ile anlaşmazlığa düşmüş ve şimdi eski Hidivin Halifeligi kabul edip etmeyeceği konusunda nabız yoklaması yapılmakta imiş. Fransız meslektaşına göre, Lozan antlaşması onaylanmaz ise Türkler askeri harekate geçeceklermiş, toplantı bunun içiniş. İttihatçıların da bir-iki ay içinde bir iç ayaklanma bekledikleri, İtalya'nın İzmir'e saldıracağını da söyleniyor.	
179	20 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 142.	398
		Son on beş günün gelişmeleri: İstiklal Mahkemesi sessizce İstanbul'dan uzaklaştı. Yargılanmakta olan üç kişi affedildi. Mustafa Kemal ile İstanbul gazeteleri baş yazarları arasında neler konuşulduğu pek anlaşılmadı. Belki Mustafa Kemal yeni bir safhaya geçiyor ve İstanbul gazetecilerinden destek bekliyor	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarîhi</u>	<u>Kanıden Kime Yazıldığı ve Öni</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		olabilir. Başyazarlar Mustafa Kemal'i övüyor, İsmet Paşa Hükümetini ise eleştiriyorlar. İzmir'de gazete başyazarları toplantısı ile askeri liderler toplantısı arasında bir bağlantı bulunduğunu anlamak zor değildir. Mustafa Kemal Paşa, yeni atılımları için ordunun desteğinden emin olmak istiyor. Halifeyi daha da zayıf düşürmeyi ve mesela onu İstanbul'dan çıkarmayı düşünüyor olabilir. Meclis Anayasa Komisyonu, yeni Anayasa hazırlıkları içindedir. Bu hafta sonunda İsmet Paşa Ankara'ya dönecek, Mustafa Kemal de muhtemelen 23 Şubat'ta dönecek ve 1 Mart'ta başlayacak bütçe görüşmelerine yetiyecek. Rauf Bey ile İsmail Canbolat, 12 Şubat'ta Meclis'te bir iddia ortaya atırlar, mektuplarının açıldığını söylediler. Üç gün sonra İçişleri Bakanı, yapılan soruşturmadan mektupların açılmadığının anlaşıldığını bildirdi. Rauf Bey, 18 Şubat'ta Ankara'dan ayrıldı, sağlık nedeniyle Carlsbad'a gitti. Fransız temsilcisi basına verdiği demeçte, Lozan Antlaşmasının Mart'ta onaylanacağını açıkladı.	
180	22 Şubat	İNGİLTERE'NİN İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSU EDMONDS'DAN İSTANBUL DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'E YAZI NO. 26..... Mustafa Kemal'in 15 Şubat günü İzmir'de komutanlar toplantısının açılışında yaptığı konuşma: "...Bu toplantı ordumuzun ve milletimizin menfaatleri açısından pek önemlidir...Cumhuriyetimiz, mukaddes saydığımız istiklâlimizin ve hakimiyetimizin müdafaasını ihmal edemez..." Toplantıda neler görüldüğü belli değildir.	402
181	26 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 162..... Yeni Anayasa Taslağı. Taslakta yer alan önerilerden bir çoğu Mecliste hararetle tartışılacaktır. Şu noktalar özellikle dikkate değer: Taslakta Halifeye yer verilmiyor. Meclise seçilebilmek için cinsiyet ayrımı öngörülüyor. Senato veya Devlet konseyi hakkında hüküm yok. Tasarıda muhafazakar denebile-	403

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		cek bir eğilim de göze çarpıyor. Yasama, yürütme, yargı güçlerinin Mecliste toplandığı nazariyesi fiilen kayboluyor. Yürütmeye geniş yetkiler veriliyor. Kabine sistemi teyid ediliyor. Cumhurbaşkanının durumu biraz daha güçlendiriliyor. Meclis'ten geçerse bu hükümler Mustafa Kemal'in gücünü pekiştirecek. Mebuslukla bağdaşabilecek meslekler Bakanlık, Müsteşarlık ve Profesörlük ile sınırlandırılmıştır. Oysa eskiden mebus olanlar aynı zamanda askerlik, elçilik gibi meslekleri de yürütebiliyorlardı. Bütün vatandaşlar "Türk" sayılmaktadır.	
182	27 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 166, GİZLİ. <i>Halife.</i> Yeni Anayasa taslağında Halifeye yer verilmediğini yazmıştım. Cavit Bey, Ankara liderlerinin Halifeyi kovacaklarını Sir Adam Block'a haber vermiş. Başka bir kaynaktan da Mustafa Kemal'in Halifeyi ve bütün ailesini sınır dışı edeceğini öğrendim. İzmir'de gazetecilerle ve paşalarla yapılan toplantılar buna hazırlıkmiş. "Laik"lik eğilimi gitgide daha fazla ortaya çıkıyor. Cumhuriyet, kendisini dini kavramlardan sıyrıyor. Basın, Halifeliliğin gereksiz bir yük olduğunu artık açık açık yazıyor. Çağdaş bir cumhuriyette şeriat mahkemelerine ve dini okullara yer olmadığı söyleniyor. Mustafa Kemal, 1 Mart'taki konuşmasında herhalde cumhuriyetin laik özelliğini vurgulayacaktır. İsmet Paşa, İzmir'de paşalarla yapılan toplantıda, Halife sınır dışı edilince, Türkiye'nin Panislamizm politikası izlediği yolundaki İngiliz kuşkularının da azalacağı umudunda olduğunu söylemiş.	406
183	4 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARİS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD CREWE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A TEL. NO. 139. "Temps" gazetesi, TBMM'nin Halifeliliği kaldırmasını savunuyor. Bu olayın Hindistan'da, Türkiye'ye karşı ve Asya halklarını bağımsızlığına karşı propaganda olarak kullanılabileceğini yazıyor. Önemli olan Halifelik değil, Türkiye'nin askeri gücüdür.	407

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		Mustafa Kemal de son konuşmasında Türk ordusuna güvenini belirtmiştir. "Journal des Débats" gazetesi de Halifeliğin kaldırılmasının 1908'den beri devam eden gelişmelerin mantıki sonucu olduğunu yazıyor.	
184	5 Mart	<p>İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 188. GİZLİ..</p> <p><i>Halifeliğin kaldırılması</i>, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin laik karakterinin vurgulanması ve ordunun politikadan ayrılması, yani "inkılabın tamamlanması", son hafta içinde kamuoyunun dikkatini en fazla çeken gelişmeler oldu. Biraz açayım: Son günlerde İstanbul basınında Halife aleyhindeki yayınlar çoğalmıştı. Kamuoyunun önemli gelişmelere hazırlandığı anlaşıyordu. "Radikal reformlar" günün parolasıydı. 26 Şubat'ta Mustafa Kemal ve İsmet Paşa, Şeriye Vekili Mustafa Fevzi Efendi ile bir toplantı yaptılar. 29 Şubat gecesi Cumhurbaşkanı köşkünde bir toplantı yapıldı. Mustafa Kemal'in 1 Mart günlü konuşması Başkanlık Mesajı karakterindeydi. 2 Mart günü Halk Partisi tekrar toplandı. Dört kanun tasarısı hazırlandı. Bunlar, Halifeliğin kaldırılması, Şeriye Vekaletinin kaldırılması, millî eğitimin birleştirilmesi (Tevhid-i Tedrisat), Genelkurmay Başkanlığının Kabine dışında bırakılması hakkındaydı. Parti toplantısında bu kanun tasarıları bütün gün tartışıldı ve pek az değişiklikle kabul edildi. Parti toplantısında bir ara Mustafa Kemal'in kendisi, prenseslerin sınır dışı edilmemelerini önerdi, ama öneri kabul edilmedi. Türkiye'ye altı yüzyıl hükmetmiş olan Osmanlı hanedanına Türkiye'yi terk etmesi için 10 günlük süre tanındı. Halifenin kendisine ise yola çıkması için sadece birkaç saatlik zaman verildi. 4 Şubat sabahı (ne gariptir ki Miraç tatiline rastlamıştır) Halife ve ailesi otomobille alelacele Çatalca istasyonuna götürülmüş, oradan Simplon ekspres trenine bindirilip İsviçre'ye gönderilmiştir. Ankara Hükümetinin bu cüretkâr kararının etkileri hakkında bir şey söylemek için henüz erkendir. İçerde açık bir muhalefet gö-</p>	408

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		rülmemiştir. Halife ve kalabalık yakınlarının yurt dışında geçimleri konusu ciddi bir sorun olacaktır. Zira kanun yalnız yol paralarından bahsediyor.	
185	8 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 200 <i>Halifelik.</i> Hindistanlı Şevket Ali ve Mısırlı Abdül Hamid, Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya telgraflar çekmişler ve Halifelğin kaldırılmasını eleştirmişler. Yanlış anlaşılmalrı gidermek için Mustafa Kemal kendilerine cevap vermiş. Adnan Bey, İngiliz makamlarında yanlış izlenim yaratmaması için bu telgrafların ne olduğunu bana anlattı. Türkler, Musul müzakerelerini göz önünde tutarak, Halifelğin kaldırılmasını kullanıyor ve İngiltere'ye Panislamizm artık ölmüştür mesajını vermeğe çalışıyorlar.	412
186	11 Mart	KAHİRE'DE MAREŞAL ALLENBY'DEN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A TEL NO. 64 Kral Hüseyin'in Halifelğini ilan etmesi Mısır'da olumsuz karşılandı, hatta küstahça bir davranış olarak nitelendirildi. Birçok camide Abdülmecid için hutbe okundu. Halifenin Mısırlı olması da konuşuluyor ve bu bağlamda Kral Fuad'ın adı geçiyor.	414
187	11 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 202 İsmet Paşa, 5 Mart'ta Hükümetin istifasını sundu ve tekrar Hükümeti kurmakla görevlendirildi. İstifa nedeni, bütçenin Mecliste reddedilmesiydi. Yeni Hükümetin listesi Mustafa Kemal tarafından 6 Mart günü Meclise sunuldu. Liste, Parti meclisinde 60'a karşı 103 oyla kabul edildi. Yeni Hükümet eskisinden çok farklı değil. Bakanların listesi. Üç Bakan Kabine dışı kalıyor: Şeriye Vekili Mustafa Fevzi, İmar Vekili Seyid Bey ve Maarif Vekili Sefa Bey. Üç yeni Bakan da Hükümette yer alıyor: Ziraat Vekili Zekai Bey, Maarif Vekili Vasıf Bey ve İmar Vekili Celal Bey.	414

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
188	12 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 221..... <i>Türk-Rus ilişkileri. 27 Şubat günü Rus Büyükelçisi Souritch güven mektubunu Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya törenle sundu. Törende, Dışişleri Bakanı olarak İsmet Paşa da bulundu. Büyükelçi askeri selamla karşılandı ve bando "Enternasyonal Marşını" çaldı. Basın, törende söylenen nutukları yayınladı. Souritch, "Rus Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri Merkez Yürütme Komitesi" tarafından Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı nezdine Büyükelçi olarak görevlendirildiğini belirtiyor. Mustafa Kemal, kısa ama dostça cevap veriyor.</i>	416
189	12 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 224..... <i>Halifelik. Osmanlı Hanedanı üyelerinin sınır dışı edilmeleri tamamlandı. Artık bu aileden Türkiye'de kimse kalmadı. Halifenin kardeşi Şehzade Seyfeddin Mısır'a gitmek istedi. Türk makamları da bir şehzadeyle eşinin Mısır'a gitmek istediklerini bildirdi. Mısır Hükümeti, Halifenin yakınlarını Mısır'a kabul edemeyecekleri yolunda cevap verdi. Bir şehzadeyi İngiliz makamlarına tavsiye ettim, kendisine bir tavsiye mektubu verdim. Türk makamları Halifenin sınır dışı edilmesini etkin biçimde tamamladılar. Halifenin eline "Abdül Aziz oğlu Abdülmecid" diye bir pasaport verdiler. Bunun diplomatik vizelik olmadığını da İtalya Büyükelçiliğine bildirmişler. 7 Mart günü Cuma namazı hutbelerinde Halifenin adının zikredilmemesi için önlem alındı. Söylentilere göre Topkapı sarayı müze yapılacak, Yıldız ve Dolmabahçe sarayları hakkında ise bir karar alınmamış imiş. Emaneti mukaddese hakkında bir haber yok. Kral Hüseyin'in halifelığının ilanla ilgili haberlere basında genişçe yer verildi, ama bu konuda yorum yapılmadı. Eski rejimle ilişkileri olan birçok kişinin sınır dışı edileceği havadisleri dolaşıyor ve Tefrik Paşa, İzzet ve Salih Paşaların adları anılıyor. Bun-</i>	418

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		lar 150'liklerden farklı olacakmış. Halifelikten sonra Patrikhanelerin ve Hahambaşılığın da lağvedilmesi yönünde basında kampanya var ama bu kampanyanın arkasında resmi destek yok. Halifelikten sonra şimdi dikkatler dış ilişkilere çevriliyor ve Lozan Barış Antlaşmasının Müttefikler tarafından onaylanması, Osmanlı borç faizlerinin ödenmesi gibi konular üzerinde duruluyor.	
190	19 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 244. <i>Başkent Ankara.</i> İstanbul'daki yabancı diplomatlara hep "Ankara'ya gidiyor musunuz ve ne zaman gidiyorsunuz?" diye soruluyor. Basında artık İstanbul'a dönmeyeceği yazılıyor. Mustafa Kemal de kesin bir dille öyle söyledi. Yeni Anayasa Ankara'nın başkent olduğunu bir kez daha belirtti. Ankara'nın başkent kalması düşüncesi Ankara'da yaygın, İstanbul'dan bunu tahlil etmek zor. İstanbul, Türk devletini yıkmış olan bütün kötülüklerin merkezi gibi görülüyor. Hükümetin İstanbul'da Avrupa tehdidine açık olacağı ileri sürülüyor. Bu düşünceler bugün Türkiye'yi yönetenlerde, Meclis'te de var. Ama günün birinde Ankara'yı İstanbul'dan idare etmenin, Ankara'dan İstanbul'u idare etmekten daha kolay olacağı düşünülebilir ve İstanbul'a dönülebilir. İstanbul'a karşı Ankara sorununu basit bir sorun değildir. "Kehanette bulunmaktan hoşlanmam, ama şimdi şunu söylemeye cesaret ederim: İstanbul bir gün kesinlikle tekrar Türkiye'nin başkenti olacaktır." Şimdiki durumda Türkiye ile ilişkilerimizi İstanbul'daki Dışişleri Bakanlığı Temsilciliği aracılığıyla yürütmek hiç kolay değildir ve ileride daha da zor olacaktır. Bu durumda birkaç günlüğüne Ankara'ya gitmeme izin verilmesini rica ederim. Ankara'ya gideceksem Mustafa Kemal Paşa tarafından kabul edileceğimden de önceden emin olmalıyım (Bkz. No. 194).	421

<u>No</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
191	19 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN, İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 247..... <i>Yeni Anayasa.</i> TBMM, 9 Mart'ta yeni Anayasaya taslağını görüşmeğe başladı. Komisyon raportörü Celal Nuri bir sunuş yaptı. Bazı milletvekilleri tasarıya çeşitli noktalardan itiraz ettiler. Maddelerin üçte iki çoğunlukla kabul edilebileceğine karar verildi. Genel görüşmelere 16 Mart'ta devam edildi. Cumhurbaşkanı'nın Meclisi feshetme ve kanunları veto etme haklarına itiraz edildi. Maddelere geçildi ve 13 madde oylanıp kabul edildi. Mecliste bir ara 181 milletvekili vardı. İkinci bir meclis kurulması önerisi geri çekildi. 1. Maddede Türkiye'nin sadece Cumhuriyet olarak değil, "Halk Cumhuriyeti" olarak tanımlanması teklifi reddedildi. 3. maddede "Hakimiyet kayıtsız şartsız milletindir" hükmü kabul edildi. Kadınlara seçme ve seçilme hakkı tanınıp tanınmayacağı daha sonra açıklık kazanacak. Okuma yazma bilmeyenlerin milletvekili seçilemeyeceği hükmü kabul edildi. Milletvekillerin yemin şekli biraz değiştirildi. Parlamenter dokunulmazlığı biraz değiştirilerek kabul edildi. Asıl tartışmalar cumhurbaşkanının veto hakkıyla Meclisi feshetme hakkı ve ordunun başkomutanlığı konularında görülecektir.	425
192	24 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN BÜKREŞ ELÇİSİ DERİNG'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 159. <i>Başkent Ankara.</i> Bükreş basınında yayınlanan bir habere göre, Mustafa Kemal Paşa, İstanbul'daki yabancı diplomatik temsilcilikleri Ankara'ya taşınmaya davet etmiş. Dışişleri Bakanı Duca, Romen Elçiliğinin Ankara'ya taşınması söz konusu değil, dedi. Ankara büyük bir köyden başka bir şey değilmiş. (Bkz. No. 194).	428
193	26 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN, İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 269.....	429

<u>No</u>	<u>Tarîhi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıklığı ve Öni</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<p><i>Yeni Anayasa.</i> Anayasa tasarısının görüşülmesine devam ediliyor ve mebusların öyle pek uysal olmadıkları anlaşılıyor. 17-18 Mart günleri Halk Partisi toplantısında muhalefet görüldü. İsmet Paşa Başkanlığa seçildi, ama Başkan yardımcılıklarına muhaliflerin adayları seçildi. Cumhurbaşkanı veto hakkı ve Meclisi feshetme hakkı verilmesine de karşı çıkıldı. Saruhan Mebusu Reşad Bey, Cumhurbaşkanı Allah bile olsa kendisine Meclisi feshetme hakkı tanımayacağını söyledi. Mustafa Kemal'in milli hakimiyet konusundaki ilkesinin unutulmaması gerektiğini savundu. Sonunda bir orta yol bulundu. Cumhurbaşkanı Meclisi feshetmeyi yine Meclise önerecek ve öneri üçte iki çoğunlukla reddedilmezse fesih kararı yürürlüğe girecek. Tasarıdaki orijinal madde 2'ye karşı 127 oyla reddedildi. Bakanlar ve onları destekleyenler Meclisi terkettiler. Ankara'da siyasi durum belirsiz. Mustafa Kemal, alışılmış temkinli davranışıyla, hiçbir görüşten yana tavır koymadı. Veto ve fesih hakkına kenaisinin de karşı olduğu anlaşılıyor. Meclis Başkanı Fethi Bey, muhalefete meylettii. Kabin e krizi ihtimali arttı. Anayasa Komisyonu Başkanı Yunus Nadi ile raportör Celal Nuri'nin istifa etükleri söyleniyor. Kabin ede değışiklik yapılacağı söylen-tileri de var.</p>	
194	30 Mart	<p>İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİL-Cİ YARDIMCISI N. HENDERSON'UN, TÜRKİ-YE'DEKİ İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİL-CİLİĞİNİN GELECEĞİ HAKKINDA LONDRA-YA SUNDUĞU SERVİS NOTU.....</p> <p><i>Başkent Ankara.</i> Lozan antlaşması yürürlüğe girince Türkiye'deki İngiliz diplomatik temsilcisinin statü-sü ve nerede oturacağı gündeme gelecektir. Tem-silcinin Büyükelçi payesinde olacağı ve İstanbul'da oturacağı açıklanmıştı. Ama Türk Hükümeti Anka-ra'da otururken İngiliz Büyükelçisinin İstanbul'da oturması anormal bir durum ortaya çıkaracaktır. Halen Ankara'daki Türk Hükümetiyle temas, İs-tanbul'da bulundurulan Dışişleri Bakanlığı delege-si aracılığıyla sağlanıyor. Ama bu tatminkâr ve uy-</p>	432

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gun bir çare değildir. İngiltere'nin Ankara'da şu veya bu biçimde temsil edilmesi lazımdır. Bu, İstanbul'daki Büyükelçinin temsilcisi olarak bir diplomatik sekreter olabilir ve onun yardımcılarıyla birlikte, Ankara'da toplam 6 veya 7 kişi bulundurmamak gerekir. Büyükelçi de zaman zaman Ankara'ya ziyarette bulunabilir. Bunlar için Ankara'da bir bina yapmak gerekecek. Bunun için Türk Hükümetinin vereceği bedelsiz arsadan istifade etmek uygun olur. Teklif edilen arsayı almak ve inşaata başlamak için vakit kaybedilmemelidir. Çünkü Türk Hükümetinin İstanbul'a döneceği söylene-
mez. Ankara, bugüne bugün başkenttir, kim bilir belki yıllarca, hatta belki hep başkent kalacaktır. Orada bir bina yapalım, ancak Ankara'nın veya herhangi bir Anadolu kasabasının Büyükelçilerin ikametine elverişli olmadığını da unutmayalım. Mustafa Kemal, Türkiye'ye Büyükelçi payesinde temsilci atanmasını sağladıktan sonra, kendi prestijini arttırmak için Büyükelçinin Ankara'da oturmasını isteyebilir. Mustafa Kemal'in prestijinin artması demek, İngiliz prestijinin azalması demektir. İngiliz diplomatik temsilciliği İstanbul'dan Ankara'ya taşınacaksa, o takdirde Türkiye'deki temsilciliğimizin statüsünü Büyükelçilikten Elçiliğe, temsilcimizin statüsünü de Büyükelçi payesinden Elçi payesine düşürmek gerekir. Mr. Lindsay'ın Büyükelçi olarak Türkiye'ye atandığını Türk Hükümetine bildirirken kendisinin İstanbul'da oturacağını da belirtmek lazım gelir. İngiliz Hükümeti buna karar verirse, Müttefik Hükümetlerin de aynı doğrultuda hareket etmelerini sağlamak için girişimde bulunmak yerinde olur.

Kralın buyruğu: Öneriyi onaylıyorum. İkametgâh İstanbul'dan Ankara'ya taşınırsa, İngiliz Misyonunun statüsü Elçilik derecesine düşürülsün. Ankara'da bir bina inşa edilsin.

195 9 Nisan

İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 303.....

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarîhi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<i>Yeni Anayasa.</i> Mecliste Anayasa görüşmelerine 6 Nisan'da devam edildi. İki gün boyunca Başkomutanlık konusu tartışıldı. Anayasa taslağında Cumhurbaşkanının Türk orduları başkomutanı olması öngörülüyordu. Muhalefet, Başkomutanlık yetkisinin Meclis'te kalmasını savundu. Sonunda bir ara formül üzerinde anlaşma sağlandı. Başkomutanlık, TBMM'nin manevi şahsının uhdesindedir; onu temsilen Cumhurbaşkanı tarafından ifa edilir, dendi. Mustafa Kemal'in taraftarları Meclisi suçlamaya başladılar.	
196	17 Nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A TEL. NO. 76 Lozan Antlaşması İngiltere tarafından onaylandıktan sonra birkaç günlüğüne Ankara'ya gitmeyi ve Bayramdan önce dönmeyi düşünüyordum. Mustafa Kemal, Amerikan ve İtalyan temsilcilerini kabul etmemiştir; herhalde beni de kabul etmez. Bu durumda Ankara'ya gidişimi ertelemeliyim. (Bkz. No. 197)	437
197	21 Nisan	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'DAN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'E TEL. NO. 38..... <i>İlgi No. 196:</i> Antlaşmanın onaylanması zaman olacaktır. Mustafa Kemal tarafından kabul edilmeyecekseniz Ankara'ya gidişinizi ertelemeniz uygun olur.	438
198	23 Nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 336 Romanya Elçisi Ankara'ya gitti, 20 Nisan günü Mustafa Kemal Paşa tarafından kabul edildi ve güven mektubunu sundu. Romanya Başbakanı Brătianu'nun da 24 Nisan'da İstanbul'u ziyaret edeceği haber verildi. Ama bu ziyaret gerçekleşmedi.	439
199	29 Nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 345	440

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarih</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özet</u>	<u>Sıra</u>
		<p>Son hafta içinde Amerikan, Romen ve İtalyan temsilcileri Ankara'ya ziyaret edip İstanbul'a döndüler. Amerikalı Amiral Bristol, çeşitli Bakanlarla görüşmüş, ama Mustafa Kemal Paşa tarafından kabul edilmemiş. Romen Filalini, güven mektubunu Mustafa Kemal'e sunmuş, ama rahatsız olan İsmet Paşa ile görüşmemiş. İtalyan Montagna İsmet Paşa ile görüşmüş, fakat Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmemiş. Filalini gibi Montagna da Ankara'daki yayan partileri karpında dehşete kapılmışlar. Yemek yenebilecek alin odalı bir tek otel varmış.</p>	
256	29 Nisan	<p>İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ YÜKSEK KOMİSERİ LINDSAY'DEN FOREIGN OFFICE'DE LANCELOT OLIPHANT'A ÖZEL MEKTUP.....</p> <p>Mustafa Kemal, belki Amerika ile imzalanmış olan antlaşma onaylanmadığı için Amiral Bristol'u kabul etmemiştir. Resmen atamaları tamamlanmamış olan yabancı temsilcileri kabul etmek istemiyor da olabilir.</p>	445
257	7 Mayıs	<p>İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DIPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 373.....</p> <p>Halifeliliğin ilgasından sonra Patrikhanelerin ve Haham Başlığın da kaldırılması yönündeki basın kampanyası yeniden başladı. Bu konuda Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın "New York Times" gazetesine verdiği söylenen bir demeç "Tanin" gazetesinin Fransızca baskısında da yayımlandı. Cumhurbaşkanı, Cumhuriyetin ilanından ve Halifeliliğin kaldırılmasından önce de yabancı basına demeçler vermişti. Rum Patrikhanesine hala şüpheyle bakılıyor. Büyükelçilik olarak da Rum Patriği ile ve dini liderlerle doğrudan temas etmenin doğru olmayacağı düşüncesiyle yalnız kart gönderiyorum.</p>	444
Ek	4 Mayıs	<p>"TANIN" GAZETESİNİN FRANSIZCA BASKISINDA ÇIKAN YAZI.....</p> <p>"Gazi'nin "New York Times" gazetesine verdiği demeç.</p> <p>Cumhurbaşkanı, Patrikhanelerin ve Hahambaşlığın kaldırılmasından bahsediyor. Şöyle diyor:</p>	445

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		'Halifelik kaldırıldıktan sonra Rum Ortodoks ve Ermeni patrikhanesi ile Hahambaşılığın da kaldırılması gerekir. Bu kurumlara eskiden tanınmış olan ayrıcalıklar Türkiye'nin ileri atılımları önünde bir engeldir. Rusya, Rum patrikhanesi üzerindeki hegemonyası nedeniyle yüzyıllarca içişlerimize karışmıştır. Türkiye Ermenileri de aleyhimize çalışmışlardır. Rum ve Ermeni kiliseleriyle okulları siyasi fesat yuvaları olmuşlardır. Fransa, İngiltere, Amerika, kendi ülkelerinde böyle bir duruma ne kadar göz yumarlardı acaba?' (Bkz. No. 204).	
202	8 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE'NİN BUDAPEŞTE ELÇİSİ JOHN BALFOUR'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 191..... Yeni Türk Elçisi Hüsrav Bey Budapeşte'ye geldi ve basına bir demeç verdi. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın genel sekreteri ve birinci TBMM üyesiymiş ve ikinci Meclise de Trabzon'dan seçilmiş.	447
203	14 Mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 386 Yeni Macar Elçisi Ladislas Tahy 11 Mayıs'ta Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya güven mektubunu sundu. Karşılıklı sıcak nutuklar söylendi. Macar Elçisi, Türklerin kahramanca ve başarılı Milli Mücadelesini övdü.	448
204	14 Mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 391 İlgi No. 201. Mustafa Kemal'in "New York Herald" gazetesine verdiği söylenen demeç, 6 Mayıs günü Anadolu Ajansı tarafından kesinlikle yalanlandı. Demeç tamamen uydurma imiş. "Cumhuriyet" gazetesi, Patrikhaneler hakkında hiçbir karar alınmadığını da belirtti. Demeç Cumhurbaşkanı tarafından değilse bile bir Türk yetkilisi tarafından verilmiş ve şimdi siyasi nedenlerle inkâr ediliyor olabilir.	448

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205	21 Mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 417..... <i>İç gelişmeler.</i> İçişleri Bakanı Ferit Bey aleyhinde basında yayınlar yapıldı. Bir ara tartışmalara katılan Refet Paşa, "Mustafa Kemal ve başından beri onun yanında olan arkadaşları bugün iktidarda olmalıydı" diye konuştu. Yunus Nadi İstanbul'da "Cumhuriyet" adlı bir gazete yayınlamaya başladı. İçişleri Bakanı Ferit Bey istifa etmiştir. Mustafa Kemal tartışmaların tamamen dışında kaldı.	450
206	28 Mayıs	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 427..... Kütahya mebusu Recep Bey İçişleri Bakanlığına atandı. Recep Bey Halk Partisinin Genel Sekreteriydi ve Mustafa Kemal'e sadık bir kişidir.	452
207	28 Haziran	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 496..... Alman Elçisi Nadolny, 16 Haziran günü güven mektubunu Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya sundu. Karşılıklı nutuklar basında yayınlandı. Mustafa Kemal Nadolny'yi Olağanüstü Elçi diye vasıflandırmıştır. Nadolny, şimdilik Ankara'ya yerleşmek niyetinde değil gibi görünüyor.	452
208	28 Haziran	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 517..... Alman Elçisi Nadolny, Ankara'dan dönünce bana geldi. Buradaki meslektaşları ile birlikte hareket etmesi için talimat almış. Ankara konusunda İngiltere'nin tutumunu sordu. Ankara'nın başkent olarak kalacağını söylüyor. Ankara'da bir arsa seçmiş, burada prefabrike bir ahşap bina kurdurmak niyetinde. Kendisine İngiliz Büyükelçisinin asla Ankara'da oturmayacağını söyledim. Nadolny, Büyükelçilerin Ankara'da oturmaları için ısrar etmemelerini Türklere söylemiş. Türkler İngiltere'nin gerçek niyeti hakkında kuşku içindeymiş. Sovyet	453

<u>No</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özet</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Hükümeti Ankara'da 60 odalı bir Büyükelçilik binası inşa etmek niyetindeymiş. Polonya da bir bina yaptıracakmış. Ankara'da temsil edilmemiz ve daha fazla gecikmeden orada bir bina yaptırmanız zamanı gelmiştir.	
209	1 Temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 523 İstanbul'da Dışişleri Bakanlığı delegesi olarak, Adnan Beyin yerine Nusret Bey atandı. Kendisi arzu edilen çapta bir kimse değildir. Adnan Bey yabancılarla ve Mustafa Kemal'in bazı karşıtlarıyla iyi ilişkiler geliştirmişti. Şahsen ben onun gidişine üzülüm. Kendisi, bir dış göreve atanacağı yolundaki söylentileri yalanladı.	456
210	1 Temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 524 Polonya Elçisi Knoll, 25 Haziran günü güven mektubunu Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya sunmuştur. Yaptığı konuşmada iki ülke arasında 1795 yılında kesilmiş olan diplomatik ilişkilerin yeniden başladığını ve Polonya'nın paylaşılmasını Türkiye'nin hiçbir zaman tanımamış olduğunu belirtmiştir. Cumhurbaşkanı da kendisine samimi bir cevap vermiştir. Knoll, Mustafa Kemal'in eşine de ziyarette bulunmuştur. Latife Hanım, Macar Elçisi Tahy'yi de kabul etmişti. Polonya Hükümeti, Elçiliğini Ankara'da açmak niyetindedir.	458
211	2 Temmuz	İNGİLTERE'NİN VARŞOVA ELÇİSİ SIR MAX MULLER'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 342 Türkiye ile Polonya arasında diplomatik ilişkiler başlamış ve Polonya Elçisi Knoll, 25 Haziran günü güven mektubunu Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya sunmuştur. Aynı gün Türkiye Elçisi de güven mektubunu Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı'na sunmuştur.	459

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
212	24 Temmuz	İNGİLİZ GİZLİ İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİNDEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI DOĞU DAİRESİNE YAZI NO. 918 / 1A GİZLİ <i>Türk Hükümeti askerleştiriliyor. Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile İsmet Paşa, askerinin tam kontrolü ele almadan Türkiye'de işlerin düzelmeyeceği sonucuna varmışlar. Ali Fuat Paşa, Kazım Karabekir Paşa gibi bazı generalleri Kabineye almak, bazı Elçiliklerin personelini de askerlerle değiştirmek niyetindedirler. Bazı vilayetlere de sivil görünümlü subaylar atanıyor.</i>	460
213	26 Temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DIPLOMATİK TEMSİL- Cİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 575..... <i>Türkiye ve Milletler Cemiyeti. Türk Hükümeti, Mil- letler Cemiyetine karşı bekle gör tutumu izliyor, ü- ye olmak için ileri bir adım atmıyor. Mustafa Ke- mal, 1 Mart günü TBMM'de yaptığı konuşmada, Milletler Cemiyetine de ölçülü biçimde değindi. Belki Musul işinin sonucu da Türk Hükümetinin Milletler Cemiyeti konusundaki tutumunu etkile- yecektir. Türk kamuoyu Milletler Cemiyeti konu- sunda yeterince bilgilendirilmiş değildir ve bu ku- ruluşa kuşkuyla bakılıyor. Ama İstanbul'da "Mil- letler Cemiyetini Destekleme Derneği" diye bir dernek de vardır. Başında Çürüksulu Mahmut Pa- şa'nın bulunduğu bu derneği asıl yürüten Devletler Hukuku Profesörü Cemil Bey'dir. Ankara'da Mil- letler Cemiyeti ile ilgilenen ayrı bir daire yoktur.</i>	461
214	29 Temmuz	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DIPLOMATİK TEMSİL- Cİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 579..... <i>Ankara'dan dönen Polonya Elçisi Knoll ziyaretine geldi. Başkentte üç ev kiralamış, sürekli olarak An- kara'da oturup görev yapacaktır. Mustafa Kemal, resmî konuşmasında, iki ülke arasında istişarelere ihtiyaç olduğunu belirtmiş. Knoll'a göre Türkiye şimdilik bir ittifaka girmeyi düşünmüyor, fakat Ankara'da birçok kişi Rusya'dan ve İtalya'dan çe- kinmektedir. Türkiye ile müzakereleri yürüten</i>	464

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Bulgar temsilcisi Simeon Radev çetin zorluklarla karşılaşmıştır, şimdi daha iyimserdir. İçişleri Bakanlığına atanan Receb Bey, birgün Başbakan olabilecektir. Gazi Paşa, üstün bir adamdır, onun içkiye aşırı düşkün olduğu yolundaki söylentiler asılsızdır.	
215	6 Ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 596 Kemalettin Sami Paşa Türkiye'nin Berlin temsilciliğine atandı. Mustafa Kemal, önemli görevlere askerleri getiriyor.	466
216	19 Ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 629 Ankara'da birkaç aydır devam eden Türk-Bulgar müzakereleri geçen hafta kesilmiş ve Radeff İstanbul'a dönmüştür. Ekim ayında müzakerelere yeniden başlanması öngörülüyor. Dün görüştüğüm Radeff, önce sadece bir dostluk anlaşması düşündüklerini, fakat Türk Hükümeti aradaki bütün sorunların çözüme bağlanmasını istediğini bildirdi ve müzakereler hakkında bilgi verdi. Ankara'da her şeyin Mustafa Kemal'in omuzlarında olduğunu, kendisine danışılmadan hiçbir siyasi sorunun çözülemediğini söyledi. Sağlığı yerinde olan Gazi'nin çok içtiği yolundaki söylentilerin aslı esası olmadığını belirtti. Rauf Bey gibi kişilerin başını çektiği muhalefetin Hükümeti devirebileceğini düşünmenin saçma olduğunu ekledi. Görüşleri değerlidir.	467
217	2 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 653 Türkiye meçhul asker anıtı dikeyyor. Anıtın temelini atmak için Dumlupınar meydan muharebesinin ikinci yıldönümü ve anıt yeri olarak da Mustafa Kemal'in muharebeyi bizzat idare ettiği tepe seçildi. Cumhurbaşkanı'nın da katıldığı törene basında geniş yer verildi. Törenin kapanış konuşmasını Mustafa Kemal yaptı. Özel sohbetlerinde çok ko-	470

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		nuşkan olan Mustafa Kemal, kamuoyuna dönük olarak pek seyrek konuşur ve fakat konuşunca dik-kate değer ve anlamlı konuşur. Bu defa da böyle bir konuşma yaptı. Konuşmasının özellikle son bölümü daha etkileyicidir, yoğun ve dürtüst bir yurtseverliği sergiliyor. Mustafa Kemal, devlet a-damlığına yararır biçimde, yeni Türkiye'nin hangi temeller üzerinde yükseleceğini vurguluyor. Türki-ye'nin bilime ve bilgiye, yüksek uygarlık düzeyine, hür düşünceye ve bağımsızlığa ihtiyacı olduğunu belirtiyor. Türk milletinin idealinin medeni dev-letler arasında yer almak olduğunu, medeniyet ya-ratamayan milletlerin hürriyet ve bağımsızlıklarını kaybedeceğini söylüyor. Bu sözleriyle yeni Türki-ye'yi Baulaşturmaya kararlı olduğunu gösteriyor. Türkiye'nin uygarlık savaşını da kazanmak duru-munda olduğunu ve bu savaşın Dumlupınar mey-dan muharebesinden daha çetin olduğunu hatırla-tıyor...Mustafa Kemal samimidir. Hem Türkiye'yi uygar bir Batı Devlet yapmak ve hem de ülkesinin küt gelirini ekonomik kalkınmasına harcamak ko-nusunda samimidir, kanusundayım. Törenlerden sonra Mustafa Kemal, eşiyle birlikte, Bursa dışında bir villaya çekildi.	
218	12 Eylül	İNGİLTERE'NİN İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSU EDMONDS'DAN İSTANBUL'DA DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'A YAZI NO. 94 İzmir'in kurtuluşunun ikinci yıldönümü 9 Eylül'de büyük bir heyecanla kutlandı. Şenlikler sırasında her tarafa Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın resimleri asıl-mıştı. Hafta içinde Halk Partisi toplantısı da yapıl-di.	473
219	16 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİL-Cİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MAC DONALD'A YAZI NO. 685..... Lozan Antlaşması İngiltere, İtalya ve Japonya ba-kımından 6 Ağustos'ta, Fransa için ise bu tarihten bir ay sonra yürürlüğe girdi. Türk Hükümeti, Musul sorununu Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyi'ne sunmaya sessizce razı oldu ve Cenevre'ye gönderilecek Türk	474

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delegesi olarak Fethi Bey seçildi. Türkiye'nin Milletler Cemiyeti hakkındaki tutumu Musul konusunda vereceği karara bağlı olacak. Lozan Antlaşmasının öngördüğü, Trakya Sınırı Komisyonu, Boğazlar Bölgesi Komisyonu gibi çeşitli komisyonlara Türk delegelerinin seçilmesi işi ağırdan alınıyor. Londra'ya, Yusuf Kemal Beyin yerine Tarım Bakanı ve milletvekili Zekâi Bey atandı. Onun Londra görevi uzun sürmez. Muhaliflerden eski İtihatçı Rahmi Beyin Kabineye alınacağı söyleniyor. Mustafa Kemal Paşa belki Rauf Bey'e de Hükümeti kurma görevini verir. İstanbul barosu temizlenmeye çalışılıyor. Baronun 960 üyesinden 530'u mahkemelerde avukatlık yapmaktan men edildi. Geri kalan 430 üyeden 313'ü Türk, 42'si Rum, 39'u Ermeni ve 34'ü Musevidir.

220 20 Eylül

İNGİLTERE'NİN İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSU EDMONDS'DAN İSTANBUL'DA DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'A YAZI NO. 96.

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Mustafa Kemal'in kayın pederi Muammer Bey ile bir görüşme yaptım. Söylediğine göre, Türkiye'nin üç eksigi var: nüfus, sermaye ve teknik beceri. Gazi, 1908 yılından beri Türk soyunun 8 milyon azaldığı kanısındaymış; ama, Türkiye 15-20 yıl barış içinde kalabilirse nüfus iki katına çıkar diyormuş. Muammer Bey'e göre, güven gelince Türkiye'ye sermaye de gelecek; teknik bilgi ve beceri edinme ise zaman alacaktır.

221 26 Eylül

İNGİLTERE'NİN İZMİR BAŞKONSOLOSU EDMONDS'DAN İSTANBUL'DA DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİ VEKİLİ HENDERSON'A YAZI NO. 99.

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Bir hafta önce İzmir'de bir sinemada yangın çıktı ve 25 kişi can verdi. Belediye Başkanı diye Uşakizade Muammer Bey ağır eleştirilere uğruyor. Bu eleştirilerle dolaylı olarak Muammer Beyin damadı Mustafa Kemal Paşa da eleştirilmiş oluyormuş.

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222	1 Ekim	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 720..... Cumhurbaşkanı'nı yurt gezileri. 12 Eylül'de İstanbul Boğazından geçip Trabzon'a giden Mustafa Kemal, oradan Rize'ye, Ordu'ya, Samsun'a geçmiş; Havza, Amasya, Tokat üzerinden Sivas'ı ziyaret etmiş ve Erzurum'a gitmiştir. Amacı, oradaki son depremin hasarlarını yerinde görmek ve durumu incelemektir, denilebilir. Rize'de iki müftü Mustafa Kemal'e bir dilekçe sunarak medreselerin yeniden açılmasını istemişlerdir. Cumhurbaşkanı. "Hayır, medreseler açılmayacaktır" diye cevap vermiştir. Gazi muhtemelen kara yoluyla Ankara'ya dönecek ve böylece İstanbul'dan geçmemiş olacaktır.	480
223	8 Ekim	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN, İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 750. GİZLİ... İstanbul basını, İzmir'de İttihatçılara karşı bir hareket başlatılacağını yazdı. Hüseyin Cahit, yakında Türkiye'de bir muhalefet partisi kurulacağını bildiriyor ve Hükümeti eleştiriyor. Mustafa Kemal'in doğu Anadolu'ya yaptığı gezinin bir çeşit askeri teftiş olduğunu ve aynı zamanda Halk Partisi propagandası yapmak amacı taşıdığını ileri sürüyor.	482
224	15 Ekim	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 770..... Alman Elçi Nadolny, Ankara'da elçilik binası için arsa satın almış. Cumhurbaşkanı, Polonya Elçisine ve diğer yabancı temsilcilere de Ankara'ya yerleşmelerini söylüyormuş. Polonya Elçisi Ankara'da kiralık bir evde oturuyormuş.	485
225	28 Ekim	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 805..... Musul sorunu dolayısıyla alelacele toplantıya çağrılan TBMM 18 Ekim'de toplandı ve toplantılarına devam etti. Ancak iç sorunlar üzerinde durmaktadır. Yunanistan'dan gelen mübadillerin ihmal e-	486

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		dildikleri gerekçesiyle İmar Bakanı Refet Bey sert biçimde eleştiriliyor. 25 Ekim'de Halk Partisi toplandı. Muhalefet henüz kendisini toparlayıp partileşemedi. Basında muhalefetin liderleri olarak Rauf, Refet, İsmail Cambolat ve Dr. Adnan Beyler gösteriliyor, bu isimlere son olarak Kazım Karabekir de eklendi. Yakında sansasyonel gelişmeler olacağı yolunda söylentiler var. Mustafa Kemal duruma hakim görünüyor. <i>Foreign Office'in notu:</i> Mustafa Kemal rejimine karşı henüz ciddi bir tehdit belirtisi yok.	
226	4 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI MACDONALD'A YAZI NO. 818 <i>İç gelişmeler.</i> TBMM on beş gün önce toplanmıştı ama, Mustafa Kemal, 1 Kasım günlü konuşmayla yasama döneminin resmi açılışını yaptı. Konuşmasında yapılan işleri övdü, bazı güçlükler bulunduğunu da itiraf etti. Yunanistan'dan mübadil olarak gelen göçmenlerin sorunlarının henüz tam olarak halledilemediğine değindi. Donanmanın ıslah edileceğini, demiryolları yapılacağını, Ankara'nın inşa edileceğini, uygarlık yolundaki yürüyüşün süreceğini belirtti. Cumhurbaşkanı, dış politika konularına geçti. Musul sorunu ve Fransa ile ilişkiler üzerinde durdu. Rusya'dan "eski dostumuz" diye söz etti, Polonya ile ilişkilerin olumlu biçimde geliştiğini söyledi. Milletler Cemiyeti'ne değindi. Meclis çalışmalarına devam ediyor. Fethi Bey Meclis Başkanı seçildi. Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat, Cafer Tayyar ve Cevat Paşalar ordudan istifa edip Mecliste yerlerini aldılar. Fevzi, Fahrettin, İzzeddin, Ali Hikmet ve Şükrü Naili Paşalar ise askerlik mesleğini tercih edip mebusluktan istifa ettiler. Hüseyin Cahit, "Tanin'de ordunun siyasetten tamamen ayrılmasını kutluyor, yoksa Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Latin Amerika cumhuriyetlerine benzeyebileceğini söylüyor. <i>Foreign Office'in notu:</i> Türk generallerin politika sahnesinde boy göstermeleri, (Mustafa) Kemal'e ve İsmet'e (Paşa) sıkıntılar yaratabilir.	488

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227	11 Kasım	<p>İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 834.....</p> <p><i>İş politika.</i> TBMM'de bir haftadır soru önermeleri tartışılıyor. Mübadiller sorunu yüzünden İmar Vekili aleyhinde önerge verilmişti. İktidar, önce muhalefete karşı taciz manevralarına girişti. Askerlikten istifa edip Meclise gelen muhalif paşalar, komutanlıklarını şahsen haleflerine devretmeden Meclise sokulmadılar. Kazım Karabekir Paşa, devir teslim muamelesi için Erzurum'a kadar gitmek durumunda bırakıldı. Sonra tek tek Bakanlar aleyhinde değil, ancak Hükümet aleyhinde soru önergesi verilebileceği bildirildi. Yani iş Hükümete güven sorununa dönüştürüldü: Meclis'teki son tartışmaları Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile Latife Hanım da izlediler. 8 Kasım günü 19'a karşı 147 oyla Hükümete güven tazelendi. 10 Kasım günü Halk Partisi toplandı. Parti içinde bir muhalif gurup olduğu biliniyordu ama bunlar henüz partileşmemişti. Dünkü toplantıda 18 üyenin Halk partisinden istifası kabul edildi. Bu, yeni oluşumun çekirdeğidir. Yeni kurulacak partinin "Cumhuriyet partisi" adını taşıyacağı söyleniyordu. Dün, Recep Beyin önerisi üzerine Halk Partisinin adı "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi" olarak değiştirildi. Gazeteler Halk Partisinden 30-40 kadar istifa daha olacağını yazıyorlar. İsmet Paşa hastalandı, son hafta içinde Meclise gelemedi. Bir süre başkentten ayrılabilir.</p>	490
228	19 Kasım	<p>İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 850.....</p> <p>17 Kasım günlü "Son Telgraf" gazetesi, Mustafa Kemal'in, Fransa'yı ziyaret için kendisine yapılan resmi daveti kabul ettiğini yazdı. Diğer gazeteler de bu haberi doğruladılar. Aynı tarihli "Akşam" gazetesi ise haberi yalanladı. Cumhurbaşkanı bir tarihte bir Fransız devlet adamına, bir gün Avrupa'yı ziyaret edersem Fransa'yı ziyaretle başlarım demiş, sonrasını ise gazeteler uydurmuş. General Mougin, Hükümeti adına Mustafa Kemal'i davet</p>	493

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		emiş olabilir, ama Cumhurbaşkanı şu sırada dış ge- ziye çıkmaz.	
229	24 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİL- CİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 859..... <i>Iran'la ilişkiler.</i> Yeni İran Büyükelçisi Sadık Tabatabai, geçen hafta Ankara'da güven mektubu- nu Cumhurbaşkanıya sundu. Sunarken sözlü bir nutuk söyledi ve İslam ülkeleri arasındaki menfaat birliğinden de söz etti. Bu ifadeleri, Cumhuriyetin laik özelliğini vurgulamak isteyen Türk Hükümeti- ni pek hoşnut etmedi. Cumhurbaşkanı kısa bir nutukla kendisine cevap verdi.	494
Ek	17 Kasım	İRAN BÜYÜKELÇİSİNİN 17 KASIM 1924 GÜNÜ MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA TARAFINDAN KABULÜ..... İran Büyükelçisinin Nutku. Mustafa Kemal Pa- şa'nın cevabı	495
230	24 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİL- CİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 862..... <i>Fethi Bey (Okyar) Kabinesi.</i> 22 Kasım günlü gazete- ler, Başbakan İsmet Paşa'nın sağlık nedeniyle istifa ettiğini, Cumhurbaşkanı'nın Fethi Beyi yeni Hü- kümeti kurmakla görevlendirdiğini haber verdiler. İsmet Paşa'nın bir süredir rahatsız olduğu bilindi- ğinden istifası sürpriz olmadı. Fethi Bey, Cumhur- başkanına danışarak yeni Hükümeti kurdu. Şöyle- dir: Başbakan Ali Fethi Bey, İçişleri Bakanı Meh- met Recep Bey, Maliye Bakanı Mustafa Abdül Ha- lik Bey, Bayındırlık Bakanı Feyzi Bey, Dışişleri Ba- kanı Şükrü Kaya Bey, Adalet Bakanı Mahmut Esat Bey, Millî Eğitim Bakanı Şükrü Saracoğlu Bey, Sağlık Bakanı Dr. Mazhar Bey, Ticaret Bakanı Ali Cenani Bey ve Tarım Bakanı Hasan Fehmi Bey. (Başbakan ve Bakanlar hakkında bazı değerlendirmeler). Yeni kurulan Terakkiperver Parti'den kimse Hükümete alınmamıştır. Ama Ba- kanlardan üçü (Feyzi, Mahmut Esat ve Şükrü Saracoğlu) son zamanlarda Halk Partisi'ne kafa	496

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		tutmuş ve istifalarına ramak kalmış kimselerdir. Yeni Kabine bir geçiş Kabinesidir, denilebilir. Resmen kurulmuş olan Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, etkili olabilmek için çaba harcıyor. Ancak şimdiye kadar sadece 30 kadar milletvekili Halk Partisi'nden istifa etmiştir. Yeni parti karakter bakımından muhafazakârdır. Halk Partisi'nden ayrılmış olan mebuslar çok çeşitli kategorilerdendir. İçlerinde Erzurumlu Hoca gibi Hilafetçiler vardır. Üçüncü bir hareket de vardır. Bunlar da mutlakiyetçi eğilimde olan kimselerdir. Mustafa Kemal, bu üç hareket karşısında ne yapması gerektiğine karar vermek durumundadır. Fethi Bey Kabinesinin kurulması ilk adımdır. Bundan sonraki adımın ne olacağı henüz belli değildir. Bir gazete, şimdi resmen iki parti olduğuna göre, Cumhurbaşkanı partiler üstünde olmalı diyor. Yani Cumhurbaşkanı Halk Partisi Başkanlığından ayrılmalı demek istiyor.	
Ek	24 Kasım	YENİ KABİNE ÜYELERİ HAKKINDA BİLGİLER. 24.11.1924..... Başbakan Ali Fethi Bey (Okyar) ile kabinesindeki dokuz Bakanın kısa özgeçmişleri.	500
231	25 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 868 GİZLİ..... Gazi'nin "Times" gazetesine demeci. Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal, Londra'da çıkan "Times" gazetesini muhabiri Macartney'i 21 Kasım günü kabul etmiş ve kendisine uzun bir mülakat vermiştir. Macartney, gazetede yayınlanmak üzere hazırladığı yazısının bir örneğini bana (Lindsay) verdi; Londra'ya göndermeden önce bu yazıyı Gazi'nin onayına sunmaya da söz vermiş. Gazi'nin bundan sonra ne yapacağı sorusunun cevabı bu yazıda bulunmaktadır. Gazi, Terakkiperver partilileri, gerici, cumhuriyet karşıtı olarak görüyor. Sanki onlara savaş açacakmış gibi görünüyor. Belki muhalefete gözdağı vermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çünkü Macartney,	503

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		Refet Paşa, Rauf Bey, Hüseyin Cahit Bey ile ve diğer muhalefet liderleriyle yakınlığı olan bir kimsedir ve Gazi'nin ona söyledikleri muhalefetin kulağına gidecektir.	
		<i>Not. 26 Kasım:</i> Macartney'in şimdi bildirdiğine göre, Gazi'nin demecini gazetede yayınlamasına izin verilmemiştir. Mustafa Kemal, muhalefete yaklaşmaya çalışıyor ve onların işini kolaylaştırmak istiyor.	
Ek	22 Kasım	(CUMHURBAŞKANI GAZİ MUSTAFA KEMAL'DEN ALDIĞI DEMEÇ HAKKINDA) MR MACARTNEY'İN RAPORU. 22 KASIM 1924..... Beni kabul etmek ve siyasi durum hakkında bazı açıklamalar yapmak nezaketini göstermiş olan Gazi Paşa, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası hakkında diyor ki: "Terakkiperverlerin samimiyetinden emin değilim. Yayımlanan programlarının onların gerçek amaçlarını ve ihtiraslarını ifade ettiğine kani değilim. Rauf Bey'in Mecliste Hilafet hakkında söylediklerini, Cumhuriyetin ilanı üzerine İstanbul basınına verdiği demeci unutamıyorum. Kazım Karabekir Paşa da Cumhuriyetin ilanından hoşlanmadığını gizleme zahmetine girmemişti. Yeni Partinin liderlerinden biri olan Sabit Bey de Cumhuriyetin ilanının aceleyle getirilmesini Mecliste protesto etmiş ve "Neden iki ayağımızı bir pabuca sokuyorsunuz?" diye sormuştu...Cumhuriyetçi olduklarını söylüyorlar. Biz de Cumhuriyetçiyiz...Öyleyse neden bizi terkettiler?...."	505
232	3 Aralık	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİNDE SIR W. TYRRELL'E YAZI NO. 3913/30..... Fethi Bey Başbakan olunca kendisini kutlamış ve kendisinden cevap almışım. Üç gün önce basın Fethi Beyi hararetle kutladığımı yazdı. Türkler, bizimle dost olmaya pek istekli görünüyorlar.	509
Ek I	24 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN BAŞBAKAN FETHİ BEY'E TEBRİK MEKTUBU Başbakanlığa atanmanız dolayısıyla en içten tebriklerimi sunar, bu görevinizin Türk milletine	510

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		mutluluk ve refah getirmesini dilerim. Tebriklerimi Ekselanslarına yüz yüze sunmayı umarım.	
Ek 2	29 Kasım	BAŞBAKAN FETHİ BEY'DEN İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'E TEŞEKKÜR MEKTUBU..... Nazik tebrik mektubunuza teşekkürü görev bilirim. Türk milleti hakkındaki dileklerinize de pek duygulandım. Sizi yakında Ankara'da Büyükelçi olarak kabul etmekten mutlu olurum.	510
233	12 Aralık	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 909 <i>Ankara'da durum.</i> Macar Elçisi Tahy Ankara'da bir arsa edinmiş. Ama şimdilik oraya temelli yerleşmeyi pek düşünmüyor, Fransa ile bizim bu konudaki kararımızı bekliyor. Tahy, Mustafa Kemal ile Rauf Bey arasındaki rekabeti bir ölüm-kalım mücadelesi olarak görüyor ve Rauf Bey'in İttihatçılarla yakın ilişki içinde olduğunu belirtiyor. İsmet Paşa'nın da tekrar Başbakan olacağını söylüyor.	511
234	16 Aralık	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 920 <i>Şeyh Sünnisi.</i> Türk Hükümeti, öncelikle iç politika sorunlarına eğilmiş olduğundan, Şeyh Ahmet Sünnisi'yi özel görevle Arabistan'a göndermemiştir, sanırım. Türkiye'nin dış sorunlardan uzak durmaya çalıştığını yabancı meslektaşlarım da doğruluyorlar. "Panislamizm, Abdül Hamid gibi ölmüştür" deniyor. Çeşitli söylentiler var. Güya Şeyh Sünnisi, Beyrut'ta oturan Şehzade Selim ile haberleşiyormuş. Güya Türk Hükümeti 2000 lira verip kendisini başından savmış. Bu son söylenti doğru olabilir. <i>Foreign Office'in notu:</i> Şeyh Sünnisi'nin faaliyetleri hakkında çeşitli senaryolar ve spekülasyonlar.	512
235	17 Aralık	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 924	514

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		<i>İç politika.</i> Kazım Karabekir Paşa Terakkiperver Fırkanın Başkanlığını resmen kabul etti. Bekir Sami Bey de bu partiye katıldı. Bu partinin liderlerinden biri olan Ali İhsan Paşa, bağımsız olarak Bursa'dan ara seçime katıldı ve kazandı. İzmir'in geri alınmasından sonra Mustafa Kemal, Ali İhsan Paşa'yı görevden almıştı. İstanbul basını, İsmet Paşa'yı eleştiriyordu, Fethi Bey kabinesini ise eleştirmiyor. Fethi Bey Kabinesi, bir geçiş Kabinesidir. Muhalefetin gerçek başı durumundaki Rauf Bey'in yakın gelecekte oynayacağı rol hakkında spekülasyonlar yapılıyor. Kendisi, Malta'ya sürülmüş olmaktan dolayı bize (İngilizlere) kırgın değil.	
	1925		
236	7 Ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 17 <i>İç politika.</i> Türk Hükümetinde iki değişiklik oldu: Ayrı bir Denizcilik Bakanlığı kuruldu ve bunun başına İhsan Bey getirildi. İçişleri Bakanı Recep Bey istifa etti ve yerine Tekirdağ mebusu Cemil Bey atandı. "Tok Söz" gazetesi ile İngilizce "Orient News" gazetesi Hükümetçe geçici olarak kapatıldı. Fethi Bey Hükümeti, geçiş Hükümetidir. Meclis normal oturumlarına devam ediyor. Cumhurbaşkanı, eşi Latife Hanım'la birlikte Ankara'dan Konya'ya gitti. Bu gezinin amacı bir sırdır, sadece basında spekülasyonlar vardır.	516
237	20 Ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 47 Rifat Bey içişleri Bakanlığından istifa etti. Daha önce Recep Bey de bu görevden istifa etmişti. Sorun, İstanbul ve Ankara Belediye Başkanlarının atamayla mı yoksa seçimle mi göreve gelecekleri sorunudur. Bir ara Başbakan Fethi Beyin de istifa edeceği söylenmişti. Hükümet ile Konya'da bulunan Cumhurbaşkanı arasında telgraflar gidip gelmiş ve	519

<u>No</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yarıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		kriz giderilmiştir. Belediye Başkanların Hükümet tarafından atanmasına karar verilmiştir. Gazi, Konya'dan Adana'ya, oradan da Dört Yol'a geçti. Nureddin Paşanın milletvekili seçilmesi geçersiz sayıldı. İsmet Paşa Heybeli adada nekahet dönemini geçiriyor. Dün kendisini ziyaret ettim, dostça davrandı, fakat politika konuşmadı. Aşırı çalışmaktan hasta düşmüş.	
238	28 Ocak	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 67 Macaristan'dan bir grup üniversite öğrencisi Türk Hükümetinin davetlisi olarak İstanbul'u ziyaret etti. Macarlarla Türkler Turan kökenli olduklarını vurguluyorlar ve bu ziyaret de ikili ilişkilerde biraz etkili olacaktır, sanırım.	521
239	28 Ocak	İNGİLTERE'NİN HALEP KONSOLOSU HOUGH-DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'A-YAZI NO. 18. GİZLİ Mustafa Kemal'in Çukurova gezisi konusunda Fransız makamlarının verdiği bilgiler: M. Kemal, 8 Ocak günü Adana'ya geldi. 15 Ocak'ta Dört Yol'a, 16 Ocak'ta Osmaniye'ye geçti. Dört Yol'da heyecanlı bir kitle tarafından karşılandı ve halka hitap etti. Öğleden sonra kasabanın ileri gelenleriyle birlikte iki çete başını kabul etti. 17 Ocak'ta Osmaniye'den İslahiye'ye, 21 Ocak'ta da Mersin'e geçti.	522
240	23 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E TEL. NO. 37 Şeyh Said ayaklanması. Hareket, başlangıçta gösterildiğinden daha ciddidir. Bir habere göre Şeyh Said, Türkiye'de şeriatı yerleştirmek için ilahi bir misyonu olduğunu ileri sürüyormuş. İsmet Paşa Ankara'ya gitti ve Cumhurbaşkanı ve Başbakan ile görüştü.	523
241	24 Şubat	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 154 Şeyh Said ayaklanması. Hareket, başlangıçta gösterildiğinden daha ciddidir. Bir habere göre Şeyh Said, Türkiye'de şeriatı yerleştirmek için ilahi bir misyonu olduğunu ileri sürüyormuş. İsmet Paşa Ankara'ya gitti ve Cumhurbaşkanı ve Başbakan ile görüştü.	524

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özet</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<i>Şeyh Sait ayaklanması. İsmet Paşa 21 Şubat'ta Ankara'ya vardı ve istasyonda Cumhurbaşkanı tarafından karşılandı. Başbakan Fethi Bey karşılamada yoktu. Güney-Dogu Anadolu'da sıkıyönetim ilan edildi. Şeyh Sait hareketi büyük boyutlara ulaştı. Basın, ayaklanmada yabancı entrikaların (İngiltere kastediliyor) rolünden bahsediyor, ama hareketin dini duygulardan kaynaklandığı açıktır. Bu, bugünkü Türk rejiminin laik özelliğine karşı ilk açık harekettir. Bir avuç gerici bir yana bırakılırsa, Meclis'te bu dini ayaklanmaya sempati besleyen yoktur ve Terakkiperver Fırka da Hükümetin alacağı tedbirleri destekleyecektir.</i>	
242	1 Mart	İNGİLTERE'NİN PARIS BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LORD CREWE'DAN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'A TEL. NO. 95..... Frankin Bouillon kendisine teklif edilen Ankara Büyükelçiliğini reddetmiştir. Kendisi Mustafa Kemal'e telgraf çekerek üzüntüsünü bildirmiş ve fakat yakında Ankara'ya bir ziyaret yapacağını eklemiştir.	525
243	2 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E TEL. NO. 49..... Büyükelçi atandığını ve güven mektubunun geldiğini Nusret Bey'e bildirdim. Güven mektubumu Cumhurbaşkanı'na sunmak için henüz bir randevu istemedim.	526
244	3 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E TEL. NO. 52..... Başbakan (Fethi Bey) dün istifa etti. İsmet Paşa Başbakan oldu.	527
245	3 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 178. GİZLİ..... <i>Şeyh Sait ayaklanması. Genç'te başlayan ayaklanma önemli boyutlara ulaştı. Ne olduğunu tam bilemi-</i>	527

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		yoruz. Haberler Ankara'dan geliyor, ortalıkta sayısız söylenti dolaşıyor. İsyanın merkezi Murad su boyunda ve güneydeki dağlık bölgelerdedir. Beş tümen asilerin üzerine yürüyecek. Hareket dinidir ve cumhuriyete karşıdır. Halen Beyrut'ta sürgünde yaşayan Sultan Abdülhamid'in oğlu Selim Efendi, asiler tarafından Padişah ilan edilecekmış. İhanet kanununda değişiklik yapıldı. Dini duyguları siyasi amaçla istismar edenlerin iki yıldan idama kadar varan cezalara çarpıtılması öngörülmüyor. Muhalefeti temsil eden Terakkiperver parti örnek bir davranış sergiledi ve gericilere sempati beslemediğini gösterdi. Durum, Mustafa Kemal ile İsmet Paşa'nın kontrolü altındadır. İlimli tutumda olan Başbakan Fethi Bey ise 2 Mart'ta Halk Partisi içinde sert bas-kılara uğradı ve istifa etmek zorunda kaldı. Terakkiperver partiden de taşra teşkilâtını kapatması isteniyor. Bu akşam İsmet Paşa'nın Başbakanlığı üstlendiği, Kabinayı kurmakta olduğu ve Gazi'nin istediği politikayı uygulamaya hazırlandığı bildiriliyor.	
246	6 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 181 İsmet Paşa kabinesinin listesi ilişikte sunulmuştur.	530
Ek	4 Mart	4 MART 1925 GÜNÜ KURULAN ÜÇÜNCÜ İSMET PAŞA KABİNESİ ÜYELERİ HAKKINDA NOTLAR..... <i>Başbakan İsmet Paşa, İçişleri Bakanı Cemil Bey, Dışişleri Bakanı Tevfik Rüştü Bey, Milli Savunma Bakanı Recep Bey, Adalet Bakanı Mahmut Esat Bey, Bayındırlık Bakanı Süleyman Sırrı Bey, Maliye Bakanı Hasan Bey, Ticaret Bakanı Ali Cenani Bey, Sağlık Bakanı Dr. Refik Bey, Denizcilik Bakanı İhsan Bey, Millî Eğitim Bakanı Hamdullah Suphi Bey ve Tarım Bakanı Sabri Bey. Başbakanın ve 11 Bakanın özgeçmişleri hakkında notlar. Cemil, Mahmut Esat, Ali Cenani ve İhsan Beyler eski Bakanlık koltuklarını korumuşlardır; diğer yedi Bakan ise Hükûmette yenidir.</i>	531

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247	10 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ DİPLOMATİK TEMSİLCİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 199..... Fethi Bey Kabinesinin nasıl düşürüldüğü tam açıklanmamışsa da bu değişiklikte Mustafa Kemal'in doğrudan etkili olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. 4 Mart sabahı Halk Partisi meclisi yine toplandı ve yeni Hükümetin programını onayladı. İsmet Paşa, günün ihtiyaçları için iki önlem alındığını açıkladı: Biri Takriri Sükun kanununun çıkarılması, diğeri de iki İstiklâl Mahkemesinin kurulması. Terakkiperver Parti her iki önleme de şiddetle karşı çıktı ama nafiye. Her iki önlem aynı gün kanunlaştı. İstiklâl mahkemelerinden biri Ankara'da kuruluyor, diğeri ise isyan bölgesinde çalışacaktır. Takriri sükun kanunu, iki yıl boyunca Hükümete istediğini yapma yetkisi veriyor. Müzakereler sırasında Recep Bey İstanbul basınına şiddetle saldırdı. 6 Mart günü, yasanın çıkışının ertesi günü, "Tevhid-i Efkar", "Son Telgraf" ve "İstiklâl" gazeteleri kapatıldı. Tağradaki bazı gazeteler de kapatıldı. Kapatılmayan gazeteler ise yorum yapmaktan çekiniyor, Hüseyin Cahit Bey de "Tanin'de Malta hatıralarını yayınlıyor. Terakkiperver parti örgütü de rahat bırakılmaz. İstiklâl Mahkemelerinin hakimleri atandı; hepsi Mustafa Kemal'in destekçileridir. Basın fazla bir şey yazmıyor, biraz bilgi toplaması için Mr. Knight'ı Trabzon'a gönderiyorum.	534
248	18 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 213 16 Mart 1925 günü Ankara'da güven mektubumu Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı'na sunarken okuduğumuz nutukların örnekleri ilâşikte sunulmuştur.	536
Ek 1	16 Mart	İNGİLTERE BÜYÜKELÇİSİ MR. LINDSAY'IN NUTKU..... Türkiye Cumhuriyeti nezdine Büyükelçi atandığımı gösteren mektubu Ekselanslarına sunmaktan onur kazanırım. Türkiye ile Britanya İmparatorluğu arasında diplomatik ilişkileri resmen ve tam olarak	537

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		yeniden bağlatmaktan da onurlanırım. Ülkelerimiz arasında en iyi ilişkileri geliştirmek için çalışacağım. Ekselanslarından ve Cumhuriyet Hükümetinden destek görmeyi umarım.	
Ek 2	16 Mart	TÜRKİYE CUMHURBAŞKANININ NUTKU "...İtimatnamenizi memnuniyetle alıyorum. Zatâîlilerinin, birçok senelerden beri münkati (kesik) olan Türkiye-Büyük Britanya münasebat-ı diplomatikîyesinin tamamiyle suret-i resmîyede yeniden tesisine memur edilmesini hüsn-i telakki ederim...Türkiye Hükümeti dahi münasebat-ı mezkûrenin daha emin ve daha samimi olmasını arzu etmektedir..."	537
249	20 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 217 <i>İngiliz Büyükelçisi güven mektubunu sunuyor: 15 Mart'ta Ankara'ya geldim ve ertesi gün, güven mektubumu sunmam için Cumhurbaşkanı tarafından kabul edildim. Dışişleri Bakanı bana yapılacak seremoniyi anlattı. Nutkumu Fransızca olarak hazırladım ve önceden Türk Hükûmetine gönderdim. Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın okuyacağı nutuk metni de 16 Mart sabahı bana gönderildi. O gün öğleden sonra Çankaya'ya gittik. Oraya varışımızda askeri bando İngiliz Milli Marşını çaldı. Sonra Cumhurbaşkanı beni yalnız olarak kabul etti. Yalnız Tefvik Rüştü Bey ile bir görevli oradaydı. Cumhurbaşkanı "Hoşgeldiniz Sefir Hazretleri" dedi, el sıkıştı ve nutuklarımızı okuduk. Güven mektubumu sunduktan sonra izin isteyip maiyetimi takdim ettim. Onlar çekildikten sonra Cumhurbaşkanı Ankara hakkında ne düşündüğümü sordu. Başkentlerinin yerini değiştirenlerin cesaretine hayranım diye cevap verdim. Tez zamanda buraya yerleşeceğimi umduğunu söyledi. Önce bir arsa bulmam gerekiyor dedim. Çıkarken bando tekrar milli marşımızı çaldı ve askerler beni selamladı.</i>	538

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250	24 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 226 <i>Ankara'dan izlenimler:</i> Ankara'da bir hafta kaldık. Hava güzeldi. İstanbul'dakiler düzeyinde bir tek yol var. Binalar yoksul. Son dört yıl içinde gelişme olmuş, ama yavaş. "Tokatliyan ayarında" bir lokanta var. Karşılaştığımız insanlar pek iyimser. Devlet ve Gazi Paşa aynı şey. İki üç defa Meclisi ziyaret ettik. Kalpak ve fesler olmasa bir Orta Avrupa Parlamentosu denebilir. Devlet dairelerinde insanlar yoğun çalışma içinde. Türkiye politikası İstanbul'dan da izlenebilir, Bakanlarla görüşmek için ise zaman zaman Ankara'ya gitmek gerekecek.	540
251	24 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 225 <i>Eski Başbakan Fethi Bey</i> Paris'e Büyükelçi atandı. Birkaç haftadan beri orada Büyükelçi olan Cevat Bey başka bir göreve nakledilecek. Fethi Bey, İsmet Paşa'ya kıyasla daha ılımlı bir kimsedir. Cumhurbaşkanı ile de farklı görüştedir. Şimdi Büyükelçi atanmaktan dolayı kırılgan değil, memnundur. Malta sürgünlerinden olan Fethi Beyin eşi Galibe Hanım, genç ve hoş bir hanımdır; eski Marsilya Başkonsolosunun kızıdır ve Fransa'da yetişmiştir. Fransızca ve İngilizce bilir. <i>Foreign Office'in notu:</i> Fethi Bey Ankara'dan uzaklaşmakla akıllılık etmektedir. Zira Kürt ayaklanmasından ona da sorumluluk payı düşebilirdi.	542
252	25 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINDA OLIPHANT'A MEKTUP, ÖZEL..... Latife Hanım, mükemmel İngilizce konuşan bir hanım. Kendisiyle kadın hakları hakkında konuştum. İtalyan Montagna, Ankara'dan İstanbul'daki eşine, "Ankara her zamanki gibi korkunç" diye telgraf çekmiş ve bütün İstanbul bu patavatsızlığın dedikodusuyla çalkalanmıştır. Ankara'ya seyahatimiz yararlı oldu, orada iyi bir arsa bulduk, Gazi'nin	544

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		köşkünün hemen dışında. Tevfik Rüştü, bir akşam yemeğinde tam altı kadeh rakı içti. Yemekte on yedi erkek ve sadece iki hanım vardı. Bir yanda Türkiye ile ilişkilerin önemi, öte yanda Ankara'nın elverişsiz hali. Değerlendirmesini Foreign Office'e bırakıyorum.	
253	31 Mart	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 258 İç politika. TBMM bütçeyi görüşüyor. Muhalefetin pek sesi soluğu çıkmıyor. Ankara İstiklâl Mahkemesi çalışmalarına başladı. Adanalı iki gazeteci gecici propaganda yaptıkları için mahkum edildi. Doğudaki İstiklâl mahkemesi henüz işe koyulmadı. Basın suskun, Hüseyin Cahit "Tanin"'de Malta a-nılarını yayınlıyor. Varto'da, Silvan'da yer yer çarpışmalar olduğu bildiriliyor. "Hakimiyet-i Milliye", ayaklanmanın hala bastırılmamış olmasını eleştiri-yor; bastırılması için 10 milyon lira ödenek ayrıl-dı. 1925 bütçesi 30 milyon lira açık verecek. İsyan bastırıldıktan sonra Türk ordusu Musul'a yönelir mi? sorusu akla geliyor.	547
254	7 Nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 285 Franklin-Bouillon 4 Nisan günü İstanbul basınına bir demec verdi. Türkiye'ye Büyükelçi olarak gön-derilmeyi kabul etmeyişinin nedenlerini anlatmaya ve özür dilemeye geldiğini söyledi. Aynı akşam Pa-ris'e hareket etti. Ankara'da Gazi Paşa ile görüş-müş, Tevfik Rüştü Bey ile birçok defa konuşmuş. İsmet Paşa ile sadece bir defa görüşebilmiş.	550
255	21 Nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 313 Zekâi Bey'in Londra'ya Büyükelçi atandığına dair Nusret Bey'den alınan nota ile eki güven mektubu örneği ilijikte sunulmuştur.	551

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Ek 1	18 Nisan	HARİCİYE VEKALETİ İSTANBUL MURAHHASI NUSRET BEY'DEN İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ SIR LINDSAY'E NOTA..... Zekâi Bey'in güven mektubu ilişkide sunulmuştur.	552
Ek 2	—	TÜRKİYE CUMHURBAŞKANI GAZİ MUSTAFA KEMAL'DEN BÜYÜK BRİTANYA KRALI MAJESTE GEORGE V'E MEKTUP..... Türkiye ile Britanya İmparatorluğu arasında dostluk ilişkileri kurmayı arzu ettiğimden Zekâi Beyi Majesteleri nezdine Büyükelçi atadım. Kendisinin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti adına yapacağı bildirimlere itimat buyurulmasını Majestelerinden rica ederim. Not: Zekâi (Apaydın) Bey, Büyükelçi olarak bu güven mektubunu İngiliz Kralına sunmaya vakit bulamadan, Ahmet Ferit (Tek) Bey Londra Büyükelçiliğine atanmış ve 11 Mayıs 1925 günü onun için İngiltere'den agreman istenmiştir.	553
256	22 Nisan	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 317..... Belçika Elçisi Baron de Villenfagne, 15 Nisan günü güven mektubunu Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı'na törenle sunmuştur. Bu tören sırasında söylenen nutukların çevirileri ilişiktir. Belçika Elçisi, Türkiye ile ticaret anlaşması yapmak istediklerini söylemiş, Cumhurbaşkanı ise gayet temkinli bir karşılık vermiştir. Başka ülkeler de Türkiye ile ticaret anlaşmaları yapmak istiyor, ama Ankara Hükümeti kendisini bağlamak istemiyor. Not: Belçika Elçisi 15 Nisan'da değil, 14 Nisan 1925 günü güven mektubunu Atatürk'e sunmuştur.	553
Ek	15 Nisan	"HAKİMİYET-İ MİLLİYE" GAZETESİNİN 15 NİSAN 1925 GÜNLÜ SAYISINDA ÇIKAN HABERİN ÇEVİRİSİ..... Belçika Elçisi de Villenfagne'nin güven mektubunu Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı'na sunarken okuduğu nutuk: "...Türkler ticaret yapmak için bizimle müzakere etmek isterlerse bundan memnun olacağız." Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı'nın Elçiye cevabı: "Haşmetli Belçika Kralı Hazretlerinin Zau Âlilerini	554

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		nezdine tayinine dair itimatnamenizi memnuniyetle alıyorum. Belçikalılar gibi sulhü ve inkişafı iktisadiyeyi kendilerine en büyük gaye ittihaz etmiş olan Türkler dahi iki memleket arasında uzun senelerden beri mevcut ve her iki memleketin menafiline muvafık olan ticari ve iktisadi münasebetlerin mütekabil bir hüsnü âmiziğ ve muhabbet içinde inkişafa mazhar olmasını arzu etmektedirler..."	
257	11 Mayıs	İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ CHAMBERLAIN'DAN İSTANBUL'DA BÜYÜKELÇİ SIR R. LINDSAY'E TEL. NO. 78. ACELE..... Zekâi Bey geri çekiliyor ve Londra'ya Ferit Bey Büyükelçi olarak atanmak isteniyor. Bu konudaki görüşlerinizin bildirilmesini rica ederim.	556
258	18 Ağustos	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ MASLAHATGÜZARİ HOARE'DEN DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI. GİZLİ NO. 686..... Cumhurbaşkanının boşandığı bir Hükümet açıklamasıyla kamuoyuna duyuruldu. Açıklamada sadece Cumhurbaşkanın 5 Ağustos'ta Latife Hanım'dan ayrıldığı bildiriliyor.	557
259	1 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANİ CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 678 <i>İç politika.</i> Muhalefet partisi haftalar önce kapatıldı, liderlerinin adları unutuldu bile. Yalnız "Hakimiyet-i Milliye"de siyasi yorumlar çıkıyor, öteki gazeteler suskun. İstiklâl mahkemesi hüküm vermeye devam ediyor. Cumhurbaşkanı son on günü Kastamonu yöresini ziyaretle geçirdi. Burada çeşitli konuşmalar yaptı, milletin çağdaşlaşması gerektiğini vurguladı ve özellikle kılık kıyafet üzerinde durdu. İnsanlar dükkanlara koştu. Muhalefetten kurtulan Gazi, önümüzdeki dönemde kendisini yoğun bir modernleşme kampanyasına verecek görünüyor. Kendisini Napolyon'a veya boyarların sakallarını kesen Büyük Petro'ya benzetenler var.	558

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260	9 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 694 <i>Tekke, zaviye ve şapka.</i> Gazi, İnebolu'da yaptığı konuşmada, çağdaş giyim kuşamın kullanılmasını savunurken, tekke ve zaviyelere de değinmişti. Ankara'ya döner dönmez O'nun Başkanlığında toplanan Bakanlar Kurulu üç kararname kabul etti. Bunlar, tekke, zaviye ve türbelerin kapatılması; din görevlilerin kıyafetleri ve memurların şapka giymeleriyle ilgili kararnamelerdir. Ancak bunların anayasal dayanağını göremedim. Mustafa Kemal'in daha Ocak ayında Konya'ya yaptığı gezi sırasında, Türk Hükümetinin Mevlevi mallarına el koyacağı yolunda söylentiler çıkmıştı. Dolayısıyla şimdi gelen darbe pek sürpriz olmadı. Tekke ve zaviyelerin kapatılma nedeni, bunların Şeyh Sait ayaklanması na bulaşmış olmalarıdır. Yani Hükümet, laikleşme tutkusuna bir gerekçe bulmuştur. Bu kararnamelere karşı herhangi bir tepki beklenmiyor. Şapka kararnamesi basında geniş yer tutuyor.	560
261	14 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 704 <i>Musul sorunu.</i> Türk basını bu soruna geniş yer veriyor. Bazı Londra gazeteleri de sanki İngiltere Cenevre'deki ısrarında ciddi değilmiş gibi Türk kamuoyunda yanlış bir izlenim yaratıyor. Ankara'da Rus nüfuzu şu sıralarda artmış görünüyor. Aslında Ankara'dakiler Rus yanlısı veya İngiliz yanlısı değil, sadece Türk yanlısıdır. Yalnız ılımlılar ve aşırılar diye iki gruba ayrılıyorlar. İsmet Paşa ılımlıdır, şu sıralarda Cenevre'de bulunan Tefvik Rüştü ise aşırıdır.	561
262	16 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 717 <i>İç politika.</i> Türk Hükümeti biraz yumuşuyor. İstiklal Mahkemesinin yargıladığı gazeteciler salıverildi. İstanbul gazetecileri de cumhuriyete sadık ol-	564

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		duklarına dair Cumhurbaşkanına iki telgraf gönderdiler ve berat ettiler. Hükümette başka yumuşama belirtileri de görülüyor.	
263	22 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 720 Mr. Helm'in Ankara ziyareti ile ilgili raporu ilişikte sunulmuştur.	566
Ek	—	16-17 EYLÜL 1925 TARİHLERİNDE ANKARA'YA YAPILAN ZİYARET HAKKINDA GENEL NOTLAR <i>Dışişleri Bakanlığı</i> — Tevfik Kamil Bey görevinden ayrılacak. Yusuf Hikmet Beyin yerine Nusret Sadullah Bey Siyasi Direktör oldu. Protokol Şefi şimdi Celal Beydir. <i>Kabine</i> — Gazi ile İsmet Paşa arasında geçimsizlik belirtisi yok. İsmet Paşa, Gazi ile Latife Hanımı barıştırmak için elinden geleni yapmış. Tevfik Rüştü Bey, İsmet Paşanın durumunu yıpratıyormuş. <i>Cumhurbaşkanı ve çevresi</i> — Mustafa Kemal, Latife Hanımı uğurlamaya gitmemiş, İsmet Paşa Latife Hanımı istasyondan uğurlamıştır. Bayan İnönü de İzmir'e kadar Latife Hanıma refakat etmiştir. Latife Hanımın ısrarla politik işlere karışması boşanma nedeni olmuştur. <i>Musul</i> yüzünden savaş çıkacağına kimse inanmıyor. <i>Telsiz</i> . Fransızlar Kalecik'te bir telsiz istasyonu kuracaklar. <i>İnşaat işleri</i> — Ankara'da inşaat işleri hızla devam ediyor. İstasyonda büyük bir bina tamamlandı, yedi yeni evkaf evi yapıldı, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı inşaatı tamamlanmak üzere, inşaatçı çalışanlar Almanca konuşuyorlar. Yollar tamamlanıyor, yeni dükkanlar açılıyor. Çankaya eteklerinde bir düzüne ev yapılmış, istasyon tarafındaki bataklık kısmen kurutulmuş, Gazi'nin model çiftliğinde de çalışmalar devam ediyor. <i>Sıhhiye</i> — Kanalizasyon sistemi yok, ama daha az sıvrisinek var.	566

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		<p><i>Şapka</i> — Ankara'da şapka henüz yaygınlaşmamış. Memurların çoğu hala fesli.</p> <p><i>Oteller</i> — Martta gördüğüm yeni büyük otelin yapım çalışmalarında fazla ilerleme olmamış. Buna karşılık yedi odalı başka bir otel yapılmış, zemin katında mutfak ve restoranı var. Gecelik oda ücreti 6 lira. Ankara'da hayat pahalılığı İstanbul'dakinden % 35-40 daha yüksek.</p>	
264	23 Eylül	<p>MUSTAFA KEMAL VE YENİ TÜRKİYE HAKKINDA İNGİLTERE DİŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞINCA HAZIRLANAN NOTLAR</p> <p>Bu sonbaharda TBMM'nin muhalif unsurlardan temizleneceği ve ayrıca Kabinede değişiklik yapılacağı, çok yorgun düşen İsmet Paşa'nın yerine Recep Bey'in Başbakan olacağı yolunda haberler var. Mustafa Kemal, bir arkadaşına demiş ki: "Bizim halkımız henüz demokratik rejime alışık değil; Cumhuriyetin kurucuları olarak halkımızı yetiştirmek bize düşen bir görevdir. 10-15 yıl boyunca Devlet işleriyle bizler meşgul olmalıyız. Ondan sonra Türk halkı siyasi partiler kurar. Ama bu arada halkımız kendisini, tehlikeli politik oyunlara değil, tarıma, ticarete ve sanayiye vermeli." TBMM'de "temizliğin" bu görüşler doğrultusunda yapılması doğaldır. Türkiye'nin "batlaşması" devam ediyor. Dr. Rıza Nur, "Amacımız Türkiye'yi modernleştirerek ikinci bir Japonya yapmaktır" demiştir. Son yapılan reformlar bu doğrultudadır. Reformların arkası gelecektir. Sırada evlilik reformu (Medeni kanun), alfabe reformu var gibidir. Ama yeni Türkiye'nin temel taşı Cumhurbaşkanı kendisidir. Temel taşı çöker veya kayarsa bütün bina yıkılır. Bunu gören İsmet Paşa, Mustafa Kemal'i bir kalp krizinden korumak, sakinleştirmek için Latife Hanımla işbirliği yapmış, boğanmayı önlemeye çalışmıştır. Halen Mustafa Kemal durumu hakimdir. Onun önünde iki risk vardır: sağlığının bozulması ve siyasi düşmanları tarafından kendisine suikast düzenlenmesi.</p>	569

No	Tarihi	Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özet	Sayfa
265	28 Eylül	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 734 Cumhurbaşkanı gitgide "Devletin Diktatörü" durumuna geliyor, (Devletle bütünleşiyor). Bu nedenle Gazi'nin sağlığı önem kazanıyor. Kendisine karşı suikast tehlikesi her zaman mevcut. Bir eski Bakan, bana, "Gazi İstanbul'a gitmez, çünkü bizler Türkiye'de Browning tabancalarla politika yapıyoruz" dedi. Gazi, güçlü, kararlı, cesur ve aynı zamanda tedbirli bir insandır. Gerçek bir vatanseverdir, ülkesini güçlendirmeyi ve refaha kavuşturmayı samimiyetle arzu etmektedir. Bu büyük eseri ancak kendisinin başarabileceğine inanmaktadır. İsmet Paşa bir gün giderse yerine Recep Bey gelir. Recep Bey, uzun zamandır Gazi'ye yakın durmuşsa da O'nu etkileyebileceğini pek sanmıyorum.	570
266	13 Ekim	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 773 Cumhurbaşkanı üç haftadır Batı Anadolu'da dolaşmaktadır. Bursa'da eski Hidiv Abbas Hilmi Paşa ile iş görüştü. Abbas Hilmi Paşa Türkiye İş Bankasını desteklemişti. Gazi de kişisel servetini İş Bankasında değerlendiriyor. Cumhurbaşkanı, Bursa'dan sonra Bandırma-Balıkesir-Manisa yoluyla İzmir'e gitmiştir ve halen oradadır. Gezisi, çağdaşlaşma kampanyasını genişletme amacı güdüyor ve özellikle fese parmak basıyor. Meclis 23 Ekimde açılacak. Bu arada Meclisteki boş sandalyeleri doldurmak için ara seçim yapılıyor. Partileri kapatılmış olan Terakkiperver mebusların durumları tartışılıyor.	572
267	4 Kasım	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 827 Cumhurbaşkanı, 1 Kasım günü uzun bir konuşmayla TBMM'ni açtı. Konuşmasında şu noktalar üzerinde durdu: Şeyh Said isyanı, basın özgürlüğü, ekonomi, adalet, millî eğitim, dış politika, ordu ve maliye.	574

<u>No</u>	<u>Tarihi</u>	<u>Kimden Kime Yazıldığı ve Özü</u>	<u>Sayfa</u>
		Konuşmanın en büyük ve önemli bölümü iç işlere ayrılmıştır. Bu da Türkiye'nin daha ziyade içe dönük olduğunu ve kendi iç sorunlarına eğildiğini gösteriyor. Hükümetin izleyeceği politikanın, yığın bir reform ve modernleşme politikası olacağı anlaşılmaktadır. Cumhuriyet bayramı öncesinde sıkı bir şapka kampanyası yürütülmüş ve 29 günü sokaklarda fesli bir tek kimse kalmamıştır.	
268	2 Aralık	İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 883 Mr. Leeper'in Ankara'ya yaptığı ziyaretiyle ilgili rapor ilişikte sunulmuştur. Raporda, genel siyasi durum ve Musul sorunu üzerinde durulmaktadır. Musul'un istilasının Türklere pahalıya patlayacağı mesajını vermek gerekir. Raporda iki üç nokta dikkati çekiyor ve çok önemli görünüyor. Cumhurbaşkanı'nın sanıldığı kadar otokrat olmadığı anlaşıyor. Genelkurmay Başkanı Fevzi Paşa, gerektiğinde Cumhurbaşkanı olarak Gazi'nin yerine geçecek kimse olarak görülmesine rağmen politikadan uzak duruyor ve orduyla ilgileniyor. Gazi'ye sadakati yüzünden laikliği içine sindirmektedir, fakat Musul yüzünden Gazi'ye sadakati değişir mi sorusu akla gelmektedir. Şimdi barış, İngiltere'nin gücüne bağlıdır.	576
Ek	—	MR LEEPER'IN ANKARA ZİYARETİYLE İLGİLİ RAPORU <i>Musul sorunu ve Ankara'da politika.</i> 26 Kasım'da İstanbul'dan Ankara'ya hareket ettim ve 30 Kasım'da geri döndüm. İki tam gün Ankara'da kaldım. Anadolu bozkırının monotonluğu ile Ankara'da yeni bir başkent yaratma çalışmaları arasındaki tezat çarpıcıdır ve insanı etkilemektedir. Musul meselesi yüzünden bazı mebuslar benimle görüşmekten kaçındılar. Halen mevcudu 80,000 kadar olan Diyarbakır'daki ordu için Osmanlı Bankasından 700,000 lira alınmış. Gazi, sağlıklıdır, Meclise hakimdir. Ankara'da hava elektrikli, Musul'a saldırı ihtimali gerçekten vardır. Gazi ile İsmet Paşa'nın arası	578

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çok iyidir. İç politikada İsmet Paşa serttir. Meclis, Musul'a saldırmaktan ve İngiltere'yi bir olupbitti karşısında bırakmaktan yanadır. İsmet Paşa ile Tevfik Rüştü bu görüşte değillerdir. Meclis dışında Fevzi Paşa da Musul'a karşı bir hareket yapılmasını savunmaktadır. Gazi, İsmet Paşa'ya tam destek vermektedir ve şiddeti önlemektedir. Lahey kararı belli olunca Fevzi Paşa, Musul'a derhal "saldırmayı" savunmuş ve 46 saat içinde Musul'u almayı da garanti etmiştir. Kabinede Mustafa Kemal ile İsmet Paşa beraberce bu planı önlemişlerdir. Mebuslar, İngiltere'nin savaşamayacağını düşünmektedirler. Gazi, fiilen kontrolü elinde tutmaktadır ve sağlam bünyesi sayesinde sağlığı hala yerindedir. Musul konusunda Türkiye aleyhine bir karar çıkarsa Gazi, askeri harekate geçmek isteyenlerle boğuşmak durumunda kalacaktır.

269 15 Aralık

İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ
LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI
CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 908

582

İç politika. İsmet Paşa, 12 Aralık'ta Mecliste uzun bir konuşma yaptı. İsyanın dışarıdan hazırlanmış olduğunu söyledi ve galiba San Remo'yu (Vahdetin'i) kastetti. İsyan bölgesinde dolaşan çeşitli söylentileri zikretti: Güya İsmet Paşa ölmüş imiş, güya Şeyh Sait'in yerine bir başka Nakşibendi şeyhi geçmiş imiş. Avrupa'ya uzak olan Doğu Anadolu halkı daha fazla dine sarılıyor ve şapkaya tepki gösteriyor. Erzurum ve Trabzon'daki karışıklıklar şapka yüzünden çıkmıştır. Rize çevresinde ayaklanma çıkmasına ramak kalmış. İstanbul'da bir hoca, "Şapka ve Frenk Mukallitliği" başlıklı broşür yayınladı ve tutuklandı. Sarayburmu'na Gazi'nin bir heykeli dikiliyor.

270 30 Aralık

İSTANBUL'DA İNGİLİZ BÜYÜKELÇİSİ
LINDSAY'DEN İNGİLTERE DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI
CHAMBERLAIN'E YAZI NO. 939

584

Rize'deki olay bir hocanın kışkırtmasıyla çıkmış. "Ankara'da ihtilal çıktığı, Mustafa Kemal'in üç yerinden yaralandığı, dindar bir paşanın başa geçti-

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		<p>gi" yolunda söylentiler çıkarılmış. Rize'de sekiz kişi asılmış. Giresun'da da dini bir hareket olmuş ve iki şeyh ölüme mahkum edilmiş. İstanbul'da da, şapka giymeye karşı direnen bazı derviş ve hocalar yargılanmak üzere Ankara'ya gönderildi. Son karışıklıkların sebebi şapkadır. Kabine'de iki değişiklik oldu: Hamdullah Suphi Bey, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığından ayrıldı ve yerine Mustafa Necati Bey geldi. Ölen Bayındırlık Bakanı Süleyman Sırrı'nın yerine de Behic Bey atandı.</p>	

BELGELER

No. 1

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold

No. 481. (Telegraphic)
Very Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 8th 1922
2.0 a.m.

Exchange of prisoners.

With reference to General Harington's telegram D 10 of October 7th, Your Excellency is requested to inform him that whilst welcoming the release of any prisoners of war or hostages, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to press the Greeks beyond the point of reciprocity.

According to a communication made to us by Italian Ambassador here Kemal has announced intention of trying as rebels or traitors the men who served as volunteers in Greek forces and whom he now holds prisoners. If condemned they will be shot. We can hardly believe that whatever might be advanced as technical legal justification Kemal seriously contemplates such wholesale fusillades, but the possibility must be borne in mind in any arrangement made with regard to civilian or regular military prisoners.

Italian government propose joint remonstrance by High Commissioners at Constantinople. Your Excellency is authorised to associate yourself with your Italian colleague in such action and should endeavour to obtain co-operation of French High Commissioner also.

Repeated to Paris No.374, Rome No.323 and Athens No.304.

F.O. 371/7900

F.O. 424/255, p.84, No.131

No. 2

General Harington to War Office

Clear
8. (en clair)

Despatched 1500 8.10.22
Received 1354 8.10.22

I have just secured definite undertaking from General Ismet Pasha on behalf of Mustapha Kemal that all movements of Kemalist troops will immediately stop. Avoid therefore any contact today. We hope to sign final Protocol this afternoon in accordance with instructions which I have just received from Government. Inform local Turkish Commanders above sense and that orders have been issued from their H.Q. accordingly (ends).

F.O. 371/7902/E. 10836

No. 3

General Harington, Mudania, to War Office

Secret
Paraphrase
Priority "A"
D.19 cipher. 8.10.22

Despatched 1615 8.10.22
Received 1635 8.10.22

Cabinet instructions received 1100 hours to-day. I am preparing protocol strictly in accordance therewith and at 1500 hours we shall submit it to Ismet who has arranged that Mustapha Kemal shall be on the telephone at Angora. Have received assurance that definite orders have been issued to stop all movements of Kemalists troops. Hope to-night to secure signature including definite undertaking to withdraw from neutral zones at once. To-day I issued strong warning to Ismet that contrary to my recent communique he had violated both neutral zones and that if conflict opens responsibility is his, pointing out that his recent movements during conference constitute distinct breach of faith and that we have gone to limit of endurance.

F.O. 371/7900/E. 10837

No. 4

*General Harrington, Iron Duke, to War Office**Secret**Despatched 1030 9.10.22**Paraphrase**Received 1118 9.10.22**Repeated to G.H.Q., Constantinople*

Admiralty D.21 cipher 8/10

As Italian and French Generals had no authority from their Governments to sign protocol containing points insisted upon by British Government, Meeting with Turks which had been arranged for 1500 hours was postponed.

They have gone by destroyer to see their High Commissioners and return together. Pellé has wired Paris for authority for Charpy. Mombelli's instructions to sign received since he left.

My instructions quite clear and convention ready.

Have got definite agreement in writing that while conference is in progress Kemalist troops will not advance.

As Mustapha Kemal states he does not recognise any neutral zones, am describing them as zones of allied occupation defined in proclamation which is same thing. I shall recommend sending identic telegrams to our Governments, in the event of the Turks refusing to sign. Document will then be handed to Ismet saying zones of Allied occupation must be respected, and he will be given a limited time to withdraw his troops, otherwise I shall be obliged to push them back.

F.O. 371/7902/E 10838

No. 5

*The Greek Legation in London to Foreign Office**Urgent**LONDON, 9th October 1922**Confidential**No. 3298/SU/22*

The Greek Legation has the honour to bring the following information of a grave character, which has just been received, to the notice of His Britannic Majesty's Government and wishes to draw their special attention thereto.

The Minister for France in Athens called on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday and stated that he was instructed by his Government to make urgent and pressing representations against the reinforcements of the Thracian front actually in progress, such reinforcements being of a nature to impede negotiations now going on, and that France strongly dissuaded Greece from sending any further troops to Thrace.

The answer was given to the French Minister that, while quite prepared to conform to the Great Powers' desires, nevertheless, elementary precaution compelled Greece to take these measures, without which she would be exposed, to any offensive intentions on the part of Mustapha Kemal - all the more as no one can be certain that he will accept the proposed terms and not put forward further demands.

The suspension of such measures of precaution would be equivalent to Greece surrendering herself to the mercy of the Turks. The French Minister stated that from all the information available by him, he was under the impression that negotiations were proceeding on the understanding that the Kemalist army should not cross to Europe and that therefore all danger from that quarter was averted.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs reserved to himself the right to place the matter before the Greek Government.

This Legation also begs to draw the full attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the fact that according to authoritative information, concentrations of armed Turks with artillery were going on in the neutral zone round the Strandja region, these Turks penetrating through the French lines and others landing on the coast between Midia and the Bosphorus. On the other hand the Greek Government received unconfirmed information from a Russian source in Sofia that ten steamers had arrived at Erekli (Pontoheracleia) and Ineboli on the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor, and that Turkish troops were being embarked in them with the intention of effecting a landing on the Thracian coast between Istrandja and Midia.

F.O. 371/7902/E. 10823

No. 6

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 883

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 10, 1922
(Received October 16)

My Lord

I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary as published in the "Stamboul" newspaper of the 6th October, of a speech delivered by Mustapha Kemal Pasha in the Angora Grand National Assembly on the 4th October.

2. This is Mustapha Kemal's first address to the Assembly since his victory over the Greeks. Having regard to the circumstances, his language as to the possibility of achieving the remainder of the national programme without military operations may be regarded as moderate. He used similar language in a message to the people of Constantinople, sent through the editor of the "Vakt", who saw him in Smyrna before he left that place.

3. The message in the "Vakt" runs as follows: "Many, many salutations from me to Constantinople. We shall shortly embrace one another. Peace according to our national desire will be obtained. Its realisation is near. It is not necessary to employ the army in everything. Henceforth the whole world is with us. Humanity is with us. The intelligent elements of the British people are on our side. Even some Western statemen who followed the wrong path, have finally seen the truth and they have come over to us."

4. It is noteworthy that neither in the portion of his speech relative to the Straits nor in any other part of it does Mustapha Kemal make any reference to Russia.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/255, p.147-148, No.210

Enclosure in No. 6

Extrait du quotidien "Stamboul" du 6 Octobre 1922

Le Discours de Moustapha Kemal Pacha à l'Assemblée d'Angora

On vient de recevoir le résumé du grand discours annoncé, et que le généralissime a prononcé avant-hier du haut de la tribune de la Grande Assemblée.

Le maréchal s'y était rendu en uniforme. Il a parlé de 2 heures à 5 heures.

Il a commencé, comme nous l'avons dit, par un exposé militaire, et il a utilisé une carte murale pour sa démonstration.

Les tribunes étaient pleines. On y remarquait notamment les représentants étrangers. Les applaudissements furent généraux et répétés.

L'Offensive

Le maréchal a débuté ainsi:

"Peu d'hommes peuvent ressentir l'intime satisfaction que j'éprouve à l'idée d'avoir pu, avec une fidélité et une obéissance militaites, exécuter, à la tête de mes troupes viriles et héroïques, les ordres de notre Assemblée qui, de rien, est parvenue à extraire une énorme réalisation.

"Nous voulions réaliser nos objectifs nationaux sans verser du sang. Nos tentatives pour cela ont été prises pour de la faiblesse. Nous avons dû par conséquent, déclancher l'offensive. Notre plan, élaboré par Fevzi Pacha, consistait, non point à mettre l'ennemi en fuite, mais à le saisir et à l'étouffer. C'est le 26 août que j'ai donné l'ordre d'attaquer. Tandis que les yeux de l'univers s'ouvraient avec les premiers rayons du soleil, nos tirailleurs commençaient leur fusillade. Ce moment était celui du prélude de l'encerclement de l'ennemi.

"Le 27 août, l'adversaire se trouvait complètement enveloppé dans un cercle de feu. Cinq jours plus tard, nos baïonnettes étaient plongées dans le sein de l'ennemi. Notre plan de le saisir et de l'étouffer se trouvait, intégralement et selon nos vœux, exécuté. La question était résolue.

"Nos artilleurs, par la capacité et la compréhension dont ils ont fait preuve, peuvent être donnés en exemple à tous les artilleurs du monde.

"La fougue de notre cavalerie dépasse toute imagination. Nos braves cavaliers ne pouvaient se retenir à l'entrée de toute nouvelle division ennemie dans la bataille. A peine les apercevaient-ils qu'ils se lançaient au travers, jetant le désarroi dans leurs rangs. Nos fantassins ne s'embarrassaient pas à couper les fils barbelés: ils sautaient par dessus.

"Nos adversaires croyaient que nous ne pourrions reprendre notre Afion-Karahissar, même au bout de quatre mois. Mais messieurs, une heure a suffi aux Turcs pour s'emparer de cette place fortifiée.

"Le cher et sacré but assigné à nos troupes a été heureusement obtenu et sous la forme désirée. Les opérations militaires avaient été prévues dans tous leurs détails; elles ont été menées à bon fin. L'armée a fait son devoir avec dévouement. Notre victoire figurera dans l'histoire comme le plus bel exemple de la force intime que peut constituer un idéal que toute une nation a fait sien. Notre peuple s'est acquis la place la plus haute dans le respect et la sympathie de tout l'univers. Le doux soleil de paix ne tardera plus à luire à l'horizon de notre pays que nos enfants ont arrosé de leur sang pour le sauver, et qui a été ravagé par des mains ennemis."

La Situation Politique

Passant à la situation politique l'orateur poursuit:

"Arrivée à Smyrne, l'armée reprit son contact avec la politique. Le général Pellé est venu causer à Smyrne; il nous dit de ne pas diriger nos opérations militaires vers les Dardanelles et Constantinople et de ne pas pénétrer dans la zone considérée comme neutre. J'ai répondu que j'ignorais l'existence d'une telle zone et que notre devoir était de poursuivre l'ennemi.

"M. Franklin-Bouillon arriva à Smyrne avec l'assentiment de l'Italie et de l'Angleterre, et alors que nos troupes se disposaient à traverser Constantinople et les Dardanelles pour entrer en Thrace, y poursuivre l'ennemi vaincu et parvenir enfin jusqu'à nos frontières nationales. Une note parvint à notre gouvernement.

"Ce document comprend deux points: l'un a trait aux opérations militaires, l'autre à la conférence de paix. On demande la suspension de notre activité militaire...."

No. 7

Foreign Office to Colonial Office

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 13, 1922

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 3rd March and to the letter from this Department of the 13th March regarding the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to enquire whether Mr. Secretary Churchill desires to furnish this Department with any further observations regarding the views of his Department upon the provisions of any revised treaty, so far as the Arab countries are concerned.

2. In particular, Lord Curzon desires to draw attention to the fact that article 1 of the National Pact, the integral fulfilment of which Mustapha Kemal and the Grand National Assembly are understood still to desire to achieve, may be interpreted as providing for recovery by Turkey of Mosul and the greater part of Southern Kurdistan. Should the Turkish representatives at any forthcoming conference press for the integral fulfilment of this part of the National Pact, Lord Curzon will be glad to learn whether, and if so to what extent, Mr. Churchill will be prepared to meet them. If it is still desired to adhere to the revision of the northern frontier of Irak, as laid in the Treaty of Sèvres, so as to include Amadia in Irak, and in a sense, therefore, more unfavourable to Turkey than the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres on this point, I am to enquire whether there are any counter-concessions, such as participation in Irak oil development, and therefore presumably in the Turkish Petroleum Company, which Mr. Churchill might be prepared to concede.

3. Lord Curzon understands that, in any case, it is the opinion of your Department that Great Britain, as mandatory for Irak, should sign the future treaty on that State's behalf and that no change in this direction should be made upon the procedure followed at the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres.

4. As Mr. Churchill is aware, the revision of the financial and economic clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres has already been discussed at inter-departmental conference at which the Colonial Office was represented.

5. An early reply to this letter, a copy of which is being sent to the Petroleum Department, is desired.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

F.O. 424/255, p. 129-130, No.184

No. 8

Sir H.Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 360
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 13th, 1922, 11.40 a.m.
(Received October 13th, 1922, 11.55 a.m.)

My telegram No.558.

Following is summary of views expressed by Minister of Foreign Affairs in conversation with Mr. Ryan today.

He agreed as to undesirability of holding conference anywhere in Turkey. He disliked the idea of Russian participation. Question was for Powers to decide. Russia might perhaps legitimately claim share in settlement of Straits question which was international. Perhaps this could be arranged without giving them voice in settlement of purely Turkish questions.

He had no indication whether Kemal could actively contest right of Constantinople Government to seat at the conference. Constantinople Government consider they have right to attend as legal government. He did not think that Kemalists were illdisposed towards Constantinople Government though they were unfortunately inflexible regarding the Sultan. He was trying indirectly to modify latter's attitude but expressed no hope of success.

If Kemal did contest right of Constantinople Government his idea would be to address formal remonstrance throwing on them responsibility for any consequent difficulty in assembling Conference. Once both delegations were there working agreement could probably be made.

Reverting to the question of locality he expressed fear that French, or at any rate Franklin-Bouillon, favoured Smyrna. Mr. Ryan expressed opinion that though Franklin-Bouillon had rendered service he had greatly outrun his authority and said he did not think that French Government would support choice of Smyrna.

F.O. 371/7903/E. 11025

F.O. 424/255, p. 126-127, No. 178

No. 9

*M. Poincaré to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*PARIS, le 16 Octobre 1922
(Received October 17.)

Mon cher Ministre,

M. Franklin-Bouillon, revenu aujourd'hui à Paris, m'a expliqué que Moustapha Kemal désirerait pouvoir assister lui-même à la conférence et rester en contact avec l'Assemblée d'Angora, de façon à éviter les lenteurs et les retards postaux. C'est la raison pour laquelle Moustapha Kemal désire le choix de Smyrne. J'ai dit à M. Franklin-Bouillon les objections que nous avons contre cette désignation et il s'est rendu à mes raisons. Il craint seulement que Lausanne ne paraisse trop éloigné aux Turcs. Nous pouvons cependant formuler ensemble cette proposition et nous verrons comment elle sera accueillie. Il serait bon, d'autre part que la date fût aussi rapprochée que possible.

Croyez, &c.

R. POINCARÉ

F.O. 424/255, p. 153, No.221

No. 10

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*No.573
*Telegraphic*CONSTANTINOPLE, 16th October 1922, 12 p.m.
(Received October 16, 2.30 p.m.)

Your telegram No. 492.

I have discussed question of prisoners of war with my French, Italian and United States colleagues, General Harington and Doctor Nansen. Owing to ambiguous attitude of Kemalist representatives at Mudania conference when question was raised by allied generals we considered allied powers should not interfere at present and that initiative should come from League of Nations. We unanimously agreed that Doctor Nansen should propose to Angora and Greek governments appointment of British delegate at Greco-Turkish commission to examine problem with League of Nations representatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. Doctor Nansen consented to do so. Proposal will however

only be made after Doctor Nansen has had a personal interview with Mustapha Kemal. He hopes to see the latter in a few days.

Repeated to Athens No. 197.

F.O. 371/7904/E. 11161

No. 11

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 903

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 17, 1922
(Received October 24)

My Lord,

I have not attempted, since writing my despatch No. 801 of the 12th September, to present to your Lordship any general review of the course of events in this country. Even in the short interval between drafting that despatch and sending it off, certain portions of it became out of date. By the 13th September it had become evident that the plight of the Greeks in the Broussa area was hardly less grave than it had been in the Smyrna hinterland on the eve of the rout. From Smyrna itself I had received news of the deplorable events which culminated in the destruction of the most flourishing portion of the city.

2. There has been no moment since that date when, even had it been possible for me to find the necessary time, I could have summed up the situation in despatch form without risk of being overtaken by events before my account of it had reached your Lordship. We have now however, arrived at so definite a turning-point that I take advantage of the pause following the signature of the Mudania Convention to submit, not a detailed review of what has passed, but an attempt to appreciate the situation as it is to-day and the outlook which confronts the Allies.

3. Once the Kemalists had finally settled their account with the Greeks in Asia Minor, it was evident that the centre of gravity of the situation must shift to the Straits and Thrace. Any differences which has existed among leading Nationalists on fundamental matters affecting their relations with Western Europe were, for the time being, obliterated. It became simply a question of the best method of taking the next step towards the complete realisation of the National Pact. Some were for a frontal armed attack on the Allies; some for turning the Allied position astride the Straits in one way or another and carrying the war against the Greeks into Thrace; some for diplomatising, in the

confident expectation that all immediate aims, *e.g.*, the whole of the National Pact, could be secured at the conference. The firm determination of His Majesty's Government not to abandon the Straits prematurely and not to tolerate the continuance of the Turco-Greek war in Thrace turned the scale in favour of the third of these alternatives. Mustapha Kemal, who for the time has recovered all the authority which began to slip from him a year ago, himself rallied to it, and the Mudania Conference was the result.

4. The Kemalists realised at Mudania that His Majesty's Government still held a dominant position in the counsels of the Allies, and that, unless they were prepared for war with Great Britain, a war in which they had no absolute assurance of Russian support, they must concede something to the British point of view. They would be less than human, however, if they did not consider that the result was a great diplomatic victory for them. They have secured Eastern Thrace without striking a blow. They have at last forced the Allies as a whole to treat with them as a real Government of Turkey on questions which, despite the technically military character of the conference, are of great political import. The concessions which they were forced to make gave away nothing of a permanent nature.

5. This last consideration is really the most important of all in its bearing on the general outlook from the Allied point of view. The Kemalists will come into conference with a strong military position. They will come with the National Pact in one hand and a thrown sabre in the other. They have less than ever any intention of abating a jot of the Pact, except possibly as regards the Caucasus, in the coming negotiations. They know that they have only one serious adversary to contend with, even at a green table, and they realise only too well that that adversary, namely, His Majesty's Government, is being attacked in the rear by the combination of forces represented by labour, the "Daily Mail" and the politicians who imagine that the way to placate Islam is to yield on every point to a militant Turkey. The spirit in which the Kemalists will approach the great issues is summed up in a sentence from a speech just delivered by the Angora Foreign Minister:

"Saisissant l'occasion de la signature de la Convention militaire de Moudania, nous nous adressons de nouveau au monde civilisé et lui disons, 'Nous nous battons pour obtenir nos droits légitimes; plus tard nous serions en Orient un important facteur de la paix, un facteur qui comptera aussi plus ou moins sur sa force.'"

6. The Treaty of Sèvres is dead, but it is only necessary to glance at some of its headings to see at how many points the Allies will come up against the National Pact. The frontiers of Turkey must be defined. It is the settled

determination of the Kemalists to demand a plebiscite in Western Thrace. They will certainly demand the restoration of Mosul, and they may even ask for a further rectification of the Franklin- Bouillon frontier between Turkey and Syria. On the Straits question, they will make every use of the clause in the Pact to the effect that the freedom of the Straits must be assured on lines compatible with the security of Constantinople. I shall be surprised if, in their present mood, they agree readily to any thorough plan for demilitarisation and non-fortification. They will fight harder than ever any proposal to give the minorities greater protection than is afforded by the minority clauses of European treaties. It will be difficult to get them to agree to definite limitations of their armed forces, and, if they do, they will stand out for much greater effectives than were contemplated at Paris last March. They will strive against any kind of financial or economic control, even in the form of security for reparations. There is no question now outstanding on which they will be more unbending than that of the Capitulations. It is a settled principle with them that nothing must be done to go back on the *fait accompli* of September 1914, when their predecessors, the Young Turks, abolished the privileges of foreigners by a unilateral act. It is useless to talk to them of the necessity of a substitute for the Capitulations in the shape of safeguards without privileges for foreigners. Their one answer is that Turkey must be sovereign and independent.

7. It would be easy to make a list of minor points on which trouble must be expected at the conference. I have contented myself with indicating the attitude which the Kemalists will take up as regards the larger issues. In my opinion, no opportunity should be lost of educating public opinion at home on the importance of these issues, and of mobilising such foreign support as is possible for the points of view which His Majesty's Government will have to sustain. On such a question as the Capitulations even the weak-kneed French may be induced to help us. There is a very strong movement in the French colony here against the policy of the Quai d'Orsay and the big financiers, to which the ordinary Frenchman here considers his interest to have been sacrificed. The French High Commissioner is doing his best to stifle this movement, but an agitation has been started which cannot fail to have some repercussion in France. This question is also of great concern to the United States of America and all countries having any considerable colony here. On other questions, such as the Straits and minorities, it should be possible to secure the backing of public opinion and, perhaps, the Government of the United States of America and other countries, and in dealing with minorities the support of the League of Nations should be valuable.

8. I have elsewhere pointed out to your Lordship the importance of in no way reducing the forces concentrated by His Majesty's Government in this part

of the world pending the meeting of the conference, and of discreetly encouraging the Greeks to maintain their army in being in Western Thrace. Mudania has shown that nothing but the possession of force and the will to use it impresses the Kemalists. This consideration will apply with infinitely greater force during the peace negotiations.

9. I have spoken throughout of the Kemalists. One of the inevitable consequences of the recent events, especially the decision to deliver Eastern Thrace to the Angora Government, has been to reduce the Constantinople Government to a still lower ebb of ineffectiveness than before. That Government is naturally pleased with the outcome of the Mudania Conference. When Smyrna fell it made no official sign of rejoicing, but the Porte has been beflagged for the signature of the recent convention. Tewfik Pasha and his colleagues nevertheless realise that their last hour is approaching. *Morituri te salutamur* is their attitude towards Mustapha Kemal. They will doubtless linger on and hold solemn councils, but they count for so little that it is doubtful whether they will amount to more than a minor complication when the invitations to the conference are issued. Indeed, were it not their disappearance would inevitably raise the grave question of the Sultan's position, it would probably be better that they should depart from the scene before the conference meets.

10. I have spoken of the realisation of the National Pact as being the *immediate* object of the Kemalists. In stressing the word "immediate", I wish once more to remind your Lordship that for many of them that is only the first step. It is a step at which they will pause, and there will not be the same union afterwards regarding a completely revolutionary policy at home and a policy of expansion abroad. Many of the leaders and the majority of ordinary Turks will wish them to preserve traditional institutions and to "cultivate their garden" in peaceful conditions. It would, however, be folly to forget that others among the leaders cherish the dream of reconstructing the Turkish Empire, if only on a federal basis, and establishing Turkey in a position of hegemony in a great Islamic combine. For these Great Britain not only is, but will remain, the enemy. They desire nothing less than the collapse of our position, first in Mesopotamia, then in the East generally. The really vital issue at the Peace Conference will not be any of the questions enumerated above, important as they are, but whether Turkey is to be placed in such a position as to enable these men to dominate her internally and so carry forward their plan.

11. In conclusion, I would point out that the Kemalists at this moment hang more than ever between Bolshevik Russia and the Western Powers. I have always maintained that Mustapha Kemal adjusted the closeness of his relations with Russia to the necessities of his immediate situation, never going further in

that direction than it was absolutely necessary to do, and that Russia has at no time acquired such influence as to be able to dictate the foreign policy of Angora. Recent events appear to me to have justified this theory. The Russians have been far more expansive about the victory of the Turks than the Turks have been about Russian assistance. I read between the lines of M. Karakhan's recent notes about the Straits question a great nervousness lest Turkey should try to leave Russia out in the cold now that the realisation of her own immediate aims *vis-à-vis* of the Allies appears to be in sight. This situation may be turned to account either by using the Russians against the Turks or the Turks against the Russians; but in the latter alternative we should endeavour not to play too much in the hands of the aggressive type of Kemalist described in the last paragraph, whose ultimate ideal will be to make Turkey independent, on an Islamic basis, either of Russia or the Western Powers.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/255, p.220-222, No. 298

No. 12

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.300

SOFIA, October 20, 1922
(Received October 31)

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that I called on M. Stamboliisky yesterday to pay my respects on his return from abroad. After expressing his appreciation of the courteous hearing given to him at Geneva by Lord Balfour and Mr. Fisher, with whom he said he had had long conversations, he turned to the Near Eastern crisis and said how much he regretted that his proposal for the autonomy of Thrace had not been adopted and that His Majesty's Government had not insisted on carrying through their original policy of expelling the Turks from Europe. He thought that His Majesty's Government did not fully realise how deep an impression their firm attitude at Mudania had made on the Turks. He believed that the prestige then acquired would have sufficed to prevent the return of the Turks to Europe and he still hoped that circumstances might arise which would enable the matter to be considered, especially if, as he understood was the case, it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to let

the negotiations drag on as long as possible. I replied that, as far as I knew, he was entirely mistaken in attributing this intention to His Majesty's Government, who, I felt sure, would, on the contrary do all in their power to hasten the conclusion of peace. It was entirely due to their firm attitude that Kemal Pasha was not already in occupation of Constantinople and Eastern Thrace, and possibly a good deal more territory besides, but they had been forced to recognise the new situation created by his victory and having in conjunction with their Allies, formally promised him the possession of Eastern Thrace, they would not go back on their word.

I gained the impression that M. Stamboliisky is genuinely concerned at the prospect of the return of the Turks to Thrace. This attitude may appear inconsistent with the eulogistic observations regarding Kemal Pasha's victory which he made in public a few days ago, as reported in my despatch No.292 of the 17th instant. It is, however, one of his Excellency's peculiarities that he sees no objection to expressing diametrically opposite views on different occasions to suit his audience or what he regards as the necessity of the moment. On the occasion referred to, his object was clearly to allay the resentment aroused in Turkey by his proposal for Thracian autonomy.

M. Stamboliisky then referred to the question of the Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean, which he earnestly hoped would be settled at the coming conference in a manner satisfactory to Bulgarian interests. Any arrangement depending on transit through Greek territory would be useless, as was sufficiently proved by the complete failure of the Serbs, though they were the Allies of the Greeks, to come to a satisfactory arrangement for a commercial outlet at Salonica. Failing the establishment of an autonomous régime he advocated the neutralisation of a zone including both banks of the Maritza and the railway from the Bulgarian frontier to Dedeagatch, the latter place being assigned to Bulgaria. Unless Bulgaria obtained Dedeagatch in full sovereignty it would be impossible to carry out the necessary harbour works. I replied that I had no information as to the intention of His Majesty's Government and their Allies in regard to this matter, but I thought it extremely unlikely that they would assign Dedeagatch in full sovereignty to Bulgaria and had no reason to suppose that the final settlement would differ essentially from that already provided for in the treaty between them and Greece which had been concluded at Sèvres.

I believe that the value attributed by public opinion in this country to an outlet on the Aegian is much exaggerated and that, even if Bulgarian aspirations in this respect were fully met, the bulk of the country's trade would for various reasons continue to pass through the Black Sea ports. At the same time, if it should be found possible to some extent to meet the Bulgarian

objections to the arrangement provided by the Treaty of Sèvres, it would, besides eliminating a probable cause of trouble in the future, undoubtedly enhance M. Stamboliisky's prestige and the stability of the Government - a matter of some importance at the present moment.

While I am satisfied that there exists no understanding between the Bulgarian and Soviet Governments and that the fears felt by the Roumanian Government of aggression by this country in conjunction with Russia and Turkey are groundless, so long, at least, as M. Stamboliisky's Government remains in power - his one settled principle being the avoidance of any foreign adventure - there is evidence since the Greek defeat of the initiation of an active campaign backed by Russian propaganda in favour of such a policy as the only means of enabling this country to escape from her present isolation and from the burdens imposed upon her by the Treaty of Neuilly. The danger of this movement, which may make a strong appeal to the Nationalist elements and provide them with a ground for common action with the Bulgarian Communists, cannot be ignored and I regard the surest safeguard against it to be the maintenance in power of a strong Agrarian Government.

I have, &c.

WILLIAM ERSKINE

F.O. 424/255, p.253-254, No. 356

No. 13

Mr. T. Russell (Berne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 261

BERNE, October 20, 1922
(Received October 24)

My Lord,

During the whole of the Near Eastern crisis, when the press in other countries was either siding with the British or the French point of view as to the most efficacious means of arriving at a settlement, the organs of public opinion both in German and French Switzerland were content merely to record events. They indulged in no criticism whatsoever neither did they show by any sign in which direction their sympathies lay. It was therefore a positive relief to read at last in this morning's issue of the "Journal de Genève" a decided expression of opinion, which runs as follows:

"It must be acknowledged that Mr. Lloyd George was quite correct on certain points. He certainly was right in wishing to prevent by force the Turks entering the zones destined to guard the Straits. The fact of his having maintained British garrisons there compelled the Kemalists to halt and undoubtedly prevented a fresh war in Europe. When it is asserted, as is done by most of the Paris journals, that the soft words of Mr. Franklin-Bouillon saved the situation, we are merely being mocked at. The fact remains that Mustapha Kemal did not dare to embark on so perilous an adventure as an encounter with British soldiers and he would have come to terms in an even briefer period if the united Entente had maintained their garrisons at Tchanak."

2. In the course of conversation with Mr. Motta at the Political Department this afternoon, he too emerged for a space from the strictly neutral attitude so dear to the Swiss official and gave vent to very much the same views as those expressed above. I further gathered that these views were widely shared in Government and other authoritative circles in this country.

3. In speaking later of the resignation of the Cabinet, Mr. Motta expressed the hope, in the interests of general peace, that whatever Government was finally formed in London, Your Lordship would consent to remain at the Foreign Office and would not at the present critical juncture lay down the threads of the delicate negotiations, so recently inaugurated under difficult conditions in Paris, before a satisfactory and permanent Treaty had been signed.

I have &c.

THEO RUSSELL

F.O. 371/7906/E. 11516

No. 14

Extract from "Pall Mall Gazette" (London) of October 21, 1922

Revelations of General Townsend
 Memorandum he gave to ex-Premier.
 How public money was wasted.
 Near East chances that were missed.
 Grave charges

The "Pall Mall Gazette" publishes below a sensational article by General Sir Charles Townsend, severely critical of the Near East policy of the ex-Premier and his Government. General Townsend charges them with wanton waste of the

taxpayers' money, when conditions of peace honourable to all parties could have been secured without that cost.

He summarises a memorandum which he gave to the ex-Premier, at his request, on September 6, on his return from England to Angora, to prove that on that date Mr Lloyd George was "quite aware that the Turks were willing for England, France and Italy to hold and control the Straits."

Blunder and error

How ex-Premier played perilously near flame
(By General Sir Charles Townsend, M.P.)

Mr Lloyd George's speech at Manchester was as full of complicated stuffing as a clock.

Errors in facts and want of sincerity dispute with ignorance of the Turks and of the Greeks and of the elementary principles in diplomacy.

On the eve of a Peace Conference he goes out of the way to deliberately insult the Turks for the third time in the past month or six weeks, and now adds a deliberate insult to France!

His speech will never convince anyone outside the entourage of Downing-Street that he and his Cabinet have not committed every blunder, and every error, in their Near East policy (not to speak of Mesopotamia) which time and opportunity, since the ridiculous and unratified Treaty of Sèvres, have permitted.

Responsible for Greek Invasion

His speech will never convince anyone in Parliament that he and his Cabinet were not responsible for the Greek invasion of Turkey in Asia, and consequently for the Greek disaster, rout and defeat.

His Manchester speech will certainly not be read upon parade to the defeated and disorderly battalions from Asia Minor, nor will there be fireworks at Athens! Rather will there be fishtails.

The main cause of the Turks' distrust of the British is not touched on.

Let me recall the words of Kemal to me:

"Can Mr Lloyd George deny that he knew of the preparations for a Greek offensive launched last March in the middle of an armistice, in the middle of peace

negotiations in London; if you can persuade me on that, can you persuade me that he could not have stopped it by rising his finger?"

British Fame Suffers

For that act of treachery of the Greeks the British fame for their good word has suffered severely throughout the East, and therein lies the distrust of the British Cabinet on the part of Kemal and his Ministers.

The speech of the Prime Minister at Manchester will certainly not remove the belief that the policy of his Cabinet of hostility to the Turk throughout has turned the whole Mohammedan world against us.

Witness that egregious strategical and political blunder of occupying Constantinople with troops, which I denounced at the time as certain to make the Nationalist Turks fly to arms and light up all the Mohammedans in India, Mesopotamia and Egypt.

Who can deny that my words have come true?

The Contrast

Throughout this Government have treated the Turk with utmost severity, in wide contrast to the treatment dealt out to the prime offender - Germany.

We stripped the Turkish Empire of Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria and all Thrace up to the very gates of Constantinople, and then - to crown all - urged the Greeks to invade Turkey in Asia and plant themselves in Smyrna, the richest province.

Are all these right honourable gentlemen surprised that the Turks in desperation united together and, with the sword, hewed through all their intrigues and literally kicked the invaders out, and have a legitimate right to the fruits of victory?

Against the Evidence

Mr Lloyd George drew a dramatic picture of the victorious Turks entering Constantinople "red with the blood of Smyrna and of a Greek army."

He still persists in the Smyrna story, although the right honourable gentleman well knows that the bulk of the evidence is against the Greeks - but then he has to prepare for his election campaign.

The Turks are not fools. They did not burn Smyrna, their richest port. Constantinople is dear and sacred to every Turk. Did ever one hear such balderdash as that of Mr Lloyd George's imaginings given to his audience at Manchester as to the Turk burning Constantinople!

Mr Lloyd George, however, can rest assured that his famous speech at Manchester will give our diplomatists some trouble when the Peace Conference sits.

However, the Turk is good humoured and is patient.

As one of Kemal's Ministers said to me the other day:

"We are determined to have peace *in spite of Mr. Lloyd George* and his friends, and orders were actually given in the Chanak business that the Turkish troops were not to fire even if the British opened fire on them."

Why Peace is Assured

I believe that peace is assured now, but it is due largely to the moderation of M. Poincaré and the Italian Government, who wisely withdrew their troops from any chance of a collision with the advance of the victorious troops of Kemal, and is largely due to the presence of Franklin-Bouillon with Kemal.

We had no need at all to "rush" reinforcements to Chanak, I maintain, with the Fleet in the Straits, and the Straits as a barrier, even Fabius might be careless!

Why not a Few Marines?

If it was considered necessary to have a force landed at Chanak as a political protest against the Turks approaching the shores of the Dardanelles, then I should have landed some Marines and Bluejackets, who might have been re-embarked on their ships, if considered desirable, without this terrible loss of prestige that Mr. Lloyd George and his assistants constantly refer to.

In this way I would have gained all the so-called advantages that the Cabinet now plume themselves on having acquired, without costing the British taxpayer at least thirty millions of pounds in "rushing troops out to Chanak", and hiring ships and so forth.

Glaring Mismanagement

The very fact of sending out the Guards, who all the world knows are only sent in the case of a great war, alone must have caused Kemal to think that the British intended war.

The Near East political campaign of this Government, so glaringly mismanaged, obliges Mr. Lloyd George and his colleagues, who cannot vindicate it from blame, to throw it on to someone else.

Their recriminations may succeed, they think, if their apologies do not, so France is chosen to bear the brunt. The French are accused of having deserted us, and Mr. Lloyd George sneers at France for evacuating Cilicia.

A Proper Reply

To which the French reply properly that Cilicia was a part of Turkey, and it would have been an act of piracy, to continue to occupy it.

Does the right honourable gentleman believe that he could have held Cilicia with a sword he is so fond of talking about, or have continued to occupy Constantinople, so foolishly occupied in the first place?

The Memorandum

What ex-Premier Failed to Tell his Audience

There is no more certain or more legitimate way of impressing public opinion than by stating facts which cannot be disputed and the bearing of which cannot be misunderstood.

This memorandum will prove that all the time Mr. Lloyd George was beating the drum and dramatically calling "Help!" "Help!" to the Dominions to save the Straits, and ordering reinforcements to Chanak, with great headlines in the Press by way of bold advertisement, and costing the British taxpayer at least thirty millions, he was perfectly aware that the Turks were willing for England, France and Italy to hold and control the Straits!

This Mr Lloyd George omitted to tell to his audience at Manchester, and there are some other points which I wish to touch on, and which also the right honourable gentleman has avoided mentioning.

Wire from Angora

On July 27 last I telegraphed from Angora to a member of the House of Commons, asking him to lay the telegram before the Prime Minister and other Ministers and leading members of Parliament.

This telegram began with the statement that after long conversations with Kemal, instant peace might be had by the immediate evacuation of territories occupied in Asia Minor by Greek troops.

On September 6, on my return to England from Angora, I gave to the Prime Minister, at his request, my memorandum drawn up after long interviews with Kemal Pasha and his Ministers, in which conditions of peace honourable to Turkey in Kemal's estimation are set forth and discussed.

But Were They?

For this memorandum the Prime Minister thanked me, and said the suggestions would be laid before Government in the question of peace.

The following is a précis of my report drawn up at Angora as July 27-28 last. Space does not permit here to print the whole report:

Smyrna and Thrace

1. Evacuation of the province of Smyrna and all occupied territories in Asia Minor by the Hellenic troops, which will be restored to the Turks.

2. The Eastern frontier line of Thrace, laid down in Paris Conference of last March in Paris to be remodified to the old frontier line of the Maritza river, including Adrianople, and two alternative schemes were offered also.

3. The Turks were perfectly willing that an international garrison of England, France and Italy should occupy the Dardanelles, under the governance of a man representing some disinterested nation, such as Denmark, for example. That the occupation might be fixed for five years, and then the Powers might confer as to whether it was necessary to continue the military occupation.

Turkey's Army

4. It was pointed out that an army for Turkey of 40000 regulars and 45000 gendarmerie laid down in the Paris Conference of March last was hopelessly inadequate, when the extent of frontiers of Asia Minor and Turkey in Europe

are considered more over, also when disseminated nature of the duties of a gendarmerie are considered.

They further stated that a "voluntary army" imposed on the Turks by us in Paris in March last was an impossible idea for Turkey; only England can afford the luxury of a paid voluntary army.

The Turks will not hear of any foreign officers being appointed to the gendarmerie.

Mohammedan Menace

5. In the memorandum I discussed the Mohammedan menace to England at length, which had been preparing in India, Mesopotamia, etc., for at least a year past, which many officials of many years' experience of Mohammedans believe in, and which Kemal Pasha declared to me he would use if Mr. Lloyd George continued his blind hostility to the Turks.

One of the highest placed officials of France, a man of great experience in the Mohammedan world of North Africa, said to me that 'we must have peace with the Mohammedans', that the French were determined not to have the same mess in North Africa and Syria that the English are having in India.

Kemalist Efficiency

6. In the report I gave an account of the high state of efficiency of the Nationalist Turk army - well over 300000 combattants and of the high qualities of the generals and battalion officers and artillery; and also of the work of their arsenal at Angora, where wonderful work was being done in fitting new breechblocks to guns and rifles by skilled Turkish artisans carefully trained by the Germans during the Great War.

7. I gave a brief account of Foreign trade with Nationalist Turkey and how owing to the hostility of our Government, all the trade is being rapidly picked up by the French, Italians and Americans to the detriment of British trade in the Near East.

Hand in Hand with France

I concluded by pointing out that England and France must march hand in hand in this Near East question, as also in European affairs (as I have been advocating for two years in Parliament).

How was it possible to use united action when France had Turkish sympathies and the British Government had Greek sympathies! - that the common danger to England and France was the Mohammedan menace - did the Government contemplate another great mutiny in India with Mesopotamia and Egypt added? - in consequence we should make peace with the Turks as France and Italy had long made up their minds to do - to do this all we had to do was to tell the Greeks to quit Asia Minor at once.

The Alternative

What was the alternative? I asked. We have demobilised our army to a far greater extent than France; we have not the power to support the Greeks in their mad enterprise in Asia Minor.

I said it was madness to try and push the Turk out of Europe into Asia Minor, for if that was done the Turk would become an Asiatic Power hostile to us on the road to India.

Does the Government want peace or war? I asked. If the latter, you will have to make an efficient and powerful army which you have not got now, and conscription, I should say, will be necessary to get it.

Why Allies Withdrew Because they were not consulted

Mr. Lloyd George also omitted to tell his audience that one reason for France and Italy withdrawing their detachments from the Adriatic shore was his announcement to the world that if Kemal advanced on Constantinople the Allies would be reinforced without consulting France or Italy.

Nor did he make any reference to the fact that he had invited the Serbians to send troops to Constantinople, and that the Serbians had declined.

Would have set Islam Alight

Such an occupation alone would have set Islam alight at once.

The late Prime Minister has played perilously near the flame. That we were not drawn into a terrible war is due to the wise moderation of M. Poincaré and our officials on the spot, and we are not going to join in his mock thanksgiving to himself and his late Cabinet for saving us by their firmness from another "new" war!

Kemal means to have Peace

Kemal and his Ministers say that they mean to have peace with England in spite of Mr. Lloyd George!

Finally since my return to England, not only have I begged Mr. Lloyd George several times to send me out with a mandate, but also a highly placed ex-Cabinet Minister of this Government has also begged the Cabinet to send me out at the same time, with M. Franklin-Bouillon, as Kemal Pasha, he urged, was a personal friend of mine; but the answer of the Cabinet was that Kemal would look upon my being sent out as an act of weakness, of "climbing down", on the part of the British Government.

An Act of friendship

On the contrary, I urged that he would take it as an act of friendship, a proof that we were trying every path for peace.

I would like to observe also that in the moment of the late crisis when Lord Curzon was in Paris trying his best to avoid war, I offered Lord Curzon to go off to Kemal to assist the negotiations in surmounting obstacles.

F.O. 371/796/E. 11518

No. 15

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 2468

PARIS, October 22, 1922
(Received October 23)

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents its compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 21st October, respecting the association of the French Government in the joint remonstrance against Mustapha Kemal's intention of trying as traitors volunteers in the Greek forces.

F.O. 424/255, p. 194, No. 176

Enclosure in No. 15

M. Poincaré to Lord Harington

PARIS, le 21 Octobre 1922

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Par une lettre en date de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire savoir que, d'après une communication faite par l'Ambassadeur d'Italie à Londres au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, Mustapha Kemal aurait l'intention de juger les prisonniers de guerre originaires de l'Anatolie, sous l'inculpation de haute trahison et de les passer par les armes. Elle ajoutait que, suivant la proposition du Gouvernement Italien, le Gouvernement royal avait prescrit au Haut-Commissaire britannique à Constantinople de se joindre à son collègue italien, pour faire auprès du Gouvernement d'Angora une démarche en faveur de ces prisonniers et qu'il souhaiterait que le Général Pellé reçût des instructions dans le même sens.

J'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que, saisi de cette question par la Légation de Grèce à Paris, j'avais dès le 6 octobre, prescrit au Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople de s'efforcer de faire insérer dans la convention d'armistice une clause visant ces prisonniers. J'ajoutais qu'il devait appuyer, auprès du Gouvernement d'Angora, l'action de ses collègues alliés en faveur de cette catégorie de sujets ottomans.

Veuillez, &c.

R. POINCARÉ

F.O. 424/255, p. 194, No.176

No. 16

General Harington to War Office

Secret

Paraphrase

2833 cipher 24.10.22

Despatched 2230 24.10.1922

Received 0800 25.10.1922

I have received a letter dated October 18th from Mustapha Kemal signed by him as President of Grand National Assembly and C-in-C in which he says "I wish to inform you that sincere sentiments of reciprocal appreciation which reigned during the Mudania Conference between yourself and Ismet Pasha have caused us real pleasure, and in name of humanity I sincerely and earnestly

hope that all the efforts made for peace may be crowned with success". A similar letter has been received by me from Ismet Pasha which concludes "I sincerely and ardently hope that work we did together may be a prelude leading to organization of countries to an eternal peace."

High Commissioner is being informed.

F.O. 371/7906/E. 11654

No. 17

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 638
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 31, 1922
(Received November 1)

My immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me Constantinople Government telegraphed to Mustapha Kemal yesterday to say that it had been invited to Peace Conference.

Constantinople Government suggest that the two Governments should consult together with a view to unity of action. If this were not done prospect of peace might be endangered, and neither Government could afford to assume this responsibility. Constantinople Government was now awaiting reply. Mustapha Kemal might ignore telegram, in which case Constantinople Government would have to consider its position. It would let us to have an answering two or three days' time.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs what had passed between Sultan and Refet Pasha. He said he had not got detailed information, but that he understood from Grand Vizier that Refet Pasha had asked Sultan to dismiss his Government in order to allow Angora Government to send a Governor-General here. Sultan is stated to have replied that he would consult his Ministers.

F.O. 424/255, p. 265, No. 371

No. 18

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 957

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 31, 1922
(Received November 7)

My Lord,

Both my Allied colleagues spoke to me last night in terms of evident anxiety with regard to the present attitude of the Kemalist Government towards foreigners and foreign enterprise generally. They had both received information from a Frenchman and an Italian, who had just come from Smyrna, of the intolerable régime at present in force there. The old Turkish officials had been ejected by young Kemalists from Angora who were imbued with chauvinistic feelings. Customs duties had been enormously increased and the importation of articles of luxury absolutely forbidden. Further than this, although firms which had imported articles of luxury were not allowed to clear these from the customs, they were equally prohibited from re-exporting them. Measures had been threatened against the foreign banks, and foreign subjects were liable at any hour of the night and day to domiciliary visits by the Nationalist police. In these circumstances trade was impossible, and the French High Commissioner had even been advised that it would be useless for French subjects to remain there.

2. The French High Commissioner also informed me that he had received reports from Colonel Mougin, the French agent at Angora, to the effect that the extremists in the National Assembly appeared to have the upper hand for the moment. General Pellé had also heard that at Zungouldak, and probably elsewhere on the littoral of the Black Sea, the Kemalists were applying the measures which they applied in Ionia, namely, that they were retaining men between 18 and 45 and giving the women, children and old men the choice between expulsion and deportation. These unfortunate persons preferred expulsion, and it was to be foreseen that a fresh mass of refugees might be expected from the regions in question.

3. The French High Commissioner said that, as a result of this state of things and of the general attitude of the Kemalists, he meant again to urge on M. Poincaré the absolute necessity of preliminary conversations between the three Allied Governments, so as to enable the latter to decide, before the conference, to what extent they were prepared to accept the probable Kemalist demands, and at what point they would make a stand. He told me that he had already suggested this course at least twice to M. Poincaré, but that the latter,

under the influence of the irritation produced on him by Mr. Lloyd George's speech at Manchester, had rejected the idea. General Pellé added very frankly that M. Poincaré was not always an easy man to deal with, and that the tone of his correspondence was often disagreeable. I told general Pellé that in my opinion, absolute solidarity between the Allies was the only chance there was of resisting Kemalist pretensions at the forthcoming conference.

4. Admiral Dumesnil, who spent a considerable time in Smyrna both before and after the destruction of that place by fire, has also in conversation with me dwelt on the intractability and arrogance of the Kemalists. He expressed the view that Mustapha Kemal would endeavour to hold fresh elections for a National Assembly at as early a date as possible. As at present constituted the National Assembly was not sufficiently under his influence. In the course of a recent tour Mustapha Kemal had openly said to a gathering of notables that the people must not send any more *hodjas* to the Assembly. These men had been the curse of Turkey in the past, and if anymore were elected he would throw them into the sea.

5. Meanwhile, Refet Pasha has continued to make speeches and to indulge in all manner of activities at Constantinople. His speeches have produced a bad impression on the Constantinople Turks, and it may be said with truth that he has outstayed his welcome. In one of his earlier speeches Refet Pasha spoke slightly of Western republics, which, he implied, no longer corresponded to present-day conditions. He claimed that the Nationalist Government had discovered a far more up-to-date system of government, in that sovereignty was vested directly in the Grand National Assembly. He seems however, to have forgotten the convention at the time of the French revolution. His allusions to the abolition of the Sultanate but to the maintenance of a Caliph, who would have no power of any sort, has puzzled even if it has not shocked moderate opinion here. Refet Pasha seems to have had in mind some such system as prevailed in Japan before the Restoration, i.e., an Emperor who was a mere figure-head, with a shogun, in this case possibly Mustapha Kemal, exercising sovereign powers.

6. It is probable that, with the knowledge of what has happened at Smyrna, the official classes of Constantinople are not looking forward with any enthusiasm to the installation of the Kemalist régime here. It may mean the dismissal of many of them in favor of office-seekers from Angora. The extreme doctrines proclaimed by Refet Pasha must also be a shock to the more conservative Turk. A few days ago one of the associations arranged a procession of Refet Pasha's escort through the town. This procession consisted of thirty-two motor-cars with three of Refet Pasha's men in each, but as far as I could see it evoked no enthusiasm whatever. In speaking to me of the first detachments of

gendarmarie which have gone into Thrace, the Italian High Commissioner informed me yesterday that he had reliable information to the effect that the men were carefully-selected officers and non-commissioned officers, but that they were *des fripons*.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, p.216-218, No.144
F.O. 424/255, p.296-297, No.434

No. 19

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.960.

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 31, 1922
(Received November 7)

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No.631 of the 28th October relative to the election of Ismet Pasha to the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora, I have the honour to state that it is now definitely announced that Ismet Pasha will preside over the Angora delegation at the Peace Conference. Various reports are current as to the other members of the election, but up to yesterday Hamid Bey professed to have no definite information on the subject. He said he had himself begged to be excused from attending the conference. The names of Riza Nour Bey and Fethi Bey are mentioned for the post of second plenipotentiary. Private telegrams from Angora state categorically that Riza Nour Bey had already been appointed. He is a doctor by profession, but has for many years an active politician. He has for some time been a member of the Angora Government. He was sent some months ago to Kharkoff to exchange the ratifications of the Angora-Ukraine Treaty, and went on to Moscow on a special mission. His political past since 1908 has been varied. Izzet Pasha calls him a weathercock.

2. Mustapha Kemal and Ismet Pashas left Broussa for Angora on the 28th October. The "Terdjuman-i-Hakikat" publishes a short interview with Mustapha Kemal just before he left. He confirmed the fact that Ismet Pasha would be the principal delegate at the Peace Conference, and said that there would be no other soldier on the delegation. Asked whether he himself might be expected in

Constantinople, he said, "Certainly". To a further question as to the date, he replied that, anyhow it would be very shortly.

3. The "Aksham", a very strong and sometimes well informed Nationalist paper, published on the 28th October a summary of certain of the Angora peace proposals. I enclose a translation. It will be observed that the writer adheres closely to the National Pact, that specific mention is made of the recovery of Mosul, and that while it is stated that Turkey must have military and naval forces sufficient to secure her against attack, the gloss "without limitation" is expressly inserted.

4. The Constantinople Government appear to be very anxious to arrange a composition with Angora preparatory to the Peace Conference. They do not wish to be eliminated altogether, but they are clearly prepared to go very far in the direction of leaving the effective representation of Turkey to the Angora Government, subject to some safeguards for their own technical position and that of the Sultan. Much attention has been attracted by the fact that Refet Pasha visited the Sultan on the 29th October. He had already had two or three conversations with Izzet Pasha and at least one with the Grand Vizier. It is however, significant of his attitude and that of Angora that he did not apply for the audience through these statesmen. I believe he approached His Majesty through the prefect of the city. I have no information as to what passed, but the Sultan sent for the Grand Vizier immediately afterwards, and on the following day (30th October) the Grand Vizier addressed to Mustapha Kemal a telegram, a translation of which I enclose.*

5. It is on my opinion, eminently desirable that some arrangement should be made by which the Sultan and the Constantinople Government should now yield to the logic of facts and recognise the claim of the Grand National Assembly to represent Turkey effectively, without formally abdicating. I fear that great difficulty may be encountered, but Refet Pasha's visit to the Sultan is perhaps a hopeful sign.

6. I see no reason to alter the forecast given in my despatch No.903 of the 17th instant of the probable attitude of the Angora delegates at the Peace Conference. I am reporting in a separate despatch the views of my French and Italian colleagues, from which your Lordship will see that the French High Commissioner more particularly takes a gloomy view. At the same time, there are some signs that Angora is anxious to create a more favourable atmosphere

* Anılan telgraf cihine yok. B.N.Ş

and to avoid giving offence beforehand to His Majesty's Government. The promise to return the Smyrna-Aidin railway to the concessionary company, which took me by surprise, is an indication of this kind. I attribute this slight relaxation not to any intention of weakening at the conference, but to a realisation that, in spite of their recent successes, the Angora Government have many dangers to face. They are mistrustful of, and mistrusted by, the Bolsheviks. They are apprehensive of a combination of the Balkan countries to resist possible Turkish expansion in Europe. They are indisposed by the Bulgarian Premier's reiterated pronouncements in favour of autonomy for a portion of Thrace. They cannot fail to see signs of a revulsion in French feeling, and they probably apprehend that this revulsion, combined with the resignation of Mr. Lloyd George, may bring the Allies to the conference with a more united front than has existed for some time.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/255, p. 298-299, No.436

Enclosure in No. 19

Extract from the "Aksham" of October 28, 1922

(Translation)

According to information which we have received, views are already being formulated regarding certain things which will be asked for by our delegation at the Peace Conference. Of these, the points which have been settled are these:

Territorial Question- As regards territory, the whole of territories included in the National Pact will be demanded, namely, Eastern Thrace with the 1914 frontiers, a frontier including Mosul and a plebiscite for Western Thrace.

Military Question- Turkey must possess an army and fleet without limitation, on a scale sufficient to protect her from all attack.

Internal Questions- Exactly the same treatment will be applied to the minorities remaining in our country as that to which other Powers are bound.

Gendarmerie- If necessary, some foreign officers will be employed to reorganise our gendarmerie.

F.O 424/255, p. 299, No.436

No. 20

*Lord d'Abernon to Sir E. Crowe, Foreign Office**Confidential*BERLIN, November 2, 1922
(Received November 9)

Dear Sir Eyre Crowe,

Enclosed important statement reaches me from a member of the Embassy, who is in close touch with Near Eastern Representatives here.

Yours very truly,
(Signed) D'ABERNON

F.O. 371/7910/E. 12334

Enclosure in No. 20

Secret

Berlin, November 2, 1922

Yesterday evening I received an unexpected visit from the ex-Syrian Deputy to the Turkish National Assembly, Emir Chekkib Arslani. He stated that he was leaving Berlin for Switzerland immediately as a result of unexpected and unforeseen developments. During our subsequent conversation he informed me very confidentially that he had received confirmation of certain suspicions which he had harboured with regard to the last visit of M. Franklin-Bouillon to Mustapha Kemal.

"You will remember that our general standpoint in regard to the coming Conference was that the Syrian Nationalists should not embarrass the Angora Government by a reiteration of their complaints and protests against the French occupation of Syria. It was our view that the Angora government should be strengthened as far as possible with the support of the French at the coming Conference, in order that the Turkish support of our claim for autonomy might be more effective later on. It now appears that Poincaré and Franklin-Bouillon have forestalled us. The latter, during his visit to Angora, must have promised Mustapha Kemal to mitigate the severity of the French régime in Syria, and even to recall General Gouraud, who was closely identified with that régime, in return for a continuance of French support at Mudania. In other words, in return for some sopps from France to the Syrian population the Angora

Government seem prepared to acquiesce in the status quo in Syria and ignore our aspirations. My latest news from Syria, coupled with Gouraud's recall, tends to corroborate our view that Franklin-Bouillon bargained French support at Mudania and at Lausanne against non-interference on behalf of Syria, either at Lausanne or at any future date.

"I am now going to Switzerland to a conference to discuss our future relations to Angora. From Switzerland I intend to go to Rome, and thence to Adana, partly to visit my family and partly to observe the situation more closely from a point of vantage close to the Syrian frontier.

"With regard to the Peace Conference at Lausanne I think you will find that the question of the Capitulations, that is to say, the measure of independence which the Powers will grant to the Turkish National Government, will be of paramount importance, and will provide abundant scope for your diplomatic representatives."

F.O. 371/7910/E. 12334

No. 21

Lord Hardinge to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

Telegram No. 564

En clair

By bag

PARIS, November 5, 1922

As I entered M. Poincaré's room at the Quai d'Orsay this morning, a lady left. M. Poincaré told me that she was a Madame Gaulis, a writer of repute and a Turcophil lady with diplomatic connections, who had just returned from a journey to Angora, Smyrna and Constantinople. She had had long conversations with Mustapha Kemal and was absolutely convinced that if the Turks did not obtain what they claimed at the Near Eastern Conference, they would renew the war, and more over that they counted with confidence on the assistance of the Bolsheviks, who would attack Roumania and Poland. She further told him that there was a pan-Turanian movement by which the Turks would obtain assistance from all the Powers of Central Asia as well as from Afghanistan. I at once interposed that I thought she was mistaken about Afghanistan since although there was a definite treaty between Turkey and Afghanistan, the Afghans were not likely to associate themselves with any movement in union with the Bolsheviks, and that our latest information was to

the effect that the Afghans were determined to keep quiet and to pursue their own internal development.

Monsieur Poincaré replied that that might be so but that the Kemalists were under the impression that they might receive support from Afghanistan in the form of an attack upon the North Western frontier of India with the idea of crippling the military resources of Great Britain. He added that an attack of the Bolsheviks on Poland would immediately provoke an attack by Germany on German Poland, since Monsieur Wirth had made it quite clear that if the Bolsheviks captured what was formerly Russian Poland, the Germans would intervene to prevent the capture by them of what formerly was part of the German Empire. Monsieur Poincaré added that he contemplated the Near Eastern Conference with the utmost apprehension and that it was absolutely essential for His Majesty's Government and the French Government to preserve a united front on all questions that might arise, and he expected the difficulties to be very great owing to the demands and attitude of the Turks which had become quite insupportable.

I impressed upon Monsieur Poincaré that this renders it all the more necessary that there should be harmony between the two Governments on questions such as the Tangier Port Concession which was not one of world wide importance. I added that I would not fail to bring to your Lordship's knowledge all that he had told me.

F.O. 371/7909

No. 22

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 663
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, 6th November 1922, 11.40 a.m.
(Received November 6, 12.30 p.m.)

Turkish authorities arrested here yesterday afternoon (Ali) Kemal Bey, former Minister of the Interior and editor of an anti-nationalist paper "Peyam Sabah" which ceased to appear some time ago.

Allied High Commissioners agreed yesterday that no political persecutions could be tolerated so long as allied occupation endures. This is the first and therefore test case on which it is essential to take strong line. All High Commissioners were unanimous in this respect.

High Commissioners have accordingly requested generals to take whatever measures, even force, they considered necessary to procure his immediate release. In agreeing to force if necessary French High Commissioner said that he was prepared to pledge his own responsibility.

F.O. 371/7909/E. 12129

No. 23

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 572

PARIS, November 7, 1922

Telegraphic

My telegram No.570, last paragraph.

Note just received from M. Poincaré states that he was on the point of instructing French Ambassador in London to urge on your Lordship the cardinal importance of accelerating to the utmost possible extent the step to be taken by the Allies for the re-establishment of peace. The uncertainty, as to the actual conditions of peace, which exists at the present moment in Turkish army and amongst Turkish people is causing an excitement which Government of Angora seems unable to control, and which is likely to develop, in spite of the Mudania Convention, into a resumption of hostilities, or at any rate, into the taking of steps by the Turks which will result in Allied Governments being faced by a *fait accompli*.

M. Poincaré goes on to recall that as long ago as last March he urged His Majesty's Government to agree to a conference being held without delay at Constantinople. If his advice had been followed the last phase of the Turco-Greek conflict might have been avoided, and the Allies would at all events have secured better peace terms than they will now ever be able to get. He is convinced that every day's delay increases difficulties in way of concluding peace, and he fears that the illusions to which their rapid victory has given rise in Turkish mind are accompanied by a feeling of mistrust, and they are coming to believe that they will only obtain by force of arms the advantages which they feel now to be within their grasp.

Poincaré does not believe by postponing date of meeting of conference that satisfactory relations between Allied authorities and Turkish civil authorities in Constantinople will be facilitated, nor does he think that question of accomodation at Lausanne can really be regarded as a justifiable reason for

further delay; if however, His Majesty's Government and Italian Government, for reasons special to themselves, feel that they are absolutely unable to send their delegates to Lausanne on 13th M. Poincaré urged with utmost insistence that the postponement should be as short as possible, and under no circumstances later than 20th. In any case he declined to take any responsibility for effect which news of this postponement may have on Angora Government and Turkish public opinion.

Poincaré considers that the best method of calming excitement which this news will produce at Angora would be to sign with as little delay as possible the preliminaries of peace, which would include, in a small number of articles, the essential terms of treaty. We should thus obtain an immediate acknowledgement by Turkish Government of certain general principles; this would produce a calming effect on Angora Government and would enable the elaboration of the definite treaty to proceed at leisure. This procedure, to which Mustapha Kemal is believed to have been favourable a short time ago, might yet be accepted by him. Poincaré is not blind to difficulties of settling such a preliminary treaty, but he is certain of its great advantage, and that the earlier sessions of the Peace Conference should be devoted thereto. Poincaré is anxious to know whether your Lordship approves, and if so, what are questions which, in your Lordship opinion, should properly form basis of such a preliminary treaty?

Discussions of these questions would, in Poincaré's opinion, correspond with proposal originally made by your Lordship for an exchange of views between our two Governments prior to opening of conference.

In a postscript Poincaré adds that he has further considered question since my interview with him this evening (reported in my telegram No.570), and that he must now insist on maintenance of the date of 13th November and that he cannot admit any postponement even until 20th. The dangerous thing, and thing which may well lead to a resumption of hostilities, is announcement made to Turks of any delay whatsoever. If day of 13th November is not changed Turks will have no pretext for not coming at Lausanne, and once there on the spot it might be possible, if necessary to postpone effective opening of discussion. First essential is to meet Turks in a conference with peace as its objective ("réunion pacifique").

D.B.F.P., I. XVIII, p.240-241, No.164

F.O. 424/255, p.308, No.445

No. 24

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 984

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 7, 1922

(Received November 14)

My Lord,

As I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 652 of the 4th instant, the Grand Vizier called on me by appointment at 11 a.m. on that day. Speculation had been rife as to how long the Constantinople Government would be able to maintain itself in view of the measures taken against it by the Angora Government. I knew that there had been frequent consultations at the Palace amongst the Ministers, which all pointed to the discussion of some decision of importance. Matters were brought to a head by the attitude taken up by the Grand National Assembly at Angora when the Grand Vizier's telegram suggesting united action at the Lausanne Conference was read out. The manner in which this telegram was received must have convinced the Central Government, even if it did not realise the fact before, that any understanding or accomodation with the Angora Government was hopeless.

2. I was consequently not surprised when the Grand Vizier, after some preliminary remarks about his son, who has been ill, alluded to the telegram he had sent to Mustapha Kemal about the Peace Conference and the manner in which it had been received. In this connection he alluded to a statement made by Mustapha Kemal in the Grand National Assembly to the effect that a reply had been sent to the telegram. If this was true, he could only say that he had never received the reply and he suspected Hamid Bey of having suppressed it. He spoke of Hamid Bey in terms of profound distrust and dislike. His Highness declared that the Nationalists had continually reproached him and his colleagues with maintaining themselves in power illegally. They had even gone so far as to accuse the Central Government of treason. He did not admit that his tenure of power had been illegal. His was a properly constituted Government functioning under the Sultan and in close relations with the Allies. In that capacity the Central Government had been invited to the Peace Conference. He wished therefore, to ask me in the first place, whether the invitation should be accepted, and if so, whether a delegation from Constantinople should go to Lausanne, even under the threat that the Kemalist delegation would abstain from attending a conference at which representatives of the Central Government were present.

3. I replied that I greatly regretted that I could not offer his Highness any advice on this matter. I reminded him of what had happened in February of last year in London. Delegations had gone both from Constantinople and Angora and had managed to get along perfectly well together. It was true that the respective positions of the two Governments had changed owing to the complete defeat of the Greeks by the Nationalists. I could only put the matter to his Highness in the following way: If invitations to an official dinner had had to be sent out to two personages who were known to be on bad terms with each other, it seemed to me to be a matter for the decision of one or other of those personages whether or not to abstain from attending the dinner.

4. The Grand Vizier then alluded to the larger question of the position of the Central Government. Again he enquired, with an anxiety which was pathetic and unusual for a man who is generally so self-possessed, whether his Government should resign. In point of fact, I only learned afterwards that his mind was already made up on that subject, as he had offered the resignation of the Cabinet to the Sultan the previous afternoon. I could only reply that there again I could not offer him any advice as it was contrary to the principles of His Majesty's Government to mix itself up in the internal affairs of foreign States. I expressed regret, however, to his Highness for not being able to be more helpful.

5. The Grand Vizier did not seem surprised at my reply. He enquired whether, if his Government resigned, the Allied High Commissioners would be prepared to carry on the administration of Constantinople. I said that we could not undertake such a task, for which for one thing, we had not the material means. His Highness nevertheless begged me to consult my colleagues with regard to the position in the event of the resignation of the Government. I made no allusion during this interview to the Sultan. The Grand Vizier then took his leave, and I felt that I had seen the last, officially, of a courteous old Turkish gentleman of the old school. His dignified bearing in the midst of his difficulties and humiliations could not but make a strong appeal to my sympathy.

6. I saw my colleagues in the afternoon, when the French High Commissioner informed me that the Grand Vizier had told him, about two hours after he had left me, that he had telegraphed to Mustapha Kemal to say that he was ready to resign and asking to whom he should hand over the conduct of affairs. It is therefore evident to me that after he left me at noon the Grand Vizier, with the consent of his colleagues, took the final step. The Grand Vizier also told the French High Commissioner that the Sultan had no intention of abdicating at present. My colleagues approved the line I had taken with the Grand Vizier, and agreed that we must face the prospect of a

Kemalist Administration. Indeed, it was evident to us that Refet Pasha's real purpose in prolonging his stay at Constantinople had been to prepare the *coup d'Etat* which would get rid of the Constantinople Government.

7. Thus have disappeared a régime and an institution which have existed for many centuries. The office of Grand Vizier is nearly as old as the Turkish Empire itself, and it precedes or follows the deposition of the last representative of a dynasty which has reigned for fully 600 years.

8. The observer here lives too close to these remarkable events to be able properly to appraise their full significance. Time alone will show whether the disappearance of this historic régime will make for the prosperity of Turkey, but present indications seem to show that those in power in Turkey to-day are steering the country to ultimate disaster.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/255, p. 369, No. 544

No. 25

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 573
Telegraphic, by telephone

PARIS, November 8, 1922
(Received November 8.)

M. Poincaré asks me to communicate to your Lordship the following telegrams, which he has just received (Colonel Mougin's from Angora has been delayed in transmission) from General Pellé, Constantinople:

Telegram No. 1:

"Le Colonel Mougin me télégraphie d'Angora qu'Ismet Pacha insiste vivement pour que la conférence ne soit pas retardée.

"La nation attend", dit Ismet. "Je ne sais pas ce qui peut arriver demain. Pensez à toute une armée immobilisée devant un ennemi implacable, qui retarde toujours le moment de la paix; songez à tout un peuple enthousiaste. Que pouvons-nous faire? Nous serons débordé. Aucun ajournement ne semble possible".

Telegram No.2:

" Avec Ismet Pacha, le Colonel Mougin vient d'arriver à Constantinople. Il est tout à fait pessimiste. Il me dit que les éléments modérés et Moustapha Kemal Pacha lui-même sont débordés; on leur reproche à Angora, d'avoir arrêté l'armée avant la victoire complète. Les instructions données pour la conférence à Ismet Pacha lui prescrivent de ne rien céder sur les points suivant: les territoires fixés par le Pacte national, comprenant Mossoul; plébiscite en Thrace occidentale; rectification de la frontière de la Syrie; autonomie des Iles; indemnité pour la réparation, 6 milliards de francs-or; indépendance ratifiée; aucune Capitulation. Les éléments les plus modérés accepteraient peut-être un régime provisoire pour les tribunaux.

"En ce qui concerne Constantinople, on veut appliquer immédiatement les lois d'Angora. Moustapha Kemal Pacha suggère la transaction suivante: les Alliés évacueraient la ville de Constantinople et se retireraient à Scutari, Tchanak, Gallipoli et Tchataldja. A cette condition, il a promis que pas un soldat ne franchirait la ligne de démarcation.

"La situation est très grave.

"Le Colonel Mougin redoute même que l'ajournement de la conférence entraîne des résolutions extrêmes. Il dit que l'armée, bien approvisionnée en matériel et munitions, est prête à marcher. Si nous ne voulons pas abandonner nos intérêts à Constantinople à la domination du régime Kemaliste, il est indispensable que les Gouvernements alliés prennent d'un commun accord des mesures pour la protection de ces intérêts.

"La présence d'Ismet Pacha va permettre de voir si notre volonté de conciliation que je ne me lasserai pas d'affirmer, peut attendre un résultat pratique.

"Dans la même journée d'hier, Hamid Bey et Refet Pacha ont été visiblement impressionnés par les efforts que j'ai faits en vue d'obtenir un régime acceptable à Constantinople jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix."

F.O. 371/7910/E. 12297

F.O. 424/255, p. 315-316, No.466

No. 26

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 2605

PARIS, November 8, 1922
(Received November 9)

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 7th November, 1922 respecting the proposed postponement of the Lausanne Conference.

F.O. 424/255, p. 320, No. 472

Enclosure in No. 26

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge

*Ministère des Affaires Étrangères,
PARIS, le 7 novembre 1922*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Je reçois à l'instant la lettre de ce jour par laquelle votre Excellence, après m'avoir exposé les difficultés que soulève, à l'avis du gouvernement britannique, la réunion de la Conférence de Lausanne le 13 de ce mois, me fait part du désir de Lord Curzon de voir reculer cette réunion jusqu'au 27. Cette lettre me parvient au moment où j'allais prescrire à l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres d'attirer l'attention du Foreign Office sur l'intérêt pressant qu'il y avait à accélérer le plus possible l'action des Alliés pour le rétablissement de la paix, que tout retard risquerait, à mon sens, de compromettre sérieusement. L'incertitude qui règne dans l'opinion et dans l'armée turques sur les conditions générales de la paix est la cause d'une effervescence que le Gouvernement d'Angora paraît incapable de contenir et qui risque de se traduire, en dépit de l'Accord de Moudania, par une reprise d'hostilités ou tout au moins par un ensemble de mesures tendant à placer les Gouvernements alliés devant le fait accompli.

Je ne peux pas oublier qu'à la suite de la Conférence de Paris, au moins de mars dernier, j'ai insisté vivement, à plusieurs reprises, auprès du

Gouvernement britannique pour qu'une conférence se réunisse sans retard à Constantinople. Si cette conférence s'était réunie, même dans des conditions légèrement différentes de celles qui avaient été arrêtées à Paris, la dernière phase de la guerre gréco-turque été évitée et la paix aurait pu, dès le printemps dernier, être conclue dans des conditions bien plus satisfaisantes qu'elle ne pourra plus jamais l'être. Il est à craindre que l'excitation et les illusions qu'ont fait naître chez les Turcs leurs rapides victoires ne soient accompagnées d'un sentiment de méfiance et qu'ils ne soient portés à croire qu'ils n'obtiendront que par la force la confirmation des avantages sur lesquels ils croient déjà pouvoir compter. Je suis persuadé que chaque jour de retard augmente les difficultés qu'il y aura à conclure la paix.

Je ne pense pas qu'en reculant la date de la réunion de la conférence on facilite l'établissement des rapports entre les autorités alliées et les autorités civiles turques de Constantinople.

Je ne pense pas non plus que les mesures à prendre en vue de l'installation des délégations à Lausanne puissent être considérées comme une raison sérieuse justifiant un nouveau délai.

En conséquence, si le Gouvernement britannique, pour des raisons qui lui sont particulières et que fait valoir Lord Curzon, ne peut absolument pas envoyer ses délégués à Lausanne pour le 13, et si le Gouvernement italien, pour des raisons analogues, se trouve dans la même difficulté, j'insiste d'une façon toute spéciale auprès de votre Excellence pour que le nouveau délai soit réduit au strict minimum, et que la conférence puisse se réunir le 20 novembre. Je décline d'ailleurs toute responsabilité sur les effets que l'annonce de ce retard pourra produire sur le Gouvernement d'Angora et sur l'opinion turque.

Il me paraît qu'un moyen de calmer l'émotion que cette nouvelle produira à Angora et de mettre terme à un état d'incertitude qui comporte de réels dangers serait de signer dans le plus bref délai des préliminaires de paix comprenant en quelques articles les conditions essentielles du traité. On obtiendrait ainsi immédiatement une reconnaissance par le Gouvernement turc de principes généraux, et on lui donnerait, d'autre part, des apaisements qui faciliteraient considérablement dans la suite la discussion des clauses du traité, à laquelle il pourrait être procédé à loisir. Cette procédure, que j'avais recommandée dès le printemps dernier, et à laquelle Moustapha Kemal semble s'être autrefois montré favorable, rencontrerait peut-être encore son adhésion. Je ne me dissimule pas les difficultés que pourra présenter l'établissement de ces préliminaires, mais l'avantage certain qui en résulterait me fait penser que les premières séances de la Conférence de Lausanne, surtout si elle est reportée

à une date ultérieure, ne sauraient être consacrées à une tâche plus utile ni plus urgente.

Je serais obligé à votre Excellence de faire part immédiatement de mon sentiment et de cette proposition au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, et de le prier, au cas où il estimerait cette procédure opportune, de me faire connaître les questions qui, à son avis, devraient faire l'objet de ces préliminaires de paix. Cette procédure répondrait d'ailleurs au désir que m'a fait exprimer le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté d'échanger nos vues avant la réunion de la conférence sur les principaux points qui devront y être traités.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

R. POINCARÉ

P.S.- Comme je vous le dit tout à l'heure, j'insiste pour que la date du 13 soit maintenue, et pour qu'il n'y ait aucun renvoi, même au 20. Ce qui est dangereux et ce qui peut amener la reprise des hostilités, c'est l'annonce, faite aux Turcs, d'un retard quelconque. Si la date du 13 n'est pas changée, ils n'auront aucun prétexte pour ne pas venir à Lausanne, et là, sur place on pourra, s'il le faut, ajourner de quelques jours le commencement effectif des discussions. Mais l'essentiel est, d'abord, de se rencontrer avec eux dans une réunion pacifique.

R.P.

F.O. 424/255, p. 320-321, No. 472

No. 27

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 684

CONSTANTINOPLE, 9th November 1922
(Received November 10, 8..a.m.)

My telegram No. 675.

On learning that Ali Kemal had been taken to Ismid where he had been lynched then hanged by crowd, allied High Commissioners addressed a strong written protest to Hamid against this "political murder" which they would report to their respective governments. Although both Refet and Hamid denied all knowledge of kidnapping of Ali Kemal, allied High Commissioners are satisfied that it was carried out with knowledge and connivance of Kemaliste authorities.

F.O. 371/7911/E.12405

No. 28

*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*No. 362
TelegraphicROME, November 10, 1922. 9.20p.m.
(Received November 11. 10.50a.m.)

A reliable Italian who has just seen Jelal-ed-Din, the Angora agent here, tells me he has quite lost his head and talked with the utmost intransigence. Jelal declared that European Powers entirely misconceive the situation; Turkey had the whip-hand and they could do nothing to her. Turks would insist on full satisfaction of their demands. Mustapha Kemal and the moderates were now back numbers. In the meantime 50.000 Turkish soldiers disguised as civilians would be gradually introduced into Constantinople to make a coup at the right moment.

F.O. 371/7911/E.12477

No. 29

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*No. 693
(By wireless)CONSTANTINOPLE, November 10th 1922
(Received November 11, 1.30p.m.)

As I am uneasy (group indec.) as to safety of Sultan having regard especially to murder of Ali Mustapha Kemal* I informed General Harington officially yesterday that my allied colleagues and I would deplore any violence to Sultan whilst allies were in occupation of this town. I added that I did not think it fair that responsibility of Sultan's safety should devolve especially on British military authorities and I suggested that he should consult allied Generals with a view to provision, if necessary, of an inter-allied guard.

This matter was brought before a meeting of allied High Commissioners and Generals this evening. The latter pointed out difficulties in the way of ensuring absolute safety of the Sultan's life and Italian General dwelt on the size of force which would be required to protect him. I was not at all impressed by his arguments and derived impression that he was not at all willing to share responsibility for protection of Sultan.

*Ali Kemal'in tutuklanması ve sonra linç edilmesi, Kurtuluş Savaşı yıllarında yabancı işgākilerle işbirliği yapmış olanlar arasında panik yaratmıştır. Bu konuda Sir H. Rumbold, 7 Kasım 1922 tarihli 675 sayılı telgrafında şunları bildiriyordu:

"All attempts to discover whereabouts of Ali Mustapha Kemal have failed. Both Refet and Nationalist agent deny all knowledge of arrest. There is good reason to believe however, that having been arrested by unofficial agents of Angora Government, he was smuggled across to Asiatic side where if he has not already been murdered, he will certainly be executed.

Arrest has caused great consternation here and one hundred and fifty Turks, fearing similar fate, took "hast" in embassy garden yesterday. They were taken under military escort to Tashkisha barracks last night and are temporarily accommodated there. But it is probable that others will follow their example. Their disposal is matter requiring urgent settlement and it may be necessary to incur financial charges on their behalf. Would Cyprus be willing to receive a certain number of Turks of this category?"

F.O. 371/7911/E. 12488

No. 30

Viceroy of India to the Secretary of State for India

10.11.1922

*Telegraphic
Clear the line*

Private and personal. Your private and personal telegram of 8th November, 4369. Apart from being Caliph, Sultan commands little sympathy in India, where his personality is hardly known, and he is generally suspected of having been a tool in our hands during our occupation. Though public opinion is not yet crystallised, partly because telegrams (sic) do not command belief, and partly because issue is obscure, there seems to be general disposition to look forward to deposition with equanimity, and to belief in Mustapha Kemal as the proved saviour of his country and champion of Islam. So far as I can judge, and speaking generally, even although Mustapha Kemal's Khilafat proposals may be of revolutionary character, acquiescence in fait accompli – provided it is accomplished by Moslems and is not brought about by non-Moslems – which is innate in Islam, will prevail, even though current ideas have to be radically readjusted in order to be adapted to it.

Hence I do not see how deposition can be used to our advantage. On the contrary, in my opinion our only safe course is to stand absolutely aloof and make it clear that question is domestic concern of Turkey and Moslems which is no business of ours. If we gave Sultan asylum, suspicion that he had been our willing tool against the National and religious movement would be reinforced by a belief that we meant to retain him as our pawn for future use. Any action or intrigue by the Sultan, or in his interest, whilst he is sheltering under our asylum, would inevitably be ascribed to our machination. If our hands are forced by his imminent personal danger, we should make it clear that asylum is purely temporary, and we should get rid of him as soon as possible; but even this would be dangerous and we should forestall such a contingency if possible.

Utmost we could safely do would be to pose as peacemakers between the Sultan and Kemalists at the Lausanne Conference; seeking to secure for him suitable arrangements for a life of retirement.

F.O. 371/7913

No. 31

General Harington to War Office

Secret

Desp. 02.30 12.11.1922

Paraphrase

Recd. 02.42 12.11.1922

Clear the line

2971 cipher 11th November, 1922.

Reference telegram No. 693 from High Commissioner to Foreign Office. To-day I sent for the Sultan's most trusted A.D.C. and put the following questions to him:

(a) Was his Majesty satisfied as to his present protection. Answer: Yes.

(b) If he thought it was necessary to provide additional protection. Answer: No.

(c) If His Majesty's life was considered safe. Answer: Yes. If His Majesty should contemplate leaving I asked him to let me know privately so that I could make necessary allied arrangements. He told me that His Majesty was waiting for a communication for Angora and had not at present any intention of leaving. He also told me he thought personnel at Palace could all be trusted. There is a company of Grenadier Guards handy which can enter palace, from their barracks, by back door.

F.O. 371/7913/E. 12669

No. 32

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 959

Secret

14.11.1922

The Policy of the Angora Government

According to information obtained at first-hand, in the course of a recent speech at Broussa, to visitors from the University of Stamboul and certain Turkish schools, Mustafa Kemal Pasha recently made statements to the following effect:

"By the 15th of December, whether there be war or peace, I shall, in any case, enter Constantinople and shall be there with you for good. I have definitely made up my mind on this point, and I do not trouble about the means, for I know that I can get there.

"So far as I am concerned the Peace Conference is a mere formality and of little importance.

"Our plans will be carried out whatever happens, and I make no secret of those plans; I have even informed foreign journalists that Constantinople, the Straits, Thrace, the whole of Anatolia, including Mosul, and part of Irak must be ours, absolutely Turkish, without any control whatever, and that we shall dwell there in absolute independence and liberty.

"For the time being, the Sultan is a mere phantom, and the only reality is the Law of Fundamental Organisations, which exists at present, and will continue to exist."

F.O. 371/7914

No. 33

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 710

Very Confidential

Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, 14th November 1922 1.00 p.m.(Received 14th November, 3.00 p.m.)

French High Commissioner is doing his utmost to bring home to his government true position of affairs here and issues involved. He notices that tone of French press has been much more satisfactory to Near East, but I gather

French Embassy are convinced that Franklin-Bouillon is intriguing in the background. I have had one report to the effect that French suspect Franklin-Bouillon of still corresponding direct or through Ferid Bey with Mustapha Kemal. He is stated to have informed Mustapha Kemal that French will never fight.

French High Commissioner told me in confidence yesterday that he had some sharp passages of arms with French President of the Council at the time of Mudania agreement and he said quite frankly that latter was a most disagreeable person to serve under.

My allied colleagues warmly approve your insistence on inter-allied agreement on all main issues before going to the conference so that allies may present a united front at conference.

F.O. 424/255, p.387, No.556

No. 34

Note by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations respecting the Questions of Exchange of Populations between Turkey and Greece

GENEVA, November 15, 1922
(Received November 23)

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate, for the consideration of the Council and the information of the members of the League, the first part of a report by Dr. Nansen, dealing with the question of the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece.

The second part of the report, which deals with the situation as regards relief for refugees in Greece, will be circulated shortly.

F.O. 424/255, p.499, No.631

Enclosure in No. 34

Report by Dr. Nansen

Part 1. - Reciprocal Exchange of Racial Minorities between Greece and Turkey

I have the honour to submit the following report on the question of a reciprocal exchange of racial minorities between Greece and Turkey:

When I was entrusted by the Assembly of the League of Nations with the study of the problem of the refugees in the Near East, my first aim was to get into touch with all the Governments interested in this problem. The question seemed to me of extreme economic and social importance for the countries of the Near East, and also of great importance for the peace of the world. Before leaving Geneva I telegraphed, on the 27th September, to his Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha, expressing to him my earnest desire to enter into relations with the authorities of the Angora Government. The Persian delegation of the Assembly of the League of Nations also telegraphed, at my request, drawing the attention of the Angora Government to the importance of the questions entrusted to me.

Immediately after the end of the Assembly, I went straight to Constantinople, because I considered it of primary importance to have an interview with the Angora authorities. A few days after my arrival I had the good fortune to meet, several times, his Excellency Hamid Bey, diplomatic representative at Constantinople of the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. I discussed with him the various problems which, in my opinion, were involved in the question of the refugees, and I asked him to point out once again to the Angora authorities my desire to enter into direct relations with them. In confirmation of our conversations I sent him on the 12th October a memorandum, and on the 14th October a letter, in which I set forth the various questions with which I wished to deal, particularly that of an exchange of population between Greece and Turkey.

On the 15th October the High Commissioners of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan told me their reasons for giving me a formal invitation to take all possible steps to endeavour to reach an agreement with regard to an exchange of population between the Greek and Turkish Governments as soon as possible, independently of the peace negotiations. They sent me this invitation because they considered that this question was essentially connected with the question of refugees with which I had been entrusted by the League of Nations. Sharing these views, I accepted their invitation, and I drew his Excellency Hamid Bey's attention to the importance of having the earliest possible reply from Angora to the request, which I had already made several times, that I should be enabled to enter into personal relations with his Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

While awaiting for this reply, I went to Sofia and to Athens on urgent business in connection with the refugees. In Athens, where I passed one day, the Greek Government told me of its desire that I should attempt to establish an agreement on the subject of the exchange of populations.

I returned to Constantinople, on the 23th October, and on the same date I received a telegraphic communication from his Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha, dated Brousa, the 22nd October, 1922, and reading as follows:

"The exchange proposed by Dr. Nansen is acceptable in principle. Nevertheless, the matter must be considered with the Government. As it is impossible for me, under present conditions, to wait in any one town, it is unfortunately not possible for me to fix a meeting place.
(Signed) MUSTAPHA KEMAL, *Commander-in-chief.*"

This communication seemed to me to postpone indefinitely the consultation which I desired to have with the Angora authorities. Having received this reply, and wishing to enter into negotiations with the Angora authorities in the speediest possible manner, on the 24th October I called upon his Excellency Refet Pasha, Governor of Thrace, who had just arrived at Constantinople, in order to consider with him the method to be adopted. Refet Pasha considered it desirable that, in order to reach a speedy agreement, I should proceed without further delay to Angora. I at once stated that I was ready to undertake this journey, and Refet Pasha promised me that I should be informed by Hamid Bey as soon as the necessary arrangements for my journey had been made. He told me that I should have to provide myself with a document stating that the Greek Government gave me full powers to endeavour to obtain an agreement. I consequently procured this document by telegraph.

I waited until the 30th October for a reply from Angora to the proposal which I had made to proceed to that city. On that date his Excellency Refet Pasha informed me that he had just received a telegram from the President of the Council of Ministers at Angora making the following statement: "We agree in principle to the exchange of populations, excluding Western Thrace. Dr. Nansen need not, therefore, trouble to go to Angora. The details can be discussed by Hamid Bey." A copy of this telegram was sent me later by Hamid Bey, who at the same time gave me a copy of a telegram from his Excellency Ismet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which read as follows: "There is no need for Dr. Nansen to go to Angora. We agree to the exchange of populations. On this principle you can discuss with Dr. Nansen."

On the 31st October I had my first and only conference with his Excellency Hamid Bey. The latter took note of the powers granted me by the Greek Government, and immediately informed me that his instructions only permitted him to negotiate on the basis of a total and enforced exchange of populations, from which the population of Constantinople would not be excepted.

When I stated that I could not agree to limit the discussion in this way, he replied that he was of opinion that it was useless to continue without further instructions from Angora. I was agreed that Hamid Bey should ask Angora for instructions, and that at the same time, I should submit to the Greek Government the question whether it should accept, as the basis of discussions, a total and enforced exchange of populations, including the populations of Constantinople. I asked that the discussions might be continued while awaiting the replies from the two Governments, seeing that many provisions dealing with the execution of any future agreement would be almost identical, whether in the case of either voluntary emigration or expulsion. Hamid Bey stated that he could not agree with this view, and he added that in his opinion it would be time and labour lost to continue any discussion before knowing whether the two Governments could agree on even the basis of any future agreement. I insisted on the necessity of avoiding any further delay, and I gave Hamid Bey a list of questions that would have to be discussed. I informed him of my intention to send him immediately a draft preliminary agreement, which might serve as a more detailed basis for discussion than the list of questions.

On the 1st November, my representatives, who had called upon his Excellency Hamid Bey to hand him certain documents, were informed by him that he himself could no longer deal with this matter, because he had to leave in three days for the peace conference at Lausanne. Hamid Bey added that he had asked at Angora for the appointment of a substitute and for the sending of experts, and that he hoped to have a reply to his request within three or four days.

I was again therefore in the position of being unable to negotiate with any representative of the Angora Government, and I had no means of knowing the date when such a representative would come. Under these circumstances I considered it necessary to send, on the 2nd November, a memorandum to the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly explaining my sincere desire to obtain the solution of the question which had kept me so long at Constantinople, and adding that it was impossible for me to remain an indefinite time waiting for a result. I referred in my memorandum to the fact that, apart from my duties as High Commissioner of the League, I was also entrusted with other very important tasks, particularly the question of relief to the starving populations of Russia, but I stated that I was prepared to remain for a limited time at Constantinople if the information given me by the Angora Government seemed to me to offer a possibility of reaching a solution. I asked the Angora Government to inform me -

1. If it was prepared to negotiate without delay, and independently of the peace negotiations, an agreement for the exchange of populations on the basis

of a voluntary emigration of the racial minorities in Turkey and Greece including the question of civilians detained in Asia Minor; and

2. If it was prepared to appoint delegates with full powers to conclude with Greek representatives, and under my auspices, an agreement which would be submitted immediately for ratification by the two Governments.

I expressed the hope that I should receive the Angora Government's reply before the 6th November. Having been informed that there was no boat between the 4th and 8th November from Constantinople to Athens – where I had to deal with urgent questions relating to relief for the refugees – I decided to leave for Athens on the 4th November in the afternoon, in order not to lose time. On the morning of the 4th November I sent the following letter to his Excellency Hamid Bey:

"Constantinople, November 4, 1922

"Your Excellency,

"With reference to our correspondence and our previous conversations on the subject of an exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece, and finally to my note with memorandum of the 2nd November, I have the honour to inform you that I find it necessary to consult the Greek authorities on various questions. I feel bound to take advantage of the departure of a boat for Athens this afternoon, otherwise I shall not have an opportunity of leaving until Wednesday next.

"In this way I shall be free to continue, without loss of time, the negotiations already begun between us.

"I beg you to be good enough to send me any communication from the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to my office here, addressed to: Osman Bey, Techvikiye dairesi 62. I have given instructions at my office that any communication from you or from your substitute at Constantinople shall be telegraphed to me, or, if necessary, sent me by wireless in order that I may be informed without delay, and so be able to take the steps which such communication may require.

"I have, &c.
"FRIDTJOF NANSEN."

Up to-day, the 9th November, I have not yet received any information from my office at Constantinople to the effect that my communication has reached it from the representative of the Angora Government.

F.O. 424/255, p. 499-501, No. 631

No. 35

Paraphrase telegram from the Governor of Malta to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

17th November 1922

(Received Colonial Office 1.20 a.m. 18th November 1922)

Just received from Harington telegram saying that Sultan of Turkey is en route for Malta on board H.M.S. Malaya.

Have received no previous intimation of his intended arrival here. What are the wishes of His Majesty's Government as to his disposal.

It is very difficult to make any arrangements for him here. Please telegraph.

Addressed Colonial Office, General Harington.

F.O. 371/7914

No. 36

Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors General of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and the Officer Administering the Government of Newfoundland

Secret

17th November 1922

(Sent 1.40 p.m.)

Following message for your Prime Minister, begins: Yesterday Sultan, on the ground that his life was in danger asked General Harington for protection in letter signed as Caliph. The necessary arrangements are being made for him to be embarked on His Majesty's Ship Malaya. Ends.

DEVONSHIRE

F.O. 371/7914

No. 37

Mr. Erskine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 77

Telegraphic

SOFIA, November 20, 1922

(Received November 21)

Your telegram No. 57.

Greek Chargé d'Affaires informs me that Turkish and Bulgarian elements in Thracian Committee are now in agreement regarding common action with a view to autonomy of Western Thrace, and that arrangements for komitaji activity there, to coincide with Lausanne Conference, are complete. Serbian Chargé d'Affaires, in whom I have far more confidence, has information concerning this to some extent. I learn to-day on fairly good authority that some Bulgarian ex-officers have recently gone to Eastern Thrace in service of Kemal to lead bands into Western Thrace.

French representative on liquidation organ enquired yesterday of Bulgarian Chief of the General Staff as to certain concentrations of troops near southern frontier. Latter replied that there were about 3000 men with six guns in neighbourhood of Nevrokop, explaining that, though order had been restored at Nevrokop itself, there was still trouble in outlying districts (see my despatch No. 331), and that about 2000 had been sent to Kirjali district to maintain order on frontier and prevent passage of bands; that their presence was all the more necessary as all conscripts in frontier guard had been dismissed on 1st November, contrary decision by Conference of Ambassadors having only now been received. While these explanations appear reasonable, they do not exclude possible *arrière pensée* in minds of military authorities, at least, that in certain eventualities, such as failure to obtain satisfactory solution of question of Aegean outlet, these troops might be used for less legitimate purposes. There is, however, no evidence at present of their collusion with komitajis.

F.O. 424/255, p. 496-497, No. 624

No. 38

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 974

24.11.1922

Extracts

The Recruiting of German Officers for the Turkish Nationalists

The following report was obtained from an agent who saw the papers of a German officer being so recruited:

Mustafa Kemal Pasha has sent several officers to Germany in order to recruit old officers and N.C.O.'s who have seen service, for the Turkish Army. These Turkish officers have established themselves in various provincial towns as merchants. Several are already in Silesia and East Prussia.

A transport of 240 people (including nurses and doctors) has already been sent from Beuthen. Another transport numbering 450 has been collected and sent off from other towns.

Apparently the German local authorities are informed of this activity of the Kemalists.

The recruiting in Berlin is directed by Colonel Nouri Bey.

Information which tends to confirm the above has also been received from the S.I.S. representative in Cologne, who reports that during September a number of Turks left Germany accompanied by German Officers and N.C.O.'s, totalling somewhat less than 100. The Germans who have been so recruited are apparently distributed for the most part among the fighting units of the Turkish Nationalist forces. It would not appear that they exercise much influence in the Staffs of these forces.

F.O. 371/7916

No. 39

Sir A. Young to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 503

BELGRADE, November 30th 1922
(Received December 5)

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 457 of October 26, in which I transmitted extracts from the Mussulman press of this country bearing on the

developments in the Near East, I have the honour to forward herewith, copies of despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Sarajevo*, and His Majesty's Vice Consul at Skopje, which I have received in response to my request for further information respecting the influence of recent developments on Moslem opinion.

It will be observed that both Mr. Greig and Mr. Bird testify to the enthusiasm which Mustafa Kemal has engendered in the minds of all Mussulmans, and to the expectations of political benefit to be derived from the restoration of Turkish power in Europe, expectations which formed a powerful motive of Serbia's opposition to any consummation of the Kemalist victories which might tend to their realization.

I have &c.

(Signed) ALBAN YOUNG

F.O. 371/7917

* Saraybosna Konsolosunun raporu pek siliktir ve okunamamaktadır. Buraya alınmadı. (B.N.Ş.)

Enclosure in No. 39

Consul Bird (Skopje) to sir A. Young (Belgrade)

No. 41

*British Vice consulate
SKOPIJE, November 24, 1922*

Sir,

I have the honour to report that throughout the time of crisis in the Near East, the attitude of the Mahommedans in Southern Serbia has been most correct, and the tone of their Press has been characterized by its great moderation. The news of Kemal's defeat of the Greeks was received with enthusiasm, but there was no noisy demonstration; the victory was celebrated here by thanksgiving services in the Mosques.

The Mahommedans are delighted at the victory of Kemal which has resulted in the regaining by Turkey of a foothold in Europe. They feel that Turkey will have greater prestige and more influence in the Councils of Europe, and that consequently the demands of the Moslem minority in Southern Serbia will receive more favourable consideration. They do not expect, or even consider it possible, that the Turks will again rule in Macedonia; nor they have

any sympathy with the idea of an autonomous Macedonia, but they hope that the question of their schools and mosques will now have to be settled to their satisfaction.

It is as yet too early to express an opinion on Moslem feeling here in the matter of the Caliphate. The Turkish organ "Haq" has been receiving no direct news from Constantinople or Angora, and is dependent on Belgrade for its information. The Mahommedans are reserving their judgement until they have received detailed information regarding the circumstances attending the Sultan's departure from Constantinople. If it can be shown that the Sultan was incompetent as a Caliph, and that it is on religious grounds that a new Caliph was elected; and if the new Caliph was chosen in strict accordance with the reconized ecclesiastical procedure, Kemal's action will not be viewed in an unfavourable light. So long as there is a Caliph, it matters very little to the average Mahommedan here who that Caliph may be. As regards the separation of the temporal from the spiritual power, I think that it is a matter of indifference to Mohammedans here. The majority of the Mussulman element in Southern Serbia is Albanian and not Turk; and as far as the Caliph is concerned is occupied chiefly with the religious aspect.

Kemal has certainly lost ground lately, not because of the Sultan's departure, but because it is felt that his demands are excessive. It is feared that he will end by alienating the sympathies of all nations in Europe, and that Turkey will thereby eventually lose what has already been gained.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F.H.W.STONEHEWER BIRD

F.O. 371/7917

No. 40

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No.985

1.12.1922

Secret

TURKEY
The Khalifat

Appended is a summary of information, compiled from the reports of various authoritative informants, including a well-known Turkish theologian, in close touch with the Clerical Party at Angora, and upon confidential communications which Rafet Pasha received from Angora. It is issued in

continuation of Summary No.961, which described the circumstances attending the passing, by the Great National Assembly, of the resolutions concerning the deposition of the former Khalif etc.

The appended information gives an account of the manner in which the plot against the Khalif was carried to its conclusion. It is shown how Mustafa Kemal was unable to secure, in a legal manner, the acceptance of the "Fetva" justifying the resolutions of the 1st November, and how, as was the case of the passing of those resolutions, this "Fetva" was approved by a mere show of hands. The new Khalif, moreover, was only accorded 148 votes; that is to say, he was elected by little more than two-fifths of the total number of Deputies in the Assembly. It is further described how the Angora Government encountered considerable difficulties in overcoming objections to the scheme on the part of the Heir Apparent. The information also throws light on the circumstances attending the resignation of Abdullah Azmi Effendi, the former Commissioner for Religious Affairs, and on the significance of the invitation to the Egyptian Extremist, Abdullah Aziz Shawish, to proceed to Angora. Finally it is shown how the Great National Assembly has taken steps to forestall adverse criticism of its action in the Moslem world, particularly in India, whither pamphlets have been secretly despatched.

F.O. 371/7917

No. 41

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.2821

PARIS, December 1st 1922

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith an extract from the "Matin" of this morning criticising Mr. Lloyd George's policy towards Greece at the time of the opening of the Greek campaign in Asia Minor.

The writer commences by referring to a leading article which appeared in the "Morning Post" of yesterday and in which the question was asked as to how it came about that when things appeared to be going so swimmingly for peace at that period, the Greek Ministers were secretly launching a war and quoting an allegation which was then made that while the late Prime Minister was openly working for a settlement, he gave secret encouragement to the Greeks to go forward with their preparations.

In this connection the "Matin", by publishing certain documents written by Monsieur Venizelos from London, claims to have acquired the proof that a

secret policy was being pursued by Mr. Lloyd George in direct opposition to his public policy.

In support of this contention the "Matin" publishes a despatch written by Monsieur Venizelos from London and dated March 19th 1920 from which it transpires that Monsieur Venizelos, even before the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, was informed that neither France nor Italy would support him in his policy of adventure but that England was prepared to give him her support though at the same time declining all the responsibilities which such a policy might entail.

Monsieur Venizelos is further quoted as saying in an interview with Mr. Lloyd George after the Boulogne Conference that should the contemplated offensive against the Kemalists not be sufficient to ensure the signature and execution of the Treaty, he would then himself undertake to increase the Greek effectives, in such a way that, in collaboration with the British forces then in Turkey, it might be possible to impose their will by force. But in this case, he added, he would need British support financially and materially. It was from this period states the "Matin" that the Lloyd George-Venizelist policy, which alas, was to prevail in the East for a long time, was clearly defined since Mr. Venizelos succeeded in obtaining Mr. Lloyd George's support and consent to his proposals.

Knowing that Greece was divided and weary of war and that his influence was rapidly declining, Monsieur Venizelos saw that he could not induce his country to consent to fresh sacrifices without making an appeal to his political adversaries and the "Matin" then proceeds to divulge the tactics of Monsieur Venizelos in a further letter he wrote from London to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs under date of June 15th 1920.*

I have &c.

(Signed) HARDINGE OF PENHURST

F.O. 371/7917/E. 13544

* Bu rapor üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında Harold Nicolson şu yorumları yapmıştır:
Minutes on copy of Lord Hardinge's despatch No 2821 to Foreign Office of December 1st
respecting Mr. Lloyd George's alleged encouragement of Greek campaign in Asia.

These alleged "revelations" date, of course, from the period when M. Venizelos was still in power and when Greece was regarded by France and Italy, as well as by ourselves, as an ally. On most people they will, however, leave the impression that we were encouraging Greece in this way at a time when we had agreed with France and Italy to furnish her no support.

I gather from M. Caclamanos that these documents were sold to the "Matin" by a M. Frangoulis, who was in the Athens Foreign Office under M. Baltazzi, and who escaped with some of the archives. M. Venizelos fears that further revelations may be expected.

M. Cakalmanos also told me that in the "Sunday Express" of yesterday has appeared M. Gounaris' Note to Lord Curzon in which he stated that Greece could no longer continue in Asia Minor unless given support. The reply was not printed.

These documents were it appears, sold to the "Sunday Express" by an ex-secretary of M. Gounaris, a M. Chrysoski who resides at the Greek Club, Linden Gardens S.W. M. Cakalmanos expects that M. Chrysoski has further documents in his possession, and evidently hopes that Scotland Yard would be asked to take action.

I do not see that we have anything to fear from these revelations, and I consider that it would be a mistake to take any notice of M. Chrysoski.

(Signed) Harold C. Nicholson

4.12.22

I agree.

W.T. 4/12

Enclosure in No. 41

Extract from the "Matin", Paris, 1re Décembre 1922

Comment M. Lloyd George a lancé la Grèce dans l'aventure asiatique *La véritable histoire de l'expédition et de la défaite grecques reconstituée avec les documents diplomatiques secrets*

Le Morning Post se demandait hier matin comment il se faisait que les ministres grecs "aient déchainé secrètement la guerre, quand tout semblait tendre vers la paix." A la question il apportait aussi la réponse:

"Tandis que le Premier Ministre britannique, écrivait notre confrère, cherchait ouvertement à conclure un règlement, il encourageait secrètement les Grecs à poursuivre leur préparation."

Le grand journal anglais ajoutait:

"M. Lloyd George jouait le même jeu qu'il avait joué à Paris, quand il prétendait qu'il était pour la pendaraison du kaiser, et pour une fouille minutieuse des poches des Boches, alors qu'en même temps il assurait au correspondant parisien de la Westminster Gazette que ses sympathies allaient au point de vue allemand.

Le Matin a acquis la preuve de cette duplicité qui explique une de nos plus longues campagnes. Il l'apporte aujourd'hui au public du monde entier qui va suivre sur les documents mêmes, et comme s'il pouvait pénétrer tout entier dans les cabinets des présidents du conseil et des ministres des affaires étrangères, une des périodes les plus sinistres de l'histoire de la diplomatie secrète.

Il espère ainsi contribuer à mettre fin à des moeurs qui empestent l'atmosphère internationale. Quand on songe que cette politique a été faite par

un homme qui est l'auteur au traité de Versailles, qui a proclamé maintes fois renoncer à la diplomatie secrète, on ne peut pas lire ces pages sans révolte.

M. Lloyd George avec des hommes d'affaires grecs et un ministre grec atteint de la mégalomanie a, contrairement à l'avis des Français, des Italiens, contrairement même à celui de son ministre des affaires étrangères, lord Curzon, et des milieux militaires anglais, conduit les ministres grecs à la peine capitale et le peuple grec à la débâcle. Il a failli ruiner l'Entente, diviser l'Europe, amener la guerre. Avions-nous raison, encore une fois, de dire que M. Lloyd George n'était pas l'Angleterre?

Nos lecteurs pourront répondre à cette question en lisant la suite des correspondances d'Athènes dont nous n'avons pas voulu entreprendre la publication avant d'en avoir reçu la totalité et qui, nous ayant été expédiées avant l'exécution des ministres grecs, nous en apportent aujourd'hui l'explication et la morale."

La tactique de M. Venizelos est explicitement indiquée dans le document que voici:

Londres, le 15 juin 1920

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères - Athènes

"Absolument personnel et secret. Qui soit déchiffré par le ministre lui-même.

Je suis arrivé à Londres hier soir. Ayant été appelé, je me suis rendu une demi-heure après auprès du premier ministre anglais. Ce dernier m'a exprimé sa joie que je sois venu dès maintenant, puisqu'il était nécessaire que les moyens d'imposer le traité de paix à la Turquie, au cas où elle refuserait de le signer ou au cas d'une impossibilité à faire exécuter ce traité, soient étudiés à temps. Il a ajouté que l'Italie ne doit pas compter plus longtemps, puisque non seulement elle ne contribuera pas à imposer le traité de paix, mais qu'elle se réjouira si le traité n'est pas exécuté. Probablement même sans se compromettre, elle poussera les Turcs à le refuser.

M. Millerand est sincère, mais l'opinion publique française admettra difficilement l'envoi d'une armée nouvelle en Turquie pour imposer les conditions de paix.

Le premier ministre anglais lui aussi, se trouve en face de difficultés provenant du ministère des affaires étrangères et des milieux militaires, lesquels, dernièrement surtout, sont encore inspirés par un esprit proturc et ont, concernant la Turquie, les conceptions qu'avait, il y a cinquante ans, Disraëli. Le premier ministre m'a demandé en conséquence, si je croyais que la

Grèce avait la volonté de faire l'effort militaire nécessaire pour imposer la paix à la Turquie et si je croyais que la Grèce avait aussi les forces nécessaires. En un mot, si j'estimais comme lui, la force de la Turquie comme n'étant pas considérable. J'ai répondu sans montrer une hésitation quelconque, que la Grèce avait la force nécessaire et que je crois qu'elle prouvera sa volonté de faire l'effort nécessaire pour autant qu'elle collaborerait avec les deux puissances occidentales ou tout au moins avec l'Angleterre. Le premier ministre m'a prié de voir le ministre de la guerre et de lui parler dans cet esprit et de le convaincre que l'état-major anglais surestime la valeur de la résistance turque."

On cherche partout les responsables de la politique qui a conduit la Grèce à sa perte. La question n'est pas aussi simple qu'il paraît tout d'abord, aussi me suis-je adressé à une personne hautement qualifiée et connue pour son impartialité afin d'avoir des renseignements aussi précis que possible à ce sujet.

Voici exactement rapportées, les indications qui m'ont été données:

Sans aucun doute, M. Gounaris et les membres de son gouvernement portent-ils de très lourdes responsabilités, mais cependant, à titre de complice, les grands, les vrais responsables sont, au premier chef, M. Lloyd George et M. Venizelos.

Le premier pour avoir voulu, en se servant de la Grèce comme instrument, poursuivre en Orient une ruineuse politique personnelle, le second pour s'y être prêté de toutes ses forces en vue de réaliser, en dépit de tous les avertissements, une politique mégalomane.

On ignore tellement les dessous de la politique orientale que cette affirmation véridique vous étonne certainement; mais la vérité se prouve, une multitude de documents sont là qui viennent à l'appui de mon assertion.

Un avertissement à M. Venizelos

Voici par exemple une dépêche prouvant que, dès avant la signature du traité de Sèvres, M. Venizelos était prévenu que ni la France, ni l'Italie ne le suivraient dans sa politique d'aventure. Quant à l'Angleterre, elle encourageait cette politique d'aventure, tout en déclinant les responsabilités qui pourraient en découler.

No. Protocole 11650

Londres, 6/19 Mars 1920

Secret

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères-Athènes

J'ai été invité aujourd'hui par le ministre de la guerre en présence du maréchal chef de l'état-major. Le ministre de la guerre m'a déclaré ce qui suit: "Le premier ministre m'a chargé de vous voir pour vous demander si vous êtes disposé, au cas où la Turquie refuserait d'accepter les conditions de la paix, à vous charger d'imposer militairement ces conditions en ce qui concerne les parties qui vous intéressent en Thrace et en Asie Mineure. Le premier ministre désire que vous sachiez que les multiples obligations de l'Angleterre ne lui permettent de disposer d'armées ni en Thrace, ni dans les parties qui vous ont été données en Asie Mineure." Par conséquent, nous ne devrions attendre aucune aide en hommes de la part de l'Angleterre en ce qui concerne ces contrées qui nous intéressent immédiatement. L'Angleterre disposera de l'armée nécessaire pour Constantinople et les Détroits et pour des besoins éventuels en dehors des pays qui nous ont été adjugés..."

Après avoir exposé le danger que couraient les revendications grecques en Thrace et en Asie Mineure en raison de cette attitude des alliés, M. Venizelos ajoute:

"A ce moment critique de notre histoire nationale, après avoir apprécié exactement toutes les circonstances, je déclarais à M. Lloyd George que je me chargeais non seulement de venir en aide en envoyant une division aux Anglais à Ismid, mais d'écraser par notre armée, l'armée de Kemal qui se trouve devant notre front et d'assurer toute la côte de la mer de Marmara contre les incursions de Kemal. J'ai ajouté qu'après nos succès le prestige de Kemal sera diminué, et que la signature et l'exécution du traité de paix seront sinon certaines, du moins très probables. J'ai déclaré que, pour cette action de la Grèce, je ne demandais aucune aide aux alliés, pas même une aide financière.

"J'ai ajouté que, au cas où, par cette action je ne pourrais pas assurer la signature et l'exécution du traité, je prendrais sur moi d'augmenter les effectifs de l'armée grecque de manière que, avec l'armée britannique qui se trouve actuellement en Turquie, il soit possible d'imposer nos volontés militairement. Dans ce cas j'aurais besoin de l'appui britannique, tant au point de vue financier qu'au point de vue des munitions de guerre. Mais surtout pour que je puisse demander au peuple grec ce nouvel effort considérable, il est nécessaire qu'on se décide à démembrer la Turquie qui serait réduite au plateau d'Anatolie. J'ai réussi à faire adopter mes propositions par M. Lloyd George, et c'est grâce à lui que nous avons obtenu l'autorisation qui nous a été donnée à Boulogne."

*No. Protocole 11650**Londres, 6/19 Mars 1920**Secret**Ministère des Affaires Etrangères-Athènes*

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La Grèce soldat de M. Lloyd George

Il est désormais entendu que la Grèce sera en Orient le soldat de M. Lloyd George, et M. Venizelos s'en réjouit et en escompte les plus brillants résultats comme il l'explique dans cette même dépêche:

"J'ai tout lieu de croire que le nouvel état de choses dans le Proche-Orient s'appuyera sur le facteur hellénique que l'Angleterre s'efforcera de rendre aussi puissant que possible."

Dès ce moment la politique Lloyd George-Venizelos qui devait trop longtemps, hélas, prévaloir en Orient, est nettement dessinée. M. Venizelos ne pouvait conserver aucun doute sur le fait que c'était au seul peuple grec qu'un effort réel serait imposé.

Les revendications grecques

Vous savez que je suis parti de Grèce, cette fois, avec un moral ébranlé. Mais étant donné que le premier ministre anglais est disposé à imposer, avec la collaboration de la Grèce, la paix à la Turquie, je crois que quand j'exposerai les choses au peuple grec telles qu'elles sont, ce dernier acceptera de faire l'effort nécessaire pour réaliser la presque totalité des revendications nationales. Il est bien entendu que si la Turquie refuse de signer et que si nous usons de la force pour imposer la paix, j'espère que les conditions seront modifiées en notre faveur. D'une part, par la fondation d'un état fédératif comprenant le Pont et l'Arménie, d'autre part par notre extension sur tout le golfe d'Adramiti, peut-être même par l'éloignement des Turcs de Constantinople. En tout cas, j'espère occuper en Turquie une place égale à celle des grandes puissances et obtenir la surveillance des Détroits. Il est évident que nous demanderons une aide financière analogue à celle de 1917 et le droit de mettre les frais de la guerre à la charge de la Turquie.

...Je vous prie de me faire savoir vos pensées et si vous êtes d'accord là-dessus et si vous croyez que nous pouvons appeler trois ou quatre classes pour compléter les vides existants et mobiliser au moins deux divisions.

Venizelos

Les successeurs de M. Venizelos, ceux dont on entreprend le procès actuellement et dont le sort dépend de la décision de l'homme d'Etat crétois qui, à la faveur de la révolution, est redevenu le maître occulte de la Grèce, n'ont commis qu'un crime, inexcusable du reste: c'est d'être tombés sous la coupe de M. Lloyd George et d'avoir suivi fidèlement la politique impérialiste de leur prédécesseur.

Comme le préconisait M. Venizelos, on mobilisa les classes de la réserve jusqu'à atteindre un effectif de plus de 300.000 hommes, on occupa un front de plus de 800 kilomètres, on pénétra en Asie Mineure jusqu'à plus de 500 kilomètres de Smyrne.

Le résultat vous le connaissez, ce fut la débâcle. Presque seul, le meilleur expert militaire de la Grèce, le général Metaxas, ancien chef de l'état-major hellénique, avait clairement prévu et prédit avec insistance la catastrophe finale.

F.O. 371/7917/E. 13544

No. 42

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.2833

PARIS, December 2nd 1922
(Received December 4)

My Lord,

In continuation of my despatch No. 2821 of December 1st regarding the attack on Mr. Lloyd George's Greek policy which appeared in the "Matin" of the same date, I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a further article which is published in the "Matin" of today, accompanied by documentary evidence which, so claims the "Matin", proves that M. Venizelos was duly informed of the reservations which the French Government made on the subject of the Lloyd George-Venizelist policy.

The correspondent of the "Matin" at Athens gives a short account of his interview with an "informant," who produced documents in support of his thesis, in which the latter accuses Mr. Lloyd George of having almost succeeded in embroiling France with Greece and states that it was due to the collaboration between the ex-Prime Minister and M. Venizelos which caused France to sign the Treaty of Sèvres.

Referring to the return of ex-King Constantine, he declared that the idea that the attitude of the Allies had changed towards Greece owing to this fact was hypocritical. Mr. Lloyd George, he maintains, succeeded in winning over M. Gounaris to his own foolish personal policy to the same degree as M. Venizelos.

The "informant" then proceeded to produce two letters written by M. Romanos, Greek Minister in Paris, to M. Venizelos under date of March 24th and 25th respectively, giving an account of the results of his interviews with M. Paleologue and M. Millerand.

From these documents it will be seen that M. Romanos was given to understand that France, though by no means, Turcophile, was a Moslem Power, and that, not being possessed of the means for compelling the Turks to accept the severe decisions come to regarding them, she could not share Mr. Lloyd George's views on the Near East.

I have &c.

(Signed) HARDINGE OF PENHURST

F.O. 371/7917/E. 13550

Enclosure in No. 42

Extract from the "Matin" of 2 Décembre 1922

La France avait prévenu la Grèce

*Celle-ci a préféré écouter M. Lloyd George
Elle sait ce qui lui en a coûté*

Les révélations du "Matin", qui soulèvent à Londres une vive émotion, vont faire l'objet d'une question au premier ministre

(De notre correspondant particulier)

Londres, 1er décembre. - La presse anglaise n'a évidemment pas encore eu le temps de commenter les révélations faites aujourd'hui par le Matin sur les relations secrètes qui existaient entre la Grèce et le gouvernement de M. Lloyd George, mais celles-ci ont naturellement soulevé ici le plus grand intérêt, comme en témoignent la place que leur consacrent les journaux du jour et les titres énormes placés au-dessus des longs extraits publiés par eux.

A Downing Street comme au Foreign Office, on refuse de faire le moindre commentaire à ce sujet, mais dans les milieux diplomatiques et politiques de Londres, "l'histoire secrète de la guerre du Proche-Orient" - comme on appelle ici ces importantes révélations - fait les frais de la conversation.

On estime que la question soulevé par le Matin, est de grand intérêt historique.

Le rédacteur diplomatique du Star, écrivant au sujet des révélations, dit:

Il n'y a aucune raison de douter de l'authenticité des lettres publiées par le Matin, car un fonctionnaire qui a été en relations étroites avec l'ex-premier ministre anglais depuis 1920 m'a déclaré aujourd'hui que les principaux faits relatés dans les documents

publiés par le journal français sont un compte rendu fidèle des négociations qui eurent lieu.

Enfin, M. Lambert a demandé aujourd'hui au speaker des Communes l'autorisation de poser lundi la question suivante au premier ministre:

A-t-on dans les archives de l'un ou de l'autre de nos ministres, la preuve qu'un membre quelconque du cabinet britannique ait encouragé les Grecs à poursuivre en Asie-Mineure la politique qui a abouti à leur défaite et à l'exécution des ministres helléniques qui en furent responsables?

On connaîtra donc lundi les vues de M. Bonar Law sur les révélations faites par le Matin.

Les preuves

Athènes, novembre 1922. - Je suis retourné voir, hier soir, l'homme intelligent si charmant qui se montre un informateur si puissamment documenté.

Je voudrais, lui dis-je, que vous m'exposiez ce qu'ont été les rapports anglo-grecs sous les gouvernements qui ont succédé à M. Venizelos, après la chute de ce dernier.

"Ils n'ont pas varié hélas! Ils ont été identiquement les mêmes et le sorcier gallois, que ce soit sous Venizelos ou sous Gounaris, a conduit la Grèce à la ruine, au désastre et au déshonneur; je vous le prouverai, pièces en main.

"Pour ce soir, si vous le voulez bien, nous parlerons d'un autre sujet; j'ai là des choses intéressantes.

"Sous l'influence de M. Lloyd George, de sa propagande et des gouvernements serfs que nous avons eus ici, on a presque réussi à brouiller la France avec la Grèce. On en est arrivé à faire considérer la France comme l'ennemi acharné du peuple grec, comme une puissance infidèle à ses alliés de la guerre et passant outre à la parole jurée.

"Or rien n'est plus faux, il faudra tout de même qu'on le sache un jour. La France n'a commis qu'une faute, à mes yeux assez grave du reste, c'est d'avoir mis sa signature, à son corps défendant au bas d'un traité qu'elle trouvait mauvais et qu'elle n'avait nulle volonté de faire appliquer à coups de sacrifices. Je parle du traité de Sévres, cet instrument déplorable dû à la collaboration de M. Lloyd George et de M. Venizelos.

"On a dit et répété que le retour du Constantin – que j'ai toujours considéré, vous le savez, comme une faute lourde à la charge des politiciens grecs et comme une erreur tragique – avait modifié du tout au tout l'attitude des alliés à l'égard de la Grèce. Rien de plus faux. L'Italie n'a pas changé d'une ligne sa politique antigrecque. M. Lloyd George a embrigadé au service de sa folle politique personnelle M. Gounaris au même titre et au même rang que M. Venizelos. Je vous en apporterai les preuves plus tard.

"Quant à la France, le retour de Constantin lui a simplement permis de dire ouvertement ce qu'elle n'avait cessé de proclamer au cours des négociations diplomatiques.

"M. Venizelos avait été dûment prévenu qu'il n'avait à compter sur aucun appui de votre pays pour réaliser le programme démesuré qu'il s'était assigné.

"Voici les documents qui permettent de mettre fin aux légendes qui ont été accréditées contre la France et qui établissent la vérité au sujet de sa politique en Orient."

Lettre adressée par M. Romanos, ministre de Grèce à Paris, à M. Venizelos, président du conseil:

Paris, 24 Mars 1920

Mon cher président,

L'ancien président du conseil* auquel j'ai fait part de votre lettre, m'a dit qu'il en parlerait avec M. Millerand à la commission des affaires extérieures et qu'il me fera savoir demain la conclusion de cet entretien... Ce qui est certain, c'est que toutes les fois que je me plains des informations tendancieuses des agents français en Orient, j'entends dire que les Italiens également ont la même opinion au sujet des affaires de Turquie. Cela ne me surprend guère. Ce qui est certain c'est que, soit par des informations puisées directement, soit par des informations de source italienne, les milieux officiels français sont persuadés que la résistance de Kemal impose la revision des conditions du traité de paix. Une longue conversation que j'ai eue avec M. Paléologue m'a produit une impression pénible et ne m'a laissé aucune illusion quant aux dispositions du secrétaire général du ministère des affaires étrangères. "La France, m'a-t-il dit, est une puissance musulmane, elle a sans doute son idéal, mais elle ne peut pas courir de risques pour la libération des populations asservies."

F.O. 371/7917/E.13550

* Evidemment M. Briand.

No. 43

*Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe*No. 760
(Telegraphic)CONSTANTINOPLE, December 9, 1922
(Received December 9)

There appears to have been an incident a few days ago in Grand National Assembly in connection with proposed modification of Electoral Law, whereby only persons born within Turkish National Pact frontiers or having resided five years in an electoral district can be elected Deputies.

Modification if accepted, would have excluded Mustafa Kemal, who treated proposal as direct attack on himself.

I learn from Smyrna that all Deputies in that district have been urgently recalled to Angora until conclusion of peace. Deputies in Constantinople area have similarly been recalled.

It is alleged, possibly in view of coincidences, that their recall is due to opposition to Mustafa Kemal having grown to serious proportions. It would be equally reasonable to think, however, that they have been recalled in view of importance of decisions to be taken in connection with Peace Conference.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 58.)

F.O. 424/255, p. 645, No. 751
F.O. 371/7918/E. 13803

No. 44

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 1111

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 11th 1922
(Received December 18)

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 760 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith an extract from the 'Journal d'Orient' of December 8th, giving an account of the proceedings of a recent session of the Grand National Assembly at which it was proposed to modify the electoral law, in such manner as to render ineligible for election persons born outside the

frontiers fixed by the National Pact, or who had not resided in the same constituency for a period of five years. This proposal, if it were adopted, would entail the exclusion from the Assembly of Mustafa Kemal, who satisfies neither requirement.

2. It is difficult here in Constantinople to gauge the possible consequences of this incident. Much depends on Mustafa Kemal's capacity for resistance which I have no reason to believe is in any way fundamentally diminished. It certainly furnished him with a brilliant opportunity for glorifying his own great services to his country. He did not fail to profit by it and the debate closed amid energetic protests, possibly insincere but also nervous, that the amendment was not directed against him, and amid loud expressions of the veneration in which he was held by the entire Turkish Nation.

3. At the same time there can be no doubt that the attack on Mustafa Kemal was deliberate and insidious and that he has once more seriously to reckon with a growing opposition consisting principally of the adherents of the old Committee of Union and Progress Party and of his personal enemies, but probably supported also by the members of what is known as the Clerical Group. It is even confidently asserted that all the deputies absent from Angora have been urgently recalled there in order to counter this opposition. Certainly the deputies from the Smyrna district and the Kemalist deputation that recently visited Constantinople to congratulate the new Caliph on his succession returned to Angora a few days ago. A sufficient cause for this would however have been the importance of the present deliberations of the Grand National Assembly in connection with the peace negotiations at Lausanne.

4. In various ways Mustafa Kemal has hitherto been able to keep the opposition in check and he will probably be able to do so once more by intensifying his methods. The last occasion on which that opposition appeared to be menacing was a few weeks before the offensive in Anatolia. The successful result of that campaign rendered the opposition for the time being innocuous; but the subsequent abolition of the Sultanate and the novel manner of election of the new Caliph, have afforded an opportunity for the opposition to revive and to add to its numbers. The abolition of the Sultan and the relegation of the Caliph to a purely religious and utterly ineffective figurehead might appear to have removed from the path of Mustafa Kemal the last obstacles in the way of supreme power. But a feature of the Grand National Assembly has always been its persistent determination that all power shall be vested in the Assembly and not in the hands of a Government or of an individual. Mustafa Kemal may therefore find that the jealousy of the Assembly is a greater obstacle to his ambitions than even a Sultan-Caliph.

5. It is certainly improbable that without considerable confidence in its own strength, the opposition would scarcely have dared to make so obvious a personal attack on Mustafa Kemal. The possibility of some weakening of his position in consequence cannot therefore be altogether excluded, though as I have said above, it may on the other hand induce him to make special efforts with a view to strengthening that position and securing it beyond all doubt. Either result might well produce a considerable effect on the attitude adopted by his Representatives at the Conference at Lausanne and especially on İsmet Pasha, who is said to be his most intimate friend.

6. The danger of any weakening of his position lies in the possibility of encouragement being thereby afforded to the section in the Assembly which, if not actually in the pay of Moscow and Araloff, is in favour of a Russian alliance. I am inclined to think however that it may tend to induce Mustafa Kemal to count more on the support of the Moderate elements in the Assembly, and thereby possibly enhance the influence of Reouf Bey, who is certainly one of those who are the most anxious for peace. Nevertheless I do not think any party would be strong enough in that intractable Assembly to be less firm than Mustafa Kemal has hitherto been in insisting on the integral acceptance of the National Pact, or that any individual, other than Kemal himself, would be able to persuade the Assembly to agree to any limitation of that Pact.

I have &c.

(Signed) NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7918/E. 14191

Enclosure in No. 44

Extract from "Le Journal d'Orient", Constantinople, December 8, 1922

Un important débat à la Grande Assemblée Nationale

Ghazi Mustapha Kémal Pacha en vient à retracer un magistral exposé de sa carrière militaire et politique

De "l'Akcham": Au cours de l'une des dernières séances de la Grande Assemblée Nationale un projet de loi déposé par Selaheddine Bey député de

Mersine; Nédjati Bey député d'Erzeroum et Emine Bey député de Samsoun tendant à modifier l'art. 14 de la loi sur les élections a donné lieu à un débat.

L'article modifié devrait être ainsi conçu:

Art. 14 - Pour pouvoir être élu membre de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie il est indispensable d'appartenir à la population des régions se trouvant dans les frontières actuelles de la Turquie, ou bien d'habiter dans la circonscription électorale où l'intéressé désire se faire élire député.

Les Kurdes et les Turcs venus dans le pays par voie d'émigration ne peuvent être élus que dans un délai de cinq ans après leur installation dans la région. Les enfants de tous les autres éléments nés dans le pays bénéficient de ce droit.

-Messieurs, cette proposition de projet de loi recèle une intention particulière, visant directement ma personne. Je demande donc à exposer mon opinion en quelques mots:

Le projet de loi proposé par Nedjati, Selaheddine et Emine Beys tend directement à priver ma personne du droit de citoyen!...

Youssef Zia Bey. - Nous n'y songeons nullement!

Salah Effendi. - Votre personne est pour nous l'objet d'une haute vénération.

Moustapha Kemal Pacha continuant, malgré ces interruptions, donne lecture du texte du projet et ajoute:

"Malheureusement le lieu de ma naissance est demeuré en dehors des frontières actuelles du pays et je n'ai pas encore une résidence de plus de cinq ans dans n'importe quelle circonscription électorale.

"Mais si telle est la situation la faute n'en incombe pas à moi. Il faudrait plutôt en chercher la cause dans le fait que l'on n'a pas été à même d'empêcher la réussite partielle des tentatives de l'ennemi qui voulait anéantir notre peuple et notre pays.

"Si nos adversaires avaient réussi complètement dans leur projet - ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise - les pays d'origine de Messieurs les signataires de cette motion seraient également demeurés en dehors des frontières!..

"En outre si je ne remplis pas les conditions prévues par l'article en cause - c'est-à-dire si je n'ai pas eu de résidence consécutive de cinq ans dans une

circonscription électorale cela est dû aux services que j'ai eu l'occasion de rendre à cette patrie. En effet si j'avais tenté s'acquiescer les conditions requises par cet article, il m'eût fallu renoncer à défendre Art Bournou et les Anafarta, c'est-à-dire à la défense même de Constantinople.

"Si j'avais été condamné à rester durant cinq années à un même endroit il m'eût fallu renoncer à m'opposer aux ennemis qui, après s'être emparé de Bitlis et de Mouche avançaient dans la direction de Diarbekir:

"Si j'avais voulu remplir les conditions requises par ces Messieurs, il m'aurait fallu ne pas entreprendre la défense contre l'ennemi, ni former une armée avec les débris de celle qu'avait évacuée la Syrie; cela revenait en fait, à rendre impossible la délimitation de ces frontières que nous appelons nationales. Je suppose que les efforts que j'ai déployés dans la suite sont connus de vous tous.

(Exclamations, gestes d'approbation unanime) "C'est pour ces services que j'ai mérité l'amour de notre peuple et peut-être aussi, l'affection et la sympathie de tout le monde musulman.

"Moi je n'aurais jamais songé que malgré cette affection et cette sympathie je serais exposé à être déchu de mes droits de citoyens.

"Je supposais – et je continue à le supposer – que nos ennemis de l'étranger tenteraient par un complot de m'éloigner des charges dont j'ai été investi par le pays, mais je n'aurais jamais songé que – fussent-ils deux ou trois – les représentants du peuple aient pu avoir une telle mentalité! Par conséquent je voudrais savoir si ces messieurs sont vraiment...."

Ihsan Bey: Excellence à quoi bon de continuer! Les erreurs d'expression de quelques individus peuvent-elles concerner l'assemblée tout entière?

Moustapha Kemal Pacha.– Je m'adresse à Messieurs les signataires de ce projet, et je me demande si ces Messieurs sont les interprètes sincères des populations, des circonscriptions électorales qu'ils représentent ici. Je répète qu'en qualité de députés, ils ont un titre naturel et général. Le peuple partage-t-il l'avis de ces Messieurs?

(Des voix: En aucune façon.) "Et qui donc a donné à ces Messieurs le pouvoir de me faire déchoir des droits de citoyen?

"Du haut de cette tribune, je le demande officiellement, en présence de votre Haute Assemblée, aux populations des circonscriptions électorales qui ont élu ces Messieurs et au peuple tout entier, et je réclame une réponse."

Ihsan Bey: Vous êtes le sauveur du peuple et le réformateur de l'Etat!

Hussein Avni Bey, (député d'Erzeroum) – Messieurs il est question d'une proposition de projet de loi. Toute opinion est respectable. Chacun est libre d'émettre telles propositions qu'il juge favorable au bien et au salut de la Patrie. D'ailleurs les propositions de loi ne pouvant pas être interprétées comme si elles étaient acceptées immédiatement et d'une façon définitive, je m'étonne que S.E. Ghazi Moustapha Kemal Pacha ait pu y voir une tentative visant sa personne. Depuis que le peuple de la Turquie a fait de S.E. son symbole, la Patrie de Ghazi Kemal Pacha est le coeur de tout le monde.

"Messieurs, ce que je demande, c'est qu'il n'y ait plus, en Turquie des députés arabes et des députés albanais (approbations et applaudissements).

"Mon Pacha, si vous nous comparez en patriotisme, avec le commun des individus, permettez-moi de vous dire que vous faites erreur.

"Du moment que vous vivez dans nos coeurs et que vous symbolisez pour nous l'histoire, nous estimons comme incompatible avec les intérêts du pays de vous ranger dans la même catégorie que tout le monde."

Moustapha Kemal Pacha: "Hussein Avni Bey, l'article est clair et se passe de commentaire."

Hussein Avni Bey: "Excellence votre personne n'est pas et ne peut pas être en cause. Ces messieurs n'ont pas eu cette conception. Mais il ne faut pas que d'autres profitent à la faveur de votre personne."

"Les propositions de projet de loi sont transmises selon la procédure à la commission compétente qui en décide à son tour si l'Assemblée Nationale sacrifie Moustapha Kemal Pacha qu'il soit sacrifié. La parole est à l'Assemblée. Autrement je prie instamment de ne pas interpréter de cette façon une motion déposée par quelques camarades de bonne foi et pour une cause juste et légitime. Le jour où vous ne vivrez plus dans notre coeur nous n'hésiterons pas à vous répudier.

(Cette partie du texte a subi une déformation, au cours de la transmission).

"Toutefois avant de faire les déclarations qui ont pu affliger nos collègues j'estime qu'il était important que S.E. consultât leur opinion. Je suppose que vous entendriez en eux la véritable expression de la voix de leur conscience que je ne fais qu'interpréter aujourd'hui.

"Si une telle question se pose aujourd'hui, c'est que l'on a ouvert les débats contrairement aux dispositions du règlement intérieur. V.E. sait très bien que

nos amis sont des hommes sincères. Ils ont été les ouvriers de la première heure et ce sont eux qui ont rendu le plus grand service en vue de faire vivre notre peuple.

"Mon pacha, comme ce fut le cas au début vers la fin aussi. Ces camarades collaboreront avec vous la main dans la main. C'est notre but et il n'y a lieu en cela à aucun malentendu. Que puis-je dire de plus. Après vous avoir érigé en symbole de notre Assemblée, vouloir vous tenir en marge des droits de citoyen serait un non-sens et l'on n'a pas songé à pareille chose. Je vais vous dire toute la vérité:

"Pendant des siècles nous avons payé le tribut aux Arabes. Vous avez constaté vous-même, alors que vous exerciez un commandement en Arabie, comment ces Cherifs de la Mecque que nos villageois serraient sur leur cœur quand ils venaient dans nos provinces, nous ont chassé de l'Arabie. Pendant des siècles nous avons servi de gardes-frontières pour protéger les terres du peuple albanais que nous qualifions de nobles, et vous n'ignorez pas dans quelle circonstance nous avons été chassés de ces régions.

"L'année dernière un enfant du peuple turc se rendit en Albanie, et on refusa de l'y admettre.

"Désormais nous ne pouvons donner le titre de députés à de tels hommes.

"Je n'ai jamais séjourné cinq ans durant dans une même circonscription électorale et tel n'est pas mon idéal. Quel que soit le point où vous avez travaillé vous avez le droit de vous faire élire député.

"Le droit de citoyen ne s'appuie pas sur le séjour en un endroit plutôt qu'à un autre. Ici, à cette tribune, le droit de parler appartiendra au Turc et au Kurde. (Des voix: A tous les habitants de la Turquie) Aussi longtemps que vous conserverez ce caractère et maintiendrez cette opinion, vous aurez toujours votre place au-dessus de notre tête. Votre savoir, vos vertus et votre droiture sont votre garantie. Mais dès que vous dévierez du chemin, notre devoir sera de vous renvoyer."

Djelal Nouri Bey. – A quoi bon admettre une telle évanescence?

Hussein Avni Bey. – Je ne suis pas un hypocrite. Nous sommes humains, et tout homme peut faillir. Je parle sérieusement.

(Voix bravo). – Je prie votre Excellence de finir avec ce malentendu et de clôturer les débats.

Le peuple proteste à voire égard un respect inébranlable.

Ghazi Moustapha Kemal Pacha: "Cet article n'est pas l'interprète des paroles que vient de prononcer notre frère Hussein Avni. Il dit autre chose.

Chevket Bey: "Vous faites exception."

Kemal Pacha: "Il n'y a aucune loi disant que je fais exception et je ne peux pas faire exception."

Nedjati Bey: "Après avoir déposé ce projet de loi, je me réservais d'en exposer les motifs en temps opportun.

(Après avoir fait l'éloge de la personnalité et des services exceptionnels de Gazi Moustapha Kemal Pacha, Nedjati Bey a ajouté):

"Et maintenant voulez-vous connaître la raison pour laquelle j'ai prononcé cet article? Nous sommes en présence des débris d'un immense empire ottoman et nous cherchons les causes pour lesquelles il s'est écroulé.

Nous constatons que le malheur est dû au fait que le "moi", la conscience du peuple turc étaient écrasés, et que le turkisme avait servi d'instrument aux mains des étrangers.

Messieurs, examinez les faits, et vous verrez que ce fut partout la même chose.

Un sujet français peut-il dire autre chose sinon que "je suis français".

Or, chez nous ce n'est pas la loi.

Vous verrez des hommes tels que le Bosniaque, Mehmed Pacha, le circassien Véli et pas un turc.

Chaque race a vécu dans sa propre communauté en jouissant de sa liberté nationale.

La conséquence en fut la ruine du peuple turc. Désormais nous devons créer dans notre pays un sentiment de patriotisme entre citoyens. Nous ne pouvons plus répéter les errements anciens qui doivent rester sous les décombres du passé.

Ce sentiment n'est pas aussi simple qu'il paraît.

En temps opportun je vous ferai connaître les causes déterminantes du projet de loi de mes collègues."

A la majorité des voix, la discussion est déclarée suffisante.

F.O. 371/7918/E. 14191

No. 45

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 1125

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 18th, 1922
(Received December 28)

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 1111 (8274/10) of the 11 instant, I have the honour to report that the local Press of the 15th December announces that the people of Angora, in order to mark their disapproval of the debate in the Grand National Assembly respecting the proposed modification of Article 14 of the electoral law, have decided that the name of His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Pasha be inscribed in the register of the citizens of Angora in grateful appreciation of the services which he has rendered the country. On the application of the Councils of Mukhtars, the Municipal Council and the other Corporate Bodies, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was registered in the Hadji Bairam Veli Quarter of Angora, and a certificate to that effect, drawn up in Kufic script by the calligrapher, El-Bustani Mustafa Effendi, was presented to him by Hadji Atif Effendi, deputy for Angora, who spoke of the pride of the people of Angora in having the Pasha's name in their registers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/7919/E. 14500

No. 46

J.E.B. Hotson, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department

No. 784-A-Conf.

BOMBAY, 23rd December 1922

Sir,

With reference to the correspondence ending with the telegram from the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department No. 1450-S, dated the 8th December 1922, I am directed by the Governor in Council to state that the Netherlands Trading Society, Bombay, has obtained the permission of the Government of Bombay to remittances of 5,000 on behalf of Dr. M.A.

Ansari and 20.000 to 30.000 on behalf of Mr. H.M.H.J.M. Chotani, being made to Mustapha Kemal Pasha at Angora.

I have &c.

(Signed) J.A. ARATOON
for Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Political Department

F.O. 371/9137

No. 47

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.1150

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 26th, 1922
(Received January 1, 1923)

My Lord,

Isaak Khan, the Persian Ambassador called upon me today and informed me that being now the only Persian representative in Turkey since the departure from Angora of Mumtaz ud Dowleh, his Government had suggested to him that he should proceed himself to Angora to enter into relations with the Government of the Grand National Assembly.

Isaak Khan was obviously displeased with the idea of having to reside in a town which he said was only remarkable for its snow in winter and its storks and mosquitoes in summer. He accordingly anxiously enquired whether there was any prospect of an early conclusion of peace at Lausanne. I told him that I thought we had arrived at the critical stage of the negotiations, that the Turks were proving very unnecessarily obstinate but if all went well during the next fortnight I hoped that peace might be signed in February.

Isaak Khan said that he thought he would wait and see and that it would suffice in the meantime to keep in touch with the Angora Government, if he sent a secretary there. The only question of immediate interest was the activities of Sheikh Mahmoud who was at present in Turkish territory.

Isaak Khan is not I think very friendly disposed either to Mustapha Kemal or to the Turks. He said that Mumtaz ud Dowleh had accomplished nothing at Angora though there had been plenty of compliments. He expressed the fear

that once peace was signed Turkey would prove an uncomfortable neighbour for Persia.

I have &c.

(Signed) NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9125/E. 84

No. 48

Mr. Henderson to Sir Eyre Crowe

No.789
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 28, 1922
(Received December 28)

I asked representative of Grand National Assembly yesterday what impression Hassan Bey, who has arrived here on his way to Angora, had given him of peace negotiations. He said not very hopeful impression, and that he thought there would be difficulties in Grand National Assembly, to which Hassan would probably render account on 1st or 2nd January. Adnan Bey said that he himself was glad no longer to be vice-president of that Assembly, and hinted that it was not easy to manage it. I told him I would be less optimistic than I was if I did not think that Mustafa Kemal's common sense would triumph over its intransigence. He agreed, and referred warmly also to Reouf Bey's judgment and influence. I expressed hope that Hassan, who is to leave for Angora to-morrow, would be wise enough to put his account of Lausanne negotiations in a favourable light. I asked Adnan to what Grand National Assembly would be likely to take exception. He mentioned Allied demand for inclusion of Moslem minorities in general minorities proposals and for participation of Armenians and Bulgarians in work of special sub-commission. I told him that it was custom at all conferences to hear views of interested parties, even if they had not been officially invited to participate.

Adnan, after harping on constant theme of Allied interference in Turkish internal affairs, said that Turks were losing patience. As local press has been writing in this strain for past week, I took opportunity to speak very strongly to him. If delay there had been, it could only be attributed to Turkish obstinacy and incapacity to appreciate their true interests. Turks would be mad if they

allowed their impatience to impel them to any foolish act. Your Lordship was working very hard for peace, a fact Adnan spontaneously and sincerely admitted, and peace was impossible if Turks persisted in their obstructiveness. After so much conciliation on the part of Allies, Turks would put themselves entirely in wrong.

Adnan listened attentively, but complained that Allies (he referred to M. Bompard) would not trust Turkey. I said that so far there was nothing to show that new Turkey, which he asked us to trust, would prove to be different from old Turkey. He pleaded for confidence in this respect, with many professions of sincerity of new Turkey's intentions.

(Sent to Lausanne, No.105)

F.O. 424/255, p. 787, No.839

No. 49

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No.1027

December 30th 1922

Secret

Russian agitation with a view to stiffening the Turkish attitude at Lausanne

The following is the text of a telegram from the S.I.S. representative in Turkey:-

Information of a reliable nature has been received to the effect that Russian agitation has created a serious situation at Angora. There is a danger that, as a result, the Angora Government will be obliged to adopt a more unyielding policy at Lausanne.

Public opinion at Angora has been alarmed by Russian propaganda to the effect that the 6th Army Corps is assembled for manoeuvres in the Caucasus. This agitation has also affected the Deputies belonging to the Defence of Rights Party and they have raised questions in the Assembly regarding Russia's attitude.

As a result, a special meeting of the Party was convoked on 22nd December. Rauf Bey and Mustafa Kemal endeavoured to dispel anxiety by insisting on the

fact that Russia could not take hostile action, because she requires Turkish support until the position of Russia is re-established.

Russian agitation is continuing. Endeavours are being made by Mustafa Kemal's party to secure the support of Conservative Deputies. Mustafa Kemal himself has endeavoured to maintain a non-party attitude with a view to the domination of the extreme elements.

The above information has also been telegraphed by the S.I.S. representative in Turkey direct to the S.I.S. representative in Switzerland with a view to its being communicated to the British Delegation at the Lausanne Conference.

F.O. 371/9099

No. 50

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 6

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 1, 1923
(Received January 8)

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's despatch No. 1174 of the 13th ultimo, requesting my observations on the use of the title "His Majesty" in reference to the Caliph.

2. Before the Grand National Assembly of Turkey decreed the separation of the Sultanate from the Caliphate, the title of "His Imperial Majesty" (Zat-ı Shahaneh and Shevket Penahi) was used in reference to the Sultan-Caliph. In references to the Caliph Abdul Mejid in the Turkish press and official notifications, the equivalents of "Imperial" are omitted, but otherwise the titles used are the same as, or similar to, those of his predecessors. Like them, he is given the title of "Hazret" (Arabic, "Hadhret"), which literally signifies "Presence", but has the further meanings of "Holiness," "Majesty," and "Excellency." Moreover, "Hazret" may, like "Majesty," be applied to the Deity.

3. The selection of "Majesty" as the European translation of "Hazret" would appear therefore to be purely arbitrary. But the fact remains that in all their communications to me, which have hitherto been in French, the Nationalist authorities in referring to the Caliph have used the words "sa Majesté", while in conversation on one occasion Refet Pasha complacently drew my particular

attention to the fact that the title of "Majesté" had been carefully and intentionally preserved.

4. I am inclined to believe that in translating "Hazret", as applied to the Caliph, by "Majesty", Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his advisers desire to give foreigners an erroneous impression as to the actual position of the Caliph, and of their plans for the future of the Caliphate. Natives of this country know well that temporal power is in the hands of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who is also referred to as "Hazret", translated in his case by "Excellency", often with the additional title of "Ghazi" or "Conqueror of Unbelievers," while the Caliph receives the additional title of "Khilafet Penahi" or "Refuge of the Caliphate."

5. I have not noted in conversation with Refet Pasha or Adnan Bey any indication of an intention to revive the Sultanate. Whatever may be the feelings of a large number of Turks, especially in Constantinople, I much doubt if any such intention exists in the minds of the present Turkish leaders. If the title of "Majesty" has been preserved to the Caliph it is probably with the object of enhancing the dignity and prestige of the office.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 424/256, p. 77, No. 31

No. 51

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 7

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 1, 1923
(Received January 8)

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that the local Turkish newspaper "Vakit" of December 28th, published an interesting leading article by Ahmed Emin Bey, entitled "The Nation needs a Guide: His excellency Mustafa Kemal Pasha must remain a Statesman and not become a Party Leader".

2. Ahmed Emin sums up the future position of his country as follows: "Turkey's national fight for independence and free development is not yet over, although great successes have been achieved. The Turks must not allow themselves to be dazzled by their victories, or their efforts and sacrifices will

have been made in vain. No matter what kind of peace the Turks may conclude at Lausanne, they will find themselves in a centre of storms. Their geographical and general situation makes it impossible for them to remain indifferent to these storms, and it will be necessary for them to be powerful to be in a position to defend their neutrality. In addition to the defence of their frontiers and coasts, much effort will be required to bring this backward country to the position of an average State. For this task, their forces and means are in every respect insufficient. If these forces, instead of co-operating, clash owing to personal jealousies, internal development will be arrested. A nation, which is obliged to accomplish much with small forces, must remain, as it were, on a war footing, to be able to carry through a minimum programme to assure its existence."

3. A struggle of this kind, Ahmed Emin Bey continues, requires the guidance of a far-seeing, firm and courageous leader. In a country, which is not perfectly organised, the chief condition of success is that it should have a good director. The Turks have a perfect and natural leader in their struggle for national prosperity and progress, namely, His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Pasha. At a moment when the nation was in the deepest despair, he saw the possibility of saving it, and by his far-sightedness, daring and initiative he has saved it. The Ghazi Pasha raised the nation from a state of utter weakness and despair to the greatest honour and glory, and did a thing which very few great men have done in history. He refrained from giving a personal shape to the might and power which he had acquired by his lofty personality. Notwithstanding the situation due to war dangers, he insisted that power should be vested in the Assembly. The nation owes it to the guidance of Mustafa Kemal that it obtained a new life. He has great claims on this country. He is an exceptional leader, such as nations have produced only a few times in history. This nation, which has to accomplish much in a short time and with small forces, is in exceeding great need of his guidance. He has hitherto shown in the national struggle that he possessed the greatest qualities of leadership. He saw what was required, fixed it in a Pact, which he caused the nation to accept, and thus directed the struggle towards definite aims. In the future difficult phase, the nation is entitled to expect that he will follow the same course. Because Mustafa Kemal belongs to the nation, this country cannot agree to his belonging to one party. If he became the leader of a party, the portions of the nation outside that party would lose him. This cannot be permitted, because, not to mention internal administration, Turkey may be exposed at any moment to fresh aggression from abroad. At such a juncture, he would have to discharge the duties of Commander-in-Chief and address himself to the whole nation. Would not the function of leadership of a party prejudice this great duty?

4. The writer enlarges on the reasons why Mustafa Kemal Pasha should not be involved in the struggles of competing parties. He asks who will represent the country and protect its permanent interests as against the narrow interests of parties, and states that the next Assembly will need the Ghazi Pasha as President, for the Office of President entails impartiality.

5. In the last paragraph of his article Ahmed Emin Bey states that he is convinced that public opinion is in favour of Mustafa Kemal remaining in the position of a National hero and guide, high above all jealousies and rivalries, and against his descending to the party stage. Inasmuch as the "Vakit" is regarded as the semi-official organ of the Angora Government, Ahmed Emin Bey's article is not without significance. However, as Your Lordship is aware, it is the unexpected that usually happens in countries like Turkey.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9129/E.344

No. 52

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.34

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 16, 1923
(Received January 23)

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that the official Turkish communiqué which was published yesterday repeated once more the accusation that the British forces were engaged in constructing new fortifications in the Dardanelles' zone, in violation of the Mudania convention.

2. I accordingly drafted a personal letter to Dr. Adnan Bey, copy of which I have the honour to enclose, complaining against this objectionable repetition of an accusation which both General Harington and I had declared to be without foundation.

3. I took the opportunity to hand this letter personally to Dr. Adnan Bey, who came to see me yesterday evening to inform me that he was leaving for Ismidt to meet Mustafa Kemal, who was arriving there today on his tour of inspection of the front. I asked His Excellency to mention the matter himself to

the Ghazi Pasha. Adnan Bey said that he would do so, that he shared my views as to the undesirability of these allegations and that he had already made representations in that sense to his Government. He said that the accusation was based on the reports of agents whose information, as is the case of the agents of most armies, was often incorrect and insufficiently controlled.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9120/E.893

No. 53

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 38

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 16, 1923
(Received January 23)

My Lord,

In view of the meeting which Adnan Bey is to have with Mustapha Kemal at Ismidt today, I considered it desirable to speak to the former during his visit to me yesterday in the sense of the second paragraph of your Lordship's Lausanne telegram No. 69 of the 11th instant to me, with regard to Mosul.

2. I added that, in my opinion, it was impossible for your Lordship to recede from the standpoint which you have adopted on this question. Mosul was an integral part of Irak, the mandate for which had been entrusted to Great Britain by the League of Nations. Great Britain could not with honour either lay down the responsibilities, which she has thus accepted, nor repudiate the treaty which she had concluded as a consequence thereof with the Emir Feisal. It was not a question either of oil or of commercial interest, and the attempts to place it on that basis only led to misconception and confusion. It was not even a matter for discussion between Great Britain and Turkey alone. The League of Nations and Irak itself were interested parties which would have to be consulted.

3. Adnan Bey stated that it would be unjust and contrary to the National Pact to exclude Mosul from Turkish sovereignty. While he admitted that the town itself was purely Arab, he contended that the surrounding country was entirely Turkish. Aleppo, he added somewhat significantly, was in this respect in a similar position to Mosul. I denied, so far as the Mosul vilayet was

concerned, the justice of this contention. The large majority therein was not Turkish at all, and even the small minority of Turkomans could hardly be regarded as coming within the description of Ottoman Moslems referred to in the National Pact.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 424/256, p. 191, No. 104

No. 54

Dr. Adnan Bey à M. Henderson

*Dépêche chiffrée
Traduction non garantie*

Le 17 janvier 1923

Quand j'ai rencontré Son Altesse le maréchal Gazi Moustafa Kemal Pacha à Ismidt je l'ai trouvé fort désappointé de voir la Convention de Moudania violée, les troupes helléniques ayant occupé Kara-Agatch et que les troupes alliées s'étaient retirées sur la rive Orientale de la Maritza. J'ai essayé de le rassurer sachant que ces procédés injustifiables seront empêchés par les Alliés. Je vous prie de vouloir bien hâter vos démarches et de ne donner lieu à aucun incident.

Je dois signaler qu'une bonne impression pourrait se produire si je pouvais communiquer à Son Altesse une réponse favorable de votre part.

Je resterai encore quelques jours avec Son Altesse.

DR. ADNAN

F.O. 371/9099

No. 55

Télégramme de Mr. Henderson à Son Excellence le Docteur Adnan Bey
Copie

18.1.1923

Je remercie Votre Excellence de Son télégramme d'hier. Veuillez donner à Son Excellence le Maréchal Ghazi Moustafa Kemal Pacha l'assurance la plus formelle

1. que les troupes helléniques n'ont pas occupé Karagatch. Cette ville est occupé par le contingent français entreposé entre la Maritza et le détachement grec dont la présence seule à Karagatch n'est pas contraire à la Convention de Moudania.

2. que les troupes alliées ne sont point retirées sur la rive orientale de la Maritza. Jusqu'à présent une seule sentinelle britannique se trouvait sur la rive orientale au pont de Kuleli Bourgas. Sa présence sur la rive gauche n'étant pas prévue par la Convention, Général Harington a donné des instructions que même cette sentinelle soit désormais retirée.

En général je suis péniblement surpris par des allégations si dénuées de fondement. Les Alliés respectent scrupuleusement partout les provisions de la Convention de Moudania. Ils n'ont aucune intention ni de se départir de cette attitude de parfaite loyauté eux mêmes ni de permettre sa violation par autrui. Ils feront tout ce qui dépend d'eux pour empêcher tout incident.

F.O.371/9099

No. 56

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.52

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 20, 1923
(Received January 29)

My Lord,

Mustapha Kemal Pasha arrived at Ismidt on the 16th instant. It is not clear what predominating motive to attribute to his departure from Angora at this critical stage of the Lausanne Conference, when his presence in the grand National Assembly would seem almost indispensable in view of the importance of the decisions which may have to be taken.

2. The published reasons for his journey which, it is reported, will extend to Broussa, Smyrna, Adana, the southern front and even to Mosul, are two-fold: the inspection of his army and the explanation to the people of the aims and objects of the Popular Party which he has announced his intention to found.

3. It is probable that both these given reasons are real. The French High Commissioner informs me that in his telegram on the subject of Mustapha Kemal's journey Colonel Mougin has laid great stress on its military character. General Pellé has little faith in the critical faculties of Colonel Mougin, whom

he regards as ready to accept any version that the Turks at Angora wish him to believe. This may be true in the present instance, in which case it is the military objective to which the Turks desire the Allies to attach the greatest importance.

4. In this connection Mustapha Kemal's tour would seem to have been undertaken in anticipation of the crisis which is likely to arise at Lausanne before the end of the month. The pressure on the conference which the Turks are determined to exert through their army would undoubtedly be enhanced by the presence in its midst of the commander-in-chief.

5. It is certain that the arrival of Mustapha Kemal at Ismidt coincided with an outbreak of pessimism in the press and public opinion as to the prospects of a peaceful issue of the Lausanne conference. This pessimism, which is in striking contrast with the wave of optimism which was prevalent in all circles during the preceding week, may be merely the result of the Greek activities in Thrace, but it may well also be inspired. There is no doubt that the Angora Government mainly relies on the menace of its army to overcome the last resistance of the Allies. It is certain that that Government issued instructions to all concerned to make as much capital as possible out of the recent calling to the colours of three classes of recruits. The press was, as I am aware, instructed to give great prominence to this measure, and to emphasise the alacrity with which the recruits were obeying the summons.

6. Apart from the question of pressure on the Allies, there is another military ground for Mustapha Kemal's inspection of his troops. The *moral* of the army has much diminished since the Mudania Convention. It would be surprising were it otherwise. After a complete and almost bloodless victory, the Turkish army has been held up in excessively uncomfortable winter quarters, exposed to the most inclement weather and suffering from a scarcity of supplies. The main object of the campaign of last September was the liberation of Asia Minor and Smyrna. This has been accomplished. It is true that the loot, comfort and plenty of Constantinople would be no little incentive to a further effort. But the vast majority of the army must be Anatolians, whose principal attachment is to their own homes and villages. An army under these conditions must inevitably suffer from reaction and tend to demoralisation. One of the motives of Mustapha Kemal's tour of inspection probably is to revive the *moral* of his troops, as well as that personal popularity which is such a necessary adjunct to retention of power by an adventurer.

7. I am, however, convinced in the very real desire of the Turks for peace. I am therefore of opinion that, in addition to, and without in any way clashing with, the military objectives, which I am inclined to regard mainly, if not wholly,

as bluff, the Ghazi Pasha's journey has in the main a political objective, and is actually a kind of electoral tourney in anticipation of peace.

8. Once peace is signed at Lausanne, the present Grand National Assembly will probably be dissolved. It may even be necessary to dissolve it before the treaty is accepted. It may well be that it is against this eventuality that Mustapha Kemal is preparing, and that he has chosen the present moment to make this journey for fear lest the opportunity may not offer itself later. In this respect it is probably a journey that has been deferred till now only on account of the insecurity of Mustapha Kemal's own position at Angora.

9. The only effective electoral organisation at present in existence is that of the old Committee of Union and Progress Party, to which Mustapha Kemal's personal enemies largely belong, and of which the leader in Angora is, I believe, Kara Vassif Bey, Deputy for Sivas. Kemal's own party hitherto has been known under the name of the Party for the Defence of Rights in Anatolia and Roumelia. There is in addition, a National Defence Party, and in Constantinople, at any rate, the remains of the old *Entente libérale* Party. A few weeks ago Mustapha Kemal announced his intention of creating a Popular Party, with the unity of the nation as its political programme. It is probable that Mustapha Kemal will endeavour to combine under the banner of this new party all his own adherents in the other groups. Apart from those enemies of Mustapha Kemal who are to be found in the ranks of the old Committee of Union and Progress Party, there are others outside that party who, for either no other motives than jealousy and personal animosity or on monarchical or religious grounds, are hostile to him. Out of these elements a formidable opposition is likely to be created. Hitherto a common foreign danger has helped to restrain it, but Mustapha Kemal may well deem it indispensable to arrange for a regrouping of parties in order to cope successfully with that opposition once the external pressure has been removed.

10. The declarations made by Mustapha Kemal to representatives of the Constantinople press at Ismidt on the 18th instant confirm the double object of his tour. After sympathetic references to the sufferings and patriotism of Constantinople, whose suffrages he doubtless wishes to attract, he refers as follows to his future political party: "We are obliged to adopt a programme calculated to satisfy the needs of our people and to compensate it for the sufferings endured. This programme must be applied by the whole population, thereby necessitating the creation of a political organism. It is with this object in view, and in order to ensure the happiness of our people, that we contemplate the constitution of a 'Popular Party.' Our object is not to ensure advantages to one class to the prejudice of others. We wish the whole nation to be restored to prosperity by means of an efficient co-operation."

11. After thus expounding in sufficiently vague terms his electoral programme, and after stating that the new Turkey will not be a Government of conquest but an economically prosperous country, "not more behindhand in this respect than the Japanese," he refers in almost equally vague terms to a possible belligerency: "The victorious army of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey maintains intact its enthusiasm, ready for fresh victories.... We are ready to make still greater sacrifices than during the past three years to achieve our end." But he adds that "the Government of the Grand National Assembly is a rational Government which avoids criminal adventure for chimerical ideas."

12. Mustapha Kemal described the fundamental principles of the Government as being firstly absolute independence and secondly, unconditional national sovereignty. The first, he said, finds its expression in the National Pact, now actually realised by force of arms, and the second in the new constitutional law of Turkey.

13. Mustapha Kemal's declaration ended as it began with a reference to Constantinople. "Owing," he said "to the breaches of the Mudros armistice, a number of misfortunes have befallen the country. One of the most tried centres has been Constantinople, which has suffered not only as the result of Allied occupation, but also from the evils caused by its Sovereign. Now that the Government of the Grand National Assembly has taken possession of Constantinople, it will do its best to alleviate suffering there."

14. Nevertheless, apart from the ostensible motives, there may possibly be an underlying purpose in Mustapha Kemal's absence from Angora at this particular moment. He may desire to leave the Grand National Assembly free to vote according to its inclination without any inspiration on his part in respect of any decisions that may be taken by İsmet Pasha at Lausanne. At the same time, in the event of that assembly refusing as it would be easier for it to do in the absence of Mustapha Kemal on account of the close relations between him and İsmet, to ratify a treaty signed by the latter, he may wish to reserve to himself the opportunity of being the final arbiter of the destinies of Turkey.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

No. 57

Mr. Henderson to Mr. Lindsay

No. 32

Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 21, 1923

(Received January 21)

Adnan Bey came to see me yesterday on his return from Ismid. He was more cheerful and confident of peace than I have known him. He said himself that his impression, after conversation with Mustapha Kemal, was most favourable. As I believe Adnan to be a firm pacifist this should be good sign. I fear, however, that he carries little weight in the councils of his Government. Motives of Mustapha Kemal's tour are not obvious, and it is curious that he should have chosen moment when his attendance in Grand National Assembly might have been thought indispensable. Ostensible object is doubtless military, and with a view to enhancing pressure of his army through his presence with it at (?groups omitted) probably have been taken earlier if Mustapha Kemal's position at Angora had been more secure. This impression is confirmed by nature of his speeches and declarations to press, which have so far been comparatively anodyne and chiefly concerned with future internal politics and economics of new Turkey. He has beaten war drum less loudly than might have been anticipated.

The two objectives of military bluff and electoral campaign can be pursued concurrently. It is also possible that Mustapha Kemal prefers to be absent from Grand National Assembly at the precise moment that it has to decide whether to accept or reject treaty.

His absence, owing to his close connection with Ismet, would leave Assembly more freedom to reject anything latter might sign, (?thereby) both increasing pressure on Allies and also leaving loophole against irrevocability in the event of rejection.

(Sent to Lord Curzon No.41)

F.O. 371/9120/E.829

F.O. 424/256, p. 166-167, No.93

No. 58

Mr. Henderson to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 61

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 23, 1923
(Received January 29)

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a memorandum by Mr. Greenway, 3rd Secretary at this High Commission, giving a summary of the Turkish Press during the past week.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

(Copy sent to Lausanne)

F.O. 371/9121/E.1145

ENCLOSURE IN No. 58

Résumé of Turkish Press for the week ending January 22, 1923.

The only event of any importance which has attracted attention in the Turkish Press during the past week, apart from the wild rumours as to the Greek occupation of Karagatch and military activities in Western Thrace, has been the delivery by Mustapha Kemal at Ismid of speeches dealing with the future of Turkey, and combining the usual protests of the peaceable intentions of a misunderstood Turkey with threats of her capabilities if she is finally roused.

Apart from this, little of interest has occurred; the fact that the free and unfettered Turkish Press is entirely under the control of the severest of censorships, and that lines of policy, if not leading articles, are issued daily from official quarters, makes it difficult to obtain, from the Press, at least, any insight into the views of the average Ottoman as to the outcome of the Conference.

Judging merely by the tone of the leading articles, and apart from a couple of pessimistic days at the time of Mustapha Kemal's arrival at Ismid, officialdom would seem to be optimistic; the old arguments concerning the

unimpaired sovereignty of Turkey, her rights her civilisation and her undeviating justice are reproduced with the same untiring fatuity, but it is more than ever easy to realise under all this specious optimism the nervousness and uncertainty dominating the aspirations of the new lords of Turkey.

Mustapha Kemal recently interviewed representative editors with the result that a series of articles have appeared in practically all the papers couched in almost identical terms and having as their theme the greatness of the National Hero, who very wisely has his eye on the elections which all follow the conclusion of peace, and is preparing the ground for the Peoples Party of which he is now the acknowledged head.

A certain amount of attention has been given to the Armenian question. Thus, the *Tevhid Efkar* of the 16th insists on the fact that the Allies have used the Armenians as a tool for obtaining concessions for the Patriarchate and the petrol deposits of Mosul. "When the Turks made these concessions (sic), Lord Curzon immediately withdrew his proposals for an Armenian National Home, and the Armenians lost their case in such a way as to prevent it from ever being raised again."

The Anatolian News Agency sent out on the 17th an article reproduced from the 'Yakim Rapuchi', stating that Lord Curzon in proposing a National Home did so in order to regain his influence with the Christian World, and to repair his defeat in the discussions with Angora. It is further stated that Lord Curzon's desire was to establish this Home near the petrol wells of the Caucasus, its establishment being necessary for the British Bourgeoisie in order that the latter may have a base in Caucasian territory. The Bolsheviks at the Conference have taken steps to rid the Armenians of the influence and intrigues of the Powers.

The 'Aksham' on the same day insists also that this question is being used simply for bargaining purposes. The British Fleet in Turkish waters is for the defence of the Mosul petrol and not in any way for the Christian minorities. Armenia should cease all relations with the European Powers and then only will they enjoy rest, and be in position to build up their hearts!

The 'Vakit' of the 18th has a long and bitter anti-French article, extracts from which are not without interest. "France being the greatest creditor of Turkey, the question of the Public Debt, lies between her and Turkey alone. The French policy against Germany has already exhausted the patience of Great Britain, who, in view of the fact that she has sacrificed her point of view to that of her ally on the questions of Minorities, Straits and Exchange of

populations, cannot be expected to make any further concessions on financial and economic matters."

"The attitude of France in asking for the payment of the expenses of the Allied occupation is unreasonable. On the other hand she has occupied certain Turkish territory in contravention of the Mudros Armistice, causing various damage and committing every kind of atrocity against the population."

"She must be satisfied with Syria, one of the richest of Turkish provinces, and overlook the few millions which she would obtain through the Public Debt. The French delegates have condescended to offend Turkey for a few millions. It is very difficult to deal with people who are ready to burn a blanket to destroy a flea."

The question of officials of the late Government is again approached by the 'Yeni Shark' in a leader stating that if no sensible arrangements are made for the payment of these officials, a hundred thousand persons will be compelled to emigrate from Constantinople. The Government of Angora intends to send school teachers to Anatolia; if that is the case, and the Government does not interest itself in the educational and economic departments of the capital, it will make a mistake which will shake the very foundations of the Turkish Empire."

F.O. 371/9121/E.1145

No. 59

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.42
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 27th 1923, 8.20 p.m.
(Received January 27th 1923, 9.40 p.m.)

It is reported in Turkish Press that Mustapha Kemal who arrived at Smyrna is returning immediately to Angora.

While press here is somewhat violent in tone in regard to Mosul and considerable emotion seems to have been provoked in Grand National Assembly in regard to Kurdish question last speech of Kemal himself at Alasher on January 25th was of a pacifist nature.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.42, sent to Lausanne No. 52.

F.O. 371/9121/E. 1071

No. 60

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 45
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 29th 1923, 6.35 p.m.
(Received January 29th 1923, 7.45 p.m.)

My telegram No.42.

Adnan Bey informs me that Mustapha Kemal has not gone to Angora but is being married today in Smyrna.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.45. Sent to Lausanne No.58.

F.O. 371/9121/E.1157

No. 61

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 59
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 29th 1923
(Received February 1st 1923)

French High Commissioner read me today text of President of the Council's telegram to Mustapha Kemal Pasha, which was communicated to the latter by the French consul, Smyrna, on 27th January, as well as telegram from Colonel Mougin, who had similarly communicated it to Reouf Bey.

Judging from Mougin's telegram, President of the Council's appeal had met with somewhat discourteous reception by Reouf Bey, who referred to Franklin-Bouillon's assurances, for which he said there was nothing to show. He hinted that President of the Council's fine words did not amount to much more. He said that Grand National Assembly, even if it wished, had no power to accept judicial Capitulations. He took exception to various financial clauses of the proposed treaty, and accused French of serving capitalist interests. He also, of course, referred to Karagatch and Mosul as being points on which Turks could not make concessions, and observed that object of British was to detach French from Turks.

Finally, he complained of delay involved in asking Turkish delegates to bring treaty to Angora, and said that they had no need to leave Lausanne, as they had full powers and instructions.

Generally speaking, Reouf's declaration was depreciation of value of President of the Council's intervention, and French High Commissioner was clearly dissatisfied with it.

F.O. 424/256, p.391, No.174

No. 62

A Report by the British Intelligence Service

No.1056

29th January 1923

Turkey

Opposition to Mustapha Kemal in the Great National Assembly

Summary No.1020 contained details regarding the development of political differences among the members of the Great National Assembly and the opposition therein to Mustapha Kemal. It was shown that the Opposition groups consisted chiefly of Clerical Conservatives and the so-called "Reformers" (Islahat Firkasi) who were, in reality, the Unionist antagonists of Mustapha Kemal. It was also shown that these groups were endeavouring to organise a Coalition with a definite political programme, and that Mustapha Kemal was seeking to counteract their activities by transferring their leaders to posts away from Angora.

The following further information regarding the development of this opposition is derived, primarily, from official correspondence received in Constantinople from Angora, amplified by the statements of prominent individuals in close touch with the Opposition groups. It indicates that the measures taken by Mustapha Kemal to nullify the efforts of his opponents are far from being crowned with success, and that he has been obliged to fall back on other tactics:

(i) The conclusion of peace as soon as possible, leaving, if necessary, certain questions to be settled by negotiation later.

(ii) Promulgation of a general amnesty to the members of the C.U.P.

(iii) Settlement of the question of the Sultanate and the Khalifate after the conclusion of peace, by a special assembly including all the principal Ulema, etc.

(iv) Preparation of a new Electoral Law, whereby Mustapha Kemal's powers would be curtailed.

The information from this source showed that, early in January, the pressure of the Opposition was having no little effect in influencing Kemal to seek a settlement at Lausanne on the basis of the first point quoted above, and that, in regard to the other points, he was playing for time by appearing to be favourably disposed, at least towards their discussion. The question of the Electoral Law, which was brought up for discussion in the National Assembly, was adjourned for the moment by the exercise of clever tactics by Mustapha Kemal.

As regards the question of the separation of the Sultanate and the Khalifate, this was to be left for discussion by a Commission composed of members of the Opposition and the Defence of Rights Party. This was merely a move to gain time, as Kemal knew perfectly well that the majority would never accept the verdict of such a Commission; further it appeared that he proposed to dissolve the Assembly immediately after the conclusion of peace.

In the meantime, to appease the Opposition, a Commission was formed under the Presidency of Yunous Nadi to discuss their claims. In reality the proceedings were "stage managed" and nothing was discussed. The result has been that instead of calming the Opposition, the measures taken by Mustapha Kemal have only succeeded in bringing on a crisis. On the 5th January, several Opposition deputies, at the moment when the appointments to the Khalif were being discussed, presented a motion demanding what, in effect, were the rights and attributes of the Khalif. This, very naturally, caused a sensation.

What eventuated is not yet fully known, but it appears that the majority took alarm and Yunous Nadi, who was at the time in Constantinople, was ordered to form a new commission consisting of Djelal Nuri, Ilyas Sami and others of the same genre. This commission was still at work on the 5th January, and, in the meantime, the press, notably the "Yeni Gun", the "Hakimieti Millie" in Angora and the "Vakit" in Constantinople had commenced to attack the Opposition.

Mustafa Kemal appears to regard the situation as grave, especially in view of the fact that the Indian deputation had arrived in Angora, the Jamiet-ul-Islam was in full activity, and there was considerable unrest in the Army regarding political affairs and a distinct tendency to favour the Opposition.

On the 8th January, at a secret sitting of the party of the Defence of National Rights, Mustafa Kemal gave a formal order to take special measures

against the "military politicians" and for the formation of a special "court martial" to deal with political opponents amongst the military. This court was to be under the Presidency of Ali Galib Pasha, former Director General of Police during the Unionist régime and later representative of Angora at Bokhara.

At the time of reporting, 15th January, matters were very confused at Angora, and the Opposition was making every endeavour to force the issue. It was the general opinion, however, in circles well acquainted with the existing state of affairs in Angora, that the Opposition had little chance of success, at any rate, for the moment. At the same time, the position of Mustafa Kemal was becoming increasingly difficult, and it was clear that he would need something more than merely oppressive measures to maintain his domination.

The Angora Government and the Khalifate

The following is derived from official correspondence between Angora and the Nationalist Representative in Constantinople:

The recent arrival of Fakhri Pasha in Angora from Kabul was connected with questions arising regarding the separation of the Khalifate from the Sultanate. Moreover, Fakhri's arrival, together with the departure of the ex-Sultan for the Hedjaz, and the attitude of many of the leaders of the Opposition in Anatolia, has given rise to considerable excitement in Angora.

Although numerous parties and the Nationalist groups in Moslem countries have signalled their approval of the Turkish action in abolishing the Sultanate and appointing a new Khalif, yet it has not been accorded general official approval by Moslems. This is especially the case in the Hedjaz, where the attitude of the Emir and numerous Arab tribal leaders may react very detrimentally on Mustafa Kemal's plans for a pan-Islamic Union.

With the possibility in view of strong opposition to the projects of the Jamiet-el-Islam coming from the Hedjaz, Mustafa Kemal has approved the appointment of Fakhri Pasha as Commander of the Southern front in Anatolia, and has issued instructions to him to use all his influence amongst the Arab tribes in the Hedjaz, and even in Iraq, in favour of Turkish policy.

It is also believed, in Turkish official circles in Constantinople, that Halil Pasha, uncle of Enver, will be appointed as representative of the Nationalist

Government to Afghanistan. Great hopes are entertained of Halil Pasha establishing Turkish influence in Afghanistan, Bokhara and in conjunction with Muhieddin Pasha, in Persia. His nomination, however, is not yet settled.

Copies to: Foreign Office (Eastern and Northern Departments).

India Office.

Colonial Office.

War Office.

F.O. 371/9100

No. 63

Mr Henderson to Mr. Lindsay

No.47

Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 30, 1923

(Received January 30.)

I hear from a sometimes well-informed source that after final secret session held yesterday morning Grand National Assembly decided that war must at all costs be avoided, that Kemal has been advised that he need not return to Angora, and that Ismet has been instructed to ask for adjournment rather than accept rupture of conference, and to give undertaking, if necessary, to refrain from military action of any sort during adjournment.

This information is borne out by what would appear to be inspired communiqué in semi-official "Vakit" this morning, issued apparently to reassure public, which states that, in spite of reports to the contrary, Kemal is continuing his journey according to original programme. This is regarded as clear indication that, even if conference comes to an end, peace will be preserved by other means. Communiqué refers to above-mentioned secret session and (group undecypherable) telegram to Kemal, and states that new situation has arisen as a result of reported willingness of your Lordship to submit question to arbitration rather than to League of Nations.

(Sent to Lausanne, No.61)

F.O. 371/9121/E. 1194

F.O. 424/256, p. 273, No.160

No. 64

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1057

30.1.1923

Turkey

Russo-Turkish Relations: Apparent Turkish Bluff

A report circulated as Summary No. 1057 was to the effect that in the course of a secret sitting of the Great National Assembly, which was held on the 2nd January, Raouf Bey was granted full powers to sign the proposed new Russo-Turkish Treaty of Alliance should such a course be considered necessary.

In this connection it has been ascertained from a sound source that, on the 21st January, Adnan's Information Bureau in Constantinople received the following telegram from Angora:

"Raouf Bey, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in accordance with full powers conferred on the Council of Ministers by the Great National Assembly, has commenced a discussion with Aralow, representative of Soviet Russia, regarding the signing of the Treaty of Alliance which the Soviet Government presented to the Angora Government on the 7th October last."

At the same time, the S.I.S. representative in Turkey reported that, according to Turkish official opinion in Constantinople, the information contained in the above quoted telegram was bluff, with a view to influencing proceedings at Lausanne.

This impression was strengthened by the fact that, in spite of the above quoted telegram, Yonous Nadi, deputy for Smyrna, and President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, and vice-President of the Party for defence of National Rights, himself a Russophile, on his arrival in Constantinople about the middle of January, stated confidentially that all statements regarding Russo-Turkish friendship made in the Grand National Assembly and the Angora Press were purely bluff, and that Mustafa Kemal had no intention of making further engagements with Russia, at any rate for the present. Opinion at Angora, he stated, was generally against signing any further agreement with the Soviet Government, especially one containing clauses which would hamper in any way Turkish activities in the Caucasus.

Yonous Nadi also stated that Mustafa Kemal was fully occupied with the great project of the Union of Islam, which was naturally regarded with the

greatest suspicion and distrust by the Russians. But, at the same time, he had no desire to offend the Russians at the present moment; rather it was considered politic, Yonous Nadi stated, to encourage them and simultaneously use the threat of further Russo-Turkish engagements against the Allies at Lausanne.

Further light is thrown on the Turkish attitude towards the Russians by the following account of an interview which took place about the middle of January between Ismet Pasha and Topdjibachef, Chief of the Azerbaijan Menshevik Delegation, which has been obtained by an independent informant:

Ismet informed Topdjibachef that Turkish policy towards Russia depended entirely on the outcome of negotiations at Lausanne. The Russians, he said, could never be sincere friends of the Turks, but the latter could not compromise their relations with Russians unless they were assured of the friendship of Europe. On Topdjibachef raising the question of the position of Azerbaijan and the other Trans-Caucasian States, Ismet Pasha told him not to despair, but to wait for a propitious moment. "If Turkey is strengthened as a result of the Peace Conference" he stated, "she will adopt a totally different attitude towards Russia, and there would then be the time to discuss these affairs seriously. If, however, the contrary is the case, Turkey will be obliged to continue her friendship with Russia."

Topdjibachef, in the course of this conversation, also gave Ismet Pasha to understand that, in spite of the Turkish treatment of the Azerbaijanis, the latter looked for their redemption to the Turks.

At the same time, the following further information has been received from an agent in Lausanne, who has close personal relations with the Russian and Turkish Delegations, which tends to confirm a report circulated on page 1 of Summary No.1048, which was to the effect that the pressure and threats which the Russians had been exercising upon the Turks had resulted, in spite of little love being lost between the two, in a stiffening of the attitude of the Turks towards the Allies.

Chicherin about the 16th January, expressed the opinion that he was sure he had the backing of Angora. He stated that the military party at Angora was controlled by the Russians and that further developments would depend on the final terms presented by the Allies to the Turks.

Chicherin also gave it to be understood that the only reason why he had not been more openly hostile in his attitude towards the British at Lausanne was anxiety lest H.M. Government should do anything premature to terminate the

Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement. He feared that such an eventuality would lead to other countries severing their commercial relations with Russia.

Regarding the Straits, the informant also ascertained from other members of the Soviet Delegation that, while the Turks apparently entertained no serious objection to the demilitarised zone being controlled by the League of Nations, the Soviet Government intended to use all its influence at Angora and also at Lausanne to have any such clauses cancelled. The Russians also intended to use their influence at Angora to prevent the agreement on this subject being ratified by the Great National Assembly.

S.I.S. Copies to: Foreign Office, India Office, Colonial Office, War Office, D.N.I., Air Ministry

F.O. 371/9100

No. 65

Mr. Henderson to Mr. Lindsay

No. 51

Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 2, 1923

(Received February 2)

I am told by sometimes well-informed source that French Government has been requested to send at once responsible agent to Mersina or other suitable port to confer with Mustapha Kemal, and remove misunderstandings as to recent policy of France towards Turkey. It is added that he should have full powers to sign a treaty.

I cannot vouch for report, which may be inspired by its inherent possibility in view of Mustapha Kemal's proposed journey to Adana, and recent French declaration.

(Adressed to Lausanne, No. 68)

F.O. 371/9063/ E.1339

F.O. 424/256, p.419, No.186

No. 66

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 78

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 2, 1923
(Received February 12)

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I received a visit yesterday from Ali Haidar Midhat Bey, who is, as your Lordship is doubtless aware, the son of the Midhat Pasha of the Constitution of 1876. He is one of the few Turks who have succeeded during the past few years in remaining completely aloof from intrigue or from connection with any particular party.

2. He begun by telling me that he was a firm believer in the necessity for Turkey of good relations with Great Britain, that there were many Turks who shared his conviction in this respect and that their number was on the increase. He added that he intended to spare no pains in endeavouring to diffuse this view as widely as possible among his countrymen. I told him that I thought he would be acting in the interest of his own country if he did so.

3. He then proceeded to tell me that he had recently had several interviews with the delegates sent by Mustafa Kemal to Constantinople with a view to bringing about a combination of Mustafa Kemal's party with the organisation of the old Committee of Union and Progress Party. He stated that he had impressed upon these delegates the importance of Anglo-Turkish friendship and had found a distinct tendency on their part to agree with him. He added, however, that they had expressed a desire to have some proof of British sincerity before openly identifying themselves with such a policy.

4. I told Midhat Bey that this was not the first occasion on which mention had had been made to me of the Turkish desire for a proof of British goodwill, but that I had never been able to discover exactly what was meant thereby. Great Britain and the British Government would, I felt convinced, as soon as a satisfactory treaty had been signed, be ready to befriend and assist Turkey if she honestly attempted to put her house in order, but the Turks could not expect more than an assurance to this effect until after the conclusion of the treaty.

5. Midhat Bey agreed, and said that in his conversation with the delegates he had himself been at a loss to suggest any form of proof to them nor had they for their part been able to explain what it was that they required. So far as Great Britain was concerned, the only real difficulty was, he said, Mosul, in regard to which there was great intractability among the Kemalists.

6. I told him that it was out of the question that your Lordship could give way on the subject of Mosul. I said that the sooner the Turks realised this the better. Mosul was not a question of oil or of bargaining, it was one of right and honour. Midhat Bey did not dispute the right or the honour. He said, however, that for the Turks it was a question of the Kurds. In the reorganisation of Turkey the Kurdish question was one which the Turks realised would give them much trouble, and they were apprehensive of a Kurdish movement under the ægis of Great Britain. He said that the attitude of the Turkish delegates with regard to Mosul was principally in this respect would be greatly modified if Anglo-Turkish friendship was established and the fears on that score thereby removed.

7. Midhat Bey was of opinion that once peace was concluded and the restraint influenced by this consideration. He hinted, however, that Turkish apprehensions of external pressure removed, there would be a violent internal reaction in Turkey. He anticipated that in the end the Sultan would be restored, and expressed no doubt as to the ultimate retention of Constantinople as the capital of Turkey. As regards the present composition of the Grand National Assembly, of which he spoke most contemptuously, he said that Mustafa Kemal could count on about 120 followers. The Opposition Party, or second group, of which the leaders were Kara Vassif Bey, Deputy for Sivas, Salahaddin Bey, Deputy for Mersina, and Hussein Avny, was about eighty strong. Between these two parties was a kind of centre group, consisting largely of Ulema neither could really count. He said that Mustafa Kemal's delegates had been able, not without some difficulty, to come to a working arrangement with the Committee of Union and Progress Organisation here, by far the most influential member of which was Kemal Bey, or Kutchuk Effendi, as he is sometimes called.

8. I gathered from Midhat Bey's conversation that his politics were those of the moderate section of the Committee of Union and Progress Party. He said that its members were far less extreme than most of the Kemalists. He spoke with considerable bitterness however, about Enver Pasha, whom he believed to be dead. He was at some pains to warn me against Hussein Djahid and Djavid Beys, whom he described as pro-French and solely actuated by financial considerations. He told me that one of the strongest supporters of the policy of British friendship was Khalil Bey, an ex-Malta deportee, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs before the war. He made the somewhat surprising statement that Khalil Bey had returned from Malta a convinced partisan of British friendship. I took the occasion to observe that I feared that his imprisonment at Malta had not left the same impression on Raouf Bey. Midhat Bey said that Raouf had, he believed, modified his opinions lately. He mentionned in this connection that there was no love lost between Raouf and Mustafa Kemal, and

gave me to understand that, in any internal reorganisation, the latter would find Raouf one of his most dangerous opponents.

9. Midhat Bey confirmed what I had realised for some time past, the complete lack of influence at Angora of Adnan Bey. He described him – an opinion which I entirely share – as amiable and well-meaning, but a weak man. He attributed this largely to his ill-health. He said that he was consumptive, and was only prevented from going to Switzerland by being too poor to afford to live there. Refet Pasha was, he said, a man of quite a different calibre. He was, however, at present in disgrace owing to his indiscreet speeches and the excessive zeal which he had shown in Constantinople. Raouf Bey had done his best to protect Refet, but the enmity of Fethi Bey had been too strong for him.

I have &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 424/256, p. 538-539, No.274

No. 67

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.138
Telegraphic

PARIS, February 3, 1923
(Received February 4)

My telegram No. 127 of the 1st February, last paragraph.

M. Gauvain in "Journal des Débats" refers to statement current in to-day's French press to the effect that French Government caused a complaint to be made to Mr. Lindsay by M. de Montille at divulcation by the Foreign Office of the contents of M. Poincaré's note to me of 30th January (see my telegram No.122). M. Gauvain points out that the contents of this note were published by the "Temps", which is in the confidence of the Quai d'Orsay, before any other divulgations (see my telegram No.126.) It was true, M. Gauvain observes, that the "Temps" did not mention the fact that a note had been presented on the subject of France's intention to conclude a separate peace with Turkey, but it expressed itself in such a way that it was easy to guess the origin of this information. M. Gauvain points out the quibble of the French *démenti* regarding the communication made on the 29th ultimo to Mustafa Kemal, whilst the communication had, in reality, been made to the representative of the Kemalist Government at Constantinople. He observes that the evil effect produced on

the course of negotiations was the same whether that communication was made direct to Mustafa Kemal or through Adnan Bey, and he observes that the responsibility for the consequences of the divulgation does not fall either on His Majesty's Government or on those persons who have endeavoured to rectify the mistaken policy pursued by the French Government at a particularly important point.

M. Herbet in the "Temps" contents himself with expressing satisfaction at the better news received from Lausanne, and has the effrontery to declare that if your Lordship's primitive intention had been realised you would have returned to London to-day a rupture would have ensued. Owing to the wise policy of the French Government the conversations were continuing, and peace was not only possible, but well-nigh certain. It would be blindness to contest the services rendered by M. Poincaré, not only to France, but to all the Allies, the Turks and the world in general.

F.O. 424/256, p.428, No.196

No. 68

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1068

3.2.1923

Turkey

Opposition Groups at Angora

It was shown in Summaries No.1020 and No.1056 that the Opposition groups at Angora, consisting chiefly of Clerical Conservatives and of the so-called "Reformers" (Islahat Firkassi), were becoming a cause of some embarrassment to Mustafa Kemal and that they were demanding, inter alia, the conclusion of an early peace, leaving outstanding questions to be settled by subsequent negotiations, and the curtailment of Mustafa Kemal's powers. The latter had resorted to various subterfuges to keep these Opposition elements quiet.

According to secret correspondence received in Constantinople from Angora, the Opposition groups have been maintaining their attitude and are about to produce an Opposition paper, the "Tan".

It has also been ascertained that the following individuals, suspected of being in touch with the Opposition groups, have been arrested in

Constantinople by the Kemalist authorities, and are being sent to Angora for trial:

Hodja Hamdi Effendi... Ex-Minister for Pious Foundations, under Ferid Pasha.

Fuad İzzet Pasha... Senator and Under-Secretary of State under Ferid Pasha.

Tayar Pasha... Member of the Military Courts under Ferit.

Abdul Rahman... Ex-Governor of Adana.

S.I.S. Copies to: Foreign Office (Eastern Department)

F.O.371/9100/6010.

No. 69

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.26

Telegraphic

BUCHAREST, February 8, 1923, 6.00 p.m.

(Received February 9, 1923, 8.30 a.m.)

Bucharest papers published report yesterday that His Majesty's Government had again asked Roumanian Government, in the event of Turkey provoking new war, to co-operate with Great Britain by strengthening British forces in Gallipoli with several divisions, and that Roumanian government had declined to participate in any warlike operation.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has issued prompt denial of statement, adding that according to latest reports there is no knowledge of rupture but only suspension of work at Lausanne conference.

F.O. 371/9121/E. 1625

No. 70

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1074

9.2.1923

Eastern Summary: Turkey

Turkish Nationalist Policy: The Question of Mosul, etc.

The S.I.S. representative telegraphed on the 8th February that the Turkish refusal to sign the Treaty presented at Lausanne was primarily due to the internal situation in Anatolia. The growing activity of the Opposition group was causing the greatest anxiety to Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his Party, who considered that peace would result in internal disruption. They therefore wished to delay peace until the consolidation of the Kemalist position, or the disruption of the Opposition.

Orders had, in the meanwhile, been given to the military commanders to avoid friction with the Allies and any action likely to provoke a conflict.

The S.I.S. representative also reported that, after meeting Mustafa Kemal on the 6th February, Colonel Mougin cabled to Paris that another visit to Turkey on the part of Franklin-Bouillon would be useless.

On the 30th January, it was ascertained, from secret official correspondence received in Constantinople from Angora, that almost continuous sittings of the Great National Assembly were taking place, and that great excitement was being displayed at the critical turn of events.

The Left wing and the deputies under the influence or in the pay of Russia were displaying more than usual intransigence, but the majority of the Deputies were in favour of a peaceful settlement and realised the difficulties in which the country would be placed in the event of a rupture.

This secret correspondence also showed that, during a secret sitting which took place on the 27th January, Raouf Bey declared that the question of Mosul must be regarded merely as a matter of "amour-propre" for the British, and that Great Britain found it necessary to maintain her present attitude solely on these grounds. It was fairly certain, however, declared Raouf, that this was a difficulty which could be overcome, and there was no reason for its being regarded as a "casus belli" on either side. "We must maintain," he said, "our present attitude, bearing in mind that Great Britain in referring the question to the League of Nations will do so to save her own face, and will take the necessary steps to see that the decision of the League is in favour of Turkey, in this way

disembarrassing herself of any reproach on the part of those interested in the maintenance of British control in that region."

This announcement on the part of Raouf Bey was derided by deputies of the Left, one of whom stated that Raouf Bey was misinformed. The latter in defending his statement was supported by several deputies who dwelt on the disastrous situation which would be brought about by war.

Raouf Bey further stated: "We have had, and have, every desire for peace, but we are taking all possible precautions, reinforcing our troops, especially in the region of the Dardanelles, and are now awaiting the turn of events, in the meantime maintaining good relations with Russia."

Regarding Mosul, it was stated in Summary No.1067 that Hussein Kader, Imam of Kerbela, had arrived at Angora, via Diarbekir, about the middle of January, at the invitation of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and that he was accompanied by two Kurdish Sheikhs, Buluchlu Zade Halil, Sheikh of the Omer Pachekan, and Mantor Zade Ali, Chief of the Zire Tribe, both of whom had been playing an important role in Turco-Persian frontier politics. It was also reported that the Sheikh-el-Senussi had recently left Angora for Diarbekir, en route for the Mosul region, his mission being apparently connected with the reported defection of several hitherto pro-Turk Kurdish tribes, whose allegiance to the Turkish cause he was to endeavour to secure.

It was also ascertained at the end of January, from secret correspondence between Angora and Constantinople, that Hussein Kader had returned to Diarbekir, where he had rejoined the Sheikh el Senussi. Further, that extraordinary measures were being taken by the Turks to intimidate the population in the Mosul and Diarbekir regions, and that the number of tribunals had been augmented in the region of Diarbekir, El Aziz, Bitlis, Sürid, Malatia, Urfa, Mardin, Severeck, Argan and Kunj.

F.O. 371/9121

No. 71

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.79

Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 12th 1923. 12.45.p.m.

(Received: February 12th 1923. 2.10.p.m.)

Kemal has gone to Smyrna. Previous intention had been to go to Ismid to meet Ismet Pasha but delay in latter's journey has probably induced Kemal to

take an opportunity of taking stock himself of the situation at Smyrna and of conferring with Fevzi Pasha, leader of military party which is said to be pressing for war.

Rôle of Fevzi seems increasingly important and somewhat ambiguous. Adnan Bey, who is convinced pacifist, and worked for two years in the same office with him at Angora, assured me recently that while a typical warlike soldier he is not a blind extremist but fundamentally sound and sensible. On the other hand, Raouf Bey told Colonel Mougin that Fevzi was furiously angry at his orders for batteries to fire on British man-of-war entering Smyrna being countermanded by Raouf on latter's own responsibility.

F.O. 424/256, p.546. No.283

F.O. 371/9107/E. 1749

No. 72

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.80

Very Urgent

Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 12, 1923, 6.55.p.m.

Received: February 12, 1923, 7.25.p.m.

My telegram No. 73

Adnan Bey begged most earnestly today some action might be taken by Allies, and especially England, to liquidate Smyrna difficulty which was complicating whole situation.

He read me further message from Raouf to that effect and giving at length reasons for which present Turkish Government was unable to recognise Mudros armistice. He told me he had also received telegram from Mustafa Kemal from Smyrna on lines of Raouf's previous message reported in my telegram above-mentioned.

I told Adnan that I had not yet received reply from Your Lordship to my previous suggestion and that Allied governments were not likely to give way in question of principle. He said situation was now six days old and Turks had taken first step towards legitimising situation by showing both by assurances and in fact that they had no hostile intention. Adnan begged, therefore, that England should show some sign of goodwill and of wish to smooth over

difficulties by withdrawing again all her warships except one light cruiser originally in Smyrna. He said for his part he would suggest to his government propriety of increasing tonnage stipulated in Turkish regulations.

I am of opinion that we can afford to do this much now. In addition to original warship French have only sent to Smyrna two or three small craft of less than one thousand tons.

It would be desirable if possible to find solution before opening of Turkish economic congress at Smyrna on February 15th and before Ismet, who arrives here about noon tomorrow February 15th, leaves again. If I were authorised to tell him that His Majesty's Government, relying on Turkish assurances of absence of any hostile intentions, were withdrawing British warships with single exception mentioned it would, I think, have good effect without encouraging military bluffers.

F.O. 371/9107/E. 1754

No. 73

Foreign Office to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

*No.33
Telegraphic*

February 12th 1923, 3.30.p.m.

Your telegram No.71 (of February 9th; situation in Turkey).

I deprecate suggested course of action. At any moment there are indications that at any rate one party among the Turks wishes to follow a friendly and conciliatory policy towards Great Britain and it is indeed possible that Ismet may still wish to sign the treaty on the terms finally offered him and may persuade Mustafa Kemal and Angora that this should be done. Situation in this respect should be clearer when you or General Harington have seen Ismet Pasha and given him the friendly message outlined in my telegram No.31.

Meanwhile an ultimatum such as you propose would incur risk of stirring up the hornets' nest, the existence of which at Angora you appear from the opening paragraphs of your telegram to fear. Just now it would appear to be more than ever important to pursue cautious policy and to avoid anything calculated to precipitate a crisis.

In the circumstances you should follow the line of policy given in my telegram No.31 and await developments.

F.O. 371/9065

No. 74

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.83
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 13th 1923
(Received: February 13)

My despatch No.35.

Mustafa Kemal received acting consul-general at Smyrna yesterday. Attitude of former appears to have been friendly. He readily undertook restoration and protection of British church. He expressed regret at delay in signature of peace, but made no reference to local situation.

F.O. 371/9107/E. 1787
F.O. 424/256, p. 551, No.294

No. 75

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.108

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 13, 1923
(Received February 19)

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship a translation of a Communication of the Anatolian News Agency, which was published in most of the local newspapers on the 12th or 13th instant, giving the text of a letter addressed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Seyyid Junani, President of the Central Caliphate Committee of India, with reference to the speech made by the latter on September 17, 1922, in celebration of the Turkish victory over the Greeks in Anatolia.

I regard the publication of this letter with its undisguised incitement to Indian Musulmans to revolt as a form of pressure upon Great Britain in the present juncture, since it would seem, from the reference to the approaching winter, to have been written at least three months ago.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9121/E. 1979

ENCLOSURE IN No. 75

A Communication of Anatolian News Agency dated February 11, 1923

Angora, February 11. (Anatolian Agency) - The following letter has been sent by His Excellency Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Commander in Chief, to His Excellency Seyyid Junani (Chotani), President of the Central Caliphate Committee of India: I have only these days been able to read the copy of the speech delivered by you on September 17, 1922 to celebrate the great victory obtained by us over the Greek Army, which without any right occupied a portion of our country and by overrunning Anatolia endeavoured to render vain our claim to independence. The results of this great victory of ours will not affect the destinies of Turkey alone, but will encourage all down-trodden nations to action against the tyrants who threaten their life and independence. In truth, there is no power capable of completely preventing the success of claims to independence, right and liberty, if maintained with persistence and resolution. We pray, and we are full of hope, that the claim of India, which is managed by devoted and resolute gentlemen like you and your collaborators, will at no distant date obtain a completely successful settlement. India has a large share of honour in the victory which we have won. The material assistance and the subscriptions furnished by you were of the greatest service in obtaining the success of the cause of Turkey. The continuance of your moral assistance will be of great service in accelerating the conclusion of our peace, whereby we shall obtain the complete realisation of our national aspirations. In particular, the millions of people inhabiting the territory of 100,000 square kilometres, which has been saved from the Greeks by the unexampled heroism of our Army, are exposed to the rigours of the approaching Winter without clothing, without shelter and without food. The Mussulmans of Turkey, who have come to this condition through the incredible savagery and destructiveness of the Greeks,

require the assistance on a large scale of their brethren in the faith in India. I beg you to convey our respectful greetings to all our Indian brethren, who invariably act with sympathy towards the people of Turkey and on every opportunity give proofs of their goodwill, and I present to yourself my hearty respects.

(sd) GHIAZI M. KEMAL
President of the G.N.A.T. and C.in C.

F.O. 371/9121/E.1979

No. 76

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.85
Telegraphic.

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 14, 1923
(Received: February 14)

Judging from press and other indications at Constantinople, there is increasing tendency in favour of immediate signature of peace. Attitude at Angora is of course quite different, but in a telegram dated 12th February, colonel Mougin reports strong reaction, headed by Reouf and Fethi Beys, against extremists. He is of opinion that much depends on whether Mustafa Kemal is prepared to come forward definitely in favour of peace.

F.O. 371/9066/E.1817
F.O. 424/256, p.553. No.300

No. 77

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1077

14.2.1923

Turkey
*Relations between the Turks and Hungarians:
Secret negotiations in Anatolia*

It was stated on page 5 of Summary No.1059 that, about the middle of January, two Hungarian Delegates had arrived in Constantinople to confer with representatives of the Angora Government regarding the conclusion of a political and economic agreement between Hungary and Turkey. On the 17th

January these Delegates, whose names were stated to be Karachoni and Torbai, left for Ismid to meet Mustafa Kemal, at the latter's invitation.

It has since been ascertained that no great importance appears to have been attached by the Turks to the Mission of these two Hungarians, which was regarded merely as a "feeler". It transpired, however, that the following two points were raised by them in the course of discussions with Mustafa Kemal:

(a) In the event of Hungary taking measures to avoid fulfilling the Treaty of Trianon, could the support of Turkey and Soviet Russia be counted on?

(b) Should the Powers charge Rumania with the task of taking action against Hungary, would Turkey and Russia take active measures against Rumania?

To the first question the Turkish delegates responded in the affirmative, and in reply to the second stated that there was no doubt that Russia would immediately take action; but they gave no indication as to what form such action would be likely to take.

In their turn, the Turks demanded of the Hungarians: to what extent could the Hungarian Army take action to prevent Rumania and Serbia attacking Bulgaria in the event of Bulgaria marching against Greece?

The Hungarian delegates gave no definite reply to this question, which they promised to convey to Vienna for consideration.

Note by S.I.S. - Further enquiries are being made.

F.O. 371/9100

No. 78

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1093

16.2.1923

Secret

Turkey

The General Situation in Anatolia: Factors affecting Peace negotiations

(1) The general situation at the end of January

All communications received at the end of January by the Constantinople representatives of the Angora Government were to the effect that no definite

decision was likely to be taken by the National Assembly for the time being, and that the Status Quo would be maintained pending further developments at Lausanne.

In the meantime, any action was to be avoided which might bring about hostilities. Efforts to come to a definite agreement with Bulgaria having failed, Russian overtures being regarded with the utmost suspicion, and almost complete disillusionment reigning in regard to French support, it was considered extremely improbable that decisive action would be resorted to by the Turkish Government until other avenues leading to a peaceful settlement had been explored.

On the other hand, Communications from Angora to Adnan indicated that the intractable and self-confident military element, supported by the Russians and the "pro-Eastern Policy" bloc, might at any moment bring about a complete change of policy, and decide for war; but this was regarded as unlikely.

As regards the attitude towards the French, it was also ascertained from officials of the Angora Government in Constantinople that the sittings of the Great National Assembly, held on the 29th and 30th January, witnessed unusually violent outbursts of anti-French feeling. French policy was attacked from all sides, incidentally, the Anatolian press stated openly that "it is now understood that not only England is our enemy, but France also. While it might be possible to come to some sort of arrangement with Britain in regard to Mosul, regarding the question of Finance and the Capitulations, France is uncompromising, and shows the basest ingratitude, etc."

(2) Activities of the Opposition Groups

In amplification of reports circulated in Summaries No.1020 and No.1056, further information was received early in February from several official and well informed representatives of the Angora Government at that time in Constantinople, to the effect that the activities of the Opposition Groups were increasing and that a situation had arisen which was regarded by the Government Party as extremely serious. The following is a summary of information obtained from these informants, which outlines the development of the Opposition movement up to the present crisis, and indicates the effect which that movement has been having on the internal situation, and on the attitude of the Government towards peace:

It will be remembered that the principal points of difference are centered round the questions of the Caliphate and the Electoral Law, and it is these

points in particular which are mainly instrumental in bringing about the present state of affairs.

The abolition of the Sultanate, passed by an insignificant majority under pressure, was largely instrumental in consolidating the various opposition groups, viz., the Unionists under the Presidency of Kara Vassif, the independents under Hussein Avni and the Conservatives under Chukri Hodja and Nedjati Effendi.

As regards the Electoral Law, by attacking it as though it were a personal attack on himself, Mustafa Kemal succeeded in having it rejected, and, recognising the threat to his leadership and the political control of his party, he immediately took measures to assure the defeat of the opposition should the measure be brought up once more for discussion.

To an outside observer it appeared that the Government party had gained the day, but the surprise of many the project was once more brought up for discussion on the 1st February, this time with the backing of a fairly solid opposition bloc.

To add to the difficulties of the Government, the Caliphate question is once more being exploited to its utmost by the opposition. A brochure published by Chukri Hodja, criticising the attitude of the Great National Assembly in connection with the Caliphate, and, in particular, the "Law of Fundamental Organisations", was the signal for action by the Government. Raouf Bey thereupon requested Chukri Hodja and his friends to cease to attack the Government, pending the signing of Peace, and, according to one informant, told Chukri that he, Raouf, was personally in favour of the proposed Law regarding the Rights and Powers of the Caliphate as presented by Chukri, and that, in his opinion, the attitude of Mustafa Kemal on the question was not acceptable and in the long run would be fatal to the country. He added that, after Peace was signed, the Law would be brought into force.

The subsequent attitude of the Kemalists, however, seems to have convinced Chukri and his party that no reliance could be placed on the assurances of Raouf.

On the appearance of Chukri Hodja brochure, Mustafa Kemal is reported to have been furious and to have threatened to take decisive action against the conservatives as enemies of the country. This merely stiffened the attitude of the Conservatives, who immediately got into touch with their centres at Eski Chehir, Brussa, Afion Kara Hissar and Bali-Kessri with the result that, in spite of tour, was accorded a cold welcome at Eski Chehir and Brussa and therefore

decided to change his itinerary and miss Afion Kara Hissar and Bali-Kessri, where disagreeable demonstrations were anticipated.

The success of the Conservatives decided Kemal to take action against Chukri Hodja, and he gave instructions for the Procurator General to prosecute. Raouf Bey, however, foreseeing the consequences of such action, endeavoured to have it countermanded, while the Council of Ministers refused to approve of it.

Mustafa Kemal, however, insisted on its being carried out. The result has been that the opposition has put forward an act for discussion regarding guarantees for personal liberty. This project was prepared by Abdul Kader Kemali Effendi, Deputy for Kastamouni, in such a manner as to render its rejection by the Government difficult, and, according to information received, it has already been accepted in principle. In the meanwhile, the opposition is marking time, awaiting action on the part of the Procurator General, who can do nothing until a new project in course of preparation by the Government Party regarding the modification of the Law for Parliamentary immunity is accepted.

This law is being pushed forward by the Government party, but is meeting with resistance, not only from the Opposition but also from within, many Government Deputies fearing for their own personal liberty.

The situation is thus extremely complicated, and the outcome is difficult to foresee. Raouf Bey and other Ministers are doing all possible to weather the storm.

(3) The Question of Nationalist-Unionist Co-operation

At the end of January it was ascertained from informants in close touch with Deputies of the Angora Government, that the leaders of the Defence of Rights Party and of the Unionists at Angora (Dr. Nazim, Halil Bey, Halil Pasha, Midhat Chukri, Kara Kemal, etc.) had come to an agreement on the following basis:

(a) No action to be taken by the Government against individuals regarded as in any way responsible for the entry of Turkey into the late war.

(b) The National Rights Party and the Unionists to combine and form a new Party, under the name of the People's Party, in which no discrimination is to be made between Unionists and Kemalists, as deputies or nominees to Government posts.

(c) The People's Party to recognise Mustafa Kemal as President.

This was regarded by the irreconcilables as a victory for the Unionists.

Early in February, however, it was ascertained that the amalgamation of the Nationalist and Unionist groups in Anatolia, as agreed upon by the leaders of both parties, had been rejected by the Unionist deputies in the Great National Assembly.

It subsequently transpired that, after a great deal of discussion, a compromise was arrived at on the basis of agreeing to co-operation pending the conclusion of peace and the holding of the Elections.

Since then, however, the above mentioned leaders have been subjected to a violent attack by the Unionist Deputies forming part of the Opposition bloc, Kara Vassif, Eyoub Sabri and others, who have definitely refused to separate from the Opposition and even to continue to work with the other Unionist leaders.

This attack resulted in upsetting the equilibrium of the Party leaders, who have been making overtures to Kara Kemal, but, up to the time of reporting, without result. The situation on the 5th February was very uncertain; but it appeared that a serious split in the Unionist ranks was imminent.

(4) Activities in the Mosul Area

An informant who, at the beginning of February, saw the relevant telegrams in Dr. Adnan's office in Constantinople, reported that, at the end of January, Turkish activities in the Mosul area continued.

In a despatch sent by Djevad Pasha from Diarbekir to Angora, Mustafa Kemal was informed that Djevad had come to an agreement with the Persian government, whereby the latter would support Turkish claims in the Mosul region in return for a rectification of the Turco-Persian frontier in favour of Persia. This message was forwarded to Ismet Pasha, together with another message which was sent in clear to Adnan Bey from Angora to the effect that "The tribes were about to occupy Mosul and thus bring about a fait accompli." This second message, however, was, in all probability, intended as propaganda, since no special significance is given to it by the Turkish authorities in Constantinople.

No. 79

General Harrington to War Office

Secret
Telegraphic
 3649 cipher.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 18.2.1923, 21.15 p.m.
 (Received: 18.2.1923, 22.30 p.m.)

I have just received visit from Japanese ambassador. He tells me that at this moment a majority can still be commanded in Grand National Assembly by Mustafa Kemal and that latter and Ismet are really for peace. He says that a lot of money is being spent by Aralov in trying to buy off moderates to upset peace. Although opposition to Mustafa Kemal is growing, he is confident Mustafa Kemal holds majority now if question is settled without delay. His information from Angora is good as a rule.

F.O. 371/9061/E. 2012

No. 80

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 99
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 20, 1923
 (Received: February 20)

My telegram No.95

Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas met at Eskishehr on 19th February and proceeded together to Angora.

Mustafa Kemal opened Turkish economic (? congress) at Smyrna on 17th February with long speech, general tone of which was rather defiant though not categorically adverse to peace. Speaking of Lausanne Conference, he accused Allies of not realising change that had come over Turkey. Turkish delegation had "naturally" considered draft proposed by Allies unacceptable. Like other delegations it was returning in order to submit situation "to Government and, if necessary, Assembly." Explanations would of course be given and demanded. Whole world must realise, however, that Turkey would stop at nothing to secure full independence. Her rights must be respected, and her power to uphold them was in proportion to their legitimacy.

Speech was not otherwise of special interest politically. Aralof was present at opening of conference.

F.O. 371/9067/E. 2030

F.O. 424/256, p.576, No.328

No. 81

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.116

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 20, 1923

(Received: February 26)

His Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of two despatches from the acting consul-general, Smyrna, reporting on an interview with Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

F.O. 424/256, p.594, NO.358

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 81

Acting Consul-General Urquhart to Mr. Henderson

No.21

SMYRNA, February 4, 1923

Sir,

I have the honour to report that, on the arrival of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in this place, it occurred to me that I might use his presence here to secure that steps be taken to remedy the deplorable condition of the British church at Bournabat. I decided to ask the Rev. L. Le Bouvier to accompany, who is a British subject, but who, as pastor to the Dutch community, has had his church treated in the same manner as the British one. He is also correspondent to the "Times", and I felt sure that if only we could reach Kemal, he would be compelled to grant my requests or else have his attitude publicly known. I decided to state expressly that I had no intention of discussing commercial or political matters.

I accordingly requested the favour of an interview on Sunday, the 28th January, and Kemal sent a messenger to say he would receive us on Thursday,

the 1st February. Before that day, however, the meeting was postponed until the following Saturday. We visited his house on Saturday at the hour named and found him absent. I do not doubt that he was intentionally treating me rudely.

I have &c.

R.W. URQUHART

F.O. 424/256, p. 594-595, No.358/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 81

Acting Consul-General Urquhart to Mr. Henderson

No.26

SMYRNA, February 14, 1923

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No.21 and to my telegram No.13 of the 12th instant, and to report more fully on my interview with Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

The arrival of Kemal in Smyrna on the 26th January had placed me in a difficult position, because I had gathered beforehand that my French and Italian colleagues intended to call on him, and in point of fact they did so, as also did the Dutch and American representatives. I felt that my absence would be matter for comment, but did not consider that British relations with Turkey and Turkish hostility at the time, on account of the Mosul controversy, justified me in paying a purely friendly call. I accordingly decided to approach Kemal on a non-political matter of some urgency, namely, the desecrated British church at Bournabat, feeling that, at worst, he could only refuse to see me.

As already reported, however, I had not succeeded in seeing him before his departure to Balıkesir, and had decided to make absolutely no further move in the matter. During his absence H.M.S. "Curaçoa" had entered Smyrna in defiance of the orders already reported to you prohibiting the entry or stay of vessels of over 1,000 tons, and Kemal's behaviour on his return on the 11th instant is a valuable indication of the manner in which this demonstration was received. Within two hours of his arrival he had despatched a messenger, who, not finding me about 10 p.m. awaited me at the consulate on the following morning to express Kemal's regret that an unfortunate misunderstanding had prevented him from receiving me before his departure, and stating his willingness to do so that afternoon.

I accordingly visited him on the afternoon of the 12th instant. He began by excusing himself again for not having received me before, and said it was due to a misunderstanding. This explanation I readily accepted, saying that I had indeed already arrived at it myself, feeling that any other would be very unjust to him. I then said that the matter I was anxious to discuss with him was entirely non-political and non-commercial, yet one of great importance to us both - a matter of common public decency. I endeavoured to place the desecration of Bournabat Church in its proper setting, enquiring whether the Turkish victory over the Greeks was sufficient cause why the excellent record of Turkey for religious toleration should be broken, and suggesting that even if Britain and Turkey were to find themselves at war, Turkey had no need to fight by such methods; but in any case, we were not at war, and I hoped that when the British community returned they would have no cause to reproach him with the state of their church. Kemal appeared to be impressed, made notes, and promised that the church should be put in good condition. He then showed a desire to go on to other topics, and talked for some time on the general situation. I felt it safer to make very little comment on his remarks. He said he regretted the delay in concluding peace, for he saw no fundamental reasons why Britain and Turkey should not be at peace; but naturally the peace must be such as would ensure the absolute independence of Turkey. He suggested that France was the stumbling-block to peace, but as I was aware that he had previously suggested to others that Britain was the cause of the delay, I referred to the hostility shown to us in the local press recently and said that I had gathered from it that there was little to choose between France and Britain in this respect. He repeated, however, that France is now the cause of the delay, and stated most emphatically that Turkey will not accept the maintenance of the Capitulations. He was anxious to show that Turkey never really had been allowed a fair chance to develop owing to the Capitulations and the evil government of selfish persons. Turkey must have her chance now. I ventured to remark that Britain's past record did not indicate that she would ever be found on the side of the oppressors of any nation in its legitimate development, and suggested that there was less danger of an unjust peace than he seemed to fear. In any case, I said, if his country had the necessary spirit and determination for progress, no Power could possibly restrain it from rising to great heights of prosperity. I was sure, however, that no one desired anything for Turkey but progress. The interview thereupon ended, to the apparent satisfaction of both parties.

Kemal gave an interview immediately afterwards to the Rev. L. Le Bouvier, correspondent of the "Times", and, from what he said, he appears to think that the British nation will not go to war on any account, and that the Government does not represent its desires in this connection. The Turks are apparently under the impression that no danger of war exists; that accordingly they can

bargain with the Allies indefinitely without risk to themselves. They clearly do not wish for war with all the Allies united against them, but they would be willing, I think, to come to an understanding with either France or Britain on one set of questions and risk a rupture with one of them on the other set of questions, believing that one of these Powers will not alone commence hostilities against Turkey. At the present moment the indication is towards an accomodation with Britain. I can therefore conceive of no demonstration happier in its results than the Allied refusal to obey the orders recently given to foreign men-of-war in this port, followed by a clear indication of British readiness to use force if the Turkish demands were persisted in. The results are that the Turks must give up their hopes of separating Britain from France and at the same time realise that the legend that Britain cannot go to war in any circumstances has no truth, for they clearly understand that they could have had hostilities on the morning of the 8th instant had they so desired. This realisation threw the local authorities into something like consternation, and doubtless has had considerable effect on Angora too. It probably will do much in the direction of the conclusion of peace.

I have &c.

R.W. URQUHART

F.O. 424/256, p.596, No.358/2

No. 82

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

S.I.S. Misc./26

21.2.1923

Turkey
Prospects of Peace

The following is an outline, for purposes of reference, of the salient features of certain recent S.I.S. information regarding factors, prior to the return of Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas to Angora, which appear to have had a bearing on the prospects of a settlement in the Near East:

(a) Absence of Internal Political Unity

It was reported early in december that, although no definite opposition coalition appeared to exist at Angora, the Opposition groups, comprising the Clerical conservatives, under Chukri Hodja and Nedjati Effendi, the so-called "Reformers" or Unionist Antagonists of Mustafa Kemal, under the Presidency of

Kara Vassif, and the Independents under Hussein Avni, were achieving a certain degree of unity, and were cooperating in a campaign against Mustafa Kemal's personal position. The principal points upon which these Opposition groups were collaborating were the conclusion of an early peace; the preparation of a new Electoral Law, whereby Mustafa Kemal's powers would be curtailed; a resettlement of the question of the Sultanate and the Khalifat after the conclusion of peace, and the promulgation of a general amnesty to the members of the C.U.P. This movement was causing Mustafa Kemal considerable embarrassment, and he was endeavouring to counteract it by transferring the Opposition leaders to posts away from Angora.

About the middle of January it transpired that the activities of the Opposition groups were rendering Mustafa Kemal's position increasingly difficult, and that he was resorting to various subterfuges and repressive measures, with a view to keeping his opponents under control.

Early in February, it appeared that the Opposition groups were achieving a greater degree of unity, and that the Government was taking a more serious view of their activities. Mustafa Kemal had only succeeded in bringing about the rejection of the project for the revision of the Electoral Law, by representing it as a personal attack upon himself, but the project was again brought up for discussion on the 1st February, with the backing of a more solid Opposition bloc. At the same time, considerable embarrassment was caused to the Government by the publication by Chukri Hodja of a Brochure criticising the attitude of the Great National Assembly in connection with the Khalifat and the "Law of Fundamental Organisations".

In the latter connection, a threat by Mustafa Kemal to take decisive action against the Conservatives merely stiffened the attitude of the latter, who got in touch with their centres at Eski Chehir, Brussa, Afion Kara Hissar and Bali-Kessri, with the result that Mustafa Kemal, on his recent tour, was accorded a cold reception at the first two places, and found it expedient to change his itinerary so as to miss the last two places, where disagreeable demonstrations were anticipated.

More recently, at a secret session of the National Assembly, held on the 7th November, the Opposition groups severely criticised the Government for failing to come to a satisfactory agreement with the Powers, and demanded the resignation of the Cabinet.

It also transpired that, at the end of January, the leaders of the Defence of Rights Party, and of the Unionists at Angora, came to an agreement on the basis of both parties combining to form a new People's Party. This agreement

between the leaders was, however, subsequently rejected by the Unionist Deputies in the National Assembly, who categorically refused to separate from the other Opposition elements and even to continue to work with their leaders, thus bringing about a serious split in Unionist ranks at Angora.

(b) Financial Difficulties

At the end of September, it was ascertained that, although the War Department since the beginning of the year, had been granted extraordinary credits, totalling Ltq.s.72.000.000, the revenues of the Angora Government were sufficient to balance the normal budget of expenditure, and it was only possible to meet the extraordinary credits granted to the War Department by subsidies from Russia, credits for the supply of war material from France, and contributions from other Moslem countries, particularly from India. Pending the full receipt of revenue from these sources, the salaries of ordinary officials were four months in arrear, and even the army was not being paid regularly.

(c) The Morale of the Army

Apart from military information of a technical nature, certain general information has been received which has shown that the Government has not been able to rely on the whole-hearted support of the Army in the event of it being decided to revert to military operations.

It was reported at the end of November that the Angora Government's action with regard to the Khalifat and the Sultanate, in addition to causing deep dissatisfaction among an important section of Deputies in the great National Assembly and among the civil population, also affected certain elements in the Army. At the same time, there was a growing agitation among the troops for demobilisation on the grounds that the enemy had been driven from the country; that the Khalifat was no longer in need of liberation, and that there was no reason why men who had been a long time under arms should not be permitted to return to their homes.

Early in December it was ascertained that there was little enthusiasm either among the officers or men for war in Iraq, partly on account of the unattractive climate of that country, and partly because the memory of the defeats experienced during the Great War had not been effaced. The War Department being aware of these sentiments had issued an Army Order to the effect that those who volunteered for service in the Iraq would be granted three years seniority rights and an increase in pay of 50 %; but this offer did not appear to have the desired effect.

It has recently transpired that the Opposition groups in the National Assembly have been acquiring considerable support among the officers in the Army, particularly those of Unionist persuasions, many of whom refused to accept the scheme for the formation of a People's Party.

(d) Uncompleted Scheme of Pan-Islamic Unity

Corroborative information recently received from a number of sources has indicated that the Kemalist leaders have been concentrating on a influence of Turkey; and, to this end, it has been arranging for the convening of a pan-Islamic Congress, at which, in addition to discussion of general Islamic affairs and the question of the Khalifat, a scheme is to be elaborated for the federation of Moslem nations. This is apparently a project conceived by Kemal himself, based on the principle of each Moslem country retaining its independence, but of general political, military and religious control being exercised by Turkey, through the medium of the Khalif and of the Jamiet-ul-Islam. Up to date, this project of convening a pan-Islamic Congress does not appear to have gone beyond the stage of issuing invitations.

As regards general relations between the Turks and other Moslems, it has been shown how the Khalifat committee sent special envoys to Ismet Pasha at Lausanne, to protest against the Angora Government's action with regard to the Khalif, and how the Turkish Nationalists felt obliged to take early steps to forestall adverse criticism of its action in the Moslem world, particularly in India, whither pamphlets were secretly despatched during November. Reports from Lausanne also showed that relations between the Turks and Arabs at the Conference were very strained. It has been reported, in fact, that, although numerous parties and Nationalist groups in Moslem countries have signified their approval of the Turkish action with regard to the Khalifat, this action has not been accorded general approval by Moslems; and, in addition to opposition from India, it has been reported that the attitude of the Arabs in the Hedjaz has been very hostile to the Turkish scheme. It would appear that this opposition will react detrimentally to Mustafa Kemal's plan for Moslem reunion.

(e) Factors Affecting an Advance on Iraq

Information has pointed generally to it not being the serious intention of the Turks under present conditions to resort to offensive action against Iraq.

It has been shown that, while it was not the intention of the Turkish Nationalist leaders to initiate any action against Iraq, during the Lausanne Conference, such military preparations as were possible were made during that periode with a view to operations being started when the military situation

elsewhere permitted. During the autumn of 1922, moreover, an agreement was reported to have been arrived at between Djevad Pasha and certain Persian and Kurdish tribes against Iraq; and documentary evidence obtained early in February showed that Jevad Pasha had come to an agreement with the Persian Government whereby the latter would support Turkish claims in the Mosul region in return for a rectification of the Turco-Persian frontier.

On the other hand, as has been shown above, the enthusiasm for war among the troops under Djevad Pasha's command has not been great.

At the same time it is shown that no arrangements have been made for co-operation with the Russians in an attack on Iraq. The proposed new Treaty of Alliance between Moscow and Angora, which contained a clause to the effect that the Russians would assist the Turks in their aims regarding Mosul, in return for non-intervention by the latter in the affairs of the Caucasus, has not yet been signed. It has also been recently reported that, although there has been a talk of military co-operation between the Turks and Russians against Iraq, the Red Army forces in the Caucasus are, according to General Kameney, in no way fitted to undertake operations in that direction.

During October, moreover, the Kemalist Military Council at Brussa considered a report from Jevad Pasha, in which the latter stated that no reliance whatever could be placed in the tribal forces which were being assembled by Sheikh Senussi. These forces, Jevad pointed out, were not of the slightest value, for their nomad chiefs, as was proved during the great war, frequently responded to appeals from others quarters to their personal interests, and were easily bribed. In Jevad Pasha's opinion, in order to undertake serious action on the Iraq front with any prospect of success, a Turkish Army of at least 50,000 men would be necessary.

Early in February it was ascertained from leading members of the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne that the majority of the members of the Angora Cabinet were in favour of coming to terms with Great Britain over the Mosul question, and that this was also Hassan Bey's attitude. At the same time it was feared that the Extremist view might be urged by about 60% of the Deputies of the National Assembly, including a number of Kurds.

(f) Relations with the Russians

During and subsequent to, the Turkish offensive against the Greeks, Turco-Russian relations were evidently very strained. After the signing of the Mudania Convention these relations improved, as the result of proposals made by the Russians for the conclusion of the new Treaty of Alliance to supplement

the Treaty of March 1921. Subsequently a state of tension again prevailed, and the Turks procrastinated over the signing of the proposed new Treaty.

Early in February matters appeared to have progressed more favourably, and Raouf Bey, at a Secret Sitting of the National Assembly, on the 9th February, stated that the Russian proposals having been made more acceptable, negotiations had been resumed.

Raouf Bey made it clear, however, that the conclusion of the Treaty did not necessarily imply that war was contemplated. On the contrary, he said, if the Government entered into a new Alliance with Russia, it would be with the object of providing a new guarantee for the realisation of the peaceful ideas of the Turkish nation.

Evidence has been obtained from other sources to show that the conclusion of a new Treaty with Russia is unlikely to involve Turco-Russian military co-operation. Mustafa Kemal, during January, replied in the negative to proposals from Moscow that Russian troops should reinforce the Turkish forces in Turkey. At a recent meeting at Trebizond between Kiazim Karabekir and Russian military experts, the former gave a non-committal reply to the suggestion of the latter that the military clauses of the Treaty should be signed in advance. Early in February it was ascertained that Soviet official circles in Tiflis were convinced that the Turks would not conclude any further military agreement with the Russians, even if they did agree to sign a new Treaty on general lines.

(g) Recent Attitude of Nationalist Leaders

Communications received by Adnan Bey from Angora at the end of January showed that the Nationalist government were averse to resorting to decisive action until all avenues leading to a peaceful settlement had been exploited. In the meanwhile, in Constantinople, all action calculated to bring about hostilities was to be avoided.

Early in February it was ascertained that, while preserving this attitude, the Turks were mainly occupied in testing Allied solidarity. The demand for the evacuation of the Port of Smyrna had this aim largely in view. While almost complete disillusionment prevailed regarding French support, it was proposed to test the French attitude by demonstrating on the Turco-Syrian frontier.

On the 7th February, at a Secret Sitting of the National Assembly, Raouf Bey said that a definite decision could not be taken until the return of Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas to Angora. Measures had been taken to meet all

possible eventualities; but the interruption of discussions with the Western Powers did not, in his opinion, imply a definite rupture. "War must be the last resort", he said, "and we will explore all other means first". In this connection, S.I.S. information from Lausanne regarding Ismet's attitude, has indicated that he has been personally in favour of a moderate policy.

At the sitting on the 7th February, the Opposition Groups, as has been shown above, severely criticised the Government for failing to come to an agreement with the Western Powers; and it was ascertained from authoritative Kemalist representatives in Constantinople that it was primarily owing to the activities of the Opposition, and the difficult internal situation, that the Government was postponing the conclusion of peace. Mustafa Kemal felt that, in the face of external difficulties, some unity could be maintained, but that, once peace was signed, all the suppressed passions of the Opposition elements, directed mainly against himself, would be set free, and would seriously jeopardise the position of himself and his party. Before concluding peace, therefore, it was necessary for Kemal to consolidate his position and to bring about the disruption of the Opposition groups.

(h) Conclusion

The foregoing S.I.S. information would seem to point the existence, at any rate previous to the return of Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas to Angora, of the following factors militating against a renewal of hostilities on the part of the Turks:

- (a) The absence of internal political unity, and the existence of a growing opposition movement against war.
- (b) Financial difficulties.
- (c) The improbability of the Army responding wholeheartedly to a call to arms.
- (d) Uncompleted schemes for strengthening Turkish ties with other Moslem states.
- (e) Unfavourable conditions for an advance in Iraq.
- (f) The absence of any agreement for military co-operation with Russia and the improbability of the Turks, in any case, receiving military assistance from Russia.

It would appear that there is a strong movement among the leaders for peace, but that the final decision will be influenced primarily by considerations of internal political expediency.

F.O. 371/9121

No. 83

Copy of a letter No.784-A, dated Bombay Castle, 26th February 1923 from the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

Remittance of funds to Kemal Pasha at Angora

With reference to the correspondence ending with my letter No. 784-A, dated the 10th February 1923. I am directed to enclose a copy of a letter No.1458, dated the 20th February 1923 from the Manager of the Netherlands Trading Society, Bombay, and to state that he has been informed that there is no objection to the proposed remittance to Angora.

*J. Reitsma, Acting Manager, The Netherlands Trading Society, Bombay,
To J.E.B. Holson, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department,
Bombay*

Sir,

BOMBAY, 20th February 1923

Re. Transmission of funds to Angora

I have the honour to inform you that I am advised that shortly an amount of about Rs. 1½ lacs will be transferred to this Bank from Karachi and Central India, for which amounts an account has to be opened in the name of the Central Khilafat Committee of India (Bombay).

It is the intention to remit an amount of about £10,100 to Kemal Pasha, Angora.

Although a few months ago your Government had no objection to these remittances I shall be glad to know whether they still look favourable upon them or whether they would prefer this Bank not to make the remittance.

I have &c.

SID/- J. REITSMA
Acting Agent

F.O. 371/9137

No. 84

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 45
Telegraphic

BUCHAREST, February 26, 1923
(Received February 27)

Journalist named Brown, formerly "Times" correspondent here during the war, arrived this morning from Angora. He gave Minister for Foreign Affairs information based on personal observations contained in my immediately following telegram.

Correspondent declares that Mustafa Kemal will endeavour to win over great portion of Centre party, which would secure majority vote in favour of peace. Failing this, as he has at Angora 30.000 troops loyal to him, he would dissolve Assembly with their assistance and then obtain peaceful decision.

Much Russian gold has been distributed to members of Left group, who have been bought by Bolsheviks. Correspondent states that it is notorious that cases arrive daily from Russia bringing more gold for Soviet representatives.

Personal impression of journalist is that peace will be accepted by Angora Government.

He is now employed by American paper and reported all his observations to Admiral Bristol at Constantinople, who stated that he would inform other High Commissioners. He returns in four days to Angora after visiting sick Roumanian wife. He is of Jewish origin, probably Polish or German, formerly named Braun.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O. 371/9068/E.2246

F.O. 424/256, p. 602, No.367

No. 85

Sir H. Dering to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.46
Telegraphic

BUCHAREST, February 26, 1923
Received February 27)

My immediately preceding telegram.

Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha control peace party of Right in Assembly numbering 110. They desire to accept all Lausanne stipulations except method of appointment of foreign judges, who, they insist, should be appointed by Turkish Government.

Ali Bey leads Centre Party, in number about 150. These demand alterations in economic clauses and probably respecting Straits and Mosul.

Left Extremist party number 65 under leadership of Fevzi Pasha, Chief of the General Staff. All are strongly against signature of any peace.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O. 371/9068/E. 2247

F.O. 424/256, p. 603, No.368

No. 86

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.122
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 27, 1923
(Received February 27)

Sir H. Derings telegrams Nos. 45 and 46

Brown is corresponded of Chicago "Daily News" in Constantinople and has never been to Angora. His wife is an American. His information is obtained from agents, whom he pays according to what he considers reliable information.

He is well known at this High Commission, where he is always ready to impart any information he obtains. Before leaving for Bucharest he communicated information in Bucharest telegram No.46, though giving somewhat lower figure for number of Extremist party and without mentioning

Ali Bey, of whom I have never heard. Figures are in any case misleading, as it is improbable that much more than 250 Deputies are actually at present at Angora for discussion of treaty.

Rumour reported in first paragraph of telegram No.45. in regard to Cromwellian mentions of Kemal is one that has more than once been spread abroad here, but I attach very little credence to it. The same might be said of stories respecting daily shipments of Russian gold, though doubtless Soviet Government is making final effort to suborn Grand National Assembly.

(Repeated to Bucharest, No.5)

F.O. 424/256, p.603, No.369

No. 87

Foreign Office to India Office

No. 1979/35/44

February 27, 1923

Sir,

I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to transmit for the information of Lord Peel the accompanying copy of a despatch from the acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople, enclosing a copy of a letter reported to have been addressed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the President of the Central Caliphate Committee in India.*

I am to add that the explanation suggested by Mr. Henderson appears to be the correct one.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

F.O.371/9121

* Bkz. No. 75 ve eki

No. 88

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1096

28.2.1923

Turkey

Turkish Pan-Islamic Policy: The Jamiet-ul-Islam

It has been shown in previous Summaries (Nos. 1049, 1068, etc.) how Mustafa Kemal has been pursuing a policy of Islamic unity, and how, to this end, he recently revived the Jamiet-ul-Islam Association. Further, that this association has been making arrangements for the convocation of a pan-Islamic Congress in Anatolia at an early date, which is to discuss, inter alia, the establishment of a League of Moslem Nations, in opposition to the League of Nations, in which Turkey is to play a predominant role.

The following further information in this connection has been obtained from an authoritative official in the Khalif's household:

The Jamiet-ul-Islam, although not strictly speaking an official Association and not subordinate to the Sheikh-ul-Islam, is protected by the Government, and as its formation is reported to be due principally to the initiative of Mustafa Kemal himself, it can be regarded as of great importance. Its principal task appears to be that of working out the details and bringing about the dream of a united Islam under the political influence of Turkey.

The ultimate object is apparently the formation of a Society of Islamic Peoples, to which delegates from all Moslem nations will be sent, each delegate to have the title of Councillor to the Caliphate. The latter, being Turkish and being directly under the political influence of Turkey, will render it possible for the Turkish Government to control this Society.

Kemal's project is briefly as follows: Each Moslem Nation shall retain its independence, but politically, militarily and from the religious point of view, Turkey will maintain control through the person of the Caliph and the Society above mentioned.

The Jamiet-ul-Islam is showing great activity at the present moment, Missions having been sent to the Iraq, Hedjaz, Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, India and elsewhere, with the object of propagandising the project described above.

The present events in North Africa are reported to be directed by the Emir Said Mehmet Idris Senussi, Imam Yahya and Said Idris of Yemen under the

influence of the Jamiet and its propaganda. Progress also appears to have been made with the endeavours to win over Ibn Saoud, Ibn Rechid and other Imams.

F.O. 371/9100

No. 89

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

*No. 132
Telegraphic*

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 2, 1923
(Received March 3)

My telegram No. 124.

Mustafa Kemal delivered long speech in Grand National Assembly yesterday on the occasion of beginning of financial year.

This public sitting interrupted series of secret sittings to consider Peace Treaty, which were to be resumed to-day. Mustafa Kemal's speech was, however, guarded, but was certainly not pacific, and there is a note of menace in certain passages.

Versions telegraphed here vary considerably in details. My telegram No. 133 gives summary of principal points based on comparison with six different versions.

Speech is said to have been well received, and passage about military preparations on Arab front was loudly applauded.

Concluding portion is evidently aimed at party in Angora which openly criticises policy of separation of Sultanate from Caliphate. Kemal was so angry with author of pamphlet on this subject that he endeavoured to have parliamentary immunity suspended in order that he should be prosecuted. Assembly rejected this, and Opposition secured, instead, passage of law on immunity of person and domicile.

As this law, though forced on Government, will doubtless be exploited in any further discussion of judicial régime for foreigners I am sending summary in my telegram No. 134.

There appear to be upwards of 260 Deputies now in Angora.

Ali Fuad Pasha, nominee of Defence of Rights group (Mustafa Kemal's organisation), was elected Vice-President of Assembly yesterday. Same group's candidate for one of the Deputy Vice-Presidencies was defeated. Political situation appears to be chaotic, and decision of Assembly is impossible to forecast.

F.O. 424/256, p. 610, No.384

No. 90

British Secret Intelligence Service to Foreign Office

Secret CX/676/1a

3.3.1923

Mr. Oliphant.

The following, which has just been received by telegram from Constantinople, throws an interesting light on Russo-Turkish relations at the present time:

A very reliable agent employed by the S.I.S. agency in Turkey has seen a secret telegram from Angora to Adnan Bey, stating that Abilov, the Azerbaijan representative who accompanied Aralov to the Smyrna Conference, was murdered by an agent of Mustafa Kemal. The Press was, in the meanwhile, being informed that Abilov's death was the result of an accident.

The telegram also showed that Abilov was in charge of Communist Cells and was fomenting a Communist revolt in the Eastern vilayets. Aralov returned to Angora immediately after Abilov's murder and protested violently.

F.O. 371/9100

No. 91

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.140

Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 4, 1923

(Received March 4.)

My telegram No.132

Reference to military preparations on Mosul front is rather less menacing as given in full report of speech. It reads as follows:

"In view of possibility of recourse to arms in order to secure south-eastern frontier of country in accordance with National Pact, necessary military dispositions have been taken on Arab front."

Great bulk of speech was devoted to past progress and future desiderata in internal policy. This is perhaps hopeful sign, as passages given in first reports sound more formidable when read apart from this larger context.

F.O. 424/256, p.613, No.393

No. 92

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.147

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 7, 1923
(Received March 12)

My Lord,

I have found it extremely difficult since my return to Constantinople to obtain any coherent general view of the political situation at Angora. This is due no less to the difficulty of obtaining sound information at so great a distance than to the indiscipline and even chaos which appear to prevail in the Grand National Assembly and to the unwillingness of many Deputies to make open confession of their true opinions. Certain internal questions are already the subject of acute discussion; the time when others of a vital nature must be thrust out is, in the opinion of those concerned, sufficiently close for feeling to run high; and in the meanwhile the fact that peace has not been made keeps everything in a stage of flux.

2. Mr. Henderson's despatches No. 1111 of the 11th December, No.40 of the 17th January, No.52 of the 20th January and No.78 of the 2nd February will have given your Lordship some idea of the internal political situation up to the suspension of the Lausanne Conference. Into this situation has now been projected the question of treaty or no treaty, and the result has been to make confusion worse confounded. The internal and foreign questions react on each other enormously, and it is evident that the votes of many Deputies on the peace issue will be governed by their views as to how peace or war will affect the political or personal interests for which they stand in domestic affairs.

3. The personality of Mustafa Kemal has been so predominant that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the main line of cleavage in the Assembly is that between his supporters and his opponents. It is, however, impossible to draw this line too definitely, as his personal prestige is still so great as to make it difficult even for opponents to criticise him openly. His two great slogans of "National Pact" and "National Sovereignty." (*alias* the "Fundamental Law") are cries that everyone must echo, though it is perfectly well known that many are prepared to see the National Pact interpreted with sufficient latitude to enable peace to be concluded, and that his extreme constitutional theories are strongly opposed by an even greater number of Deputies. On the latter question he loses no opportunity of speaking with the conviction of a fanatic. Personal sovereignty is anathema to him. On the question of peace or war his recent utterances have been much more guarded. He appears to waver between the same sort of fanatical devotion to the letter of the National Pact and the knowledge that a composition with Europe is essential to the reorganisation of the country. He presents a singular combination of genuine patriotism, doctrinairism and personal arrogance.

4. The supporters of Mustafa Kemal may be divided into two sections, viz.: the Deputies who are devoted to his person to the extent of following him blindly in everything and the extremists whose support is conditional on his beating the National Pact down at all costs and flouting the wicked Powers of the West. These together appear to constitute what has come to be called the first group. The personal adherents are the more numerous and the more respectable. Their organ is the "Hakimiet-i-Millî". The rabid extremists are a small but noisy minority, far more under Russian influence than the Pasha himself. Their organ is the "Yeni Gyun", and its disreputable editor, Yunus Nadi, is a type of the class. They are violently anti-European and particularly anti-British.

5. Mustafa Kemal's main organisation is the Defence of Rights Association. This, however, is not admittedly a political party, but is represented as being rather an association to organise all the forces of the nation in the endeavour to attain the fulfilment of the National Pact. In January the Pasha launched a campaign for the creation of a separate organisation for political purposes, to be called the People's Party, the underlying idea of which was apparently to combine under his leadership his personal adherents and those of the old Union and Progress leaders, to whom I shall come presently. As your Lordship is aware, he started on a combined military and electoral tour, which however, he curtailed early in February in order to return to Angora.

6. The opponents of Mustafa Kemal appear to consist of several groups united more or less for the present by a common antagonism to his personal

dictatorship and to certain elements in his internal policy. They consist of the followers of the old Union and Progress leaders, who appear to be pretty well organised, of monarchist otherwise conservative factions, and of miscellaneous personal or political adversaries of the Pasha. Attempts have been made from time to time to bring the Unionists into the Kemalist fold by negotiation and by giving posts to the leaders. These efforts were renewed in January, and the idea of a fusion was apparently supported by some of the old Union and Progress leaders; but little real success was achieved despite the activities of persons like Kara Kemal Bey and others. At present it looks as though several of the leading Unionists were sitting on the fence, while the Unionist Opposition in the Assembly remains in being under the leadership of Kara Vassif Bey. Everything points to a reconstructed Committee of Union and Progress becoming the real effective Opposition to Mustafa Kemal, and very possibly the governing force in the country if and when peace is concluded.

7. The monarchist Conservative group, always an element in the Opposition to Mustafa Kemal, gained prominence in January owing to the publication of a pamphlet by one Shukri Khoja openly condemning the policy of separating the Sultanate from the Caliphate and destroying the former. This was a red rag to Mustafa Kemal, who sought unsuccessfully to deprive Shukri Khoja of his parliamentary immunity in order that he should be prosecuted. The Opposition not only had this proposal thrown out, but secured after a struggle the adoption of the law on personal liberty summarised in my telegram No.134 of the 2nd March.

8. Other prominent opponents of Mustafa Kemal are Silahuiddin Bey of Mersina, who has taken a leading part in all attacks on him since the latter part of 1921, and Hussein Avni Bey of Erzeroum; but I find it difficult at present to class these under party headings. The Opposition, as a whole, has come to be known as the "Second Group," and it has an organ in the "Tan" newspaper, established on the 19th January.

9. One hears also of "Independents", a name which has sometimes been applied to miscellaneous *khujas* and others of no strong political color, but which has recently been applied to the alleged new group of military die-hard, opposed to peace, and drawn from all sections of the Assembly. Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of Staff, is sometimes spoken of as the leader and the soul of this group, but those who know most of this gentleman find it difficult to believe that he has enough personality to be a real leader. Another person mentioned in this connection is Kutchuk Jemal Pasha, who was once Minister of War in Constantinople, and who was dismissed from that post in January 1920 at the instance of the Allies, owing to his excessive Nationalist activities.

10. Probably the most notable personality in Angora after Mustafa Kemal is Reouf Bey, President of the Council. It is frequently alleged that there is no love lost between him and Mustafa Kemal, but he has been playing a very careful game, and I have not met anyone here who can say definitely what he stands for. It seems probable that in foreign politics he inclines towards peace on the basis of what was agreed with Ismet Pasha at Lausanne, and rediscussion or reservation of the clauses still in dispute on the 4th February; it is more than possible that in home politics he leans discreetly towards his old friends of the Committee of Union and Progress.

11. Until Mustafa Kemal takes a strong line, it is difficult to foresee how things will shape in the Grand National Assembly as regards peace proposals. All that can be said is that there is a bad spirit in the Assembly; and that while the Government seem to have put forward proposals on the lines attributed to Reouf Bey in the preceding paragraph, they are doing little or nothing publicly to discountenance the common tendency to regard these proposals as being alternative to complete insistence on the National Pact, or to counteract such dangerous cries as, "No peace without Kara Agatch and Mosul." It is significant that within the last few days all the three leading Angora papers mentioned above have written against the Government proposals, sometimes on the ground that what Ismet agreed to cannot be accepted, sometimes on the ground that questions like those of Mosul and the economic and financial clauses must be left open, but must be definitely decided to the satisfaction of Turkey before peace is signed.

12. There are two dangers in Mustafa Kemal's attitude, if he really stands for peace. One is that he may hedge too long and lose his power of getting the Assembly in hand. The other is that, while preferring peace, he may allow his personal ambition to prevail, and yield to the war party, rather than insist on a peace policy, one of the consequences of which would be that after peace was concluded the opposition to him would have much freer play than at present. In some quarters it is rumoured that he really does stand for peace, but he is giving the Assembly its head, because he simply means to make short work of it presently, close it down under the menace of troops which are faithful to him, and play the role of a Turkish Cromwell or Mussolini. I attach little credence to these rumours, but it is necessary to record them as they are obtaining increasing currency.

13. As for the Opposition, I do not think they have any united policy on the question of peace or war. I rather hope that the Unionists and the Monarchists will be, on the whole, on the side of peace, provided Turkey can hope for some further satisfaction on the disputed clauses. There is certainly one element among the old Unionist leaders, who lean strongly towards peace

on that basis. This element is represented in Constantinople by the inseparables, Javid and Jahid, who are much mixed up with financial interests. Jahid Bey has taken a very definite peace line in his paper, the "Tanin", during the last few weeks. He has conducted his campaign with no little courage, and has incurred the attacks of other papers both in Angora and here. Even as regards the economic clauses he has accused the Turkish delegation at Lausanne of mismanagement, and has suggested that a great deal of the difficulty could have been avoided by treating direct with the interests concerned, a suggestion in which it is not difficult to see French inspiration.

14. All the other Constantinople Turkish papers are fervently patriotic, but evidently too little informed as to what is passing at Angora to take definite lines. The most extravagant of them is the "Tevhidi Efkâr", which screams pan-Islamism. Papers like the "Vakt", which are more in touch with the Angora representatives here, are careful not to commit themselves too definitely. The "Vakt" itself, which is sometimes thought to enjoy some sort of official inspiration, varies a good deal. There has been an element of xenophobia in its recent utterances, particularly in an article on the unfortunate Greek decision to suspend the execution of the Exchange of Prisoners Agreement. The writer of this article, a Salonica crypto-Jew and an ex-Malta deportee named Ahmed Emin, sees in this an indication of the bad faith which may be expected of the Allies in the execution of any treaty which may be concluded.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O 371/9130/E. 2664

F.O. 424/256, p. 640-643, No.425

No. 93

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.160

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 13, 1923
(Received March 19)

My Lord,

In my despatch No. 147 of the 7th March, in which I attempted to construct from very meagre material a picture of the political situation at Angora, I expressed certain misgivings as to the outcome of the deliberations of

the Grand National Assembly on the draft of Peace Treaty, due mainly to the fact that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had not yet shown his hand. My fears lest the extremists should win the day in the Assembly were fortunately falsified by the result announced late on the evening of the 7th March. Mustafa Kemal took part in the final debate, and there can be little doubt that he backed the Government proposals with all his weight, thereby producing a collapse of the opposition, which had been so vociferous up to eve of the final decision. I deduce from this that Mustafa Kemal has made up his mind that peace is necessary, and intends, if it is secured, to proceed with his projects of internal reconstruction. He has already left Angora for Adana, one of the places which he intended to visit in the course of his interrupted tour begun in January.

2. Very little has yet been disclosed as to what actually passed in the Assembly during the great debate. The account of the voting given a few days ago by the "Tanin", a paper usually well informed on such matters, is sufficiently curious and significant. It is said that 275 Deputies took part in the proceedings, but that no less than 85 abstained from voting, and that of the remainder 170 voted for and 20 against the Government proposals. I have no information as yet as to the composition of the large group of Deputies who refrained from voting on so vital an issue, but I expected to find that it was largely made up of Deputies not less desirous of peace than the partisans of Mustafa Kemal, but unwilling for reasons of internal politics to commit themselves to supporting him. Everything points to the fact that, if peace is concluded, it will be followed by a violent internal struggle between Kemalists and anti-Kemalists, and both sides are already playing for position. Everyone in Angora has combined to shout "National Pact", but the controversial questions of the future are already being debated. Among them will be the position of the throne and the hardly less thorny question of the future capital, with which I have dealt separately in my despatch No. 158 of today's date.

3. Western Europe can afford to await these struggles with equanimity. They will tend to weaken a very arrogant Turkey; and, as the conclusion of peace will drive a wedge between Turkey as a whole and the Bolsheviks, whatever party comes out of the internal struggle uppermost will probably be a little more inclined than it might otherwise be to treat the Allied Powers with consideration. So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, I do not anticipate a really friendly attitude on the part of any dominant party in Turkey for a long time to come, but I think we shall be treated with respect, and, while our subjects will have much to suffer, there will probably be a tendency to placate us on larger issues.

4. Meanwhile, the question of peace or war remains the immediate and vital issue. Those Turks who stand for peace, and among whom Mustafa Kemal

may now be definitely classed, require careful handling. It is for that reason that in my telegram I have ventured to urge a policy of elasticity in dealing with their counter-proposals. It is satisfactory to note that once the decision was taken, all the Turkish papers of Constantinople rallied to the Government with one exception. This, the pan-Islamic "Tevhidi Efkiar", has published a series of attacks, the gist of which may be gathered from the title of that published on the 9th March. "Definite Results do not come of Weak Decisions." The other papers declare with no little sound and fury that a pacific but strong and independent Turkey has said her last word in the counter-proposals, and that it is now for the Allies to accept them, if they too want peace: but it is quite evident that the writers have no expectation of an unqualified acceptance, and are perfectly prepared to see the points raised by the Angora Government debated in conference.

5. The attitude of the "Tanin", the organ of that section of the old Union and Progress Party which still ranks Javid Bey among the apostles, is sufficiently interesting to merit special attention. On the 27th February it published a long article on the "Economic and Financial Questions." This article shows strong traces of French influence, but it is satisfactory to note that the writer, Jahid Bey, rejects as absurd the idea that there is any justification for the suggestion that any question of "economic slavery" is involved. He analyses the points at issue under seven headings, viz:

- (a) Payment of the interest on the Public Debt in gold.
- (b) Participation of Irak and Syria in debts contracted during the war.
- (c) Acceptance of concessions granted by the Constantinople Government.
- (d) Confirmation of concessions granted in 1914.
- (e) adaptation to present circumstances of companies in which Allied capital is preponderant.
- (f) Purchase of railways in Asia Minor.
- (g) Non-abandonment of Civil List and "private" government property in detached territories.

6. After pointing out that the Allied proposals regarding these matters were not in the nature of an ultimatum thanks to M. Poincaré, whose readiness to discuss them prevailed over British irreductibility, Jahid Bey takes each point separately and reaches the following conclusions:

(1) This should and could have been settled on the basis of a reasonable compromise between the Turkish Government and the Debt council. Jahid Bey evidently favours payment on a French franc basis.

(2) He divides this under the headings of liability for requisitions, internal loan, and paper money. The Allies agreed that the first of these should be brought into distribution, and at one stage showed a tendency to concede the Turkish point about the internal loan, a tendency of which advantage may still be taken. They refuse to trust paper money as a debt, but the door is not yet closed to discussion.

(3) İsmet Pasha was right in refusing to accept these concessions blindfold, but the practical course was to get a list of them and deal with each separately, accepting the good and rejecting or remodelling the bad. Some say that all this fuss arises out of the Constantinople Telephone Company's concession. In principle this falls into the class of things not to be accepted blindfold; but there was certainly time in two or three months to examine it and suggest modifications. There has also been much talk of great concessions given to the Italians. Jahid Bey was unable to extract a list of these from the Turkish delegation. His enquiries in Constantinople led him to think the scope of the arrangement with the Italians has been much exaggerated. It is a question of first finding out the facts.

(4) Jahid Bey challenges the government on the question whether it is true, as has been alleged, that the Angora Government, in reply to definite enquiries by the French, undertook to recognise the concessions given in connection with the Pervir Loan. If so, the question is settled. If not, it is a question not of refusing to grant railway concessions which might well be given, but of re-examining the arrangement and rejecting anything detrimental to Turkish interests.

(5) Here again the Government was right in principle to refuse to provide in a political treaty for the case of Turkish companies, but the practical course was, and is, to settle the questions which arise direct with the companies and not merely to rely on a bare principle.

(6) Jahid Bey sees nothing to which the most fervent Nationalist need object in the allied proposal that the Turkish government should buy out the Germans, or in the suggestion that the Allies should lend the money necessary therefor. The objectionable feature is that the Allies want to form an exploitation company in which Turkey should have a 25 per cent interest only. This is a matter for a bargain, in which the government should start by asking for complete control in regard to exploitation, and should then consent to give

the Allies a small share in consideration of their advancing the money for repurchase.

(7) This is a question of international law rather than of economics or finance. Jahid Bey hopes that further negotiations may lead to a settlement more favourable to Turkey.

7. I have devoted more space to this article than is appropriate to a political despatch, because it suggests lines of thought which may be useful in the rediscussion of points outstanding in the treaty. To take one example, it is interesting to note how much stress Jahid Bey lays on the desirability of concurrent negotiations with the foreign interests concerned in concessions, in order to avoid dealing with them in the Peace Treaty. We might ourselves find it convenient to shape matters in this direction in the case of a question like that of the Constantinople Telephone Company. Jahid Bey reverts to the general suggestion in a leading article published on the 9th March, after the Angora decision had been published. As I have hinted above, he is much under French influence in making these utterances. Indeed, on the 7th March, before the decision was announced, he published a strong attack on your Lordship as being the obstacle to peace owing to your attitude regarding the Montagna judicial formula, and the economic and financial questions, on which he represented the French and Italians as quite ready to meet the Turks. When writing this article, Jahid Bey saw the solution in separate treaties with France and Italy. It is amusing to note that this article was studiously ignored by the local French organ.

8. Speculation is rife as to where the further discussion of the treaty will take place and by whom it will be conducted. It is generally assumed that Ismet Pasha will be again in charge, though with a much smaller delegation. It is much to be hoped that this will be the case, though Ismet Pasha's decision will doubtless depend to some extent on the constitution of the Allied delegations and the range of discussion agreed to. He appears to have stood consistently for a peace policy in the face of much criticism at Angora. I have before me a report from a secret source of a speech which he is said to have delivered in the Grand National Assembly on the 2nd March, and which, if authentic, bears out this appreciation of his attitude. In this speech he defends himself against the accusation of being an advocate of peace at any price, but contends that the objects for which war was necessary have been attained, that, while Turkey is capable of fighting on if need be, her greatest need now is peace, and that nothing remains which would justify a resumption of hostilities.

9. As regards the other Turkish delegates, I fear that Hassan Bey is likely to be again in charge of financial and economic questions. Riza Nour Bey has

been little heard of and would appear to be somewhat under a cloud. The "Tanin", in an article published yesterday, is very complimentary to İsmet Pasha, but observes that all his colleagues in the delegation were not equally well chosen. The first qualification of a delegate was that he should be a gentleman in the full sense of the word. No Turk could wish his country to be represented by a plenipotentiary who had provoked the remark: "We meet for the first time an ill-bred Turk in a diplomatic gathering." This obvious allusion to Rıza Nour Bey is followed by others animadverting on his frequentation of the journalists' bar at the Lausanne Palace Hotel, and a particularly bitter reference to what happened on the 4th February, when the Turkish pressmen were seeking some of the delegation to help to stem the flow of anti-Turkish propaganda. İsmet Pasha was busy upstairs. "But where is So-and-So?" they asked. And the answer, on that day of tragic happenings, was: "He is drinking whisky in the lounge!"

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/256, p. 799-800, No. 479

No. 94

A Report by British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1111

15.3.1923

Turkey
Peace Prospects Early in March

Appended is a summary of information on this subject, of which the following are the salient features:

(a) İsmet Pasha's Attitude : At a closed sitting of the Grand National Assembly, on the 2nd March, İsmet strongly urged acceptance of the draft treaty. He repudiated the accusation that he was out for peace at any cost. When it was a question of driving the enemy out of Asia Minor he favoured war, but once this object had been achieved war was useless. The nation was tired and wanted peace. Since the greater part of the National Pact had been attained, there was

no need for the army to make further sacrifices. This was the opinion of all the ministers.

(b) The Mosul Question: Mustafa Kemal recently told Extremist deputies that nothing would be gained by attempting to retake Mosul by force of arms. He was sure, however, that Mosul, together with other lost Turkish territories, would within a few years automatically revert to Turkish hegemony, as the result of his project of Islamic Union.

(c) The Internal Political Situation: Information from an authoritative Nationalist, to the effect that the existing political crisis would result in a victory for the Government party, and that Mustafa Kemal would secure his position by giving ministerial posts to members of the Opposition groups.

(d) View of the Macedonian Representative in Constantinople: Dr. Nicolov, writing to General Protogheroff on the 22nd February, stated that, in the opinion of competent Turks in Constantinople, the Lausanne draft treaty satisfied nearly all the Turkish demands, and Turkey would not resort to aggressive action unless provoked. He also commented on political grouping at Angora, with special reference to the new party which Mustafa Kemal was forming; and he foreshadowed an open political struggle following the signature of peace "when military Turkey will be replaced by political Turkey."

F.O. 371/9070.

APPENDIX IN No. 94

(a) *Ismet Pasha's Attitude*

According to official despatches sent from Angora to Adnan Bey and Rafet Pasha, Ismet Pasha spoke as follows at a closed sitting of the Grand National Assembly, which was held on the 2nd March:

"Before commencing the discussion, I beg you to allow me a few minutes for personal explanation. On the 21st February I expressed myself at considerable length regarding the Lausanne Conference. I learn to my great regret that discourse produced misunderstandings in the Assembly, also several individuals have stated that I am out for peace at any cost and that I disregard the interests of my country. This is a very grave accusation to make and a false one. I have the interests of our country as much at heart as any of you, and am as much concerned for its independence and rights as anyone. But when it is a question of peace or war, one must think deeply of the honour, interests and

strength of ones country: during the past year and a half I have been amongst those who preferred war, and in preferring war I believed and believe now that I fulfilled my duty towards the country. Yes, yesterday I wanted war because our interests demanded it, but now I want peace, because I see that the vital interests of the country demand it. You see, I do not want peace if it is against the interests of the nation, as I have been accused; I want peace because I see that we need peace. Up to the moment of driving our enemies out of Anatolia and of saving Constantinople and Thrace, our patriotic duty was to fight, and I have always insisted on the continuance of the war until Anatolia was cleared of the enemy and Constantinople and Thrace were secured to us once more. Once these objects have been attained, war has lost its importance for me; there is no reason for its continuance. It is useless. Why be frightened of the truth? Are we not tired, and is our nation not crying out for peace?

"Nevertheless, in saying that we need peace, I do not mean that we are incapable of fighting if necessary. No, I trust our glorious army, but I believe that there is no reason to call upon that army to make further sacrifices now we have attained our great object. The greater part of our National Pact has been attained. The less important points do not justify a continuation of the war. I am not alone in thinking so. All our ministers think likewise, that is to say, none of us believe that there are serious reasons to face our country with the further sacrifices and losses which would be caused by war.

"Your Government will present you with a project for peace. In it you will see that the question of Mosul and the judicial and financial capitulations are left aside to be discussed after the signature of the Peace Treaty. In preparing this project the Government has thought of all the possibilities and all the consequences, of that you may be assured.

"Our reasons are not as some think, merely based on fear. No, we desire peace because we see no reason for war, we desire the prosperity of our country.

"In conclusion, I wish to address a few words to those who have accused me of being under foreign influence. I do not wish to respond to such baseless and unjust accusations, but will content myself with repeating to them that I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Western Army and as Minister for Foreign Affairs, do not consider that war is in the interests of our country. Should the Grand National Assembly, however, not share my convictions, and declare for war, I am ready to fulfil my duty as a soldier."

İsmet Pasha showed considerable emotion towards the end of his speech. Ali Fuad Pasha then rose and said that none dared accuse so great a patriot, so

glorious a chief, etc. etc. as Ismet Pasha of wishing to disregard the interests of the nation, and he demanded an apology in the name of the Assembly.

Ismet Pasha then left the Chamber and Riza Nur commenced to address the Assembly. A report of his speech and the subsequent proceedings have not yet been received.

(b) *The Mosul Question*

In a conversation with a trustworthy informant early in March, Edhem Hidayet Bey, Chief of the Turkish Intelligence Bureau, and a member of Mustafa Kemal's staff, stated that Mustafa Kemal had recently informed several deputies, who were adopting an intransigent attitude on this subject, that Mosul was never profitable to the Turks, and that, on the contrary, it was a vilayet which had drained away revenue without giving anything in return.

Therefore, continued Mustafa Kemal, there was nothing to be gained by attempting to retake Mosul by force of arms. But, in any case, they could rest assured that within three or four years not only Mosul, but also the whole of the Irak, Basra, Arabia, Syria and probably other Moslem countries would be under Turkish hegemony. This would be attained by the realisation of the Islamic Union project, which, in Kemal's opinion, had every possibility of success. Within ten years, or even less, he believed that there would not be a single English or French official in these countries.

(c) *The Internal Political Situation*

Edhem Hidayet Bey also told the informant that the existing doubtful situation in Angora would almost certainly end in a victory for the Government. Changes in the Cabinet, he stated, were probable, and it was more than likely that several leaders of the opposition groups would replace retiring ministers. In this manner, Mustafa Kemal hoped to bridge over the present gulf. The most likely selections for ministerial posts were Kara Vassif, Jemal Pasha Mersinli, and Saleaddin Bey.

(d) *Views of the Macedonian Representative in Constantinople*

Below are given translations of extracts from a letter dated 22nd February, from Dr. Nicoloff in Constantinople, to General Protogheroff in Vienna:

"There remains no doubt now, that it was Riza Nur, the supporter of the Russo-Turkish Alliance, who succeeded in persuading Ismet Pasha not to sign the draft of the Treaty, and that Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, aided by Aralov and

Abilov, were able to convince Mustafa Kemal not to disregard the advice of Moscow.

"Competent Turkish authorities in Constantinople give their opinion regarding the present political situation as follows:

'If we regard Mudros, Sèvres, Mudania and Lausanne collectively, we shall see that what we succeeded in obtaining at Lausanne, comprises nearly all our demands, and the Lausanne Conference has consequently been entirely satisfactory. We have also shown that we are absolutely pacific in our intentions and shall not undertake any hostile actions unless we are provoked, as any aggression on our part would not be in our interests. On the other hand, if we are provoked, we shall know how to defend everything we have gained at Lausanne. If the Greeks threaten the safety of our capital, Constantinople, we shall immediately beg the Allies to withdraw their ships from the Dardanelles and if they do not comply with our request, as happened at Smyrna, we shall lay mines in the Straits to guard against a Greek invasion and shall warn the Allies to be careful in that region. With regard to the Black Sea, we shall lay no mines there.'

"Concerning the mutual relations of the different ruling factions in Turkey and the prospects for the near future, I can give you the following information:

"At present the following groups exist in Turkey: (a) The old conservatives, i.e. the old partisans of Abdul Hamid - the reactionaries, (b) The friends and partisans of the Committee of Union and Progress, who are known as the İttihajis, i.e. the adherents of the Committee İttihad ve Teraki. They are the real Young Turk party who governed the country until the Armistice, (c) The Nationalist group which is represented by the old Unionists, now transformed into Nationalists, and who are at present directing the destiny of Kemalist Turkey, (d) The İtilafjis, who are adherents of the Entente Libérale Group which for many years was in opposition to the Union and Progress Party, (e) A new group, which Mustafa Kemal has been endeavouring to form during the last few weeks, and which he wants to comprise members from the different Turkish political groups. As Turkey, however, is still on a purely military footing and the time is not favourable, the open political struggle will follow the signature of peace, when military Turkey will be replaced by political Turkey.

"In view of the existing state of affairs Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who is preparing for the future, has decided to form a new political party, which he is calling the Halk Partisi, which means the Popular Party. He has also stated that this party is to be in the nature of a "Mother Party" (sic) to all the other political parties, which will be formed after the signature of peace. In other words,

Mustafa Kemal intends to regard all the old political parties as non-existent and dead, and his new party Halk Partisi will be the first of all the new Turkish political parties.

"This shows that Mustafa Kemal is taking all the necessary measures to form a political party, on which he and his friends will be able to rely in the future, as he already feels the dangers and difficulties with which he and his friends will have to contend in the future..."

F.O. 371/9070

No. 95

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.182

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 20, 1923
(Received March 26)

My Lord,

There has been a lull in the situation here since the date of my despatch No.160 of the 13th March relative to the general political outlook. I confine myself this week to a few matters which seem worth noting briefly.

2. A fairly large number of Deputies who took part in the sittings of the Grand National Assembly to discuss the Peace Treaty have come through to Constantinople. Secret reports received after the arrival of some of them, and therefore not unlikely to be based on first-hand information, indicate that the Assembly was largely influenced in its decision by a rather dramatic pronouncement of Ismet Pasha's on the 6th March, to the effect that the clamour for war was absurd and ruinous, in view of what had been obtained and of the state of the army. According to a report from another sometimes well-informed source Mustafa Kemal also took the line that war would be absolutely unjustifiable. He is stated to have urged this mainly on financial grounds, saying that war with Great Britain would be a dangerous, though not a hopeless, enterprise; that it might entail the complete economic and financial ruin of Turkey; and that the amount involved in the outstanding differences with the Allies would be soon swallowed up in a few months of war.

3. The Turkish newspaper "Aksham" had a leading article on the 15th March, echoing with strong approval an article in the "Temps" suggesting that the practical solution of the economic and financial questions was that they

should be settled direct between the Turkish Government and the interests concerned concurrently with the peace negotiations. As I reported in my despatch No. 160, this view has been much ventilated in the "Tanin", probably under indirect French inspiration. The fact of its being taken up by the "Aksham" is significant, as, while the "Tanin" is in reality an anti-Kemalist organ, the "Aksham" is in close relations with Kemalist circles here.

4. The press generally is a little alarmed that revelations as to the amount of dissension in Angora should create the impression in Europe that the Turks do not present a united front. The journalists are at pains to prove that there is no disagreement as regard foreign policy. On the other hand, they seem to be apprehensive regarding the meeting of Allied experts in London, and to be disappointed that the Allies should have agreed to come together for discussion before pronouncing on the Turkish counter-proposals, instead of resuming negotiations with the Turks without any preliminary exchange of views among themselves.

5. Mustafa Kemal Pasha is touring Cilicia. He continues to avoid any public pronouncement on the question of peace or war. The telegrams describing his progress report some significant *obiter dicta* regarding Syria, which sound as though they were intended to bring the French to heel by veiled threats of Turkish intervention in that country. At Adana, it is said, he was greeted by some young women from Antioch and Alexandretta, clad in black, who moved him and all present greatly by crying, "Filled with blood, our despairing eyes await your coming; save us!" The Pasha replied, "The forty-century old home of Turks cannot remain a prisoner in foreign hands." At Mersina, he passed under a triumphal arch erected by Syrian Moslems, and decorated with black flags inscribed "Turco-Arab brotherhood! Do not forget your Syrian countrymen." This elicited from the Pasha the saying, "Turkey wishes that Syria too should determine her own destinies."

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

No. 96

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1115

21.3.1923

Turkey: Peace Prospects*(a) The Turkish Counter Proposals*

The S.I.S. representative telegraphed on the 20th March that, according to information obtained in confidence from the Secretary to the Council of Vekils, who was then in Constantinople, the Turkish counter proposals were not final, and the Angora Government was ready to make further concessions if necessary.

(Note by S.I.S. It is hoped to amplify this information shortly.)

(b) Ismet Pasha's Attitude, etc.

At a closed sitting on the 6th March, during the discussion on the question of Mosul, criticism of the government rose to a high pitch. Ismet Pasha, who had not spoken during the early part of the proceedings, suddenly rose to his feet, and in an emotional and dramatic manner said:

"I see again that there is nothing but doubt and misunderstanding. I cannot support this longer. If you have no confidence in my actions and in me personally, then I shall at once resign both my post of Minister for Foreign Affairs and that of Commander of the Western Forces. You do not understand, and cannot understand, that the army is worn out and that war would be madness. You cannot understand this because you are unable to think, or to judge regarding technical military matters. This being the case, I beg you to excuse me: I shall hand in my resignation."

After this theatrical scene, Ismet sat down. The effect on the Assembly was extraordinary, as everyone had been taken by surprise. The supposition that this was carefully stage-managed is strengthened by the fact that Mustafa Kemal immediately rose and demanded a vote of confidence in the government, with full powers to settle the question of peace.

The government party, with a strength of 120, was on this occasion reinforced by the "Independents", who are for the most part composed of military elements. This group which supports the Opposition on the questions of the Caliphate and questions connected with the Fundamental Organisations,

is, however, perfectly alive to the military situation, and in that respect is with Mustafa Kemal, İsmet Pasha and Fevzi Pasha. The support of the Independent group thus gave the government the vote of confidence to the surprise of everyone, and before the Assembly had time to realise the situation.

No time was then lost in completing the counter project in accordance with the government's views, and it was immediately forwarded to Adnan Bey to be handed to the Allied High Commissioners.

(c) Mustafa Kemal's Intentions

According to information obtained from hitherto reliable sources at Angora, it is the intention of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, together with İsmet Pasha and Kiazim Kara Bekir to form an Executive Trio and assume a military dictatorship in the event of the National Assembly placing serious obstacles in the way of peace and the realisation of the projects of Mustafa Kemal. Plans are reported to be in course of preparation in that connection, and to be guarded with the utmost secrecy.

(Note by S.I.S. representative in Turkey:

While no confirmation of this information mentioned above has been received from other sources, it is regarded as most probable. Efforts are being made to obtain fuller particulars.)

F.O. 371/9071

No. 97

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

*No. 322
Telegraphic*

*PARIS, March 21, 1923
(Received March 22)*

I saw Marshal Foch and General Weygand today, and they seemed much perturbed at language used lately by Mustafa Kemal in regard to the Syrian mandate of France. They seem to realise somewhat late, though they did not admit it in so many words, whither the French Lausanne policy of "scuttle" had led them.

"Pertinax", in to-day's "Echo de Paris," again deplores weak attitude adopted by French Government towards Turkey, foolishness of which is proved once more by Mustafa Kemal's language. He declares, however, that a welcome reaction has now set in and that M. Bompard will endeavour in London to carry out his instructions, which are the opposite of those which he received early last January. "Pertinax" urges that a more decided attitude should also be adopted in Syria itself, where the High Commissioner, whether he be General Gouraud or another, should at once proceed in order to assist the new Federal Council which has been set up there and prevent it from being taken in by Turkish manoeuvres.

F.O. 371/9071/E. 3050

F.O. 424/256, p.811, No.494

No. 98

Sir H Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 186

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 23, 1923

(Received April 3)

My Lord,

General Pellé alluded in conversation with me last night to the sudden campaign which the Turks have started in connection with Antioch and Alexandretta. It looked as if this campaign had been launched on a *mot d'ordre*, and it coincided with the remarks made by Mustafa Kemal Pasha during the latter's recent visit to Adana, which I reported in my despatch No. 182 of the 20th March. In support of their campaign, the Turks were making the most scandalous charges against the French of cruelty and atrocities against the Moslem population of those districts. Some of the organs of the Turkish press were accusing the French of acting towards Antioch and Alexandretta in the same manner as the Germans had acted towards Alsace and Lorraine in 1871. One paper, which had given a list of some of these so-called atrocities, had stated *inter alia* that the French had in one instance shod with horse-shoes two fellaheen of Alexandretta, on the charge of having killed two Armenians. The French were accused of forming Armenian bands near Aleppo for the purpose of harrying the Moslem population. Some of the Turkish papers developed the view, so often ventilated here of late, that French financial interests wished to exploit Turkey. In fact, the attitude of the Turkish press towards the French was as intolerable as it was disingenuous.

2. General Pellé likewise informed me that the subservient Colonel Mougin had just arrived from Angora thoroughly disgruntled. The latter part of his stay at Angora had been very unpleasant, and General Pellé described him as neurasthenic and as having no wish to return to Angora. I understand, however, that Colonel Mougin is returning to his post on the 25th instant.

3. The Turkish press has also taken advantage of its speculations in regard to the persons likely to represent the Allied Powers at the new conference, to indulge in abuse of M. and Mme. Bompard. The "İleri" threatens France by stating that if the French wish to remain in Syria they must keep on friendly terms with the Turks by facilitating the conclusion of peace. "Unfortunately France, in retaining M. Bompard's services, which formerly drove the Turks into the German fold, is helping them to become the friends of the British."

4. It will be seen from the foregoing that the former French policy of currying favour with the Turks has had its natural result. The latter are now trying to intimidate the French in view of the forthcoming renewal of the treaty discussions. The Turks obviously think that that is the best of dealing with people who have shown subservience to them in the past.

5. The statement in the Italian press to the effect that the Italians cannot give up Castellorizzo have surprised and annoyed the Turkish press, which hints that the Italians need not expect economic concessions in Anatolia unless they give the island in question back to Turkey. In a leading article in the "Vakit", which analyses the attitude of the three Allies towards the Turkish counter-proposals, the paper, after stating that the French now refuse to agree to reserve the financial and economic clauses for future discussion, concludes that if Italy follows the lead of France in the question of Castellorizzo "strange events will then take place."

6. A good deal of this language is undoubtedly due to the irritation and uneasiness caused by the meeting of the Allied experts in London, which the Turks think will make for a reconstruction of the Allied front. A prominent Frenchman whom I met yesterday evening said that there was much confusion at Angora and that the propaganda put out by the Turks that their counter-proposals represented the minimum of what they could accept and were their last word was a gigantic bluff.

7. Colonel Mougin has brought accounts which are not without interest of the rôle which has been assumed by Mustafa Kemal's wife, who is evidently a lady of great ambition. She has brought her husband a considerable fortune, and is starting a campaign for the emancipation of Moslem women in such matters as the wearing of the yashmak, &c. She has considerable ascendancy

over Mustafa Kemal, and appears to interfere in political matters. Her interventions are perhaps not always fortunate, as will be seen from the following incident: The Emir of Afghanistan had recently sent a robe of honour to Mustafa Kemal, which was handed to him with considerable ceremony by the Afghan representative. On beholding this robe, Mme Mustafa Kemal explained "Ça fera une excellente sortie de bal."

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/257, p. 5-6, No.8

No. 99

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 206
Telegraphic.

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 30, 1923
(Received March 30)

My telegram No. 195, paragraph 1.

Turkish press here and at Angora has grown restless in last few days. There has been tendency to accuse Allies, collectively or individually, of taking up attitude at Conference of Experts calculated to destroy chances of peace. This tendency has been stimulated by press telegrams regarding proceedings of experts which represent Governments as engaged not so much in providing basis for negotiations as in taking "decisions" regarding Turkish counter-proposals.

More concrete expression has been given to above-mentioned tendency in telegram issued yesterday by Anatolian Agency, which is semi-official. My immediately following telegram gives substance.

Such publications are doubtless to large extent inspired, and I think there is much nervous bluff behind them. Nevertheless, I fear atmosphere of Grand National Assembly is unhealthy. There are rumours of much discontent in army with policy of Angora Government, and Russians are said to be working actively against Kemal and against peace on basis of acceptance of what was settled at Lausanne.

I consider these rumours exaggerated, but they cannot be altogether disregarded.

F.O. 424/256, p. 869, No. 523

No. 100

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.211
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 31, 1923
(Received March 31)

My telegram No.206

Further proof of tenseness of internal political situation in Angora is afforded by mysterious disappearance on 27th March of Ali Shukri, Deputy for Trebizond, editor of "Tan", and one of leaders of second group (see my despatch No.147).

His friends assume that he has been the victim of political crime, and have created storm in the Assembly. Great publicity has been given to the incident here. This is probably due to fact that the Government dared not stifle it; but there is also tendency on the part of supporters of Mustafa Kemal to use threatening tone here towards his opponents.

I have been unable to obtain further information about alleged movement in the army.

F.O. 424/256, p. 872, No.532

No. 101

Consul Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.27

ALEPPO, March 31, 1923
(Received April 17)

My Lord,

M. le Commandant Folliet, director of the "Chemins de fer Cilicie-Syrie du Nord", recently returned here from a visit to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, whom he met at Konia and accompanied to Adana. I asked the commandant whether it was true that, in his presence, Mustafa Kemal had, among other deputations, received deputations from Alexandretta and Antioch, bearing flags draped in sign of mourning, and had, in reply to their earnest solicitations delivered a

speech, in the course of which he held out definite hopes of future reunion with Turkey. Reports, highly coloured, of this incident had been current in Aleppo.

Commandant Folliet said that these reports were exaggerated. It was true that he had been with Mustafa Kemal when the latter, in the course of his welcome by the population of Adana, had received various deputations, including those of Alexandretta and Antioch, which bore flags draped in sign of mourning. The Pasha had, however, only expressed, in his answering speech, the emotion which he said all Turks shared at the thought of their sacrificed brethren beyond the frontier.

The commandant does not understand Turkish, and it is quite possible that a tactful interpreter, in relating the speech to him, smoothed away some of the rougher edges of Mustafa Kemal's speech.

Incidentally, Commandant Folliet told me that various members of the National Assembly had, in conversation with him, deplored the necessity, for the few intelligent Deputies, of humouring the ignorant majority, which was quite out of touch with realities. It was this ignorant mass which prevented Mustafa Kemal and the intelligent Deputies from bringing about peace with Europe - a peace was a vital necessity to Turkey. As soon as peace was signed, it would be necessary to dissolve the Assembly and "make" the elections of a Parliament more amenable to the Government. There was no other means of administering the country satisfactorily.

No doubt these statements are of the usual kind encouraged by the Turkish leaders, who find it convenient to represent themselves as ready to make concessions, but prevented from giving effect to their laudable intentions by the chauvinism of their ignorant followers. The one thing certain, however, is that the Turkish population wants peace. Commandant Folliet said that he was greatly impressed by the desolation in Caramania, which has remained entirely uncultivated owing to the absence of the peasants with the colours, and, of course, the Christian exodus.

The local Turkish attitude has during the last few months been tending to become less anti-British and more anti-French. Rumours are continually being spread in Aleppo, doubtless by Turkish or pro-Turkish elements, of transfers of

Turkish troops from the Irak to the Syrian front. The Turkish press in Cilicia is frankly and violently anti-French. The Kurdish chief, Bozan, who is a Turk and the son of Shahan Bey, as well as member for Urfa in the Grand National Assembly, recently passed through Aleppo, and, in conversation with Mr. Wooley, of the British Museum, said that the National Assembly was anxious for peace with both England and France, and for friendship in addition with England. Chettahs have begun again to make their appearance in the regions north-west and west of Aleppo. The elaborate "Chettah" organisation along the Turco-Syrian frontier is sometimes regarded as a measure of protection for the Turkish flank in the event of an advance on Mosul and of French co-operation with us. It is difficult, however, to reconcile this view with the regular passage of bands into Syria, and their evasion into Turkey when pursued. It would rather seem that the Chettahs are deliberately organised by the Turks in the hope of making things difficult for the French, and eventually inducing them to abandon a considerable part of Northern Syria.

These Turkish oscillations between France and England are presumably part of Turkey's immemorial game with Europe. Since the war, France has been the first dupe, and the Turks doubtless hope that we shall now be equally ingenuous.

I have &c.

W.A. SMART

F.O. 424/257, p. 58, No.88

No. 102

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 203

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 3, 1923
(Received April 9)

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 216, of the 2nd April and previous correspondence relative to political developments at Angora, I think it will be of interest to place on record a more detailed account of the events of the last week.

2. The Ali Shukri incident undoubtedly did much to precipitate a situation which has been brewing for some time past. This gentleman, whose family came

from Trebizond, was formerly a naval officer and earned some reputation as a patriot after 1908 by his activity in connection with the "Fleet Committee" and the development of the navy and ancillary transport services. He served during the war, but was retired after the armistice and appears then to have devoted himself to politics. At Angora he became identified with the Opposition Party, known as the Second Group, and started in January last the "Tan" newspaper, which, while vying with other organs in strident patriotism and anti-Allied, including anti-British, propaganda, has attacked the Kemalist Government strongly on questions of domestic policy. It took a particularly active part in the campaign in favour of the Law on Personal Liberty, which was passed some weeks ago by the Assembly, but which continues to be a bone of contention, as the Government has made several attempts to have it modified.

3. On the 27th March Ali Shukri suddenly disappeared. His friends raised an outcry in the Assembly on the 29th March. The Government deprecated any hasty assumption that he was dead or that, if so, he had been victim of a political crime, but promised that everything possible would be done to elucidate the matter. To complete the story, suspicion at once attached to the notorious Laz chieftain, Osman Agha, who had apparently invited or summoned Ali Shukri to his house on the evening of his disappearance, and the corpse of Ali Shukri was discovered on the 1st April by following the simple clue of a cart-track from Osman's house in the country, near Angora, to a place a short distance away. Certain associates of Osman had already been arrested before the corpse was found, but it was announced that Osman himself had fled. This proves to have been untrue. He was ascertained to be hiding in his own property. Gendarmes and troops were sent to arrest him. A stiff fight ensued on the morning of the 2nd April. Osman was killed, his band sustained several casualties, and the attacking party lost at least one man dead.

4. Osman Agha's name is already familiar to your Lordship. A man of humble origin, but some personality, he established himself as a sort of petty tyrant at Kerassund early in the armistice period. He and his Laz band were the terror of the Christian inhabitants. He professed devotion to the national cause, and was of sufficient importance to be left undisturbed in his position as a band leader when the Angora Government set itself to supersede the loose band organisation of the earlier days of the national movement by a regular army. His position was regularised by making him an honorary lieutenant-colonel, but he was allowed great freedom, and operated as a kind of condottiere with a wide radius of action. During the last couple of years he has been on the confine of the Caucasus and in the nearer parts of Kurdistan. He recently visited Constantinople, and was reported to be active in Thrace, but he seems to have gone recently to Angora. He had amassed considerable wealth in the course of

his adventures, and had acquired a property not far from the capital, apparently in the same neighbourhood in which Mustafa Kemal resides. In the eyes of the Christians of this country, he was the incarnation of barbarous cruelty and fanaticism. For the Turks, and more particularly the Lazs, he had become a sort of national hero.

5. There is no reason to suspect Mustafa Kemal or any responsible statesman at Angora of complicity in the murder of Ali Shukri. It is pretty clear that it was primarily the result of a Laz vendetta. It is closely connected with an episode at Trebizond last year, when one Yahya, the head of the Guild of Caikjis, and two other persons were murdered some little way out of the town. The facts of that incident were never elucidated, but it had a political background connected with a nascent anti-Kemalist movement and a scandal in the local Defence of Rights organisation. The Government was violently criticised for its failure to see justice done, and Ali Shukri was one of the critics. Thus the whole story is mixed up with politics, and, if Mustafa Kemal and the Government may be acquitted of direct responsibility for the murder of Ali Shukri, they cannot escape responsibility for the indirect consequences of having tolerated for their own purposes a ruffian like Osman Agha. They have now sought to protect themselves by energetic action, and have subscribed as enthusiastically as the Opposition to the doctrine that such a murder is an outrage on the sovereign people in the person of one of its representatives. They are probably secretly pleased to be rid of Osman, who has served his turn and might have become an embarrassment. Two birds have in fact, been killed with one stone, and Mustafa Kemal and his friends have the satisfaction of not even having had to throw it.

6. This medieval episode has provided the setting for a political crisis of the most up-to-date type. The already more than simmering opposition boiled over as a result of it. Mustafa Kemal and his party, with characteristic resolution, decided to turn the situation to their own account. The Defence of Rights Association decided on the morning of the 1st April to move in the Assembly that new elections should be held within a maximum period of two months. That afternoon a group of 120 Deputies laid the motion before the Assembly, and proposed a short draft law annulling the special provision that the present Grand National Assembly should continue to sit until the realisation of the national aims. Immediately after the motion had been laid, İsmet Pasha spoke in support of it. He began by explaining the tenor of the Allied note which had been received the evening before. He took the line that the note provided a basis of further discussion with the Allies, but that the result of such discussion must be uncertain. The Government should therefore, on the one hand, continue its efforts to bring about peace on the basis laid down and in virtue of

the authority conferred on it by the Assembly on the 6th March, while, on the other hand, new elections should be held in order that a definite and up-to-date expression of the national will should be given. This amounted to saying that the Government relied on the decision on the 6th March as justifying it in dealing with the Allied note, but that a new Assembly would have to decide the final issue between peace or war.

7. Ismet Pasha was reproached by certain Opposition Deputies with having opposed a proposal to hold new elections when it was put forward by them some weeks ago. The motion was however, unanimously accepted in principle, and the Assembly proceeded to consider the details of the draft law. The Opposition took exception to the wording of the material article abrogating the existing special provision regarding the life of the present Assembly, but the drift of their objection is not clear from the reports so far published here. Anyhow, the law was accepted as drafted by the authors of the motion. It was also agreed to put in hand at once certain modifications of the present electoral law of July 1908. A proposal that no member of the present Assembly should present himself for re-election was rejected. Later in the day instructions were issued to all provincial authorities to proceed with the preliminary steps for the elections on the basis of the law of 1908.

8. Stress is laid on the fact that the present Assembly is to continue to exercise all its functions until the new Assembly is elected. All parties unite in presenting the Assembly as having risen to a great height of patriotism, and having shown by its unanimity that an united Turkey stands four-square to the world. It is significant that Mustafa Kemal did not intervene in the debate until after the decision had been taken, when he rose to congratulate the Assembly on its decision, to affirm the sovereignty of the people, and to declare (somewhat gratuitously unless he were accused) that "there is not, and cannot be, monarch or dictator in the Turkish world." On at least one previous occasion when he has to meet trouble half way he has resorted to this same device of speaking after the Assembly had pronounced itself.

9. It is not easy at this distance to appreciate the full significance of this sensational development. The following is a very tentative attempt to estimate the motives and intentions of the contesting parties:

Mustafa Kemal and his closest supporters are eager for peace, though they are unwilling and perhaps afraid to conclude it unless they can extract some further concessions from the Allies. They are determined that Ismet Pasha shall go to Lausanne as soon as possible. Having committed the Assembly on the 6th March to give them a fairly free hand, they wish now to keep the Assembly out of the peace negotiations as much as possible. They have, however,

irreconcilable elements in the Assembly to deal with, and no longer command a majority for all purposes. They therefore wish to convert the present Assembly into a sort of current business assembly only for the next few weeks. They are prepared to stake a great deal on their chances in the new elections. The Opposition has grown too powerful to be stifled or ignored, but Mustafa Kemal probably thinks he has a better grip of the country. In his recent tours he has made a strong bid for the agricultural vote. The Economic congress at Smyrna was very largely composed of agricultural delegates. Kiazim Karabekir, who presided over it, appears to be a supporter of Mustafa Kemal, despite the legend to the contrary which has grown around his name. These delegates have doubtless by now carried Kemalist propaganda to districts not tapped by Mustafa Kemal himself. The machinery of government is also largely under Kemalist control, nor has the pasha yet despaired of attaching to himself a section of the old Union and Progress Organisation. In Constantinople, a potential stronghold of the Opposition, owing to the freedom of action enjoyed by recalcitrant members of the old Committee of Union and Progress and the prevalence of discontent among ex-officials and dejected traders, strenuous efforts have been made to fortify the "Defence of Rights" organisation. Mustafa Kemal knows that he is in for a struggle, but he may well hope that by engaging in it now he will emerge a dictator.

10. The Opposition, consisting largely of faithful adherents of the old committee, think they are superior to the Kemalists in power of organisation. As they have not the making of peace in their hands, they can for the present shout "The National Pact and nothing but the National Pact!" louder than Mustafa Kemal himself. They rely for success at the polls on discontent and on the support of Conservative elements such as those who wish to see power restored to the throne, to see Constantinople retained as the capital, to see more real respect shown towards Islamic institutions and to see woman kept in her place.

11. There is no such thing as a free election in this country, but I think that on this occasion there will be a more genuine struggle between contending principles and the politicians who stand for them than in any election since 1908. It is a little disconcerting that the Allies should have to go into conference with the knowledge that anything that they may be agreed to will have to be referred to a new Assembly. The present Assembly has, however, become so uncertain a quantity that I do not think we have much to lose by any change; and if, as at present seems probable, Mustafa Kemal succeeds in bringing together a new Assembly committed to his programme, I think that the chance of peace will be affected favourably rather than otherwise. We shall, however,

have much trouble at the conference, for Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha are only moderates in a comparative sense.

As soon as I receive particulars of any changes in the electoral Law I shall hope to report on the constitutional aspects of the present situation which are not without interest.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9130/E. 3590

F.O. 424/257, p. 23-24, 33

No. 103

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 383
Telegraphic

PARIS, April 10, 1923
(Received April 11)

My telegram No. 376

M. Poincaré asked me to-day whether His Majesty's Government had yet decided who would be their chief representative at Lausanne, so I informed him that Sir Horace Rumbold had been chosen. He thereupon replied that in that case the French Government would in all probability appoint General Pellé to be their chief delegate. He presumed that that appointment would be agreeable to His Majesty's Government, as General Pellé and Sir H. Rumbold had always got on very well together. I replied that I was convinced that this would meet with the entire approval of His Majesty's Government.

M. Poincaré seemed pessimistic.

1. As to the probability of concluding a satisfactory treaty; and
2. As to the chances of its future ratification,

in view of the state of chaos now existing at Angora, where Mustafa Kemal had quite recently had to open fire on his own guards.

F.O. 424/257, p. 34, No. 50

No. 104

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 385
Telegraphic

PARIS, April 11, 1923
(Received April 12)

My telegram No 383

A magnified reflection of M. Poincaré's pessimism is to be found in to-day's press. "Pertinax," in the "Echo de Paris," discusses the Chester scheme and declares that it is merely a means used by Angora for annulling concessions in Asia Minor already promised and practically granted to French and British groups. Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues simply intended to resume their liberty of action, and France, who in June 1914 granted a loan of 500 million francs for the Armenian railway lines, is now left with that sum lost to her, and is quietly told that an agreement cannot be concluded until the payment of the second instalment of 500 millions. "Pertinax" concludes his article by stating that the Allies are now confronted in Turkey with a revolutionary and tyrannical power which does not intend to recognise the most legitimate rights and is itself incapable of replacing the régime which it overthrew. "What is the use of going to Lausanne? For the moment the best plan is to let the naval and even the military power of the Greeks bring the Turks back to an appreciation of realities."

It would be difficult to imagine a more striking tribute to the Near East policy of His Majesty's Government.

M. Gauvin, in the "Journal des Débats," continues to deplore the mistaken policy of the French Government, whose incredible weakness has resulted in the Turks turning towards the English, who knew how to stand out against them, and towards the Americans, who possessed the necessary capital. The Turks, after having made use of France, were now flouting her.

F.O. 424/257, p. 37, No. 57

No. 105

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.219

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 11, 1923
(Received April 16)

With reference to my despatch No.208 of the 2nd April, I have the honour to state that the internal political situation in this country continues to develop apace, although there have been no incidents so sensational as those of the 1st April and the preceeding week.

2. In one particular it is necessary to correct my despatch under reference. I said in it that the Grand National Assembly had accepted the proposal for the holding of new elections in the form in which it was laid before the Assembly by the Government Party. A closer examination of the rather confused accounts of what passed shows that this was not so. The Opposition seem to have scored a point by getting the Assembly to record a "decision" that new elections should be held instead of passing a new law abrogating one already in existence. The real point at issue is still obscure, and is so technical that it is not worth while to trouble your Lordship with speculations regarding it. What can safely be affirmed is that both sides were playing for future position, and the distinction made may eventually prove to be one of considerable practical importance.

3. Having decided that new elections should be held, the Assembly went on to amend the electoral law. I enclose a translation of the new law which was passed by the Assembly on the 3rd April.* It is not intended to supersede the existing law except as regards the important points which it specifically deals with. The system of election by colleges of secondary electors is maintained, but the proportion of Deputies to the male population is fixed at 1 to 20,000 instead of 50,000 as heretofore, and that of secondary electors to the male population at 1 to 200 instead of 500. All males over 18 years of age are given the right to vote - a provision which extends the suffrage considerably. A proposal to give the vote to women does not seem to have received any support. The number of Deputies likely to be elected to the Assembly under the new system is variously estimated, but may be placed at about 400, whom about twenty-four will sit for Constantinople.

4. The last week had witnessed a growing storm of confused controversy as to what parties exist and what they stand for. As I pointed out in my despatch No.147 of the 7th March, the Defence of Rights Association, which is associated

* Ciltte.yok - BN5.

more particularly with the name of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, has not hitherto been represented as being a political party. The fiction that it was a national organisation was maintained until a few days ago to such an extent that the Opposition elements, popularly known as the Second group, were able to represent themselves not as being a party in the Assembly, but as being a second group of the Defence of Rights organisation itself.

5. The situation was to some extent clarified on the 7th April. It was announced that at a meeting held at Reouf Bey's house the previous night it had been decided to convert the "Defence of Rights Group" into the "People's Party" and to issue a manifesto defining the party's programme in the elections. The meeting was presided over by Mustafa Kemal, and among those who attended it were Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, Fethi Bey, Feizi Bey and Yunus Nadi Bey. The manifesto was duly issued on the 8th April over Mustafa Kemal's signature. I enclose a French translation taken from the Stamboul newspaper.*

6. The manifesto of the People's Party has much in common with numerous similar documents issued in this country since 1908. It of course promises measures to secure internal tranquillity, legislative reform and all the staple blessings. Its distinguishing features are, however, a very definite assertion that the national sovereignty has come to stay, and that the decision of the 1st November last make an end of the Sultanate is irrevocable; a series of detailed promises designed to attract the popular vote and especially the agricultural vote; and more generally worded promises intended to attract the military element and the official class. The concluding passage regarding peace is also significant.

7. Concurrently with these developments the Kemalist press has manifested an increasing tendency to speak openly of the revival of the Committee of Union and Progress as one of the dangers threatening the country, to accuse the Opposition generally of being untrue to the principle of national sovereignty, and to raise the cries of "reaction" and "occult forces." The activities of Kemalist workers widely advertised, and a bit has been made for the support of labour in Constantinople, where it is organised in the form of the old guilds or more modern associations, including various trades unions and the body, consisting largely of tramway workers, which dignifies itself with the name of Labour Party.

8. It will be observed that the persons mentioned above as being concerned with Mustafa Kemal in the launching of the People's Party comprise

* Ciltte yok. - BNS.

three, namely, Kiazim Kara Bekir, Reouf and Fethi, who have hitherto been considered dark horses, and one violent extremist, namely Yunus Nadi, the editor of the scurrilous "Yeni Gyn" newspaper. It seems probable, especially as the meeting took place in Reouf Bey's house, that Mustafa Kemal has had to enter into certain commitments, but he certainly appears to have reconstructed his position on a fairly solid political basis, and unless he has to face serious disaffection in the army, which is possible, the People's Party ought to stand a great chance of success at the polls. As regards the army, the fact that Fevzi Pasha is not mentioned as having attended the meeting is perhaps significant, in view of recurring rumours that he has become the leader of the military malcontents. Ismet Pasha's name does not appear either, but this is more likely to be due to his desire to avoid an active rôle in party politics on the eve of the Peace Conference than to any difference of opinion between him and Mustafa Kemal.

9. The Opposition elements are hampered by their heterogeneity, and, in the case of the most coherent group among them, i.e., the stalwarts of the old Committee of Union and Progress, by the evil past of the committee. It is difficult for them to come into the open with a positive policy opposed to that of Mustafa Kemal. They are, however, active in various directions. I have heard that some of them contemplate issuing a counter-manifesto advocating the creation by the new Grand National Assembly of a second Chamber, which with the Assembly itself would form a Constituent Assembly; the elaboration by the latter of a Constitution restoring the temporal power of the throne with succession by primogeniture; the revival of a Cabinet system of executive administration; direct election; and the maintenance of Constantinople as the capital. This information reaches me indirectly from no less a person than Jahid Bey of the "Tanin." This fact invests it with importance, but I still doubt whether the Opposition dare challenge so openly the Kemalist régime, again, an important section in the army can be relied on to support the challenge. The initial step would be an enormous one. If it could be taken successfully great support would be found in the country for a conservative policy in home affairs.

10. I shall be grateful if the statement attributed to Jahid Bey may be treated as confidential.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9130/E.3845

F.O. 424/257, p.53-55, No.81

* Ciltine yok. - BNŞ

No. 106

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.220

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 11, 1923
(Received April 16)

My Lord,

In continuation of my despatch No.203, I have the honour to report some supplementary information which I have received from reliable sources with regard to the incidents which followed on the recent murder at Angora of the Deputy Ali Shukri Bey.

2. A member of the Grand National Assembly has stated that after the murder of Ali Shukri Bey, Osman Agha, feeling that he was in considerable danger, ordered his band to arrest Mustafa Kemal with the intention of holding the latter as a hostage. Mustafa Kemal however, got wind of this and escaped with his wife in a motor-car in the nick of time. Meanwhile, the authorities had issued the necessary orders that Osman Agha's house was to be surrounded, and that he was to be captured. It is added in this connection that Mustafa Kemal gave a strong hint that Osman Agha was not to be taken alive.

3. I understand that Colonel Mougin has reported that amongst the Lazes killed with Osman Agha were five who formed part of Mustafa Kemal's bodyguard, and that Mustafa Kemal has in consequence been obliged to dissolve that force. It is reported that Osman Agha's body was brought to Angora it was suspended head downwards from a gibbet erected in front of the Grand National Assembly. It is evident from the foregoing that Mustafa Kemal's rôle in the whole matter was very *louche*, as it is supposed that he was not ignorant of Osman Agha's intention to do away with Ali Shukri Bey. The whole incident is an eloquent commentary on present-day methods in the Nationalist capital.

4. I am also informed that the comparative luxury in which Mustafa Kemal lives at his villa outside Angora is producing a bad effect on many of the Deputies of the Grand National Assembly.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9130/E. 3846

F.O. 424/257, p. 55, No.82

No. 107

Mr. Hadkinson, British Vice-Consul at Mitylene, to C.H. Bentinck, Athens

No.6

MITYLENE, April 12th 1923

Sir,

Please find enclosed herewith copies of two proclamations in Turkish, issued by the Circassians, and destined to be distributed on the opposite coast, where they intend to land three or four days hence. One bears the reproduction of a photograph of Mustafa Kemal with his wife and speaks against him.

The Greek Military Authorities are training about 1400 men, mostly Circassians, with the object of sending them into Asia Minor, in order to incite the population there to rise against Mustafa Kemal. In three or four days time some 600 of them will be sent over to Anatolia by the Greek destroyer "Aspis".

The present head of this movement is a certain Circassian, ex-major of the Turkish army, Eshref Bey Coutsou Zade who arrived here a month ago, from Berlin where they say they have their head-office. He is a well educated man. After Eshref comes Ex-Colonel Emin Bey Kots at the head of 780 men, then Hamid Bey Tsatsan, a well known brigand of the Aivali district with 220 men, Kadri Bey, son of Anzavour, and aide de Camp of Etem Bey with 180 men. It is this Kadri Bey that is about to be sent to the opposite coast with the above mentioned 600 men. Daout Bey with 170 men, Armenian Tsakidji with 50 men.

The men get 3 drahtmas a day besides their food while the chiefs get the pay of Greek Officers.

About four months ago a Circassian named Shefket Bey with 28 men, landed at Sarmoussaki (Aivali district) and went into the Interior where he mustered a force of 1700 men who are now fighting against Kemal's forces. The Turkish papers in Constantinople often write about his doings, and lately they reported that he has destroyed two bridges, one between Tjobjan Hissar and Oushak and another between Pandermo and Balukiesser. He reports to various of his friends here that 70% of the whole Turkish population of Asia Minor are against Kemal, and that he can easily make up a force of 10.000 men, if he is provided with the means.

Three or four days ago 35 Circassians were landed by the "Aspis" close to Sarmoussaki. These men will signal here when the right time comes for the said 600 to join them.

The whole force will be divided into four parties; one will advance from Adalia, the second from Oushak, Konia, the third from Balokiesser Broussa, and the fourth from Aivadjik Giounen.

I am, Sir, &c.

F. HADKINSON

F.O. 371/9102

No. 108

Mr. William Erskine, Sofia, to The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 92

SOFIA, April 17, 1923

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Vice Consul at Varna reporting a press campaign at Adrianople and protests by the Turkish Committee at Varna against Mustafa Kemal for his lack of energy in promoting the cause of autonomy for Western Thrace.

As the latter is the policy advocated by the Bulgarian Government and would presumably form a necessary condition of any agreement between them and the Turkish Government this evidence as to Kemal's failure to support it is not without interest in view of recent reports of secret negotiations between them.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I am Sir, &

WILLIAM ERSKINE

F.O. 371/9101

ENCLOSURE IN No. 108

British Vice Consulate at Varna to British Legation at Sofia

VARNA, 12 April 1923

Sir,

I have the honour to report that according to information which I have just received a new Turkish Newspaper has now made its appearance in

Adrianople, called the "Arda", after the locally famous river of that name, and that is carrying on a fierce campaign against Mustafa Kemal Pasha, whom it accuses of lack of energy in advocating the cause of an autonomous Western Thrace, which policy, according to this paper, should be imposed, if necessary by force of arms.

The local Varna Turkish Committee has likewise addressed notes of protest to Kemal Pasha in the above sense. It is believed that all other Turkish organisations in Bulgaria are acting in a similar way.

I am Sir, &

Vice Consul (sign)

F.O. 371/9101

No. 109

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 239

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 18, 1923

(Received April 23)

My Lord,

Since I wrote my despatch No. 219 of the 11th April there have been several developments in the internal situation in this country which, while not worth reporting in all their details, deserve to be briefly summarised. The net result of them shows that Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his supporters are determined to stick at nothing to paralyse opposition and to secure success in the elections.

2. The "Defence of Rights" organisation continues to work under that name. It is apparently intended that the transformation into the "People's Party" will take place only when the new Grand National Assembly comes into being. The main objectives of the organisation during the past week have been to make sure of Constantinople, hitherto a potential stronghold of the old Union and Progress party, and to discredit the "second group" - still sometimes described as the second group of the Defence of Rights organisation itself - at Angora.

3. On the 12th April the local press published a manifesto addressed by Mustafa Kemal to the inhabitants of Constantinople. The Pasha says everything short of promising to restore Constantinople to its position as capital. He

congratulates its people on their courage in adversity. He reminds them that the Defence of Rights Association has made it its object to deliver them, but that the deliverance is not yet complete. He invites their confidence in the organisation, and entreats them not to encourage the foreigner by dispersing their suffrages.

4. It is announced in the press that several of the leading lights of the Kemalist movement will be put forward as candidates for the representation of Constantinople in the new Grand National Assembly. Various measures have been taken to ensure their election, even should their personal prestige not suffice. The prefecture of the city, which has a considerable role to play in the supervision of the elections, has fallen under suspicion owing to the success of the Union and Progress party in securing the return of a majority of its sympathisers in the recent local elections to the Council of the Prefecture. The representatives of the council on the board charged with the supervision of the elections to the Assembly have been chosen from the minority. To make assurance doubly sure, the prefect of the city, suspected of being himself politically unsound from the Kemalist point of view, or else merely of being weak, has been dismissed. The newly arrived Governor-General of Constantinople has been appointed acting prefect.

5. The "Tanin", the one newspaper which voices, though with some caution, the views of the Union and Progress Party, created a sensation on the 14th April by an article in which the editor, Jahid Bey, defined the position of his party. It did not, he said, exist officially as a party, but it had nevertheless an organisation. Its leaders had held an unofficial congress. They had before them two groups in the Grand National Assembly. There were Unionists in both groups. There were no essential differences between their principles and those of the first group, for Mustafa Kemal had carried forward with greater boldness the policy of the original Union and Progress organisation. The only point of difference had reference to the question of equilibrium between the powers of the State, which the Unionists thought it necessary to restore. They did not seek to wrest authority from the Nationalists. They had offered their collaboration to Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

6. The sting of this article lay in its attack on the Angora constitutional system and in the suggestion that the Unionists, as a party organisation, are important enough to make terms with the rulers of Angora. If "national sovereignty" is mainly advertised as meaning the permanent abolition of the Sultanate, it is no less a cardinal principle of Mustafa Kemal and his followers that it involves the unification of all power, executive as well as legislative, in the grand National Assembly. Any attempt to separate these powers would by them be regarded as a step towards the revival of the temporal authority of the

throne. Further, if the Union and Progress party were admittedly strong enough to impose terms today, they might easily be strong enough to oust the Kemalist leaders altogether to-morrow. Jahid Bey's article has provoked a volley of attack on the Union and Progress party and a repudiation of the suggestion that any offer of collaboration has been made or, if made, could be accepted. Ismail Djambulat Bey, the reputed bearer of the offer, is reported to have already left Angora on his way back to Constantinople.

7. From Angora itself it was reported a few days ago that the second group were contemplating the issue of a manifesto of their own as a counterblast to that of the first group, which I summarised in my despatch under reference, and that they were expected to advocate the restoration of executive authority to the Caliph and the separation of the powers. The "Vakt" newspaper, in announcing this on the 14th April, added that the members of the second group were divided as to how much power should be given to the Caliph. On the following day it published a further telegram from Angora to the effect that rumours of activity on the part of the second group in connection with the elections were baseless, and that for some days the group's club-house had been deserted.

8. It was not until the 15th April, however, that the Kemalists brought off their greatest *coup*. On that day they secured the adoption by the Assembly of a draft law which had been laid on the table several days previously, but which the Assembly had refused to vote off-hand. This law makes it *lèse-patrie* to oppose by word, by writing or by act the decision of the 1st November last abolishing the Sultanate and asserting the invisible sovereignty of the Assembly as sole representative of the people, or to question the legitimacy of the Assembly. This law is designed to make all opposition to the dominant faction impossible, the penalty for *lèse-patrie* being death. If applied strictly it will prevent any opposition group, whether Union and Progress or merely Conservative, from fighting the Kemalists, except by intrigue or more or less revolutionary methods.

9. Mustafa Kemal and his friends have evidently decided that their watchword must be "thorough", if they are to make sure of sweeping the country. Two members of the Angora Government have been identified with the second group. One, the Commissioner for Justice, is reported to have announced his conversion to the first group, and the report is probably true, though in some quarters it is denied. The other, the Commissioner for Religious Affairs, has been compelled to resign as a result of accusations levelled against him. A further significant feature of the situation is that the Government now appears to have no difficulty in obtaining large majorities in an Assembly which a month ago was seething with opposition. The death of Ali

Shukri Bey has probably led a good many Deputies to reflect that, even in a country as liberal as Anatolia, open antagonism to the Government is apt to lead to unfortunate accidents.

I have, &

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

F.O. 424/257, p.68. No.112

No. 110

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 148
Telegraphic

ATHENS, April 20, 1923
(Received April 20)

My telegram No 129.

I have today learnt by despatch from British vice-consul at Mitylene, dated 12th April, that Greek military authorities were training in island 1400 men, mostly Circassians, with object of sending them to Asia Minor to instigate rising against Kemal. Six hundred of them were to leave in Greek destroyer "Aspis" three or four days after date of despatch.

A body of thirty-five Circassians had, he states, already been landed by same destroyer to give signal for 600 to follow.

I am drawing serious attention of Ministry for Foreign Affairs privately to this matter.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

F.O. 424/257, p. 1, No.102

No. 111

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 248

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 24, 1923
(Received April 30)

My Lord,

As anticipated in Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch No.239 of the 18th instant, the effect of the recent adoption of the modification of the Treason Law

by the Grand National Assembly seems effectively to have stifled all opposition to Mustafa Kemal's party in the preparations for the forthcoming elections.

2. During the past week the "Second Group", which the Kemalist organisation has made such efforts to discredit, has shown little sign of life, while a recent telegram from Angora states that its headquarters are deserted and the group dissolved. In the case of the Union and Progress Party, the effect has been little less marked, and the organ of the party has been endeavouring to cloak its retirement from the electoral contest with high-sounding phrases regarding the necessity for solidarity at the present delicate juncture. The return empty-handed to Constantinople of Ismail Djambolat Bey, to whose mission reference was made in paragraph 6 of Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch under reference, has been followed by a declaration by Kemal Bey, Minister of Ravitaillement in the Committee of Union and Progress Government during the war, to the effect that the party has withdrawn in order to avoid any division in the country before the conclusion of peace, and that it has taken a definite decision to remain absolutely neutral. This attitude will not, however, I imagine, prevent the Unionists from endeavouring to smuggle some at least of their adherents into the new Assembly under the guise of Kemalists.

3. Meanwhile the dominant party is losing no time in pushing forward its preparations. Nominations will not be completed until the end of the month of Ramazan, which commenced on the 17th instant, but it is clear that there will be no dearth of candidates, as it is stated that over 8000 persons, including 700 for Constantinople alone, have already applied for nomination to the organisation of the "Defence of Rights" party. This plethora of candidates prompted the Turkish paper "İleri" to suggest on the 21st instant that, as the majority of these budding candidates were in search of employment, it would be well to provide that all Deputies should have some sort of profession, as otherwise the new Assembly would be composed exclusively of ex-Government officials!

4. It has hitherto been difficult to forecast the attitude of the non-Turkish elements towards the elections, but this is now becoming clearer. With treason and death as the price of opposition, they have been left little latitude in their choice, and it is reported that, as was to be expected, all Christians remaining in Anatolia have decided to participate on the side of the "Defence of Rights" party.

5. As regards Constantinople itself, some doubt still exists as to the line which will be adopted by the Greek population, who are awaiting advice from their Patriarchate. Present indications point, however, to their probable complete abstention.

6. The Jewish and Armenian communities have, on the other hand, decided on the recommendation of their religious leaders to give their support

to the Kemalist candidates. At one time it was proposed that at least two leading Jews should invite the suffrages of the electors. Influenced no doubt by a declaration by the new Vali, Haidar Bey, to the effect that the non-Turkish elements would be unable to obtain majorities sufficient to secure the election of any of their own candidates unless they collaborated with the Turkish population, it is now understood that this proposal has been abandoned.

7. The position of the Armenian community was clearly defined on the 20th instant, when the local press published the text of a telegram addressed in the name of the Armenians of Constantinople to Mustafa Kemal Pasha stating that the Armenians, like all the children of the Fatherland, would take part in the elections and would give their votes to the candidates of the "Defence of Rights" party. This telegram was signed by the president of the Lay Council of the Armenian Patriarchate and by another member of the same council, M. Kerestedjian, who is at the same time president of the Armeno-Turkish Rapprochement Committee, the formation of which was reported in my despatch No.33 of the 16th January last.

8. In adopting this attitude the Armenian Patriarchate and community are merely pursuing the policy which they have followed with little apparent success since the departure of Mgr. Zaven in December last, and which has for its object the removal of difficulties with the present Turkish Government, the recognition of the Patriarchate and the resumption of official relations between the Patriarchate and the Government. A further example of this endeavour to placate was afforded on the 23rd instant (which, as the anniversary of the opening of the Grand National Assembly at Angora, has been made into a national holiday), when by order of the Patriarchate the offices of the Patriarchate as well as all Armenian schools and institutions were closed and beflagged in honour of the national fête. I learn, moreover, that the above committee recently proposed to send at an early date to Angora an Armeno-Turkish delegation for the purpose of discussing questions affecting the Armenians of Constantinople. On their approaching the local Nationalist authorities, the promoters were, however advised to do nothing pending the conclusion of the elections.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Sir Horace Rumbold.

I have, &

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9130/E.4313

F.O. 424/257, p.98-99, No.149

No. 112

A Report of British Secret Intelligence Service on Turkey

No. 1140

24. 4. 1923

The Elections to the Great National Assembly

According to information obtained during the first week of April from official sources in Constantinople, the electoral campaign was then in full progress. The Central Committee of the Defence of National Rights Party, assisted by the Government had commenced an active campaign on which considerable sums were being expended.

Several deputies and other political propagandists had been sent to Constantinople by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to organise the formation of the "Halk Firkası" (Popular Party). The principal organisers of this party in Constantinople were Rassi Hodja and Ali Bey, deputy for Kutahia.

In educated circles in Constantinople there was considerable criticism of the regime at Angora whose passion for "Art and Science in the new Turkey" had been characterised as a passion for the Art and Science of Bakshish.

At the time of reporting the following were the most active parties in the election campaign:

- (i) The Defence of National Rights, 1st group (government)
- (ii) The Defence of National Rights, 2nd group (opposition)
- (iii) The The National Defence Party, formed during the early part of the Armistice period and which has continued to exist. It is on the opposition side.
- (iv) Union and Progress.
- (v) The Workmen.

The Unionists, while refraining from open activities during the elections, were continuing their machinations underground. The broad outline of their policy was apparently to secure as many seats as possible under the guise of partisans of other parties, and once the moment was regarded as propitious, to throw off the mask and declare a solid bloc once more, and if possible secure the reins of the government.

There were a number of Unionists both in the 1st and 2nd groups of the Defence of National Rights Party, as well as among the Independents.

The Committee was confident of gaining several towns, and with the help of deputies returned under other party names, to effect a surprise coup, and once more revive the old organisation.

Comment by representative in Turkey: The Unionist plan, which is by no means a new one, is confidently spoken of by prominent Unionists in Constantinople as almost certain of ultimate realisation, but the opinion of others who are conversant with the political atmosphere of Anatolia is not so confident. It seems evident that the present group in power is not blind to Unionist activities, and that it will retain control for some considerable time to come.

F.O. 371/9130

No. 113

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 443

PARIS, April 30, 1923

Telegraphic

"Matin" today publishes an interview with General Pellé after his conversation yesterday with M. Poincaré and General Weygand. General Pellé, while recognising desire of Turkish delegation at Lausanne to conclude peace, expresses doubt as to disposition of Angora, and refers to the menace of Turkish troops on Syrian frontier and Mustafa Kemal's unpleasant language during his expedition to Cilicia. He, however, doubts seriousness of this menace, as Turks must realise "the solidity of our positions in Syria as at Constantinople, from which it is impossible to dislodge us by force," and thinks also that the Greek menace in Thrace will deter them.

Article continues by stating that it has been decided to add to the Syrian forces troops from Algerian and Moroccan contingents and that General Weygand will have the means to meet any eventuality. This is a purely precautionary measure; France desires nothing more than a just peace, but she cannot allow her representatives to negotiate under Kemalist threats.

M. Herbet, however, in the "Temps" this evening, denies that it was decided during yesterday's conversation at the Quai d'Orsay to send two

divisions to Syria or that the despatch of reinforcements was discussed yesterday either with M. Poincaré or M. Peretti de la Rocca. I understand, however, that the Press Bureau at the Quai d'Orsay adopt a hedging attitude on this point and merely state that no decision has been actually come to. M. Herbette concludes by saying that he refuses to regard it as certain, or inevitable, that the Turks will seek to quarrel with France in order to do Germany a service "and to furnish a pretext for the occupation in perpetuity of Gallipoli."

F.O. 424/257, p.104, No.160

No. 114

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 265

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 1, 1923
(Received May 7)

My Lord,

The past week has witnessed no important development in the preparations for the forthcoming Turkish elections, the local press having been principally occupied in reporting and commenting on the proceedings of the Lausanne Conference.

2. From such comments on the elections as have appeared, however, it is apparent that Mustafa Kemal's party is actively though quietly completing its organisation for sweeping the country when, on the conclusion of Bairam, the struggle, one-sided though it may probably be, will really open. The electoral lists are nearing completion, and the claims of the thousands of candidates for nomination are being scrutinised by a commission appointed by the party organisation.

3. In my despatch No.248 of the 24th ultimo I had the honour to inform your Lordship that the "Second Group", which was expected to constitute the chief opposition to Mustafa Kemal's party, had deserted its headquarters at Angora. During the last few days most of its members have arrived in Constantinople, and it is reported that they will shortly commence the publication here of their organ, the "Tan", which has hitherto appeared in Angora. It is not yet definitely known, however, whether an active effort will be made by the group to secure the election of any of its members as Deputies for Constantinople.

4. Meanwhile there is little doubt that Mustafa Kemal and his party are seriously exercised regarding the fate of their candidates in Constantinople, which is expected to constitute the chief centre of opposition. For this reason it was at one time anticipated that several of the leading members of the party would be put forward in view of their prestige as candidates for Constantinople. It is possible however, that it may be considered derogatory to be elected Deputy for a town which is still in "enemy" occupation. An invitation was in fact issued to Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the name of the electors here, but in his reply, after referring to the fact that the complete liberation of the town has not yet been realised, he expresses his regret at being unable to accept it.

5. It therefore seems more probable, in my opinion, that the task of opposing any Second Group or other opposition candidates will be entrusted to some of the lesser lights of the Kemalist party. In the event of the latter meeting with defeat, this could be attributed to the fact that the electors were prevented through foreign influence from registering their true wishes, whereupon it would doubtless be easy, after the evacuation of the town by the Allies, to secure the quashing by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey of the elections in so far as Constantinople is concerned and the holding of fresh elections, when adequate measures could be taken to ensure that only approved candidates obtained election.

6. I am sending copy of this despatch to Sir H. Rumbold.

I have, &

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9130/Σ 4693

F.O. 24/257, p.126, No.193

No. 115

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.344

ATHENS, May 2, 1923
(Received May 14)

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No.154 of the 29th ultimo, to my despatch No.331 of the 25th ultimo, and to previous correspondence on the subject of the reported preparations for organising bands for operating against the Turks in

Asia Minor, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of two private letters which I addressed to the head of Political Bureau at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 20th and 25th ultimo, together with a copy of M. Politis's reply, dated the 27th ultimo, and of a further letter from me dated the 2nd May.

2. On receiving Mr. Vice-Consul Hadkinson's despatch No.6, enclosed in my despatch No.320 of the 21st April, I telegraphed to ask him the source of his information. He replied in a telegram dated the 25th April that the information had been received from the Circassian leader and others and had been confirmed by the commander of the Greek destroyer "Aspis". This news appeared to me to be so grave that I asked M. Politis to come and see me, and, in handing to him my second note, dated the 25th April, which as your Lordship will observe, referred to the departure of Cretan and other bands from Piraeus for Asia Minor, I confronted him with the information supplied in Mr. Hadkinson's telegram. I added that if it transpired that the commander of the Greek destroyer had really transported these bands to Asia Minor it appeared to me practically to amount to an act of war. From a military point of view it seemed to me that it would entail a perfectly useless and unnecessary loss of life, because I could see no military object which would be gained.

3. M. Politis quite agreed with me and promised to make immediate enquiries. He was, he said, quite sure that the Greek destroyer was in nowise implicated, but he would also look into this matter. He personally thought it more probable that the bands leaving Piraeus were being despatched to Thrace and Macedonia to guard the Greek communications against the komitajis, for he himself agreed that raids in Asia Minor could serve no military purpose.

4. On the 28th ultimo I received M. Politis's letter dated the 27th, the substance of which I reported to your Lordship in my telegram No.154. M. Politis does not mention the Greek destroyer, which, I had told him, appeared to me to be the most serious side of the question.

5. I have today received your Lordship's telegram No.68 of the 1st instant stating that the Greek explanation appears to be far from satisfactory, and I have accordingly addressed to M. Politis another letter, copy of which I have the honour to enclose. I have also again drawn his attention to the alleged intervention of the destroyer.

6. Copy of this despatch is being forwarded to Lausanne and Constantinople.

I have, &c.

C.H. BENTINCK

F.O. 424/257, p.150, No.226

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 115

Mr. Bentinck to M. Politis

ATHENES, le 20 Avril 1923

Mon Cher Politis,

Vous vous souviendrez sans doute de notre conversation du 8 courant sur la question d'une attaque que les Turcs prétendaient avoir été faite par une bande de Grecs de l'île de Samos sur la côte d'Asie Mineure. Vous avait dit que le Ministère n'en avait pas connaissance et que des ordres sévères avaient été donnés aux autorités des îles pour éviter une répétition de cette affaire.

Or, je viens de recevoir d'un Anglais, habitant de l'île de Mitylène, d'informations qui, s'il y en a de vérité, me paraissent assez graves. Je me permets donc de vous envoyer à titre privé un mémorandum là-dessus.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

C.H. BENTINCK

F.O. 424/257, p.151, No.226

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 115

Memorandum

ATHENS, April 20, 1923

His Britannic Majesty's Legation are informed that about 1400 men, mostly Circassians, were being trained at Mitylene by Greek military authorities

about the 12th instant with the object of being landed on the coast of Asia Minor in order to instigate a rising against Mustafa Kemal.

According to the same information, a body of 600 of these men was landed in Anatolia by the Greek destroyer "Aspis", following on a detachment of thirty-five men previously despatched in the same ship in order to reconnoitre.

The 1400 men are stated to receive pay and rations from the Greek authorities.

F.O. 424/257, p.151, No.226

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 115

Mr. Bentinck to M. Politis

(Personnelle)

ATHENES, le 25 Avril 1923

Mon Cher M. Politis,

Me référant à ma lettre du 20 courant, je me permets de tirer votre attention à nouveau sur la question des bandes destinées à opérer contre les Turcs en Asie Mineure et de vous envoyer ci-inclus un second petit mémorandum au sujet des informations que je viens de recevoir de plusieurs sources sur la formation des bandes crétoises.

Vous n'ignorez pas que si ces nouvelles sont correctes l'entreprise envisagée sera une violation au moins de l'esprit, si non aussi de la lettre, de la Convention de Moudania.

Je vous serai donc reconnaissant de bien vouloir me donner des renseignements autorisés à ce sujet pour transmettre à mon Gouvernement.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

C.H. BENTINCK

F.O. 424/257, p.151, No.226

ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 115

Memorandum

ATHENS, April 25, 1923

According to information received by His Britannic Majesty's Legation, in addition to the Circassian bands mentioned in the memorandum enclosed in Mr. Bentinck's letter to M. Politis of the 20th instant, a number of bands are being formed on Hellenic territory of Cretans and Asia Minor Greeks with the object of landing in Asia Minor.

Two Cretan bands are thus stated to have left Piraeus recently for this purpose and a third band to have left on Saturday last. A fourth bande will, it is said, leave this week, and a fifth is in process of organisation.

F.O. 424/257, p.151, No.226

ENCLOSURE 5 IN No. 115

M. Politis to Mr. Bentinck

ATHENES, le 27 avril 1923

Cher Mr. Bentinck,

En réponse à votre lettre en date du 25 de ce mois, je m'empresse de porter à votre connaissance que le Département de la Guerre m'informe que les bruits qui ont été, ces jours-ci, répandus au sujet de la formation de bandes destinées à opérer en Asie Mineure sont loin de correspondre à la réalité.

L'Etat-Major en effet, a autorisé l'organisation de groupes de volontaires hellènes, arméniens et circassiens uniquement dans le but d'une part de renforcer notre armée en Thrace, et d'autre part afin d'occuper plusieurs de ces malheureux se trouvant sans travail. Ces unités, soumises à la discipline militaire, sont destinées à être envoyées en Thrace occidentale.

Quant aux deux groupes de Circassiens qui se trouvent actuellement dans les îles, ils ont été formés parmi les Circassiens réfugiés dans les îles surtout en vue de les encadrer et les empêcher d'opérer des incursions en Asie Mineure.

J'espère que ces explications que m'ont fournies les Ministères de la Guerre et de la Marine suffiront à calmer les appréhensions qu'ont justement

fait naître les bruits relatifs à la formation de bandes destinées à opérer en Asie Mineure.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

POLITIS

F.O. 424/257, p.152, No.226

ENCLOSURE 6 IN No. 115

Mr. Bentinck to M. Politis

(Privé)

ATHENES, le 2 mai 1923

Mon cher M. Politis,

Je n'ai pas manqué de télégraphier à mon gouvernement le contenu de votre lettre du 27 courant au sujet de la formation des bandes grecques. Je viens de recevoir un télégramme de Lord Curzon par lequel il dit que l'explication que vous m'avez donnée ne lui paraît nullement satisfaisante. La formation de telles bandes n'aurait pour résultat le danger d'incidents qui, à l'état actuel des négociations à Lausanne, auraient des résultats déplorable.

Lord Curzon m'a chargé de vous expliquer ce qui précède et d'ajouter que, en cas d'incidents fâcheux, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pourrait se trouver dans l'impossibilité de donner aux intérêts grecs l'aide qu'il lui donne actuellement.

Je remarque en attendant que dans votre lettre vous n'avez pas fait allusion au contre-torpilleur "Aspis" dont je vous avais parlé et dont l'intervention prétendue m'avait paru tellement répréhensible.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

C.H. BENTINCK

F.O. 424/257, p.152, No.226

No. 116

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 273

Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 6, 1923

(Received May 6)

Following is appreciation of general situation:

Disorganisation and administrative chaos in Turkey is everywhere increasing. Pay of officials and even troops is months arrear. Latter are, I believe, on unpaid requisitions. Prolonged mobilisation has caused another seed-time to be lost. Both army and peasants are therefore dissatisfied. Great incentive to united resistance and endurance disappeared when Greeks were driven out of Smyrna and Adrianople was recovered. Unless some fresh stimulus can be found Turkey will consequently tend to become more and more disunited and consequently weaker.

Intrigue and espionage are already growing to proportions probably equal to those of Abdul Hamid régime, while recent treason law has produced feeling of insecurity throughout the country. Great bulk of more intellectual population in Constantinople at any rate is thoroughly anti-Angora, and the lower classes are dissatisfied owing to increase in cost of living as result of ill-considered legislation.

Even Kemalist officials, such as Prefect of Constantinople and chief of police, though latter was subsequently reinstated, are dismissed at a moment's notice. Nevertheless, precautions taken by Kemalists are such that their sweeping victory in elections, which are not likely to be completed before July, seems inevitable.

External position of Turkey appears weaker than at any time since last eighteen months. She has pushed too far her bluff with French, who incidentally, by their present firm attitude, have recovered much of their lost prestige. She has gone too far in her negotiations with Western Powers to be able to count longer on altruistic support of Russia, and recent despatch of Kiazim Karabekir to eastern front is a sign of the times.

She is faced with situation of insecurity on four fronts, Syria, Kurdistan, Caucasus and Thrace.

I hear from sometimes well-informed source that at meeting with his principal supporters about a fortnight ago Mustafa Kemal insisted upon necessity of peace at any price, and in reply to Reouf's objection that Grand

National Assembly would not approve a peace which was not in accord with all points of National Pact, declared that if Assembly rejected peace he was prepared in last resort and in the interest of nation to make a *coup d'Etat* and establish military dictatorship.

Above report may well be true. Certainly for the moment the tide in Turkey's fortunes appears to have turned. External and internal insecurity may well convince the Kemalists that not only Turkey's but their own position is perilous and can only be remedied by peace or "by desperate appliance". Though possibility of war cannot be entirely excluded, it has, I think, almost reached vanishing point, provided that the Greeks do not make ill-considered move and French firmness be not relaxed. War would be extremely unpopular, and, unless the Greeks intervene, nation would be apathetic while Turkey would be risking all her gains of the past six months. Peace, therefore, seems essential both for Turkey and the Kemalists.

In order to get the most favourable possible terms, Turks will doubtless continue to bluff until the last moment. But if it were possible to convince them that both France and ourselves were definitely prepared in the last resort for military action, peace would now be rapidly attained.

(Sent to Lausanne, No.86.)

F.O.424/257, p. 126-127, No. 190

No. 117

*J. Davies, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India,
to Sir William Duke, His Majesty's Under Secretary of State for India*

(Secret)

SIMLA, the 10th May 1923

Subject: Letter from Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Saiyid Chotani, President, Central Khilafat Committee, Bombay, expressing thanks for the past assistance from Mohammedans in India and asking for further assistance.

Sir,

In reply to Mr. Ferard's letter No. J&P. (S) 7211, dated the 2nd March 1923, I am directed to say that the letter referred to was published in the Bombay Chronicle of the 15th January 1923. The Government of India do not

think that it has had any effect on the activities of the Central Khilafat Committee or on Moslems in India in general. According to their own showing, the Committee collected Rs 39,40,000 for the "Angora" and "Smyrna" funds, of which about Rs.20,50,000 has been remitted, leaving a balance of nearly Rs.19 lakhs as still due at the end of 1922 for remittance. This balance was misappropriated by Chotani, who, on being brought to account, made over property valued at about Rs.18 lakhs to the Committee. It is doubtful whether they intend to realise the value of this property; the information of the Government of India is that the intention is to retain the property and to use the income derived therefrom for the Committee's own funds. This means that the Committee are not in a position to remit any portion of the large sum theoretically still available, and a further appeal for funds is not likely, therefore, to meet with any response.

Generally speaking, Mustafa Kemal's victory over the Greeks caused widespread joy and excitement. Indian Moslems were probably pleased at the acknowledgment of the value of their assistance but there is no reason to believe that this letter had any further influence. Since the Lausanne Conference the Moslem leaders in this country have several times announced their determination to do something drastic, e.g., resort to mass civil disobedience, if as a result of failure of negotiations a state of war should occur between Great Britain and Turkey. It is doubtful however whether the Central Khilafat Committee needed any prompting from outside in this direction or whether the letter in question affected their attitude or views.

I have, &c.

(SD) J.H.W. DAVIES
Deputy Secretary

F.O. 371/9122

No. 118

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 161
Telegraphic

ATHENS, May 8, 1923
(Received May 8)

My immediately preceding telegram.

English ex-M.P. who is here on private visit, was invited this morning to see Minister of War, and Chief of Revolution (? omitted: any Committee) was also present. They confirmed information given in my telegram above mentioned. They were warlike, particularly Colonel Plastiras, and declared that

Kemal was bluffing and that Greeks could defeat Turks without foreign assistance.

It is probable that this was intended for my ear, but there is no doubt that General Pangalos is pressing and that warlike feeling is growing.

From another less reliable source I learn that Minister for Foreign Affairs will take with him to Lausanne necessary powers to succeed Veniselos in case he decides that he would rather retire than carry out instructions.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Lausanne).

F.O. 424/257, p. 138, No. 207

No. 119

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 310

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 22, 1923

(Received May 28)

My Lord,

With the conclusion of Bairam it is to be expected that the recent lull in the electoral campaign will give place to renewed activity so that it should, at an early date, be possible to form an estimate of the probable trend of the elections, which, however, are not likely to be concluded before July. In the interval, the executive authority is still vested in the old Assembly, which, after suspending its sittings during Ramazan, met on the 21st instant, but in the absence of a quorum, again deferred the resumption of its sittings until the 2nd June.

2. While it is almost impossible to obtain definitely reliable information regarding the actual situation in Anatolia, and more particularly in the Trebizond area and in the eastern vilayets, there seems reason to believe that in these localities at least the Kemalist organisation is meeting with a considerable measure of opposition. In the Trebizond area, this opposition appears to have come to a head about the last week of April, during which telegraphic communication with Constantinople was cut off, and when, according to the statements of certain Opposition Deputies, who at that time arrived at Constantinople, there was active disorder throughout the areas of Trebizond, Erzeroum, Erzindjan, Ardahan and Kars, accompanied by a vigorous propaganda in favour of local autonomy. This disorder was, however, for the

most part shortlived, though I am informed that it still persists in the towns of Trebizond and Erzeroum.

3. Additional significance is now lent to the above report by the publication on the 20th instant, in two organs of the strictly controlled Turkish press, of statements made by Refik Shevket Bey, Deputy for Saroukhan and ex-Minister of Justice at Angora, regarding the Defence of Rights Organisation at Trebizond. From these statements it appears that the central committee of this organisation aided by their Deputies in the National Assembly exercised almost despotic powers and in the course of time became active supporters of the Opposition and of the late Ali Shukri Bey. On the assassination of the latter, this committee, still calling itself the Defence of Rights Organisation, commenced an active press campaign against the authorities at Angora and accused the leaders of the Kemalist movement of complicity in the crime, going so far as to remove a picture of Mustafa Kemal Pasha from the headquarters of the group and to put in its place one of Ali Shukri Bey in a black frame.

4. News of the proceedings at Trebizond quickly reached Angora and orders were received by the local police to close and seal up the headquarters, the committee itself being dissolved. A special commission of Inspection headed by Refik Shevket Bey was sent to Trebizond, the headquarters were reopened after the formation of a so-called loyal Committee of Defence of Rights, a special proclamation was addressed by Mustafa Kemal to the population of Trebizond, and a reply was returned in which the latter asserted their unwavering loyalty towards the national hero. The proclamation and the loyal reply were duly reproduced in all the Constantinople press nearly a month ago, but it is only now possible to assess them at their true value. From the concluding sentences of Refik Shevket Bey's statement it appears however, that the repressive measures have not been altogether successful, as he remarks that the Opposition group is still continuing its activities and it is suggested that the elections of the disciples of the true faith is by no means certain.

5. It appears that the ten Kurdish Deputies for the Bitlis Vilayet, all of whom belong to the Opposition, met on the 22nd ultimo and decided to oppose the Kemalist party by every possible means. I am also informed that a local rising of some importance among the Kurdish tribes in the eastern vilayets took place about the end of april. The immediate cause appears to have been an attempt by the Turkish authorities to collect military taxes. The rising spread to other tribes near the Irak-Turkish frontier and Djevat Pasha was hurried to the seat of the trouble where severe measures were taken. The Vali of Diarbekir as well as the Governors of Arghana and Severeke were dismissed, the officer commanding the local troops was shot for cowardice and incompetence, and the Vilayet of Diarbekir was placed under martial law, the Administration being

in the hands of Djevad Pasha himself. My most recent information shows however, that these measures have merely had the effect of the further solidifying the opposition of the Kurdish Deputies to Mustafa Kemal and to intensifying the propaganda campaign in favour of the eastern vilayets.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9130/E.5478

F.O. 424/257, p.233-234, No.354

No. 120

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1164 (A.I.)

24.5.1923

Turkey

The Khalif and Mustafa Kemal: The Question of Islamic Union

According to an important official in the Palace of the Khalif, Abdul Medjid has been seriously perturbed concerning his position vis-à-vis the Turkish Government and the ex-Sultan, and recently sent his first A.D.C., Edib Bey, to Angora to explain to Mustafa Kemal and Raouf his reasons for uneasiness, and to press upon them the necessity of hastening the despatch of delegations and missions from the whole of Islam to Constantinople to present their allegiance to the new Khalif. Without such public official recognition of the validity of his position, Abdul Medjid considered it a precarious one and open to serious danger from the propaganda and intrigues emanating from Mecca under the influence of Vahideddin and King Hussein.

Edib Bey returned at the beginning of May with Mustafa Kemal's reply, which was to the effect that it would be impossible under existing conditions to press for the despatch of deputations from all Moslem countries, since many of them, especially Afghanistan, India, Egypt and the North African countries had informed Angora that, before they recognised the new Khalif officially, a pan-Islamic congress would have to be convened with the participation of all the Moslem peoples, at which a decision would have to be taken as to the validity of Angora's action in electing the new Khalif, and as to its conformity with Moslem law. Once this had been decided favourably, all the Moslem peoples would carry out the proper ceremonial and declare their allegiance; but until then, it would be impossible to recognise Angora's method of electing the new Khalif. The

Indian Moslems had been particularly emphatic in insisting upon the adoption of such a course.

Mustafa Kemal added that the pan-Islamic Congress (to which reference has been made in previous S.I.S. Summaries) would take place after the conclusion of peace, either at Broussa or at Constantinople; and he endeavoured to console Abdul Medjid by stating his conviction that the Islamic world would certainly ratify Angora's methods and choice of the Khalif, and that the latter's position would be a glorious one.

Mustafa Kemal concluded by stating that, after the pan-Islamic Congress had settled the Khalifate question, it would proceed to the organisation of the central directorate of a League of Moslem Nations which would have its permanent headquarters at Constantinople, the capital of the Khalifate.

Apparently this exposé of the situation and of the plans of Angora increased rather than calmed the Khalif's anxiety.

F.O. 371/9103

No. 121

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1164 (A.2)

24.5.1923

Turkey

The Pan-Asiatic and Pan-Turanian Movements: Turco-Japanese Relations

It was reported in Summary No.1087, dated 20.2.23, that the Japanese High Commission at Constantinople had been in close contact with representatives of the Angora Government regarding pan-Asiatic and pan-Turanian activities in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and regarding the interchange of information on Russian military affairs. It was shown that steps were being taken to prepare the ground for closer relations between the Turkish and Japanese Governments and that the Japanese were desirous of encouraging the economic development and independence of Turkey on the ground that British influence in Asia would be weakened thereby, and that Japanese interests would benefit in consequence.

According to information obtained from Hamdullah Soubhi and other authoritative Turkish sources, a close rapprochement between the Turks and

Japanese, on pan-Asiatic and pan-Turanian lines, has been in progress since the time of the Turkish victories over the Greeks in Anatolia.

This has been evidenced by the sudden revival of Hamdullah Soubhi's Unionist and pan-Turanian Association "Turk-Ojak" (Foyer Turc). This revived Association has been accorded the support of Mustafa Kemal and the financial and moral support of the Japanese, through the agency of the Japanese High Commission in Constantinople. Hamdollah Soubhi has been for some time in personal contact with the Japanese High Commissioner, and has been advanced sums of money by the latter for the movement and for the development of the pan-Asiatic idea in Turkey.

A Central committee of the "Turk-Ojak" has been opened in Angora under the honorary presidency of Mustafa Kemal, and under the Presidency of Hamdollah Soubhi, and sub-branches have been opened in Constantinople and elsewhere in Turkey. Hamdullah Soubhi also sent a certain Ragib Khouloussi to establish a Turanian institute in Paris, which was opened towards the end of March. It was laid down in the statutes of this institute that it was to consist of educated Turks, Afghans, Azerbaijanis, Japanese, Chinese, Hungarians and representatives of other nations, whom the Turks believed to be of Turanian origin; also that it was to work for the revival of Turanian civilisation and for recognition of the common origin of the Turanian nations.

Further enquiries are being made regarding this movement and Japanese implication therein. In the meanwhile, the following note regarding the previous history of the "Turk-Ojak" may be of interest:

The "Turk-Ojak" was formed by Hamdullah Soubhi, ex-Minister of public instruction at Angora and Deputy for Education, who was celebrated for his pan-Turanian projects. The Association appeared with the advent of the Unionists in power, and until the end of the Great War played an important role in Constantinople. On its foundation, it was secretly under the control of the principal members of the Union and Progress Party, such as Enver, Jemal, Zia Bey, etc., and although it ostensibly concerned itself with researches in the realms of archeology, Turanian art, science and sociology, in reality it was mainly political. Reviews were issued, meeting arranged and at the outbreak of war its membership ran well into five figures. Its principal aim was undoubtedly pan-Turanianism, and the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" was the basis of its political ideas.

It later came under the influence of the Jews, and had definite connection with the Zionists through the medium of several Jewish savants masquerading

under Turkish names. In this way, German influence was brought to bear. Contact was also maintained with Hungarian, Bulgar and Finnish associations.

In Anatolia the Association had little support, the conservative Asiatic Turks regarding it with considerable suspicion. They recognised only Ottomans and knew and cared little for Turans, or the scientific study of their obscure origins.

The collapse in 1918 saw the end of the Association, and the movement largely went to pieces, except in so far as individual Unionists, largely under the political aegis of Soviet Russia, spread the gospel in Central Asia, and endeavoured to stir up trouble and sympathy in favour of Turkey throughout Western Asia.

But, as far as Anatolia was concerned, little was heard of pan-Turanianism, nor did the Nationalists show any special predilection in that direction. Hamdullah Soubhi, when Minister of Instruction in Angora, made an attempt to resurrect his favourite project and intrigued with certain prominent Unionists in that connection, and in consequence was compelled to retire from his post. His successor, Vehbi Bey, combated pan-Turanian ideas as vigorously as Hamdullah Soubhi propagated them.

Apart from the activities of the extreme Unionists, there was little sign of recrudescence of this movement on a large scale until the time of the Greek defeat, when, quite suddenly, it came to life again as has been described above.

F.O. 371/9103

No. 122

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1164 (A.3)

24.5.1923

Turkey

Relations with Egyptian Nationalists

It was reported in Summaries Nos. 1125 and 1133 that, early in March, an emissary from the Egyptian Wafd-el-Masri, had arrived in Angora for the purpose of soliciting Turkish support in realising the anti-British claims of the Egyptian Nationalists. Further, that Mustafa Kemal had sent back a non-committal reply to the effect that the question would have to stand over until after the conclusion of peace.

A letter written early in May from Ali Fehmy Kamel Bey, at Aix-les-Bains, to Mahmoud Bey Salem, tends to confirm the impression that the Turks are desirous of avoiding any commitments as regards Egypt for the time being, and that the Egyptian nationalists are very dissatisfied with this attitude.

Ali Fehmy Bey stated that he was greatly disappointed at the unexpected and sudden change in the attitude of the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne towards Egypt's claims for complete independence. He pointed out that on the eve of the first Lausanne conference the Angora representative at Rome had promised the Egyptian Delegation on behalf of his Government that Turkey would support the Egyptian claim as far as she was able. Similar assurances were given when the two members of the Egyptian Wafd visited Angora. Zaghlul Pasha had repeatedly implored the chief Turkish Delegates not to abandon the Egyptians at the most critical period of their national struggle. Ismet, Ali Fahmy stated, had answered Zaghlul's letters in very polite terms, but he had always carefully avoided renewing the old assurances.

F.O. 371/9103

No. 123

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 315

Telegraphic

Private and secret

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 26, 1923, 3.05 p.m.

(Received May 26, 4.10 p.m.)

Reouf telegraphed urgently yesterday that cabinet under presidency of Mustafa Kemal took following decision.

If any sacrifice is made in Greek reparations question this must conduce to attainment of peace by settlement of outstanding important questions in favour of Turks.

Question of interest on public debt, early evacuation of occupied areas, judicial régime and compensation of allied companies should be coupled with that of Greek reparations and only in the event of settlement of these questions in favour of Turkey being guaranteed could a sacrifice be made in regard to reparations.

Council of ministers, convinced that protracted negotiations could not give Turkey a good peace, which can only be attained in manner proposed, instructs Ismet to make this final proposal to conference reporting result.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.315. Repeated to Lausanne No.126.

F.O. 371/9079/E. 5404

No. 124

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.317

*Personal and Secret
Telegraphic*

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 26, 1923

(Received May 27)

My telegram No.315

In a further telegram, signed by Reouf and Mustafa Kemal, Ismet is begged not to insist on sacrificing reparation demands and to withdraw his threat of resignation.

They add: "So long as Allies have not decided unfavourably on vital issues connected with our independence, they cannot by allowing the Greek army to take action, commit themselves to participation in war arising out of our firm attitude on Greek reparations question. Should they, however, finally decide these questions against us, Greek army would be able to take action in more favourable conditions in order to force on us more important issues, such as the evacuation of Constantinople, current debt and judicial régime. The difference is that our position might then be weaker.

"It would not be in our interests to yield to Greeks on question of reparations in order to prevent them from withdrawing from the conference. Such action would have no meaning unless Allied delegates follow suit. If their withdrawal be followed by a resumption of hostilities there are certain points which Allies must explain. If in face of such a threat we were to yield on an isolated question, such action might be taken as calculated to delay peace. (Group undecypherable) please ask Allies to settle principal questions."

Portions of telegram are somewhat obscure.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No.127)

F.O. 424/257, p.218, No.345

No. 125

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 326

Confidential

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 28, 1923

(Received June 4)

My Lord,

The unpopularity of the Kemalist régime in Constantinople, to which I had the honour to refer in my telegram No.273 of the 6th instant, has during the past week received expression in the Turkish press in the form of an almost general attack on the administrative services of this city.

2. It seems probable that this attack is stimulated by resentment at the attempt of the Angora Government to relegate Constantinople to a position of secondary importance in Turkey and at seeing a large part of the revenues of the city transferred to Anatolia to be expended. This procedure constitutes such a reversal from the previous state of affairs, when the capital was the magnet which attracted the wealth of the whole Ottoman Empire, that there can be little cause for surprise if a return to the old order is desired.

3. The immediate cause of the attack, however, has been the abuses committed during the last few months more particularly by the prefecture and the police, and it is on these two departments that the attack has been concentrated. That all was not well was shown some time ago when, as reported in my telegram under reference, the prefect and the chief of police were both dismissed, though the latter was subsequently reinstated. A few days later, however, he has again dismissed and it was announced that an enquiry was being conducted into certain irregularities which were believed to have taken place. Neither a new director of police nor a new prefect has yet been appointed, the duties of the latter having for the last weeks been discharged by the Vali, Ali Haidar Bey.

4. The officials of the prefecture as well as the police are now universally accused of bribery and corruption on a large scale. It is difficult to believe that the charge is not well founded since opportunities have certainly not been lacking. While there is little doubt that the system of bribery is now once more almost general, it is alleged that those who have benefited most from this illicit source of private revenue have been the officials charged with the registration and disposal of abandoned property, with the control of the supply and price of bread and with the control of immigration into Constantinople. The entry into Constantinople of Greek refugees from Anatolia is officially forbidden, but,

according to the press, considerable numbers have been allowed to enter on payment of twenty-five Turkish liras per head. The immediate result of the press campaign has been the dismissal two days ago of the Inspector-General of the Prefecture and of the Director-General of Sanitary Services, while one Turkish paper reported on the 26th instant that on the previous day fifty-two policemen had been tried in the Turkish courts for abuses. Other dismissals are stated to be in prospect.

5. There are indications however, that the authorities are finding the police a somewhat refractory instrument; so much so, that the Acting Director-General has found it necessary to issue a circular reminding them that they are the servants of a popular Government and that, as such, they must treat the public with consideration otherwise they will be severely dealt with. While this warning may in part be prompted by the arrogant behaviour of police agents, I am inclined to think that it has been rendered necessary by a scheme which the embryo Labour Union of Constantinople are said to be contemplating for the collaboration of the police in furthering the control of the union over the labour elements of the city. This scheme, of which the chief promoter seems to be a certain Jambaz Mohamed, has now received a certain publicity in one newspaper which has since been suppressed, while the remainder of the press has demanded that the police shall not become the tool of the union.

6. In face of these local dissensions, it is not surprising that the preparations for the elections make little progress. Indeed, the desire of the authorities seems to be to delay them as much as possible. Probably with this end in view it has now been decided that the number of "second" electors, by every 100 of whom one Deputy is in turn elected, shall be based on the total male population and not on those over 18 years of age only. For this and other reasons, the electoral lists are not yet complete and, as these have to be posted for a period of not less than three weeks before the "second" elections take place, it is conceivable that the elections will not be finally concluded before the latter part of July, with the probable meeting of the new Assembly some time in August.

7. In the meantime it is stated that the Greek elders of Pera have decided to participate in the elections and have invited the other Ottoman Greeks of the city to vote for the Kemalist nominees. It is unlikely however, that much advantage will be taken of this invitation.

8. Another interesting electoral feature of the last week has been the announcement that the Opposition has subscribed to the nine points enunciated by the Defence of Rights Organisation, and that its members have applied to Mustafa Kemal for nomination as candidates. In this connection, it is

significant that some days previously the "İleri" published an article stating that the Defence of Rights party was merely the Committee of Union and Progress in a highly developed form and that there was no essential difference between the two parties. It remains to be seen whether the endeavour of the Opposition to enter the new Assembly under the Kemalist ticket will have any considerable measure of success. That efforts in this direction are being made is undoubted. The Serbian Minister two days ago expressed his opinion that two thirds of the local candidates applying for election, some 6000 according to his estimate, were in reality adherents of the committee. While I consider this estimate to be extremely exaggerated, I cannot but think that the danger is fully realised by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his associates, whose object is to secure the election of an Assembly more amenable to their control than that which it will replace.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9130

No. 126

Mr. Henderson to Sir H. Rumbold - (Repeated to Foreign Office)

No. 321 (*Personal and Secret*)
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 30, 1923
(*Received May 30*)

Intercepted telegrams from Mustafa Kemal to Ismet make it clear that Council of Vekils is gravely perturbed by Ismet's action in settling Greek reparations question in defiance of its orders. In a personal telegram he says: "Your position is serious and critical; be careful."

Renewed instructions are that sacrifice in regard to Greek reparations is to be made conditional on prompt settlement in favour of Turks of following questions: Interest on public debt, early evacuation of occupied territories, judicial régime and compensation to companies. Ismet is instructed to make a final and definite proposal to conference on these lines.

Prevailing view of Cabinet is that rupture brought about by a Greek attack owing to failure to reach agreement on reparations question would be better received both in Turkey and abroad than rupture with Allies in general over a question of world-wide interest. It is added that a rupture which was not followed by operations would suit Allies' book.

Cabinet are particularly anxious for reports on atmosphere prevailing at Lausanne after Turkish sacrifice "on account of new hopes which Allies may cherish as a result of success secured by threats."

Orders from Fevzi Pasha to Refet and Constantinople command, issued on the 26th in anticipation of rupture, say that all officers must rejoin their units and prepare for war. The western command will be ready to attack Straits, Ismid and Chanak zones. The Thrace and Constantinople command are to stand by to act on their instructions. Operations to be undertaken against Irak and French in Syria are described in detail.*

F.O. 424/257, p.242. No.375

* Lozan Konferansının son döneminde, Ankara ile Lozan'da İsmet Paşa arasında gidip gelen şifre telgrafların İngilizlerce açıldığı anlaşılıyor. Bu telgrafların asılları için bkz. Bilal N. Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları*; Cilt II, TTK, Ankara: 1994, No. 290, 306, 312, 314, vs.

No. 127

India Office to Foreign Office

J&P(S) 7311

LONDON, June 2, 1923

Secret

Sir,

In continuation of Mr. Ferard's letter of the 2nd March, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of a letter* from the government of India dated the 10th May, regarding the letter from Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Saiyid Chotani, the President of the Central Khilafat Committee in Bombay, expressing thanks for past assistance from Mohammedans in India and asking for further help. It will be observed that the letter had been published in India a month before it was republished in the Constantinople papers and that in the opinion of the Government of India it had practically no effect either in producing further subscriptions or in exciting the Indian Moslems against the Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed)....

F.O. 371/9122/E.5751

* Bkz. No. 117

No. 128

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston**No. 334 (Secret)
Telegraphic*CONSTANTINOPLE, June 4, 1923
(Received June 4)

Ismet has been informed by Mustafa Kemal that Government will under no circumstances pay interest on debt in gold, and that if franc payment cannot be obtained, declaration confirmed by Muharrem decree cannot be agreed to. He is requested to insist upon solution whereby interest is paid in francs, though any intention of abolishing public debt is denied. Mustafa Kemal points out that if Muharrem decrees are administered as before, foreigners would possess source of income which would nearly cover payment of debt interest in gold, but which would ease future finances and economic liberty of Turkey.

Angora is anxious lest if Muharrem decree, which they regard as contrary to national sovereignty, is confirmed all prospect of amending it hereafter would be lost. I gather, though sense of telegrams which have been telegraphed to War Office *in extenso* is not very clear, that if Allies refuse various proposals made and if matter is obstacle to peace, Angora insists on clause being inserted in treaty whereby question of currency for debt interest, and of such clauses in decree as are contrary to national sovereignty, shall be decided between Turkish Government and bond-holders direct.

From subsequent telegram from Ismet, dated 2nd June, it would appear that latter has already proposed third solution mentioned in my telegram No.331, namely, confirmation of Muharrem decree, with reservation to Allied delegates who have referred it to Governments. He adds, apparently in explaining himself, that he had made it clear that reservation is intended to eliminate idea of payment in gold, and that if Allies accept it an "unimaginable success" will have been secured. He says that he thinks that Allies will make new proposals giving facilities for payment of interest. His view is that payments will not be made in gold, and that we will gradually understand whether reservation will be temporary or permanent. He considers that in practice there is no divergence of views between himself and Angora.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No.147)

F.O. 424/257, p.277, No.429

No. 129

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1173 (A. 1 & A. 2)

5.6.1923

Turkey

Turkish Pan-Islamic Policy: Failure of Propaganda among Kurds and Arabs

It was reported on page 2 of Summary No. 1155 that a conference of Arabs and Kurds, which was held at Jezireh between the 28th February and the 9th April, under the auspices of the Sheikh Senussi, and in connection with Turkish Pan-Islamic schemes, was a failure, but that the Angora Government succeeded in saving its face by closing the conference before it otherwise broke up.

The following further information has now come to hand regarding the significance of the failure of this conference and civil disturbances which broke out simultaneously in Kurdistan:

Early in May, a trustworthy Turkish informant had the opportunity of perusing, in the offices of the Sheikh-ul-Islamat in Angora, the original of a very pessimistic report, made by the Sheikh el Senussi, in reply to a request from Mustafa Kemal as to why the Kurds and Arabs were so violently opposed to the idea of Islamic union, and as to why the Kurdo-Arab Congress at Jezireh was a complete failure.

The Sheikh el Senussi stated in this report that the Arabs and Kurds were generally too ill-educated to understand the necessity of Islamic union. There were certain Sheikhs and Emirs, who were capable of appreciating the value of the idea; but they were swayed entirely by their own personal interests, and were inclined to sacrifice nothing for the sake of the idea. In the Sheikh el Senussi's opinion, the only individual who appeared to be a whole-hearted partisan of Pan-Islam was the Amir of Afghanistan. Hence the realisation of the project would be possible only after an immense amount of labour and expenditure, and even then success was doubtful.

The Sheikh also dealt at some length with the dangers and difficulties which he himself foresaw in endeavouring to carry out the policy of the Union of Islam.

Two telegrams, received at the end of April and on the 2nd May, respectively, by Adnan Bey from Angora, threw light on the failure of the Turkish Government to arrive at satisfactory relations with the Kurds.

The first telegram stated that Kurdish deputies of the Great National Assembly from the vilayet of Bitlis, and all belonging to the 2nd group of Opposition, held a meeting on the 22nd April, at Gernik. At this meeting the deputies passed resolutions affirming their determination to fight against the Angora Government party by all the means in their power.

The second telegram stated that a local rising of some importance by Kurdish tribes, known by Angora as the Zaho tribes, had broken out towards the end of April. The immediate cause of the revolt was the attempt of the Turkish Government to collect military taxes. The rising spread to other tribes near the Turkish-Iraq frontier, and Turkish troops came into collision with the revolted tribes. The movement spread so much that Djevad Pasha himself hurried with reinforcements to the area, and proceeded to apply severe measures, including the execution of the local O.C. troops, Captain Shevki Bey, for inefficiency and cowardice.

This telegram of the 2nd May also stated that, in spite of these measures, the revolt could not be regarded as liquidated, since the Kurdish tribesmen had merely left their villages, and were preparing hostilities out of Djevad Pasha's reach. Further, that various administrative changes had been made, in order to cope with the situation, involving the dismissal of the Vali of Diarbekir, and the governors of Arghana and Severeke, and the placing of the Diarbekir vilayet under a military régime commanded by Djevad Pasha himself.

In this connection, it has also been ascertained from a prominent member of Adnan Bey's Intelligence Bureau, that the violent anti-British communiqué, issued by Angora, on the subject of the recent operations initiated in Northern Iraq against the revolted tribes, was nothing but a political move, in order to divert the hostility of the Kurdish tribes from the Turkish Government to the British. This informant stated that he himself, and everyone in authority, was convinced that there was very little truth in the communiqué.

The Turks and Syria

The following information is based on a telegram, dated the 4th May, from Angora to Adnan Bey in Constantinople:

As the result of communications from Ismet Pasha at Lausanne concerning the French attitude re the concentration of Turkish troops near the Syrian frontier, a council of war was called on May 2nd near Eskishehir, at which Mustafa Kemal, Hussein Reouf and a number of high military commanders were present.

The consensus of opinion of the military commanders, which was shared by Mustafa Kemal, was that the withdrawal of these troops would cause a bad effect both at home and abroad, as showing weakness on the part of Turkey.

It was therefore decided to maintain the concentration on the Syrian frontier, and even to reinforce that front against all eventualities, but at the same time to inform France through diplomatic channels that the movement did not imply any hostile intentions towards France and French interests.

Instructions were sent to Djevad Pasha to leave Diarbekir, and his task of pacifying the Kurds, for the Syrian front, and to apply himself to carrying out the decisions concerning the reorganisation and reinforcement of that front.

According to a similar telegram, dated the 6th May, Djevad Pasha had already left Diarbekir, and was on his way to the Syrian front.

Relations with Egyptian Nationalists

Summaries Nos. 1125 and 1133 contained information regarding the arrival in Angora, during March, of an emissary of the Egyptian Wafd-el-Masri, to elicit Turkish support of Egyptian Nationalist claims, and showed that Mustafa Kemal sent back a non-committal reply to the effect that the question would have to stand over until after the conclusion of peace.

In Summary No. 1164, a summary was given of a letter written by Ali Fehmi Bey, during May, in which he complained that the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne had not abided by their previous assurances to assist the Egyptian Nationalists.

In this connection it has been ascertained from Turkish official circles in Constantinople and Angora that the arrival is expected in Angora from Lausanne, in the near future, of Ahmed Loutfi, courier of the Egyptian Wafd-el-Masri.

His impending visit is reported to be due to the fact that he has been unable to secure from the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne any definite assurance of support for Egyptian demands and that notwithstanding previous checks, he is to endeavour to obtain some pledge from the Angora Government.

The opinion is held in Constantinople and in Angora that he will be as unsuccessful now, as in the past, owing to the Turkish fear of raising extra difficulties which might still further impede the Conference negotiations.

No. 130

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 333

Confidential

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 6, 1923

(Received June 11)

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 326 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Grand National Assembly was, as had been anticipated, unable to form a quorum on the 2nd instant, only some forty-five Deputies being actually present at Angora on that day. It was accordingly decided again to postpone the opening of the new session till the 30th June.

2. Although obituary notices have not so far been published, it appears probable that the old Assembly will not meet again. This seems to be the general view held by the Turkish press, one organ of which has alluded to the desirability of the Peace Treaty being discussed and ratified by the new Assembly, until the meeting of which its predecessor must theoretically remain in being. It is not unlikely, however, that the new Assembly may meet even before the election of all its members has been completed. In the course of an interview given by the President of the Assembly to the Angora correspondent of the "Vatan" on the 2nd instant, Ali Fouad Pasha stated that if on the 30th June there was a sufficiently large number of new Deputies in Angora to form a quorum, then the mandates of the present Deputies would be automatically annulled. If, on the other hand, the new Deputies were unable to form a quorum, while the old Deputies were in enough force to be able to do so, then the present Assembly would resume its functions. In the event of neither the old nor the new Deputies being able to form a quorum, then a further postponement would be decided upon.

3. Although the last appears at the moment to be the most likely contingency, it is probable that, if the treaty be signed at Lausanne, the Council of Ministers at Angora will find it desirable to secure an early meeting of the Assembly. In such an event the elections would be expedited in some localities to such an extent as would enable a quorum of new Deputies to be formed at any time, even though the elections in all constituencies, more especially in the eastern provinces, where the Kemalists are not likely to be so successful as elsewhere, might not be completed till some later date. The fact that the announcement of candidatures will only be made on the eve of the final elections, while no doubt due to other reasons as well, would seem to lend weight to this possibility.

4. This tendency to hasten the elections dates from about a week ago, and would appear to be the direct result of the progress made in the negotiations at Lausanne. In Constantinople itself, possibly owing to doubts regarding the final results, the delay seems to have been greatest, but even here the lists of electors have now been posted. Propaganda on behalf of the dominant party is in full swing, and the press is unanimously calling for the national unity which has been so much lost sight of in recent months and drawing attention to the manner in which internal dissensions have weakened the position of İsmet Pasha and strengthened that of the Allies at Lausanne. Capital is naturally made of the success which has attended the Kemalist efforts in the past, and it is interesting to note that, on the 2nd instant, the "İleri" asked its readers to realise that, though the draft treaty did not satisfy all the Turkish aspirations, its terms must be accepted as the best which could at present be obtained. It likewise reminded them of the difference existing between these terms and those of the Treaty of Sèvres, which, but for the struggle of Mustafa Kemal and his followers, would have been imposed on the Turks.

5. The progress of the elections is more marked in Anatolia, where the second elections have in a few areas actually been completed, in each case with the choice of Kemalist electors. There are indications, however, that, at least in some localities, these second elections have not been carried out without some difficulties, and in this connection particular significance attaches to reports which were published on two successive days regarding electoral events at Smyrna. In its issue of the 31st ultimo, the "Akşam" reported that the result of the Smyrna elections had been made doubtful by the acceptance by the Turkish delegation at Lausanne of the reparations settlement, which had strengthened the position of the Opposition, who appear to be open adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress. The sequel appeared the following day in the "Vakit", which stated that in one district near Smyrna the second elections had been declared null and void, as abuses were alleged to have taken place! From this it is evident that the Kemalist organisations intend to stop at nothing in order to secure the success of its candidates, and it is not improbable that action on similar lines will be taken in other constituencies in which there might appear to be any doubt in regard to the final result.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9130

No. 131

Mr. Henderson to Foreign Office

No. 346

CONSTANTINOPLE, 13th June 1923

Adnan informs me that Japanese High Commissioner is leaving at end of this week for Angora on a visit to Mustafa Kemal. He only proposes to stop there a few days.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.346 and Lausanne No.165.*

F.O. 371/9156/E.6150.

* Japon Büyükelçisi Uchida'nın Gazi Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmek üzere Ankara'ya gitmesi İngilizleri kuşkulandırmış ve sınırlendirmiştir. Bu telgraf üzerine Foreign Office yetkilileri aşağıdaki notları düşmüşlerdir:

"More of M. Uchida's subterranean diplomacy. He can hardly do much harm now. - G.W. Rendel, 14.VI. 25"

"It is a curious manoeuvre. But he is leaving his post shortly and is to be replaced by an Ambassador to the Porte. Probably the Japanese, as Asiatics though not themselves Moslems, want to be in a position to exploit the Pan-Islamic movement for whatever it may be worth to them.

"In present circumstances the visit to Angora is ill-timed & is open to misconstruction. I think this should be pointed out. Perhaps Sir H. Rumbold might speak in this sense to his Japanese colleague at Lausanne. - D. G. Osborne 14/6"

"This is M. Uchida's Swan song: a while we are lucky to be getting rid of him, I question whether we can now stop him. But Sir H. Rumbold might try. Tel. as annexed. - L. Oliphant - 14 June." (Ibid.)

No. 132

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 348

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 13, 1923

(Received June 18)

My Lord,

There has been no important development in the Turkish electoral campaign since my despatch No.333 of the 6th instant was written. Preparations for the choice of the "second electors" have been in full swing and in a few further areas their nomination has been completed. In one sector of the Constantinople vilayet these secondary elections are now taking place, but it is not anticipated that they will be generally concluded much before the end of

the present month. It is practically a foregone conclusion that only electors who are members of the Defence of Rights Organisation will be chosen.

2. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information, the situation in Anatolia remains somewhat obscure. Except for the eastern vilayets and the Trebizond, Samsoun and Erzeroum areas, little or no opposition appears to be expected, and the desire of the Government to hasten the election of at least the nucleus of the new Assembly is indicated by the publication almost daily in the local press of reports of the overwhelming success of the Kemalist's candidates in the second elections. The past week has also witnessed the election of the first four deputies of the new Assembly, three of whom will represent the Chanak area and one of the town of Gallipoli. All four are, of course, declared followers of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

3. Even outside the "disturbed" areas minor difficulties are to be expected and to one of these allusion has recently been made in the press. This has arisen as a result of the decision that each area will not be at liberty to choose its own candidates but will have to accept those nominated by Angora. The people of Anatolia will hardly carry their opposition to the methods of the party organisation to the length of nominating candidates of their own, even if the authorities permitted them to do so. It is, nevertheless, significant that a week ago Mustafa Kemal, who has for some time maintained a complete silence, found it necessary to issue a circular telegram warning the electors against accepting spurious candidates, even if these declared themselves to be members of the Defence of Rights party, and inviting them only to give their votes to the candidates whose names will appear on the lists to be furnished later by the Central Organisation.

4. Meanwhile, as evidence of the freedom from control with which the elections are to be conducted, a certain publicity was given on the 11th instant to a report from Adana of the candidature there of a certain Abdul Kader Kemali Bey, who is the only person up to the present to declare himself an opponent of Mustafa Kemal. This man, who, in the old Assembly was deputy for Castamouni, is reported to have published a manifesto denouncing the military tyranny at present in power in Angora, but the report significantly adds that no importance need be attached to this candidature.

5. My latest information in regard to Trebizond is that the efforts of the special mission sent there, as reported in my despatch No. 310 of the 22nd ultimo, to endeavour to pacify the local population, has ended in failure and that local feeling continues to be extremely hostile to the Government. Even so, however, it is not improbable that at Trebizond, as well as in the eastern vilayets, the Kemalist organisation may in the end succeed by dint of threats,

intrigue and force in securing at least a paper majority, although it is unlikely that the elections in these areas will be concluded for some considerable time.

6. So far as the press is concerned the Opposition parties maintain their policy of detachment. It seems, however, that Mustafa Kemal has not abandoned all hope of securing the cooperation of at least some of them. In this connection I have received information, for the accuracy of which I am unable to vouch, to the effect that Yunus Nadi Bey, who recently passed through Constantinople on his way to Smyrna, was commissioned by Mustafa Kemal to endeavour to conclude an agreement with Nazim Bey and the other leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress there. The basis of this agreement was to be the equal division of the accumulated funds of the party between the Defence of Rights party and the remaining members of the committee, which would thereupon automatically cease to exist. In the event of the Unionists refusing to accept this agreement energetic measures were to be taken against their leaders who would be immediately arrested and put on trial for abuse of their position during the war and for their subsequent anti-Nationalist activities. Yunus Nadi, accompanied by Dr. Nazim, Shukri Bey and Aziz Bey, ex-treasurer of the committee, has now returned direct to Angora, and it is stated that the Kemalist offer has been accepted in principle by the Unionist leaders and that only the question of the actual division of the funds remains to be settled.

7. If this report be true, and I am inclined to believe it, it is somewhat significant in the sense that it tends to indicate both that Mustafa Kemal is far from feeling absolute confidence in the result of the elections and that the Unionist Party is sufficiently powerful to require methods of compromise rather than of intimidation. Though I anticipate that, at any rate, outside the eastern vilayets, none but members of the Defence of Rights group will be elected it does not follow that they will ultimately prove to be supporters of Kemal himself.

8. Moreover, while I consider it possible that Yunus Nadi, who is certainly in close touch with Mustafa Kemal, may have been charged with a mission of the nature described above, I am inclined to doubt whether the Unionist organisation will be inclined to part with one of their strongest weapons even at the command of Mustafa Kemal. The Unionist leaders are more likely, in my

opinion, to adopt dilatory tactics realising as they must, though temporarily in the minority, the swing of the pendulum will in due course give them an opportunity of reasserting their position.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9130/E. 6313

F.O. 424/257, p. 330-331, No.508

No. 133

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No.1180 (A. 2)

15.6.1923

Turkey

Turkish Pan-Islamic Policy: Position of the Khalif, etc.

It was reported in Summary No. 1164 that the Khalif, being seriously perturbed regarding his position, approached Mustafa Kemal regarding the despatch to Constantinople of representatives of Moslem countries, in order that they should affirm their allegiance to the new Khalif. Kemal replied that this was impossible and that the projected pan-Islamic Congress would first have to be held in order that the validity of the Angora Government's action regarding the Khalifat could be discussed.

According to information from a high official in the service of the Khalif, the latter, after receiving Kemal's reply, displayed increased anxiety and expressed his conviction that the Moslem world would not accept the ideas of the Angora Government regarding the Khalifat.

The Khalif's anxiety had been increased by the fact that he had received a number of letters from leading Moslems in Mahomedan countries, containing insults against his person, and reproaches for having accepted the propositions of Kemal and thus having brought the Khalifat to ridicule.

The Khalif was also full of anxiety regarding the suspicious, cold and even contemptuous attitude of Angora towards himself, and the continual difficulties being raised against the slightest wish or suggestion on his part.

It was reported in November last that Abdul Aziz Shawish, the Egyptian revolutionary in Germany, had been invited to proceed to Angora to become President of the Council of the Department for Religious Affairs.

It was ascertained from secret information received by Adnan Bey from Constantinople, towards the end of May, that Abdul Aziz Shawish had fallen into disgrace at Angora and had been placed under close observation by the Turkish police. Shawish had received a letter from Cairo, in which the writer thanks him for the information which he had communicated regarding the policy, programme and points of view of the Turkish Government, particularly concerning Moslem affairs, and giving particulars of Kemal's Islamic schemes. The writer requested Shawish to obtain further information of the same kind, and warns him to exercise due caution in communicating it.

This letter was intercepted by the Turks, and caused considerable consternation in Angora, owing to the anxiety of Kemal and his friends that their Islamic schemes should remain secret.

Following the receipt of this letter, Shawish was at once put under observation, and was debarred from official circles, in spite of his explanation that he knew nothing of the writer and believed the letter to have been sent purposely by an enemy in order to embarrass his relations with the Turks.

The Elections. Measures against the National Defence Committee

According to information from Turkish official sources in Constantinople, the National Defence Committee, the president of which is Fevzi Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, and of which the majority of the Army officers are members, has recently shown an increased tendency towards opposition to Mustafa Kemal. Consequently instructions were recently transmitted to Constantinople from Angora to the effect that if members of the Committee did not retire from the elections within a short time, measures would be taken against them. This led to strained relations between Mustafa Kemal and Fevzi Pasha.

Mustafa Kemal, however, has followed up these instructions with an Army Order that Army officers are forbidden to occupy themselves with political matters, and as the National Defence Committee is in reality a political association, officers are forbidden to remain members thereof. Officers are to resign their membership within one week, otherwise they will be liable to "severe punishment" etc. This order has caused considerable excitement, but does not appear at the time of reporting to have been complied with.

In connection with the electoral campaign, two deputies, Shevket Bey, ex-Minister of Justice, and Zamiir Bey, Deputy for Adana, who were recently sent by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Trebizond in order to reorganise the Defence of Rights Club, arrange electoral affairs, and incidentally to calm the local population, are reported to have returned to Angora without having achieved nothing. They report that feeling in the Trebizond area is extremely hostile towards the Government.

F.O. 371/9122

No. 134

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 359

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 18, 1923

(Received June 25)

My Lord,

I have the honour, with reference to my telegram No.346 of the 13th June, to acquaint Your Lordship that I had occasion a few days ago to visit the Japanese High Commissioner here. Mr. Uchida informed me that the sole object of his visit to Angora was to get some impression of Anatolia before leaving next month to return to Japan. He also said that no Japanese had ever been to Angora, and he therefore wished to be able to report to his government what the real conditions were in that town.

2. I believe Mr. Uchida's information to be the true one. He will, of course, visit Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the principal nationalist leaders. I regard his visit as likely to be useful rather than otherwise, and I do not doubt but that he will report to his Government on the impossibility for foreign diplomatists to reside permanently in Angora.

3. Mr. Uchida told me that he was receiving numerous requests from Turkish officials for information as to Japanese methods of government and was having numerous books translated into Turkish with a view to describing the steps taken by Japan to adapt herself to Western civilisation. He incidentally mentioned that most of the Turks whom he met professed great anxiety for future good relations with Great Britain, and expressed the opinion himself that he regarded it as in the interest of both Japan and England to make

common cause with Turkey against the potential enemy of all three countries, namely, Russia.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9156/E.6573

No. 135

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 366

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 20, 1923
(Received June 25)

I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 348 of the 13th instant that the Turkish electoral campaign, at least in so far as Constantinople is concerned, was about to enter the phase of the "secondary" elections. These are now taking place in practically all the quarters of the town amidst what is described in the press as universal enthusiasm and rejoicing. In actual fact signs of popular enthusiasm have been noticeably absent as, beyond the appearance of a few extra flags and small flagwaving processions with a picture of Kemal carried at their head, there has been nothing to indicate that the people were engaged in choosing their executive Government for the next two years.

2. In face of the general apathy of the electors and of the abstention of a large proportion of the Christian elements, a notable exception to this abstention being the *locum tenens* of the Armenian Patriarchate, some little surprise was at first caused by the announcement in the press that in those areas in which these secondary elections had been concluded, over 90 per cent of the voters had taken part. An explanation of this was, however, found by the "Tanin," which in its issue of the 17th instant, reported that on a certain voter going to the polling booth to record his vote he was informed by the official in charge that this had already been done on his behalf.

3. The Turkish press has become increasingly critical of the methods of the Central Government, and has hinted broadly that a certain measure of silence is only being maintained until the conclusion of peace. It is significant that at the last meeting of the Constantinople Municipal Council, the Vali and acting prefect, Ali Haidar Bey, was the object of much criticism, the council going so

far as to veto his claim to appoint officials in the prefecture. It is, however, the Vali's handling of the prohibition question which has evoked the greatest storm of criticism. After repeated postponements, he announced, even as late as the afternoon of the 15th instant, that the dry régime would be definitely enforced on the following day, and an official communiqué in this sense was published in the press. Numerous bars and restaurants accepted the order, and it was only on the morning of the 16th that it was ascertained that a further postponement until the 1st August had been decided upon. While this *dénouement* has thrown ridicule upon Haidar Bey and indeed the whole Administration, the Turkish police have doubtless taken full advantage of this opportunity to compensate themselves for their arrears of pay.

4. It remains to be seen what steps will be taken to revive the waning popularity of the Kemalist administration in Constantinople. The dismissal of the Vali presents itself as an obvious step, and has already been suggested in the press. This could, however, only be a minor palliative, and it now appears that great expectations are being based on the effect of a proclamation which Mustafa Kemal will shortly address to the inhabitants of Constantinople in acknowledgement of the grant to him of the freedom of the city. It is announced that shortly after the publication of this proclamation the names of the candidates for the primary elections will definitely be made public. Indications point to the probability that the names of a few leading Kemalists will be included in the list, although it is officially announced that Mustafa Kemal himself will be a candidate for Smyrna, and Ismet Pasha for Malatia in the vilayet of Kharput.

5. In Anatolia the elections are proceeding without undue incidents, and the total of new deputies actually elected has reached twenty-two. The new results are in respect of Kutahia, Afion Kara Hissar and Ismid, in none of which places difficulties were anticipated or encountered. It is nevertheless interesting to note these centres have been granted more than their proper quota of Deputies, which will doubtless later be counterbalanced by reducing the number of deputies for some other areas where the prospects of an overwhelming Kemalist majority are not so bright.

6. Meanwhile, no further information has reached me regarding the position in the eastern vilayets. I am informed, however, that at Smyrna, where difficulties have, as reported in my despatch No.333 of the 6th instant, already been encountered, Rahmi Bey, the former Vali, and other leading Unionists are conducting an active campaign with fair prospects of success, and that the Kemalist organisation has been compelled to take extraordinary measures to prevent their election.

7. Perhaps one of the most significant electoral features up to date, however, is the prohibition against participation in the elections of army officers below the rank of lieutenant-colonel, a measure which shows the extent to which Mustafa Kemal and his friends are preoccupied in regard to the opposition of the military faction, under the leadership, it is understood, of Nouredin Pasha, the commander on the western front, whose relations with Mustafa Kemal have for some time past been strained. It is possible that even Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff, is associated with this opposition, which has been reinforced by the officers of justice against whom a similar vote has been issued. These dissatisfied elements will doubtless be fully exploited later when the opposition takes definite shape, and a bit will in particular be made for the support of the junior officer and general military class, whose position will be very difficult after the signature of peace and whose assistance to the Opposition will be invaluable when, in face of a disillusioned people, the real battle for political control is staged and internal differences are no longer obscured by the paramount external issue.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 424/257, p.353-354, No.540

No. 136

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.377

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 27, 1923
(Received July 2)

My Lord,

The chief electoral feature of the last week in Constantinople has been the conclusion of the "secondary" elections in all sections of the town. Your Lordship is already aware from my previous despatches of the manner in which these elections have been conducted. Needless to state, only the secondary electors whose names appeared on the lists furnished by the Kemalist organisation were actually nominated. The grotesque nature of the entire proceedings is shown by the fact that, two days before the ballot boxes were opened for the counting of votes, the municipal officer in charge of the elections despatched a telegram to Angora informing Mustafa Kemal of the unanimous vote accorded by the population of Constantinople to the

candidates of his party, a telegram, moreover, which was suitably acknowledged before the counting of the votes commenced.

2. It is interesting to note that the authorities made special efforts to ensure that as much display as possible should be made on the occasion of the collection of the ballot boxes in the Pera area, and for this purpose a special grant, alleged to be more than £ T. 10.000 was made by the municipality. Hundreds of denizens of the Turkish quarters were conveyed to Pera in cabs and motor cars adorned with the red flag and the crescent in order to impress the casual observer with the appearance of spontaneous enthusiasm. The Turkish press of the following morning did full justice to the occasion and was at pains to demonstrate that such a result had at last revenged the loyal population of Pera for the indignities and oppression from which they had suffered at the hands of foreigners during the preceding four years.

3. Altogether, some 1500 "electors" have been chosen and these will proceed on the 23th June to elect the fifteen Deputies for the Constantinople area. A list of candidates has been issued, fifteen in number, including such prominent Kemalists as Reouf Bey, Fevzi, Kiazim Karabekir and Refet Pashas, Fethi Bey, Minister of Interior, Adnan Bey and Mukhtar, Ambassador at Moscow. Perhaps the most significant feature of the list, however, is the inclusion of Ismail Djambolat Bey, one of the most active members of the Committee of the Union and Progress, who has never been at pains to conceal either his Unionist leanings or his animosity towards Mustafa Kemal himself.

4. It had been anticipated that no Opposition candidates would take the field. On the 25th instant, however, it was announced that three independent candidates would offer themselves for election, but, as one of these was, until a few days ago, president of the Defence of Rights Committee here, it remains to be seen whether these are actually Opposition candidates, or whether, as seems probable, they are in reality Kemalist candidates put up to demonstrate the alleged freedom of the elections. On the other hand, particular importance attaches to an announcement made yesterday that 300 electors had petitioned the authorities in favour of the candidature of Nureddin Pasha, whose opposition to Mustafa Kemal was dealt with in my despatch No.366 of the 20th instant. It is also stated that the absence of a Jewish candidate from the Kemalist list has caused dissatisfaction in Jewish circles. It had been hoped to secure the nomination of the ex-Grand Rabbi, Haim Naoum Effendi, who has just returned to Constantinople, but his candidature here or at Smyrna was not approved by Angora.

5. Considerable progress has now been made with the elections in Western Anatolia and altogether ninety Deputies have been elected. The results recently

announced include those for Smyrna, who as usual, are Kemalist candidates, Mustafa Kemal himself being at their head. It may be noted however, with reference to the Unionist activities at Smyrna which have already been reported, that, although over 800 electors should have participated in the final choice of the nine Deputies, only 315 appear to have done so, the remainder being reported unavoidably absent through illness and other reasons. In view of what is already known regarding Kemalist electoral methods, these figures, if correct, would indicate that local feeling at Smyrna, about which I hope to have more detailed information at an early date, has become to a large extent anti-Kemalist.

6. As regards the remainder of Anatolia, reliable information is still lacking. Apart from the election on the 25th instant of two Deputies for Erzindjan, no information has reached me regarding electoral activities in the eastern provinces, though it has been announced that Mosoul will be represented in the new Assembly by three Deputies. In Angora, however, whither some thirty of the most reliable Kemalist policemen from Constantinople have recently been transferred, it is stated that on the issue of the Kemalist list of forty-two "second" electors an Opposition list was also published, while it is reported that in two quarters of Eskişehir none of the second electors chosen appeared on the Kemalist list. The press reports add that enquiries are being made regarding the causes of these two incomprehensible incidents.

7. In so far as Constantinople is concerned, perhaps the most significant feature of the last week has been the reception accorded to the proclamation addressed to the population by Mustafa Kemal in acknowledgement of the conferment upon him of the freedom of the city. This colourless pronouncement, of which I have the honour to enclose a translation herein, is of itself not without interest, principally for what it leaves unsaid, particularly in regard to the future status of Constantinople, and also for the complete absence of that fire and vigour which have invariably characterised such declarations in the past.

8. Its reception by the press represents I think, fairly the waning popularity of Mustafa Kemal, at least among the civilian population in Constantinople. Only three of the Turkish papers gave it real prominence, one ignored it altogether, while only one went so far as to comment favourably upon it. On the other hand, the campaign of criticism is steadily gaining ground and is no longer solely confined to the "Tanin". The hitherto loyalist "Wakt" inserted on the 21st instant a partly censored letter from Edhem, the notorious Circassian leader, accusing the Turkish army of treason, praising the Committee of Union and Progress, and defining national sovereignty as

despotism; while on the 25th instant the violent nationalist journal "Tevhid-i Efkar", in common with the "Tanin", published a proclamation by Lutfi Fikri Bey, the leader of the Turkish Bar, in which after a general criticism of the Administration, particularly in connection with the elections, he quoted the Bulgarian elections, which had resulted in such an overwhelming majority for Stamboulisky and which had merely precipitated the recent *coup d'Etat* in the country, as an example from which it would be well for the Turks to take warning.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9131/E. 6824

F.O. 424/258, p.5-6, No.4

ENCLOSURE IN No. 136

Manifesto of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the People of Constantinople

(Translation)

I consider myself fortunate to-day in having received from the noble population of Constantinople a new token of their confidence and sympathy. The general municipal council, the presidents and members of which are elected by the people of Constantinople, basing itself on its mandatory rights, has conferred upon me honorary citizenship in accordance with the decision taken at its meeting on the 28th February 1923. I have received with great respect and emotion from the hands of the special commission the council's mazbata, this mark of sympathy and love, whose contents are a masterpiece of art and accord with the pure and noble sentiments of Turkish and Mussulman Constantinople. On this occasion I again recall, in all its fullness, beautiful Constantinople and the virtue of its noble population.

Throughout our national struggle Constantinople has been the high and holy altar of our national and patriotic love, and from henceforth no event and no power can turn our hearts from this sacred altar. To-day the heart of every Turk, and of every Moslem, is the inviolable abode of love and affection for Constantinople. In that beautiful city are gathered together the fruits of our national efforts throughout the centuries. There are found all the monuments and institutions, every one of which is an eternal and eloquent sign of our national capabilities.

At times there have lived in that beautiful city Sovereigns and Governments who have dominated the national destinies, and whose behaviour towards the nation has not always been faithful and patriotic. This is a historical truth which cannot be denied. The noble and enlightened people of Constantinople, being eye-witnessed of these misfortunes, were the first to become convinced of the necessity of uprooting the evils of despotism, which had brought a chain of calamities on our fatherland. I have never doubted this.

When, by its decision of the 1st November, 1922, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which, from the 23rd April, 1920, had taken into its hands the destiny of the nation, he again explicitly proclaimed that dominion and sovereignty unconditionally belong to the nation, what enthusiasm its acceptance and approval evoked from the heart of patriotic Constantinople! Although not yet completely liberated from foreign interference and oppression, nothing prevented the people of Constantinople from manifesting enthusiastically the noble sentiments hidden, up till that day, in their hearts, and on that occasion from showing their lively interest in the national sovereignty and independence.

We have now witnessed the appearance of a new and sublime sign of the patriotism of Constantinople. We have seen with the utmost gratitude that, on the decision taken for the re-election of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in order to strengthen our sovereignty and our national independence, the enlightened and patriotic population of Constantinople, which to-day is fully aware of the truth, has formed a united national bloc against friends and enemies, and is on the point of arriving at a happy result. I consider it a great honour and dignity that such a people should have conferred on myself the honorary citizenship as a proof of its sincere love.

I can never forget the separation or despair which I felt when I left Constantinople four years ago to take strength from the capacities which I had for long seen in the noble spirit of our nation, and to prepare the foundations of our national struggle. But this separation has as its object the deliverance of Constantinople, which, like other parts of the fatherland, was groaning in pain and slavery. Thanks be to God that the determination and resolution of our great nation succeeded! Our national aspirations have been, are, and will be, manifested and realised.

The day is not far off when Constantinople, which already breathes an air of greater liberty than before, will be completely delivered. By this deliverance not only will Constantinople be rescued from occupation and slavery but perhaps henceforth, in an united Turkey, it will enjoy new life and happiness in returning to the motherland and nation. It was not an honourable position for Constantinople to be the seat of the ambition and magnificence of despotic

Sultans. It is only when Constantinople has become an enlightened and precious city of a great Turkey, free and mistress of her destinies, that through her most natural resources and virtues she will be raised to her most real high position. We know that in order to obtain these glorious results Constantinople, like all our nation and country, suffered much. But it is also undeniable that calamities and sufferings have been for us sources of resolution and strength. We can be certain that, thanks to the efforts of the nation, which has taken hold of its independence and sovereignty, all these sufferings, damages and devastations will shortly be made good.

On this occasion, in the expectation that Constantinople, of which I am proud to be an honorary citizen, will enter, free and joyful, into a well-earned era of happiness, I beg you to transmit to the whole population, great and small, the expression of my warmest and most sincere affection.*

F.O. 424/258, p.6-7, No.4/1

*Bu rapor üzerine Foreign Office görevlilerinden Oliphant şu önyargılı notu düşmüştü:

"This ridiculous farce of modern democracy and parliamentary government is a striking commentary on the pretentious claims of the Kemalist leaders in respect of Turkish civilization. Mustafa Kemal's methods prove the waning of his power. It is perfectly clear that only war can arrest the progressive decay of Turkey.—L.Oliphant- 3 July (1923)"

No. 137

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.387

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 4, 1923
(Received July 9)

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No.377 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, as had been anticipated, the fifteen Kemalist candidates were on the 28th June elected Deputies for Constantinople. Thanks to the measures taken by the authorities, no extraordinary incident occurred, and all but a small minority of the electors recorded their votes, Reouf Bey, being, however, the only candidate to receive the unanimous vote of the 1.232 electors who took part. At the bottom of the list of successful candidates, some 70 votes behind the leader, was Ismail Djambolat Bey, and at the top of the unsuccessful candidates came Nureddin Pasha with 100 votes, closely followed by Ali Ihsan Pasha and Lutfi Fikri Bey, all these three

Oppositionists having submitted their candidatures on the eve of the final elections.

2. It appears that the nomination of Noureddin Pasha, to which I referred in my despatch under reference, created considerable excitement in Kemalist circles, and immediate but unsuccessful efforts were made to suppress it. It has even been reported that Mustafa Kemal ordered the immediate return to Angora of the commander of the western army, an order, however, with which, if given, the latter has so far shown no sign of complying. It is similarly stated that the Turkish police recently seized letters of compromising nature written by Noureddin Pasha, and that, as a result, the general has been relieved of his command. Both these reports, however, so far lack confirmation.

3. As regards the final elections themselves, the only feature of any interest was the list posted up in the election hall of the candidates for whom the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress were recommended to vote. In addition to Noureddin and Ali Ihsan Pashas, Lutfi Fikri and Ismail Djambolat Beys, this list contained the names of such prominent Kemalists as Reouf Bey, Fevzi, Kiazim Kara Bekir and Refet Pashas, and Fethi and Adnan Beys, a fact which may, I think, be taken as an indication of the leaders who are likely to take the helm in due course, after the conclusion of peace, the committee once again becomes a real power in the Turkish State.

4. The anticipation in my despatch No.333 of the 6th ultimo, that the old National Assembly would not meet again, has been justified by the fact that on the 30th ultimo, when the sittings should have been resumed, a quorum could not be formed. A further postponement till the 2nd August was therefore decided upon, by which time it is expected that the new Deputies will be present in sufficient numbers to constitute a quorum. As over 120 Deputies have already been elected, there is every reason to suppose that, in the absence of untoward events, this expectation will be realised.

5. Estimates of the number of Deputies to be elected vary considerably, but in any case it is not expected that they will exceed 300; 290 is the number quoted to me by Adnan Bey. But it has been confidently asserted in the press that Mosul will elect Deputies to the new Assembly; while the population of the Yemen has also petitioned to be represented. It has since been announced, however, probably in pursuance of the present declared policy of the Angora Government against interference in matters affecting the detached territories, that a reply will only be returned to this latter petition after it has been considered by the new Assembly.

6. Apart from the eastern vilayets and the Trebizond area, it is only at Angora and Adana that difficulties are apparently being encountered. In the case of the former the difficulties seem to be chiefly due to the refusal of the population to accept, at the dictation of the Government, the candidature of former Deputies who, it is alleged, have done nothing for the country. At Adana, on the other hand, the troubles are of a more serious nature, and have up to the present given rise to the arrest of over thirty persons, who were attempting to carry out propaganda on behalf of the Opposition.

7. Meanwhile, the population of Trebizond have definitely intimated their refusal to follow blindly the orders of the Angora authorities. In accordance with the prevailing custom, the latter forwarded to Trebizond a list of Kemalist candidates whose election was required. This list was however, ignored by the local Defence of Rights Organisation, which submitted to Angora for approval a list of candidates which it had decided to propose for election. No reply has, it is understood, yet been returned by Angora to this communication, but I have received information to the effect that Said Pasha, who replaced Kiazim Kara Bekir on the eastern front, has been sent to Trebizond and Erzeroum with a division in order to terrorise these localities, supervise the elections in such a manner that only Kemalist Deputies will be elected, and arrest notables who have been playing leading roles in the Opposition movement there.

8. As regards the eastern vilayets, the only definite information received is from Kars, where it is stated that the elections have had to be suspended owing to the activities of the Opposition. At no other place have the elections apparently yet commenced, but earlier general impressions are borne out by a report that at Diarbekr the population has protested against the candidature of Feizi Bey, Minister of Public Works, who is himself of Kurdish origin. In view, however, of the fact that he has been nominated by Angora and will have at his command all the forces for opposition which has been so successful elsewhere, there is no reason to doubt that the election of Feizi Bey will be secured and that in the space of a few weeks the Angora Government will meet an assembly composed, for a time at least, exclusively of its nominal partisans.

(Copy to Lausanne, No.152)

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9131/E. 7087

F.O. 424/258, p.41-42, No.46

No. 138

A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1196

9.7.1923

Turkish Foreign Policy: Mahmud Sadik Bey's Visit to Europe

On the 23rd June Mahmud Sadik Bey, ex-President of the Turkish Press Association, left on an unofficial mission for Budapest and Berlin, acting on the following personal instructions from Mustafa Kemal:

(a) To get in touch in Budapest with Press representatives, and to discuss the advantages of a rapprochement with Turkey. He was not however to approach political leaders, who, Mustafa Kemal stated, were being approached through other channels.

(b) To continue his journey to Berlin; to get into touch with the German Government, and to ascertain to what extent the Germans were sincere in their desire to support the Turks, to what extent they could supply materials, munitions and military and technical personnel.

(c) To get into touch with German press, particularly with the well known journalist and Zionist Parvus, who played an important role in Turkey during the Unionist régime.

In giving Mahmud Sadik these instructions, in Angora, early in June, Mustafa Kemal also gave the former an outline of Turkish foreign policy, of which the following were the main features:

(i) For the present a policy of conciliation towards Great Britain, hatred towards whom was only equalled by the fear of a rupture.

(ii) In the meanwhile, underground work would be pursued for the eventual realisation of Mustafa Kemal's "great Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asiatic plans." In this connection negotiations were being carried with the Japanese, Afghans and Bokharans. In addition to striking a blow eventually against Great Britain in the East, these schemes were also to be directed against Russia.

(iii) It was not an easy thing to "awaken the Moslem East", and the Turks felt that they would best be able to assume the leadership of Islam by deeds of military prowess.

(iv) The first objective was to be the French in Syria. There was nothing to fear from French; they were weak; they lacked energy; their position in Syria was very serious; and they were involved with the Germans. To quote Kemal's words: "The moment is now approaching when we can occupy Syria... we intend to act as soon as possible." In the meanwhile, the French were being put off by vague assurances regarding Turkish concentrations on the Syrian front.

(v) It was also necessary to prepare the ground and obtain support in other directions. Apart from the British and French, the Italians were not worth considering, and a conciliatory policy would keep the Greeks quiet.

(vi) In order to counter-balance Serbian and Roumanian influence, an agreement was to be concluded with the Bulgars and Hungarians. The Hungarians had for some times been trying to get into touch with the Turks, and the Bulgars had also been making tentative proposals. Now Stamboulisky was out of the way, these proposals could be taken up seriously.

(vii) An understanding was also to be reached with the Germans regarding the supply of technical assistance and military personnel. Through the Germans, the support of the Zionists was to be obtained.

As this outline by Mustafa Kemal appears to be of some importance, Mahmud Sadik's account thereof, as communicated by him to an intimate acquaintance, is given in greater detail as an Appendix.

F.O. 371/9131

APPENDIX IN No. 138

*Mahmud Sadik's statement on Turkish foreign policy as outlined to him
by Mustafa Kemal*

(a) Attitude towards Great Britain

"There is a feeling of hatred towards England, which is only equalled by the fear of a rupture with her. Yet the Nationalist leaders are doing all possible to avoid giving vent to that feeling of hatred, and to avoid any incident which will give away their real feelings.

"Outwardly they are all affability towards the English, pretending to be friendly and Anglophile, and they will keep up this attitude until the moment arrives when they will find themselves strong enough to remove the mask.

"They know the present strength of England, and they will do everything possible to gain English support, even to the extent of granting concessions which are unfavourable to Turkish interests, and will show themselves conciliatory to English demands, granting commercial and economic facilities, adopting a paternal attitude towards the Greeks, avoiding (at least outwardly) any sign of sympathy or support for the Egyptians, Palestinians or Indians, or other Moslems under British protection."

(b) Turkish Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asiatic Schemes

"In this way they will gain the confidence of England, but in reality they will continue to work underground to consolidate their great Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asiatic plans.

"The idea of a Pan-Islamic bloc has caught hold of the mind of Kemal and his friends and they are negotiating with the Japanese, the Afghans and the Bokharans in that connection. They are convinced that the Moslems of the Caucasus and Turkestan will sooner or later unite against the Russians; and the Turks will be prepared to support any movement of that kind and consolidate it with their Pan-Islamic schemes for an ultimate blow against Britain.

"The Turkish leaders, however, understand quite well that it is not an easy thing to awaken the Moslem East. They know that a peacefull, commercially-developing Turkey will never be able to influence the Islamic world, and that if Turkey is to assume the leadership of Islam she must do so by deeds of military prowess by showing her strength, by the victories of her armies.

"It is only when Turkey is active, and her arms are victorious that she can grasp the leadership of Islam and force her will amongst Moslems."

(c) The necessity for action on the part of the Turks:
Attitude towards the French

"Mustafa Kemal in the latter connection said:

"To awaken the Moslem world and assume the leadership of Islam we must act. The place where we must act first of all is Syria - against France. Our policy towards France is a very different matter from that towards England. France is comparatively weak; she lacks energy, and her position in Syria is already very bad. She is also tied up with the Germans. Her internal situation is critical and the alliance with England is weakening daily. You know quite well, Sadik Bey, as an experienced journalist, what the situation is in France and there is no need for me to enlarge on that. In short the moment is now approaching when we

can occupy Syria. Aleppo is ripe for revolt against the French and without doubt Beirut and Damascus would rise once they see any chance for success. The ground is already well prepared in Syria and there is no obstacle in our way there. We do not give much importance to the appointment of General Weygand. We have about 350.000 men available which would be quite sufficient together with the support we should get within the country itself. Therefore, we intend to act as soon as possible. We do not allow French menaces to worry us in the least. We have already replied to her protests against the concentration of our troops in the vicinity of the Syrian frontier, to the effect that troops had been sent there for economic considerations, it being easier to feed them in that region owing to the wholesale destruction elsewhere. Now we propose to reply to further protests on her part by informing her that it is our own affair and that we will not permit interference with our internal affairs."

(d) Preparing the ground externally

"Before acting there are two considerations to be faced. The first is to prepare the ground externally, and the second to gain the support of certain powers.

"We must first of all be sure that there will be no interference between us and France. England must be assured that we have no designs against her interests in Palestine and the 'Iraq', and if necessary we must come to an engagement with her to this effect. We are certain to have the support of the Zionists. We are already getting into touch with important Englishmen in connection with a monopoly for a certain important Bank, and a substantial advance in return for the resumption of the Turkish Railways by the State under British control. We shall do everything possible to satisfy the British and will ourselves favourably to them in every possible way. As for the Italians, we can always spare a bone for them. They do not count for much in any case."

(e) Attitude towards the Greeks

"Regarding Greece, we have decided to show ourselves favourably inclined towards them – a very good and correct neighbour – and we are ready to come to an agreement with her. As you know we have already taken steps in that direction, and in Constantinople we are shutting our eyes to their former misbehaviour.

"The Patriarch will probably come forward with a petition for forgiveness for the sins of his flock during the years following the armistice, and we shall magnanimously grant this.

"Jelal Nuri Bey, who is a Cretan and knows Greek, has already been entrusted with the task of a Turco-Greek rapprochement. His paper, the "Ileri" will be an organ of propaganda for this idea and a new Greek paper will shortly appear in Pera and preach the same ideas.

"In this manner we hope to keep the Greeks quiet for some time. England also is likely to advise the Greeks to come to an agreement with us."

(f) Necessity for counter-balancing Rumanian and Serbian influence:
A proposed rapprochement with Hungary and Bulgaria

"As for the Serbs and Rumanians, we have little to offer them so we must come to an agreement with the Bulgars and the Hungarians. This should be sufficient. We now come to the second consideration to be faced, that of securing support.

"The Hungarians have been trying for some time to get into touch with us, and we are not likely to have any difficulty there. As for the Bulgars, they have also been making tentative proposals but we have had to beware of Stamboulisky who has been see-sawing from one side to the other and could not be trusted. General Marcof, who is now in Constantinople, has been talking with Adnan Bey of a triple agreement between Turkey, Bulgaria and Hungary against the Little Entente and Greece. The Macedonians have also been trying to get into closer touch with us.

"Up to the present we have been obliged to show indifference to these various schemes, but now that Stamboulisky is out of the road, we can take them up seriously.

"I am certain that we can come to an arrangement with the new Bulgarian Government. We are prepared to favour her in the question of Karaagach

"Apart from that our representative in Bucharest, Jevad Bey, reports that the Serbs and Roumanians are anxious to be on friendly terms with us. However, it is fairly certain that we can count on Bulgaria and Hungary and that should be sufficient to compel the Serbs and Roumanians to hold their hand."

(g) Relations with Germany and the question of securing Zionist support

"But this is not enough. We can be certain of the support of Hungary and Bulgaria, and we will almost certainly have the support of the Zionists. The latter point is most important, and should be kept in mind when discussing matters with the German leaders. In addition to this we need German support.

During the early days of the Lausanne Conference when our relations with France were more than usually shaky, we were approached by the Germans and the Hungarians with an offer of assistance in arms, munitions and officers. Numerous senior officers were said to be ready to offer their services in the event of a rupture. Yet all these offers were too vague and uncertain to be acceptable. We do not want to repeat the mistake made with the Russians, who failed us so miserably at the critical moment."

F.O. 371/9131

No. 139

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 405

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 11, 1923
(Received July 16)

My Lord,

During the past week the Turkish electoral campaign has proceeded without any incident of particular importance. The choice of Deputies has been expedited even in the eastern provinces, and the total number now elected has almost reached 200, the latest results including those for Konia, Yozgad, Kars and Sivas.

2. At the same time, it has been announced that all electoral Deputies have been requested to proceed to Angora without delay. It is thus apparent that, if in the meantime the Treaty of Peace is signed at Lausanne, every effort will be made to secure a quorum when the Assembly meets in the early days of August or possibly even sooner. The election of a president and other officials will doubtless occupy the first sitting, after which the discussion of the treaty will doubtless be immediately proceeded with and the formality of ratification will in all probability be completed not later than the 15th August.

3. It is interesting to record that at least one Deputy in the new Assembly will not be a recognised member of the Defence of Rights party. This is a certain Emin Bey, who has been elected at Eski Shehir. His name appeared in the list originally furnished by Angora, but before the final elections took place the Kemalist approval of his candidature was withdrawn. This did not, however, prevent his election, on being informed of which Mustafa Kemal sent a

telegram to the municipality of Eski Shehir, stating that Emin Bey had been excluded from the Defence of Rights party.

4. In other areas, and more particularly in the Pontus region, minor difficulties appear to have been encountered. At Kerassund the proportion of electors who participated was so small that fresh elections have been ordered. At Trebizond considerable delay, estimated by the press at not less than one month, is anticipated. Samsoun also seems to have emerged as a centre of opposition, since it has been reported that the central organisation at Angora has given orders for the immediate dissolution of the Defence of Rights Committee there. The publication of this information coincided with an announcement that fifty Communists had been arrested at Samsoun and that further arrests were in prospect.

5. The reasons for the continued postponement of the final elections at Angora are difficult to understand. Although a further batch of reliable Constantinople policemen is being despatched there, I do not believe that the repressive measures utilised elsewhere could not be equally successfully employed by Mustafa Kemal in his own capital. Be that as it may, it is now announced that Mustafa Kemal will himself head the list of approval candidates at Angora, and that, in the event of his election, which cannot be doubted, a law will be introduced in the new Assembly empowering him to execute the double duty of Deputy for Smyrna as well as for the capital.

6. It is also not without interest to record that, for the first time in Turkish history, women have received votes in the final elections. At Smyrna, the wives of Mustafa Kemal and Adnan Bey each received 1 vote, while, at Konia, Latife Hanoum received no less than 39 votes, a fact which is doubtless causing much heartburning among Turks of the old school. At the same time, women's political committees have been formed in some of the larger centres, and more particularly in Constantinople.

7. I have no definite information regarding the position of Nureddin Pasha, the commander of the western army. It is reported, however, that anti-Kemalist intrigues continue at his headquarters, where he still remains, and that a certain Emin Pasha, Inspector-General of Artillery, has been nominated as his successor. Emin Pasha is reported to have proceeded to Smyrna, where he will have an interview with Keuprulu Kiazim Pasha, the Minister of War, before taking up his appointment.

8. As regards the negotiations between Mustafa Kemal and the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, to which I referred in my despatch No. 348 of the 13th ultimo, I am now informed that these have definitely broken

down owing to the refusal of the Unionist leaders to hand over the party funds. The three Unionists have accordingly returned to Smyrna, where they are now believed to be in contact with the leaders of the National Defence and other Opposition groups. Future developments in this connection may be of interest.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 424/258, p.69, No.92

No. 140

A Report on Turkey by the British Secret Intelligence Service

No. 1199

16.7.1923

The General Political Situation at the beginning of July

Appended is a report on this subject, based on information from a number of reliable and authoritative Turkish sources in Constantinople and Anatolia. The following is an outline, for reference purposes, of the salient features of this report:

(i) Mustafa Kemal was so obsessed with his own importance, and with the necessity of establishing a completely independent Turkey, which would lead the Islamic world, that he was not prepared to tolerate the slightest opposition, and was ready, if necessary, to sacrifice his best supporters.

(ii) He had come to mistrust Ismet Pasha and Kiazim Kara Bekir and was likely to set them aside. He disapproved of Fevzi Pasha, on account of the latter's connection with the National Defence group, but was prepared to tolerate him so long as he kept clear of politics. Fethi Bey, Hassan Fehmi, Fevzi Bey and other Ministers had already been relegated to unimportant roles. In fact, Rauf Bey was the only one in whom Kemal appeared to repose real trust.

(iii) As regards the elections, the most serious opposition to Mustafa Kemal was coming from the Eastern and Kurdish vilayets, but this was being stifled by severe repressive measures. Mustafa Kemal was also determined to reduce the National Defence Association and his Unionist opponents to impotency; but several Unionists had secured election under the National Rights ticket.

(iv) While there was a general desire on the part of the bureaucracy to return to Constantinople, it was unlikely that the seat of government would be moved from Angora for some time to come. Mustafa Kemal was opposed to an immediate change, since he wished first to consolidate his position; he did not wish the Government to become involved in intrigue round the Caliph; and he thought that plots against his person were less likely to meet with success in Angora than in Constantinople.

(v) Schemes in connection with furthering Kemal's Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asiatic policy were being actively pursued. He himself was optimistic as to the future of these schemes, and was certain that opposition on the part of the Ulema class would be overcome; but the Sheikh Senussi, and prominent Turks with first hand knowledge of sentiment among the Kurds, Persians, etc. did not share this optimism.

F.O. 371/9122

APPENDIX IN No. 140

*Report on the General Political Situation in Turkey,
at the beginning of July 1923*

Extracts

(a) Mustafa Kemal's Aims and Attitude towards his Followers.

Policy, properly so called, did not exist as far as the Grand National Assembly was concerned. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was so consumed with the idea of his own importance, and his immeasurable ambition for unquestioned power in a new Turkey, free of foreign interference, and leader of an Islamic world rejuvenated under Turkish influence, was such that he was not prepared to tolerate the slightest opposition, and was ready to sacrifice his best friends and co-operators in the Nationalist movement, in order to attain his own ends unopposed. Mustafa Kemal would tolerate the existence of one party only, i.e. the Halk Firkassi or Popular Party, which in effect would only slightly differ in personnel from the National Rights Party.

Thus, there was reason to believe that Ismet Pasha and Kiazim Kara Bekir were likely to go the way of the rest. Jelaleddin Arif was another example. He had been suspected of harbouring friendly ideas regarding the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi, and to have shown too much enthusiasm regarding the Islamic schemes of certain Egyptians and Indians, whose ideas on the subject had not always coincided with those of Kemal. Therefore, Jelaleddin had been treated

in such a manner by the Council of Vekils as would inevitably lead to his retirement, which had taken place. His successor Suad Bey was trusted by Mustafa Kemal as far as he trusted anyone, and it was believed that he would carry out the latter's personal policy more satisfactorily than Jelaletdin Arif had done.

The one man who had the complete trust of Mustafa Kemal appeared to be Rauf Bey. The latter was regarded by all Turks, well acquainted with him, and with the internal affairs of Angora, as being comparatively honest, single-minded in his desire to further the cause of a regenerated Turkey, genuinely religious and devoted to the person and ideas of Kemal. He had been spoken of in Angora as a possible Ambassador to London after the conclusion of peace, but there was scarcely any suggestion of his being in any way a rival to Mustafa Kemal.

İsmet and Kiazim Kara Bekir however, were both regarded with mistrust by Kemal. The former, it was believed, was likely to be treated with scant respect by Kemal, and would retire into private life. Kiazim Kara Bekir had of late lost Mustafa Kemal's esteem, largely on account of his discourse in Smyrna in which he stated that Mustafa Kemal and he, Kiazim, had saved the country. Therefore, for the moment, the latter was being completely ignored, until such moment as he came to heel. Then, it was believed, he would be offered the Ministry of Public Instruction, a post which would give full outlet to Kiazim Kara Bekir's well known passion for pedagogics, and at the same time keep him out of the road of more dangerous questions.

Among others, Kavaklı Fevzi Pasha had lost a great deal of favour on account of his association with the "Mudafaa-i Millî" (National Defence) group, which was regarded with detestation and no little fear by the Ghazi Pasha and which he was determined to destroy as an active organisation. Fevzi was too experienced a man and too conscientious a soldier to adopt an active antagonism towards Mustafa Kemal, and had therefore ceased to interest himself in political questions...

(d) General Tendencies in Anatolia: the Question of the Seat of Government

The impression gained by authoritative informants who had been in Angora at the end of June was that the only two ideals of the official classes in that place were (1) to return to Constantinople as soon as possible and (2) to gain as much money as possible.

It was generally believed, however, at Angora that, notwithstanding the general desire on the part of the bureaucracy to return to Constantinople, the Turkish Government would remain in Angora for several years at least. Mustafa Kemal and his close collaborators were convinced of the danger of transferring the capital back to Constantinople until their position had been thoroughly consolidated. Mustafa Kemal himself had declared that he did not propose to repeat the mistakes of the Unionists, who were ever subject to the varying moods and continual plots hatched in the "still prevailing Byzantine atmosphere of Constantinople."

The Caliphate question was another reason for remaining in Angora. The attitude of Kemal towards the Caliph was full of suspicion, even contempt, and he did not propose to allow the intrigue which was bound to develop in connection with the question of the Caliphate to influence government circles more than could possibly be helped. It was this question above all others on which Mustapha Kemal is least compromising. He would insist on the representatives of Moslem countries coming to Angora, where they would have less facility for intriguing with the Caliph. The Embassies and Legations of non-Moslem powers, however, would remain in Constantinople, where the Bureau of Adnan Bey, or of his successor, would be enlarged.

To facilitate communication it was proposed to connect the two cities by telephone and improve the railway service, so that the through train would do the journey in 15 hours.

Another consideration affecting the decision to retain the capital at Angora, at least for some time, was the fear on the part of Mustapha Kemal of plots against himself, which were less likely to meet with success in Angora than in Constantinople.

(c) Turkish Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asiatic Schemes"

Regarding the Islamic Conference proposed to take place in Brussa or some other convenient spot in Anatolia after peace had been signed, this project had not been abandoned. On the contrary, active preparations were in progress in connection with it and propaganda was being energetically carried on in favour of the Pan-Islamic scheme of Mustapha Kemal. Opposition on the part of Ulema class was expected, but Mustapha Kemal, the Sheikh ul Islam, Rauf Bey and several other leaders were convinced that it would be overcome. On the other hand, the Sheikh Senussi, Jevad Pasha - Commander on the Irak front, and Muhiddin Pasha - Turkish representative in Teheran, were extremely pessimistic as to the outcome and believed that any attempt to force Mustapha Kemal's Pan-Islamic scheme down the throat of Islam would be bound to fail.

In the meantime the Commission known as the "Taakibi Umuri Islamiye" (Study of Islamic Affairs) which consisted of Rauf Bey, Fethi Bey, the Sheikh ul Islam Akif Bey and several Ulema who were more or less favourably disposed to Mustapha Kemal's ideas, was drawing up numerous schemes to be placed before the forthcoming Conference. Another Commission known as "the Commission for inquiry into Theological questions", which was originally composed of the Sheikh ul Islam, Ismail Hakki Effendi, Ferid Bey and Abdul Aziz Shawish, was studying the question of modernising Islamic theology. This Commission was in correspondence with Islamic authorities in other Moslem countries, and, according to one well placed informant, the correspondence was for the most part carefully worded propaganda of the Kemalist Pan-Islamic idea. Since Shawish's recent fall from favour he had ceased to be a member of this commission.

The principal protagonists of the Pan-Asiatic ideas which have caught the minds of many of the Nationalist leaders were Mustapha Kemal Pasha, Rauf Bey, Hamdoullah Soubhi, Ahmed Agaiev, Yussuf Akshura, Zia Keuk Alp, Rifat Sami, Secretary of State to the Minister of Education, Yunous Nadi Bey and others. All were connected with the "Turk Ojaq" or Turanian society, which was known to be in possession of considerable funds. *

F.O. 371/9122

* Fotokopilerde bu belgenin bir sayfası kayıp olduğundan raporun (b) ve (c) bölümleri yazık ki eksik kalmış ve tamamlanamamıştır. - B.N.Ş.

No. 141

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 441

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 25, 1923
(Received July 30)

My Lord,

The accompanying copy of a despatch, dated the 16th instant, which I have received from the acting consul-general at Smyrna, reporting on a general situation in that area, confirms in so far as Smyrna is concerned, the information already reported to your Lordship regarding the waning popularity of Kemalist regime, its administrative incapacity and its tolerance of abuse and corruption.

2. Nevertheless, it is too early to say that the Kemalist, or rather Nationalist position is as yet seriously threatened. Really dangerous opposition may only develop when internal problems have to be faced without being obscured by external issues. The Treaty of Lausanne does not settle all the latter, and hitherto the country has so far succeeded in maintaining an unimpaired unity of front against its foreign foes.

3. Thanks to a successful military campaign, followed by a no less successful struggle at the conference table, and aided where necessary by methods of pressure and coercion, the party of Mustafa Kemal has now all but obtained a crowning victory in the elections. Of the 280 odd Deputies of the new Assembly, some 240 have already been elected, and of this number only one is not a member of the Defence of Rights party. No more than 102 of the new Deputies elected so far were, however, members of the old Assembly, so that the true faith of the majority in the new Assembly has yet to be put to the real test.

4. After weeks of delay, the elections in Angora have at last taken place with the unanimous election of Mustafa Kemal at the head of the six Defence of Rights Deputies. As Kemal had already been elected for Smyrna, it is now understood that he will resign the latter mandate and not, as was stated in an earlier report, obtain the permission of the Assembly to represent the two constituencies. The reasons for the great delay in terminating the elections at Angora are obscure. It is, however, of interest that within the last week a third batch of reliable Constantinople Kemalist policemen has been sent for from Angora and was furnished, though not without some difficulty.

5. One of the most important omissions from the list of the present elected Deputies is the name of Ismet Pasha who, it was announced about a month ago, would be one of the candidates of Malatia. No mention, even of the secondary elections there, has yet been made in the press, but there can be no doubt that they will be concluded in time to permit of the appearance of Ismet Pasha in the Assembly when discussions on the Treaty of Lausanne are commenced.

6. In the eastern provinces and in the Trebizond area little further progress has been reported. At Kharput disturbances appear to have occurred owing to the non-acceptance by the population of the official candidates, but a considerable number of gendarmes and troops were introduced and the elections were terminated, among the successful candidates being Djevad Pasha, the commander on the eastern front. At Trebizond, however, even repressive measures have not yet had the desired effect, as it is announced that the elections there will not be concluded before the middle of August.

7. In the meantime an order concerning army commanders has been issued from Angora which may not be without significance. This is to the effect that officers exercising an army command who have been elected Deputies will only be allowed to participate in the debates of the Assembly after they have resigned their command. It is not for the moment clear whether this order will affect all military officers, of whom thirty-eight have already been elected as Deputies, or only those holding high command. It would, however, appear to apply to such leading officers as Djevad and Fahreddin Pashas and possibly also to Kiazim Kara Bekir and Fevzi Pashas. While it is not yet possible to estimate the reasons actuating this move on the part of the Central Administration, it is not impossible that it may be due to the well-known jealousy of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and to his desire, if possible, to eliminate the possibility of any of his probable rivals establishing a simultaneous leadership in both the military and political spheres. The same agency may likewise even have been at work in the case of Ismet Pasha, whose labours at Lausanne, now brought to such a successful conclusion, have not even yet received anything approaching the notice and praise which they have undoubtedly merited.

8. With only one-seventh of the new Assembly remaining to be elected, there would now appear no doubt of the necessary quorum when the Assembly meets on the 2nd August. It may, however, be mentioned that two sometimes well-informed Turkish newspapers yesterday stated that further delay will occur, and that the discussion of the Peace Treaty cannot be entered upon much before the end of August. Although this possibility cannot be altogether ruled out, it is contrary both to the generally accepted view and my own conviction. A certain time will necessarily be occupied by the election of the officials in the new Assembly and by the examination of the credentials of the new Deputies. Thereafter, the position of the Council of Ministers will come up for consideration. They, as your Lordship is aware, hold their positions by virtue of the decisions of the Assembly, to which they are individually responsible. They will, therefore, have to submit themselves for re-election, and in the event of any Minister not obtaining the confidence of the Assembly his place will have to be filled. While allowing for every emergency, however, it is only to be anticipated that the large majority will be re-elected without difficulty. One exception is the Minister of Justice, Rifaat Bey, who some time ago joined the second group in the old Assembly, and as a result failed to secure re-election at Cesarea. It is not improbable that his place will be filled by Assaf Bey, recently elected Deputy for Smyrna, and at present an official in the Ministry of which he may become the head.

9. Even allowing for slight hitches in the accomplishment of the above formalities there is no real justification for imagining that the Assembly will not

be in a position to commence its more important labours without undue delay. It is therefore permissible to anticipate that, in the absence of unforeseen circumstances, the Treaty of Lausanne will receive the ratification of the Assembly by the 15th August, or at latest by the 20th August.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9131/E.7807

F.O. 424/258, p.101-102, No.138

No. 142

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 457

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 31, 1923
(Received August 7)

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the meeting of the new Turkish Assembly, originally fixed for the 2nd August, appears now to have been definitely postponed. I gather from statements in the press, as well as information received from other sources, that this postponement will be for not less than ten days to a fortnight, and may be for an even longer period.

2. The reasons for this delay, in view of the long-cherished and frequently expressed desire of the Turks to rid themselves as the earliest possible date of the allied forces of occupation, are somewhat difficult to estimate, unless it be that the Government feels, despite its unprincipled efforts during the elections, still insecure of its majority. Ismet Pasha himself has, of course, been detained at Lausanne by the present Turco-American negotiations, but, as far as I am aware, this has not influenced the decision to postpone the meeting of the Assembly.

3. It cannot be held that an insufficient number of Deputies have been elected to constitute a quorum, as the elections are now almost completed. In all, over 260 Deputies have now been returned, the results announced during the past week including those from such centres of trouble as Erzeroum and

Diarbekir, where Feizi Bey, Minister of Public Works, found ultimately no difficulty in securing election. İsmet Pasha has now likewise been returned at the head of the five Deputies for Malatya. Of the more important centres where the elections have not yet been concluded there remain therefore only Trebizond, Samsoun and Kerassund.

4. Official circles here are inclined to ascribe the delay in the meeting of the Assembly to the fact that many of the Deputies, having only recently been elected, have been unable to start for Angora in spite of the urgent "whip" stated to have been issued to them ten days ago. As, however, few of the Deputies have, in fact, visited their constituencies during the elections, and as a number of them have been for some time in Constantinople, from which, for Turks, Angora is now only twenty-four hours distant by rail, this excuse carries little conviction. Reports regarding conditions in Angora go further, in my opinion, to explain the reluctance of the Deputies to proceed thither before they are absolutely compelled to do so.

5. Nevertheless, approximately half of the Deputies are reported to have already arrived at Angora, where question of their accommodation is again giving rise to great difficulty. Among these, according to information which I have received from a sometimes well-informed source, an opposition is already beginning to take shape. This opposition, which so far consists of some thirty Deputies, will, it is stated, take the name of the "Sultanate Party", and will demand the abolition of the law whereby monarchist activities are considered as high treason and punishable accordingly.

6. The rumours in regard to the uncertainty of the situation at Angora have been aggravated by the fact that Mustafa Kemal, Fevzi and Kiazim Kara Bekir Pashas, accompanied by other Ministers, left suddenly a week ago for Smyrna, that Reouf Bey will in few days commence a provincial tour extending over a fortnight, and that a fourth batch of fifteen reliable Constantinople policemen has been asked for from Angora. The journey of Mustafa Kemal was even, according to an unconfirmed report from Smyrna, attributed to hostile military demonstrations in Angora. It is now announced however, that Mustafa Kemal is in need of treatment at the hot baths near Smyrna, and that he will not return to the capital before the 10th August, when it is hoped that he will do so in the company of İsmet Pasha who will proceed to Smyrna after a short stay in Constantinople.

7. Meanwhile there are indications that even the election of the Council of Ministers, which will take place immediately after the opening of the Assembly, will give rise to no little discussion. The defects of the present Constitution and methods of administration are now the subject of general criticism in the

Constantinople press, and opinion is definitely hardening in favour of the collective as opposed to the individual responsibility of Ministers to the Assembly.

8. In view of this and other considerations, it is difficult to fix any date by which the treaty is likely to be ratified by the Assembly. Official circles here relegate ratification to the closing days of August, and, if I myself incline to concur in this view, I only do so because I feel that the present Government is still strong enough for the time being to hold the embryo opposition in check, and that the really serious onslaught on the present Government will only develop when the treaty has been ratified, the Allied forces withdrawn and Turkey left to her own resources.*

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 424/258, p.110-111, No.148
F.O. 371/9131/E. 8004

*Bu tel üzerine Foreign Office'de şu yorum yapılmıştır:

"This is very interesting. Kemal's difficulties are beginning. The name of "Sultanate Party" for the opposition is a direct defiance of his most cherished principles." (F.O. 371/9131/E.8604).

No. 143

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.401
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 1, 1923
(Received August 1)

Your telegram No.236

Ismet's movements depend largely on progress of his negotiations with Americans. It seems probable that he will, however, in any case, leave Lausanne by end of this week, will stop one or two days in Constantinople, and proceed thence to Smyrna, where he will join Mustafa Kemal, whom he will accompany to Angora.

Chief difficulties in way of American negotiations are in respect of claims and nationality. Turks will not admit either claims or return to Turkey of

Armenians, &c. who, having once been Turkish subjects, have become American citizens. Policy of Angora appears to be desire to settle with America generally on same terms as Allies, but to refuse to go further. Turks would have been willing to resume negotiations elsewhere, but American representative warned Ismet that this would be regarded as rupture. Latter is consequently doing utmost to bring matters to conclusion before departing from Lausanne. He has, however, been authorised, if necessary, to go away himself, leaving remainder to maintain contact, or even appoint, if practicable, new delegate to continue negotiations at Lausanne.

This is present position in so far as I am cognisant of it. Ismet has put forward formula for settlement of claims, which has been accepted by Angora, but not by Americans, who have telegraphed to Washington as regards proposal to defer negotiations.

In the meantime, it seems unlikely that Grand National Assembly will meet before 12th August or 15th August, since, in opinion of Kemal, majority would be too slight, if proceedings opened on 2nd August, which was date originally fixed.

F.O. 371/9166/E. 7907

F.O. 424/258, p. 106, No.141

No. 144

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.403

Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 3, 1923

(Received 3rd August)

My telegram No.401.

Kemal has unexpectedly returned to Angora whilst Ismet will proceed direct from Constantinople. Date of latter's departure from Lausanne still unknown.

Meeting of the new Assembly has now been fixed for August 11th.

F.O. 371/9131/E. 7964

No. 145

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 490

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 18, 1923
(Received August 27)

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a textual translation of the speech delivered on the 13th instant by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the Grand National Assembly at Angora. Owing to its length this translation could not be completed in time for inclusion with my despatch No. 477 of the 14th instant.

2. As your Lordship will observe, Kemal Pasha confined himself to a large extent to a recital of past achievements. The old Assembly and the army were duly eulogised, and underlying these praises it is not difficult to read the hint that the organisation of the new Turkey and her victory were due to the directing hand of Mustafa Kemal himself. In regard to the Sultan, his references were particularly bitter, and it is interesting to note that at every point he linked the name of the Sultan with the country's enemies, thereby seeking further to discredit the former by showing him to have been a willing tool in, if not the investigator of, all the repressive measures taken during the earlier days of the Nationalist movement. This idea is indeed further developed than at any previous time, as Mustafa Kemal accuses the regular forces employed in 1920 by the Sultan's Government, and not the irregular Kemalist bands, of being rebels, *i.e.*, against the nation.

3. In my opinion however, the main features of the speech, which, as in the case of nearly all Mustafa Kemal's pronouncements, is well worthy of perusal, are the reference to the army and the absence of any allusion to the constitutional question, which for some time had been the universal subject of discussion. The same line was taken by Fethi Bey, the new President of the Council, in the speech delivered immediately after his election, and would seem to indicate that Mustafa Kemal, having for a time coquetted with the idea of a Government on democratic and constitutional lines, has decided to rest his fortunes on the army which he knows rather than to face the uncertainty as regards his personal position which might result from a revision of the Constitution. The latter may well wait a while, since the Constitutional Reform party must of necessity take time to complete and perfect its organisation, whereas the growing opposition of the Military party was a more immediate danger. A born opportunist, Kemal doubtless hopes that, if and when this opposition develops, the occasion will provide the means of dealing with it. In

the meantime the Ghazi Pasha observes in his speech that peace will not be everlasting, that experience shows that might is right, and that the army is the sole guarantee of the future security and independence of Turkey. The military machine must therefore, he says, be developed and organised. If his intention be to set up a military dictatorship, he would scarcely have expressed himself differently.

4. The abandonment of the scheme of constitutional reform would appear to have been decided upon at a meeting of the People's party held on the eve of opening of the Assembly. The reforms had in fact been drafted and discussed and only awaited the final approval when, on the motion of Mustafa Kemal, the whole question was indefinitely postponed. It is not improbable that it was this issue which finally brought about the retirement of Reouf Bey, who was understood to be strongly in favour of reforms, but who may not have felt himself strong enough at present to brave the hostility of Mustafa Kemal. This theory is indeed advanced to-day in the "Tevhid," which states that Reouf's resignation was due to his inability to work with his former colleagues, whose views he had sought for long to reconcile with his own and with those of other groups in the Assembly. In the meantime he has been granted three month's leave of absence from the Assembly, but shows no indication to break his self-imposed silence. Incidentally he refused the presidency of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly, and it is also reported that he was likewise declined the post of Turkish Ambassador at London which was alleged to have been offered to him.

5. By glorifying and strengthening the army, by flattering the Assembly, and by securing the election of Fethi Bey as President of the Council, Mustafa Kemal appears to have succeeded in re-establishing his ascendancy and to aim for the time being at carrying out by the same means as before. At any rate the constitutional issue has been delayed until after the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne. The resulting evacuation of Constantinople will add to the laurels of Kemal and his associates, but the practice of dismissing powerful rivals is one which cannot be indulged in indefinitely. Sooner or later internal questions will have to be faced, and Mustafa Kemal's appeal for national unity is not without significance.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9131/E. 8626

F.O. 424/258, p. 150-151, No. 195

ENCLOSURE IN No. 145

*Text of Speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal
in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey at Angora on August 13, 1923.*

(Translation)

Gentlemen,

We find ourselves at the opening of the session of the second Grand National Assembly of Turkey. I salute with the utmost respect the members who compose our new Assembly. At the same time the opening of the session coincides with a happy event in the history of the new Turkish State. I regard this fact as a happy augury for the happiness and well-being of our country and nation and for the success of your august Assembly. Actually, our four years' struggle for independence has been terminated by a peace worthy of the honour of our nation. When the treaty signed at Lausanne has been ratified by your august Assembly, we shall enter the sphere of happy labour, free and independent in the full significance of these terms. With all my heart I wish you complete success for the maintenance of the happy results obtained, for the solution of questions arising out of the Treaty of Lausanne, and for your efforts to give our country peace and prosperity.

Gentlemen, during the period of national activity which preceded the meeting of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, I have enjoyed the esteem and confidence of your nation. I have exercised the presidency of the first Assembly and the functions of commander-in-chief of our heroic army. In these two qualities I have been the object of the greatest national honours. My election to the presidency by your august Assembly has aroused in my heart feelings of the deepest gratitude. In your presence and in that of the nation I undertake that all my material and administrative energies will be devoted to assuring success in the field of labour which has been opened by the peace, and that, leaning on your support and on the confidence of the whole nation, I shall continue to work in a manner worthy of the high value of the nation's confidence.

Gentlemen, the honour of being your chosen president imposes on me the duty of making certain declarations. I hope that a favourable reception will be accorded to my declarations which deal with my position and my actions in the past. You are fully aware of the phases of the struggle and of all the sufferings as well as the joys of success through which the nation has passed. I am going to summarise these events in three distinct parts: the period from the armistice of Mudros up to the establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and

its Government, the years of our first Assembly, and finally, the present, in which our new Assembly has met. I think that these three periods contain all the important national events which have led us to this day, and which have created the situation of to-day as well as the grandeur and greatness of our new duties. Before your high Assembly, which is the first of the peace inaugurated by the New Turkey, I deem it necessary to speak of the Ottoman Empire which has disappeared and of the general war which was its last great landmark. I shall therefore commence my remarks from the armistice of Mudros.

Gentlemen, the period from the conclusion of the armistice of Mudros up to the opening of our first National Assembly is full of the most tragic episodes and of the gravest results which can be inflicted on the prestige and dignity of a nation. As you are aware, from the very morrow of the signature of that armistice between the Allies and the Turkish Government it was in word and deed violated by the victors. Invading British, French and Italian armies established themselves on the dearest portions of our fatherland. Constantinople and the Straits became exercising grounds for the land and sea forces of the enemy. The Greek armies stained the quays of Smyrna with blood. They commenced to devastate our most prosperous provinces. The honour of our women and children was violated, as was everything which bore the Turkish name, even including some of our monuments and religious institutions. Daily our finest susceptibilities were wounded by the threat to erect the cross on St. Sophia. With pressure which could not be resorted to even in the case of prisoners, our officers, who bore on their shoulders the weight of centuries of glory, were obliged to render honours to the officers of the enemy. Our flag, emblem of our honour, was insulted. Foreign officers, established in the most remote corners of Anatolia to superintend the application of this iniquitous armistice, founded centres of intrigue under the name of intelligence bureaux, while, at the instigation of our internal enemies, they exposed our people to unimaginable cruelties and insults. The influence of the Government and the dignity of the nation became as playthings in the hands of those officers of aggression. In a word, the conscience of Turkism was exposed to a terrible test. It was impossible not to foresee the result of these unending aggressions or the tragedy of that result.

The Ottoman Sultan and Caliph, who, thanks to history and tradition, had been placed on the glorious throne of the fatherland, as well as his Government, delivered themselves to the enemy only in order to secure their own contemptible private ends. They made themselves the accomplices of the enemy by betraying the fatherland. The situation appeared completely hopeless. The force of the enemy was overwhelming; the misfortune was great and unbearable. In fact, we were compelled to choose between slavery and

death. We had to struggle for freedom and independence against difficulties such as no other country in the world has ever had to face. Intelligent men regarded the situation as being beyond the limits of the destiny appointed for a conquered people. There was no longer any difficulty in understanding that the victorious Powers had decided on the final destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed it was not felt necessary to respect the honour or dignity of the Turkish people. It was impossible to imagine any obstacle in the way of the enslavement of the Turkish people and the dismemberment of Turkey. The people began to awake. In certain parts of the country committees were formed under various names, and the foundations were laid by the nation itself of armed defence against the enemy. Congresses in the east and in the west gave a fresh impetus to the national awakening. Finally, the General Congress of Sivas perfected within previously determined limits the different national organisations under the name of "the Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Roumelia", and thus united the national forces.

Gentlemen, these serious efforts drew the attention of the enemy, and particularly of the Sultan Caliph, who resorted to reprisals. Orders were issued for the persecution of the authors of the national movement. Measures of extermination were entered upon. The Palace and its Government, which had humbled themselves before the enemy, wished at any price to stamp out the national vigilance; they wished to prevent the nation from struggling against those who were attacking its right and its honour, and they gave themselves as guides to the enemy for the dismemberment of the country.

But, gentlemen, the determination of those who had organised the Congress of Sivas, was firm, and their support from the nation was strong. They continued their labour without flinching. First of all, the election of the Deputies and the meeting of the Assembly were assured. In this way the nation gave the first proof of its existence and gained its first important success against despotism.

Gentlemen, in spite of all these crimes committed by the Palace and its Government against the fatherland and the nation, the latter sought with all sincerity once more to save the Sultan-Caliph as well as the Ottoman Empire; it contented itself with assuring the meeting of the Deputies elected in accordance with the laws of the Ottoman Empire. Although it was evident that, under foreign bayonets, the Deputies could not discharge their duties with absolute freedom of opinion, the hesitation and superficial considerations of the majority unfortunately made it necessary to hold the meeting in Constantinople. Gentlemen, our enemies and the Sublime Porte could not regard as probable a courageous act on the part of an Assembly at Constantinople. In their opinion, the meeting of this Assembly would not

permit the development of a national organisation in Anatolia, and, after the national effervescence had been satisfied in this manner, the tragedy would be continued anew. Those who realised this truth continued their struggle in Anatolia. Thanks to these efforts the organisation in Anatolia grew stronger. In spite of the unfavourable position of the Assembly, which leant on Anatolia, it continued its labours. This situation did not appear favourable to the enemy. In despair at seeing their end unrealisable by fraudulent means, they took a decision, and the tragic occupation of Constantinople took place on the 16th March, 1920. An end was, in fact, made to the life of the Ottoman Empire.

To the workers in Anatolia this event was not unexpected. From thenceforth the possibility of saving the Ottoman Empire and of securing under its auspices the salvation of the fatherland and the independence of the nation had completely disappeared. An invitation for the convocation of a National Assembly became indispensable. Finally, on the 23rd April, 1920, your predecessor, the first Grand National Assembly of Turkey, assembled in the room in which we find ourselves to-day. Our first Assembly, which will for ever occupy a high and honorable place in Turkish history, and which will win the appreciation of our grandchildren, proclaimed the assumption in its own hands of the destinies of the nation. It adopted the principles of national sovereignty as the basis of its actions and laid the foundations of a strong popular Government.

Gentlemen, the creation in Anatolia of a new national Government was a deed of foresight which proved the sagacity of our nation. But our enemies, and the Sultan-Caliph with them, were not pleased at this. They took common action with a view to imposing on us by force the Treaty of Sèvres which had been signed in Paris. They had recourse to every kind of devilry in order to stifle the national enthusiasm in Anatolia. On the one hand, using religion as a political instrument, they condemned the Anatolian warriors to death, and by means of "fetvas" incited the population to revolt; and on the other hand, while the pockets of certain persons were being filled, they sent against us forces called "police forces", or "the army of the Caliph." They deceived the innocent population, and under pressure lit up and down the interior the fires of insurrection.

Gentlemen, on the day of the opening of our first Assembly the insurrection directed from Constantinople had come within eight hours' distance of Angora. In Samsoun and its environs a cruel political revolt had been prepared with a view to dominating the surrounding country. The east, the west and the south of the fatherland were burning under the fires of the enemy. That was the situation which faced us at the opening of our national movement. Honourable Sirs, it was not easy to arrive at the brilliant result of to-

day. I wish to draw your attention alike to the greatness of the journey between the commencement of our movement and the point at which we have arrived and to its shortness. Engrave it for ever firmly on your memories, for it is from this source that we must draw strength and vigour for our struggles of to-morrow.

Gentlemen, before I pass to the second phase, let me say that your predecessor, the High Assembly, never allowed itself to flinch in face of the terrors of the first days. It pursued its task with the great ability and power which it received from the nation. The Government of the new State threw itself courageously into the struggle. Those who had allowed themselves to be incited to revolt were reduced to obedience. Without guns, without rifles, without ammunition and without means, the army which had become a wreck was resuscitated. The irregular forces which had been created with painful efforts towards the end of the first struggle were immediately transformed into regular forces. This transformation caused the destruction of certain treacherous detachments who considered it contrary to their interests. The destiny and the tranquillity of the country were confided to a regular army. Gentlemen, the nation will ever gratefully recall the brilliant services rendered by the army in the first days of its organisation. The victory over Armenia, the first and second victories at İn Eunu, the phases of heroic resistance and sacrifice shown in the battles on the southern front, all these will be gloriously remembered as precious events in the honoured history of the national army.

Gentlemen, in proportion as the year of struggle passed, our young army was organised on solid foundations. It showed the power and greatness to accomplish heroically the greatest and most important tasks which the will of the nation might demand of it. At the battle of the Sakaria it vanquished the proud Greek army and obliged it to retreat. Finally, it crushed the whole Greek army of Asia Minor in the battles of Afion-Kara Hissar and Doumlou Pounar and completely annihilated it and all its accessories on the soil of Anatolia. I leave it to history to appreciate the details of the battles of Anatolia, every phase of which was worthy of the glory of our fatherland, of our national history and of our grandchildren. But, gentlemen, the art, the music, the literature and all the fine arts of the nation must for ever unitedly glorify this sacred struggle and the love of fatherland.

Sirs, these military events with which I have dealt were accompanied by very important political activities. In particular, we concluded with the Russian a treaty of friendship, which is still in force. We concluded treaties of the same nature with Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. As a result of our victory in the eastern front we made peace with the Armenians. As regards our relations of that time with the Western Governments, we were only able to

conclude with the French the agreement of Angora, which contained limited conditions. However, although we have sincerely endeavoured to obtain peace before and after every victory, our applications were either met with refusal or rejected with disdain.

Gentlemen, what can we do when the eternal rule which condemns to sterility rights unsupported by material forces has not shown an exception in regard to us! So long as the will of the nation could not appear in the form of victory, the goddess of Peace did not open her arms to us.

Gentlemen, while our first Assembly was endeavouring to rescue the country from the feet of the enemy, and while it progressed towards the goal of an honourable peace for the nation, it established the edifice of the new Turkey. With this object it elaborated laws and took decisions. It also solved several questions in accordance with the needs of the different sections of the Government. In spite of the existence of certain persons of limited view who did not cease to create difficulties in the way of peace and of our military movements, the late Assembly discharged its duty well, and in general it gave life and deliverance to the fatherland and the nation.

After four years of struggle, and following on our decisive victory, the Military Convention of Moudania was concluded, and we passed to the period of peace deliberations. The difficulties encountered in the course of these negotiations have also been numerous. But I regard this as very natural, because the questions regulated during these peace negotiations were not questions of four years, but they were the evil inheritance of a period of four centuries. For the Ottoman Empire, during its most glorious and most powerful moments, had sacrificed to the detriment of the independence of the nation and its vital interests so much that the result was not only the destruction of the Empire but also the exposure thereafter of the nation, the real proprietor of the country, to the greatest difficulties in establishing its rights and its existence. The difficulties have been successfully surmounted. As a result, the signed treaty will be submitted and explained to your august Assembly. Here I wish only to summarise the efforts already made and their results.

Gentlemen, not a trace remains of the Great Armenia which was to embrace Trebizond in the east and Adana in the south. The Armenians have been left within their own natural frontiers. The three sanjaks forcibly detached from the fatherland in 1878 are again under our flag. In the north the Pontus Government and its supporters who wished to establish themselves on the fairest and richest shores of the Black Sea have been eliminated. It has been recognised that Turkey is entitled to the same rights as every other civilised country. Again, in the south, our beautiful cities, such as Adana and many

others, in respect of which we nourished such bright hopes for the wealth and power of our fatherland, were delivered from the invasion which oppressed them. In the west our most prosperous provinces, our cities like Smyrna and Broussa, Pasha Ali (Paşaeli) and historic Adrianople, and beautiful Constantinople which incites the envy of the world, were liberated from the yoke of slavery and occupation. Besides this, there were broken the judicial, political, economic and financial chains which kept us behind other civilised nations. They were rent in sunder.

Gentlemen, the successes already obtained have only opened for us a way towards progress and civilisation. We have not yet arrived there. It is incumbent on us and on our children's children to treat this path without hesitation. We must never forget that it should be our daily thought not to permit the escape of the fruits obtained at the price of such sacrifices, and to take steps to secure that a return to the calamities of the past shall henceforth be impossible. But let us be sure that simple attention and vigilance and ingenious jealousy will not suffice to enable us to reach these ends. Gentlemen, the tasks falling to this race of the centuries of bad administration present innumerable difficulties. We must therefore regulate our numerous and important affairs in a sane and rational manner. Experience has shown that sole method of performing great works with limited means is not to scatter our forces and to concentrate the most of the existing means on the most important objectives. Without doubt in the period of peace, which we are now entering we shall above all devote our budget, in so far as it allowed, to the maintenance of the new State and to rendering it powerful and eternal. But to attain this end we must always have before our eyes certain cardinal points. The first cardinal point which occurs to me is that of security.

Gentlemen, the existence of a wise Government depends on its assuring the security of the country and the peace and tranquillity of the nation. A stable security must reign throughout the country and the nation must enjoy its tranquillity in peace and security. Those who seek in any part of the country to disturb the confidence of the people or the unity and security of the Government must find arrayed against them the whole forces of the State. Then, gentlemen, the independence of the Turkish State is sacred. It must be for ever preserved and assured. The sole guarantee for the independence of the State and for the existence of the nation and the people is our heroic army. Particular attention must therefore be devoted to the reorganisation and development of our military machine. It would be foolishness to believe that the peace which have obtained to-day will be an everlasting one. This such an important truth that carelessness in regard to it even for one moment would endanger the whole existence of the nation. Naturally, so long as our rights, our

honour and our dignity are respected we shall not fail to respond with the most absolute reciprocity. But, alas, we have learnt by bitter experience that violation of the rights of the weak is a law and that these rights are never respected. For that reason gentlemen, we cannot in any circumstances postpone the preparations which every nature of eventuality may render necessary.

Gentlemen, while measures are being taken for ensuring the external and internal security of the country, very particular importance should be attached to the reform of our judicial system as soon as possible. From the point of view of assuring the success, well-being and happiness of the nation, you will realise the vital necessity and urgency of such questions as public works, commerce and public instruction.

Gentlemen, I do not think it necessary to say anything more in regard to our foreign relations. Our objects are known to the whole world. It need not be doubted that we shall seek to live on friendly terms with our neighbours and with all foreign States and to follow a policy based on respect and reciprocal sincerity. I shall say this: we enter the era of peace with a very real sincerity and with a desire serious and calm. If your august Assembly will permit me, I would like to add a few words to all my observations to which you have so kindly listened.

Gentlemen, leaving details on one side for a minute, let us cast a glance over the existence of the sacred thing which we call the fatherland. We see it composed of a large stretch of black earth without life, without any work of art and without prosperity. Under this black earth are hidden treasures and on it there lives a nation noble and heroic. Now we have undertaken these long painful struggles to prove that we are and ever shall be free and independent masters of this precious patrimony bequested to us by our ancestors. We have waged these struggles in the name of safeguarding the fatherland and the independence of the nation. The principal aim of our future activity will also be to assure and strengthen the tranquillity, the security and the protection of our fatherland. For this reason we are going to make the country prosperous and the people happy. Our hope, our strength and, more particularly, the unity which our nation and your august Assembly will show will be guarantees for the success of the efforts which we shall make along the path of progress and civilisation.

My honourable Sirs, before concluding my remarks I would invite you all to perform one great duty. Let us together do honour to the heroes who distinguished themselves during the critical days through which we have passed. Among them are not only the heroes whose breasts have been pierced by the sword of the enemy on the field battle, but also the unfortunate old men,

women and children who have perished in the flames. Among them are young girls whose honour has been violated and who are condemned to eternal weeping. Among them are families who have lost their homes and who have buried their children. And among them are the conquerors who having gloriously performed their tasks on the field of battle have to-day returned to their villages. Let us pray for the rest of the souls of the martyrs.

Gentlemen, the secret of all the successes of which we can all justly be proud is found in the edifice of the new Turkey itself. I pray that almighty God may accord your august Assembly His support to assure the happy development of the country under these conditions.

F.O. 371/9132 E. 8626

F.O. 424/258, p. 151-152, No. 195/1

No. 146

British Embassy in Berlin to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 555

BERLIN, August 22, 1923

(Received August 25)

My Lord Marquess,

With reference to Your Lordship's despatch No. 982 of July 4th, 1923, enquiries have been made both in Turkish and German circles here regarding the intended visit of Mahmud Sadiq Bey to Germany. The individual in question does not appear to have visited Berlin since the date mentioned and nothing appears to be known regarding negotiations for the supply of material or other assistance to the Kemalists. Should the further details to which Your Lordship's despatch refers, be available, enquiries will be renewed.

In the course of enquiry it has been ascertained that Major Nouri Bey, who acted as Kemalist Representative here prior to the first Lausanne Conference, and who proceeded to Geneva during the Conference, has not returned to Berlin and it is understood that he is not expected to return to Germany. My informant stated that Nouri Bey had been entrusted with a mission similar to that attributed to Mahmoud Sadiq in Your Lordship's despatch and that his failure to achieve any success was responsible for his non-return to Berlin. In the meantime no successor has been appointed and a Consular official charged with routine work is the only Kemalist representative here.

In view of the invasion of the Ruhr and the present political situation in Germany, it seems very doubtful whether the moment is opportune for any activities of the nature indicated. It is unlikely that individuals or organisations in the illegal possession of arms would be inclined to dispose of them at the present juncture, all the more so as they would find as ready and as lucrative a market here as abroad without the difficulties and risk which export over the frontiers would involve.

As regards officers - owing to the fall in the mark ex-officers in receipt of pensions or fixed incomes have been terribly impoverished and there are hundreds of them anxious for work of a military character in any country under the sun. I doubt however, whether the Turks have a sufficiently agreeable recollection of their stringent ideas of discipline to employ them very willingly.

Regarding relations between Germany and Turkey - a rumour is current that the late Minister for Foreign Affairs -Dr. Rosenberg - will be appointed Ambassador at Constantinople soon after the Treaty of Peace has been ratified. There can be little doubt that his personal influence will be directed towards improving relations between Turkey and England. In conversations with me he has only put this in the forefront of the intelligent objects of German policy.

I have, &c.

F.O. 371/9131/E.8601

No. 147

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.438
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 28, 1923
(Received August 28)

My telegram No.429

Turkish Ministers and Mustafa Kemal are to visit Smyrna on 9th September to celebrate anniversary of its recapture. I think it would be fitting that Allied warships should withdraw before that date.

I am anxious to arrange for early withdrawal, at any rate, of British man-of-war, as this would facilitate return there of British subjects, and especially Maltese from Malta, for permission for which Governor is constantly pressing me. This could be used as argument to convince French Government, who might be informed that, in any case, we propose to withdraw by, say, 7th September.

Cypher telegram referred to in last paragraph of my telegraph above mentioned duly reached Smyrna and I have received reply. I am repeating this by same route.

(Repeated to Smyrna, No.69)

F.O. 424/258, p. 160, No.205

No. 148

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.514

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 28, 1923
(Received September 3)

My Lord,

The discussion of the Treaty of Lausanne in the Turkish National Assembly commenced on the 21st instant. In the report of the Foreign Affairs Commission, which was first read, the various points of the treaty were reviewed in turn, attention was drawn to the importance of the abolition of the Capitulations, and to the absence of any reference to the currency in which Turkish debt coupons would be paid, an omission which was held to be tantamount to Allied recognition of the justice of the Turkish point of view, and the hope was expressed that, with the definite settlement of the Irak frontier question, the national aspirations would be completely realised. In view of the advantages thus secured, the commission recommended the adoption of the treaty by the Assembly.

2. Yussuf Kemal Bey, the president of the commission, opened the debate, which followed with a short speech in which he advised the examination of the treaty as a whole, when it would be found that it conferred on Turkey rights equal to those already enjoyed by the European Powers. He complimented the negotiators on the successful conclusion of their labours, and, turning towards Mustafa Kemal Pasha, said, amid loud cheers, "Pasha, this is the work."

3. The deputies who had announced their intention of criticising the treaty when spoke, and, as anticipated in my despatch No.491 of the 21st instant, devoted themselves principally to the question of the southern frontier. The provisions of the Angora Agreement were criticised as being incompatible with Turkish national independence, and the Government was pressed to

obtain their modification in agreement with the French Government. The parallel of an unredeemed Alsace Lorraine was quoted, and appeals were addressed to the sympathies of the French nation. In this connection a particularly violent speech was delivered by Hamdullah Suphi Bey, a former member of the Angora Cabinet and ex-Vice-President of the Assembly, who stated that the situation on the Syrian frontier was a menace to the peace which everyone so ardently desired, and that the Turks over the frontier were living in a hell owing to oppression and persecution. He concluded by asserting that independent Turkey would not rest until they also were happy and free. Colonel Mougin was present during this part of the debate, and according to press reports, expressed to correspondents his regret at the language used by some of the speakers.

4. Some of the Thracian Deputies then deplored the separation of Adrianople from the adjoining provinces on which it was economically dependent. Western Thrace had, they said, been given first to the Bulgars and then to the Greeks, a fact which proved that it belonged to neither, but to the Turks. The latter were the sons of conquerors of five centuries ago who were Turks of Anatolia. It was their historic right therefore to remain in the homes of their ancestors and not to be arbitrarily separated from Turkey.

5. When the debate was continued on the 22nd instant other points of the treaty were raised, but the speeches were, on the whole, moderate in tone. Such matters as the exchange of populations, the distribution of the public debt, the judicial and economic clauses, and also the Straits Convention, were discussed. As regards questions primarily affecting His Majesty's Government, real hostility was shown by only one Deputy. This was Nejati Bey, Member for Broussa, who criticised the treaty article by article. "The whole world," he said, "must know that in taking the Mosul question out of the Treaty, the Allies will gain nothing more. We cannot abandon our precious territory." In referring to the Turkish warships requisitioned at the beginning of the war, he complained that Great Britain had confiscated the sums subscribed by the children of the country for the naval defence of its coasts. After reading the text of article 129, Nejati Bey continued: "There is no nation which respects tombs and monuments so much as ourselves. We had had to abandon our dead on foreign soil, and foreigners should have done the same. It is impossible not to feel that in keeping a corner of territory at the Dardanelles Britain is harbouring some secret design."

6. The Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission, Tewfik Ruchdi Bey, replied to the points raised by the various speakers. He dealt first with the southern frontier, and said that as the Agreement of Angora was in full force it was the elementary duty of the Government integrally to apply its clauses as

well as those of its annexes. In regard to the Irak frontier the speaker was non-committal, and contented himself with expressing the hope that the national claims would be satisfied in this as they had been in other directions.

7. The debate was thereupon adjourned until the 23rd instant, when Ismet Pasha delivered a lengthy speech, a summary of which I have the honour to enclose herein. Praise of the members of his delegation was followed by a particularly warm tribute to Mustafa Kemal. No effort was, however, made to direct attention to his own achievements, a fact which is illustrative of the well-known modesty of the speaker. He nevertheless warmly and forcefully defended his handiwork. His replies to his critics regarding the frontier settlement were such as effectively to silence them, and he did not permit himself to waste much sympathy on the co-religionists beyond the border who in the past had not, he said, been averse to raising difficulties when Turkey was passing through troublous days. On almost every point he was at pains to reconcile the terms of the treaty with those of the National Pact, though it will be observed that, in dealing with the question of the Straits, his arguments appear to have been somewhat involved.

8. The speech of Ismet Pasha was conclusive, and at 6 p.m. the adoption was moved of each of the four Bills embracing the treaty and its attached protocols and conventions and carried by votes varying between 206 and 213 in a House of 227 Members. As I had the honour to report in my despatch No.505 of yesterday's date, the ratification of the treaty by the Assembly was officially notified to me by Adnan Bey the same evening.

I have &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 424/258, p.164, No213

No. 149

Minutes by Sir W. Tyrrell Submitted to Lord Curzon of Kedleston

September 5, 1923
(Submitted on September 6)

I met last night Mr. Isaac Marcossou, the well known American journalist, who has returned from a few weeks visit to Turkey during which he spent a week at Angora.

The first thing Mr. Marcosson told me was that he had satisfied himself that there was no truth in the report that Mustapha Kemal had taken to drink and drugs. He had seen him daily in the intimacy of his private house and all he discovered was that he had taken unto himself a very pretty and wealthy wife who was a very good type of the American species called "vamp". He found her a very good linguist, speaking French and English with great ease, very intelligent and very anxious to play the part of a political lady. He was very impressed by Mustafa Kemal's personality. He described him as an intensely earnest and public spirited patriot who told him that the only two American Presidents he admired were Washington and Lincoln, because they were entirely devoted to the public good! He found him as a very optimistic as regards the help he hoped to get from America in rebuilding Turkey, and under this head Mr. Marcosson undertook to undeceive him by pointing out to him that he had made a great mistake in granting the Chester concession which he described to him as a shoddy concern run by crooks, and warned him against the concession hunters that were descending upon Angora. He found Mustafa Kemal very suspicious of us as he kept on repeating to him that he was quite unable to make head or tail of our attitude towards Turkey since the Armistice. Mustafa Kemal said that Lloyd George had been the real founder of the New Turkey and that he intended to put up a public monument to him at Constantinople. It was the arrival of the Greeks at Smyrna that had enabled him to rally Turkish patriotism in defence of their home land. Without that inducement, he did not believe he would have succeeded in resurrecting Turkey.

I asked Mr. Marcosson what future he thought there was in store for Turkey? He replied that he was not very hopeful. He thought that the intense patriotism and xenophobia which had taken possession of the Turks would prove a very serious stumbling block to the economic regeneration on which the future existence of the country depended. He felt convinced that without foreign aid and the presence of christian traders (Greeks and Armenians), the Turks would fail in their task, and he mentioned that he saw distinct signs of the Jews being willing to take their place. He repeatedly said what he had already witnessed at Lausanne that the Turks are suffering from the obsession of intense nationalism. He told Mustafa Kemal that unless he successfully tackled the economic situation, he would fail, and he advised him as a first step to secure the services of an honest and competent foreign adviser.

Mr. Marcosson is convinced that for the next few years, Mustafa Kemal would insist on retaining Angora as the capital. Firstly because he considers Constantinople too much exposed to foreign pressure and secondly, he is afraid that the Turks would become demoralized by the comparative comforts and

luxuries of life at Constantinople. Marcosson was very much struck by the willingness of a great many Turks whom he had known formerly in Europe to submit to all the discomforts and drawbacks of Angora in obedience to Mustafa Kemal's wishes. He repeated several times that for the next few years, Angora would be the capital of the new Turkey.

F.O. 371/9136/ E. 8906

No. 150

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 564

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 18, 1923
(Received September 24)

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No.468 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith a report of the statement made by General Townshend to representatives of the Turkish Press on the occasion of his stay in Constantinople.

2. In a subsequent statement the General has explained that his sole object in visiting Angora was to pay his respects to Mustafa Kemal Pasha for whom he entertained the utmost admiration. He has also announced his intention, after his return from Angora, of remaining some weeks in Constantinople and of purchasing a summer residence which he will visit annually.

3. Adnan Bey told me yesterday that General Townshend had been to see him and that he had found him much aged since July a year ago when he first met him in Angora. He confirmed, for what it is worth, the purely complimentary nature of the General's present expedition to the Nationalist Capital. I took the opportunity of giving Adnan Bey my views on General Townshend and of warning him against the Turkish habit of preferring to believe what they hear from outsiders rather than from persons officially qualified to speak for their Governments. Adnan Bey while admitting this unfortunate Turkish propensity said that he did not think his Government would attribute undue importance to anything General Townshend might say.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9163/E.9477

ENCLOSURE IN No. 150

*"Orient News" 15th September 1923***General Townshend Talks to the Turkish Press**

General Townshend who is staying at Tokatlian's Hotel has given an interview to the Turkish Press in which he denies that the object of his visit to Turkey is connected with certain commercial projects, as had been stated in the Turkish papers. He said:-

"I like the Turks. I defended them in England when everyone was against them and I made them known to public opinion. I have simply come to visit the nation which I always championed even when all the world was against it. Why should I come here for commercial matters? My own fortune is amply sufficient."

The Turkish interviewer asked General Townshend about the general opinion prevailing in England regarding Turkey. To this General Townshend answered:- "After the Turkish victory in Anatolia a current of opinion favourable to Turkey began and continues to gain ground. England is now altogether Turkophil."

General Townshend went on to say that when he heard of the occupation of Constantinople he "saw red". He continued: "In future the British desire to live as friends of the Turks and to see a strong Turkey developing successfully in the economic domain."

Referring to the Capitulations General Townshend said that they could never be an aid to foreign capital and were a serious obstacle to the economic development of Turkey. British capitalists now considered the Capitulations as a thing of the past.

Regarding Mosul General Townshend said; - "I should prefer not to say anything regarding the Mosul question but since you ask me I will tell you that when I returned to England from Turkey, the British Government asked me for a memorandum on Mesopotamia. This I drew up and in it I recommended the British Government to leave Mesopotamia under Ottoman sovereignty. Unhappily the Government did not take this into consideration. If my recommendation had been acted on, the present difficulties would not have arisen. That is all I can say about Mosul. However I would add that this question will be settled amicably between Turkey and Britain. Britain will not go to war for Mosul."

General Townshend said that he intended shortly to go to Angora. He found Constantinople just as he left it. He has already been up the Bosphorus and Prinkipo, but he told the journalists that he would never go to Halki (where he was held prisoner).

F.O. 371/9163/E. 9477

No. 151

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 636

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 9, 1923
(Received October 15)

My Lord,

I had the honour, in my despatch No. 613 of the 1st October, to transmit to Your Lordship the text of an appeal made by Mustafa Kemal to the Moslem world for subscriptions in aid of the Moslem refugees who will be settled in Turkey as the result of the exchange of populations' Convention.

2. Adnan Bey informs me that it is desired to send delegates of the Red Crescent to India for the purpose of inviting Moslems there to subscribe. He asked my good offices with a view to obtaining permission for 2 or 3 of such delegates to enter India. He said that his Government was quite incapable of finding the necessary money themselves for the settlement of the Moslem refugees and were anxious to begin the work of collecting any subscriptions they could raise from abroad without delay and without, as I suggested, awaiting the ratification of the Treaty by Great Britain and the British Overseas Dominions.

3. I presume that as soon as the Treaty of Lausanne comes into force that permission for the visit to India of delegates of the Red Crescent can scarcely be refused and that the Government of India does intend to raise obstacles in the way of Moslems in India responding to Mustafa Kemal's appeal. If this is so I hope that it may be possible to grant the desired permission without awaiting the ratification of the Treaty. I submit that there is more to be gained than lost by an acquiescence which if not willingly granted may at least have some good effect. On the other hand it would, I think, be impolitic to hinder unduly the despatch of a few delegates whose mission is essentially humanitarian. Adnan Bey, who was himself President of the Turkish Red Crescent during the European war, has given me the most categorical and formal assurances that the delegates will be most carefully selected and that they will not meddle in any

form whatsoever in politics. I believe, so far as the word of any Turk can be trusted, that, if the desired permission be granted, and especially if it be granted without difficulty, Adnan Bey will do his utmost to arrange that suitable delegates are in fact designated. In this respect he has influence which he unfortunately lacks in administrative and political matters. If their mission is facilitated the delegates themselves will be inclined to be favourably disposed, whereas if the consent to their journey is not given until it can no longer be withheld, the probability that, once in India, they will propagandize in a sense contrary to British interests will be very greatly increased. Capital would undoubtedly be made of the fact, that whereas Great Britain was prepared to subscribe to a loan for Greek Christian refugees she did her utmost to prevent her Moslem subjects from subscribing to relieve the sufferings of their Turkish coreligionaries.

4. Predicated therefore that in a couple of months' time it will no longer be possible to refuse permission for Turks to enter India, I am strongly of opinion that it would be judicious to grant the present Turkish request without insisting on the prior coming into force of the Treaty. If Your Lordship is prepared to share this view I should be grateful, on the principle of 'bis dat qui cito dat', if the views of the Government of India could be ascertained as soon as possible and in the event of its concurrence that I be so informed by telegraph.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9175/E. 10145

No. 152

British Secret Intelligent Service to the Eastern Department of Foreign Office

No. 6037/ Ia. Secret

12.10.1923

An Attack on Ismet Pasha

The following is the text of a secret despatch from Mustafa Kemal to Adnan Bey, for transmission to Selahaddin Adil and Rafet Pasha only:-

"On the 20th September at 3.30, Ismet Pasha, accompanied by the Director General of Mines, Kenan Bey, his servant Bekir Nouri, and his chauffeur, were proceeding from Ismet's house in the country to the town, where a private

sitting of the council of Ministers was to be held. When passing the 'Place of Mines' (Maiden Odjaklari), several individuals appeared from both sides of the road and fired at the car with revolvers. Fortunately the car was travelling at considerable speed and, although the glass windows were broken, and the chauffeur slightly wounded, Ismet and Kenan were unhurt.

"Enquiries have been made, but so far without results. It is believed that the would-be assassins mistook Ismet's car for my own. This incident has produced a sensation in Angora. This dispatch is to be communicated to Rafet and Selahaddin only, for their information. No one else is to be informed."

It is noteworthy that a brief reference to this attack appeared in the Turkish press, which, however, attributed no special importance to the occurrence.

F.O. 371/9132/E. 10072

No. 153

*Aziz Noury Bey, Délégué du Comité de "Sultanat", Gouverneur Général de Brousse,
à Son Excellence Le Président du Conseil des Ministres Britannique, Londres*

ATHENES, 16.10.1923

Excellence,

Nous nous permettons de porter à Votre connaissance ce qui suit: Nos représentants à Constantinople ainsi que nos Agents en Asie Mineure nous informent que ceux qui ont formé un Conseil oligarchique à Angora sous la présidence de Mustafa Kemal, ce qui d'ailleurs est à la connaissance de tous, ne cessent de martyriser sans distinction de race ou de religion tous les Ottomans.

Les familles de ceux qui pour des raisons politiques ont dû, momentanément, quitter leur Patrie pour se réfugier à l'étranger, sont exilées à l'intérieur, tyrannisées, violées contrairement à toute loi humanitaire, gestes dignes, seulement, des hordes barbares d'Athila. Ces femmes et ces enfants sont obligés de quitter leurs foyers sans pouvoir rien emporter et ces déréglés au cours de leur çalvaire souffrent les peines de l'enfer.

Non contents d'avoir passé tout et tous par le fer et le feu ces fauves veulent encore s'abreuver du sang de femmes et d'enfants encore innocents,

parce que leurs pères se révoltant contre la barbarie des Kemalistes "Hadjadj-Zalim" se sont vu obligés de chercher refuge à l'étranger.

Notre Comité tout en portant ces faits à la connaissance des peuples civilisés élève sa voix pour protester contre ces actes ignobles et espère que le Gouvernement de V.E. ne restera pas sourd et répondra aux appels d'un peuple qui est las de souffrir sous le joug d'un Kemal.

Tout en priant V.E. d'excuser le dérangement que souvent nous sommes obligés de vous occasionner, nous vous informons que copie de la présente sera envoyée aux autres Puissances signataires de l'Accord de Lausanne.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, nos respectueux hommages.

(Signé) AZİZ NOURY
Délégué du Comité de "Sultanat"
Gouverneur Général de Brousse

Athènes-Kifissios, le 16/X/23
Villa Diomidi

F.O. 371/9176

No. 154

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 663

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 17, 1923
(Received October 22)

My Lord,

The outstanding event of the past week has been the acceptance by the Grand National Assembly of a motion submitted by İsmet Pasha for the inclusion in the Constitutional Charter of a special clause fixing Angora as the seat of the Government of the new Turkey. After having been fully discussed in committee and at secret party meetings, the draft clause was finally submitted at a plenary session of the Assembly on the 15th instant. Few voices were raised in favour of Constantinople, and the speakers who did so were subjected to frequent interruption. The debate was therefore brought to a speedy conclusion, and, though some twenty Deputies abstained from voting, the motion was accepted by a large majority. It may, however, be noted as one more

proof of the control still exercised by Mustafa Kemal over the present Assembly, that at the close of the sitting one of the Deputies who had declared himself opposed to the return of the capital to Constantinople is reported in the press as having announced that at heart everyone was in favour of the former capital, but that they had to conform to the decision taken at the secret party meeting.

2. The Assembly's decision was greeted with scenes of great rejoicing in the new capital. The town was beflagged, and torchlight processions took place. In honour of the occasion the 15th October has been created a public holiday and is to be known as "Angora Day". In Constantinople, on the other hand, the decision is not regarded as final since the Constitutional Charter as a whole has still to be submitted to and accepted by the Assembly.

3. Although undoubtedly growing bolder, the Opposition groups are, however, still walking with considerable wariness. Reouf Bey, around whom so much interest and mystery centres, has arrived in Constantinople from Smyrna, and is at present the guest of Refet Pasha. Both are stated to be closely watched by Government agents. Nevertheless, Reouf is reported to be about to proceed to Angora, and since his arrival here has been received by the leading officials. He has abstained from making any public declaration, and no reliable estimate can yet be formed as to the rôle which he may play in the future.

4. Rumour continues to play with the idea of co-operation between Mustafa Kemal and the remnants of the Committee of Union and Progress, with whom Reouf is supposed to be closely in touch. Much interest has been aroused in this connection by an article published some days ago in the Angora newspaper "Yeni Gyun", from the pen of Yunus Nadi Bey, stating that no difference exists between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Popular Party, and that Mustafa Kemal is the greatest and the leader of the Unionists. This article, which was possibly nothing more than a *ballon d'essai*, has, if so, achieved its object, as it has been taken up by the entire Turkish political world. The reception accorded to it by the local press has of course varied according to the particular complexion of each newspaper, but in general the comments tend to demonstrate that a reconciliation is regarded by both parties as a very remote possibility. Indeed, the general secretary of the Popular party in Constantinople went so far as to state publicly that, if Mustafa Kemal was in fact a Unionist, he would at once completely sever his connection with the Popular party.

5. Meanwhile, as a result of the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by both Greece and Turkey, diplomatic relations are about to be re-established between the two countries. This will be done by means of Chargé d'Affaires, but it is announced that as the Greek Government have expressed the desire that

their representative should reside at Constantinople, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires will establish himself at Salonica.

6. The resumption of direct diplomatic relations will facilitate the arrangements for the exchange of the Greek and Moslem populations of Turkey and Greece. This operation actually commenced with the despatch, on the 14th instant, from Mitylene to Aivali of 1000 Moslems, and with the release yesterday from Constantinople of ships which had arrived here some days ago from the Black Sea ports with some 3000 Greek refugees on board. The transfer is being effected under the supervision of the international commission appointed for the purpose, assisted by the personnel of the American Near East Relief Commission.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9132/E. 10368

F.O. 424/259, p.26-27, No.24

No. 155

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

Confidential
No. 665

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 17, 1923
(Received October 22)

My Lord,

The Bill, presented by Ismet Pasha and eleven other Deputies, and dated the 9th October, to the effect that the town of Angora was the administrative capital of the Turkish State was discussed in the Grand National Assembly on the 14th October. In the preamble it was stated that the application of the protocol of evacuation annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne having been completed, Turkey had been entirely freed from foreign occupation. The position of Constantinople as the seat of the Moslem Caliphate and one of the most precious possessions of the Turks would be eternally preserved, and would remain under the exclusive protection of the Turkish nation. On the other hand the time had now come for the Grand National Assembly to decide on the seat of the Administration of the Turkish State. Reasons resulting from the clauses in the Treaty of Peace relating to the Straits and based on past experience necessitated the establishment of Turkey's administrative centre in Anatolia and in the town of Angora.

2. Zeki Bey, Deputy of Gumush-khaneh, who urged the superior claims of Constantinople to be the capital, met with considerable interruption. He was followed by Jelal Nuri Bey, Deputy of Gallipoli, who stated that the course of events had marked out Angora as capital of the Turkish Free State. After the armistice, Constantinople was unable to save Anatolia. It was the movement from Constantinople to the eastern portions of the country which gradually resulted in Angora becoming capital. He reminded the Assembly of Mr. Lloyd George's statement in the House of Commons at the end of 1918 to the effect that "a Turkish capital under the guns of His Majesty's dreadnoughts is better than a Government which has withdrawn to the Taurus Mountains." This statement was, according to Jelal Nuri, most important, for the one thing desired by their enemies was a Turkish capital within range of their guns. The situation of Constantinople from a military point of view excluded it from being the capital of the Turkish Free State. It was in the interest of the State and of the nation that they should govern from Angora. They must resist and endure the mud of Angora in winter and its dust in summer in order to work for the welfare of Anatolia. Jelal Nuri Bey continued that, with Constantinople as capital, little thought was given to Anatolia, and instanced the construction of railways, not to meet local requirements, but as a result of Anglo-German relations. With Angora as capital there would be no panic as to the passage of an enemy through the Straits. From the economic point of view there was no need for the chief centre of trade of a country to be the capital; for example, Washington, and not New York, was the capital of America. The interests of Constantinople, which had a great transit trade, would, however, not be neglected, and a Bill was being drafted to that end. Jelal Nuri concluded by stating that Constantinople had been the capital of the International Ottoman Empire, while Angora was the capital of a free State, and asked the Assembly to accept the Bill, which, as I have elsewhere reported to your Lordship, it did by a large majority of votes.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 371/9132/E.10370

No. 156

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.702

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 31, 1923
(Received November 5)

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No.636 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that the local Turkish newspaper "Aksham" published in its issue of the 25th instant an inspired statement to the effect that the Red Crescent Commission, formed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to collect subscriptions on behalf of the Greek Musulmans, who are to be exchanged for Turkish Christians, has decided to send a delegation to all Moslem countries.

2. For the present however, only one delegation, composed of members of the Red Crescent Society, and "probably accompanied by hodjas," will be despatched to India and Java. Subscriptions from Moslem countries, such as Morocco, Lybia, Egypt, Turkestan, Persia and Afghanistan will be solicited through the local Red Crescent or Red Cross Societies. The co-operation of the International Red Cross Society will also be invited.

3. The statement adds that the permission of the Governments of the countries to be visited will be obtained beforehand, and that the Turkish Government has been asked to take the necessary action to this end.

4. One of the members of the Red Crescent Commission in question is Dr.Adnan Bey.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON
Acting High Commissioner

F.O. 424/259, p. 39, No.43

No. 157

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*No.515 Secret
TelegraphicCONSTANTINOPLE, November 6, 1923
(Received November 7)

I am informed that on instructions from Angora Adnan Bey visited Caliph to-day and invited His Majesty to proceed forthwith either to Brussa or Konia. Caliph is said to have refused, stating that he preferred to abdicate.

Intimacy of relations with Caliph of Refet, Reouf and other leaders of Opposition has been much commented upon lately, and there have been indications in the press that some step of this nature was contemplated. I had already written despatch for bag to-morrow anticipating some such move on the part of Kemal with a view to stifling possibility of reactionary movement in Constantinople.

Information may therefore be correct. It is also reported in press that Refet and Reouf have been recalled to Angora to attend to their duties as Deputies. Signs are in fact not wanting that Kemal intends to crush Opposition by forcible pressures, and I do not think that Opposition are capable of effective resistance.

F.O. 424/259, p.43, No.48

No. 158

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.725

Confidential

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 7, 1923

(Received November 12)

My Lord,

I have the honour to state that I have read with great interest the various reports which your Lordship has been good enough to transmit to me on the attitude of Moslems outside Turkey towards the present Caliph and their views regarding the abolition of the temporal power of the Caliphate as a consequence of the abolition of the Sultanate.

2. I am in full agreement with the statement on p.4 of the report enclosed in your Lordship's despatch No.905, Confidential, of the 17th ultimo, dated the 11th September, from the Government of Bombay, to the effect that it is of the utmost importance that there should not even be the semblance of any outside interference for the present in the settlement of the Khilafat. I am inclined, however, to question the statement in the penultimate paragraph of the report from the agent to the Governor-General in Central India to the effect that Mustafa Kemal Pasha could not held the position of Khalifa as well as that of Sultan. The claim of Ottoman Sultans to the Caliphate was based primarily on the right of conquest. None of the Sultan-Caliphs were descendants of the

Prophet, or even Arabs, and none of them were chosen by the "Community of Islam."

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 424/259, p.50, No.55

No. 159

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No.729

Confidential

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 7, 1923

(Received November 12)

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the annual report on Turkey for 1922. I much regret that it was not found possible to compile it earlier.

2. I am indebted to Colonel Baird and Commander Macdonald for the sections dealing with military events and the Turkish navy respectively; to Mr. Knox for the section on the Christian minorities in Turkey and the Russian refugees in Constantinople; to Mr. Waugh for that on judicial matters; to Mr. Helm for the sections dealing with the Oecumenical Patriarchate, pan-Islamism, and that portion of the section on Turkey's foreign relations which deals with Moslem countries, and to Colonel Woods for the economic survey and the article on labour.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/9176

ENCLOSURE IN No. 159
Annual Report on Turkey for 1922

(Extracts)

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I. INTRODUCTION

Cf. Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," chapter 50; Mahomet:-

"While Europe was exhausted by the great war and distracted by her social and financial chaos, Mustafa Kemal, with the sword in one hand and the National Pact in the other, erected a new Turkey on the ruins of pan-Hellenism and Smyrna. The genius of the Nationalist leader, the paralysis of Russia and the discord between the Western Powers, involve the causes of the resuscitation of a militant Islam, &c."

2. It would be unwise to push the comparison further or to enlarge on the lasting character of the changes which have been effected by the events, which have taken place in the Near East during 1922. Nevertheless, their importance cannot fail to be far-reaching. Almost the entire Christian population of Asia Minor has been annihilated or expelled. The Greek dream of pan-Hellenism has been shattered, and the question of minorities has been settled by the Turks in their own way, and probably to their own undoing. The Treaty of Sèvres has been torn up, the first of the post-war peace treaties to suffer such a fate, and even the Capitulations are on the eve of being annulled. After reigning for some 650 years, the Ottoman dynasty has been shorn of its Sultanate, and the Moslem Caliphate of its temporal power. Rising out of what appeared to be its dead ashes, Turkey has once more emerged after flaunting those very Powers who are held in the East to be the principal oppressors of vast populations of Moslem subjects, as the victorious protagonist of pan-Islamism.

3. The judgment of history will assign to various causes the remarkable resurgence of Turkey and her re-entry into Europe, which had at last seemed definitely quit of her. Among them will be reckoned the combination of circumstances which not only excluded Russia from participation in the Treaty of Sèvres, but even converted her into the chief support of the Turks in their struggle for existence; the failure of Greece to realise the limits of her own unaided capacity for expansion, and the failure of the Western Powers to appreciate not only the capacity for resistance of a country with such a low organism as Turkey, but also the effect which, after a premature demobilisation of their own forces, would be produced by leaving to a Greek army the task which the Powers themselves were too war weary to complete; the interminable delays which occurred in drawing up, modifying and insisting on the execution of the peace terms, which were to be imposed on the Ottoman Empire; and, above all, the failure of the Allies, after the stress of war subsided, to maintain that unity which, in spite of international jealousies and pride, they had preserved in almost unexampled fashion during that war, and which had proved the principal factor in bringing them victory in 1918.

4. It is conceivable that posterity, in seeking the obscurer origins of the events which had rendered 1922 memorable in the annals of the Near East, will fix upon the bite of a monkey and a game of golf. The fall of M. Venizelos and the restoration of King Constantine in October 1920, after the death from blood poisoning of King Alexander, marked the epoch at which France, never well disposed towards Greece, became definitely anti-Greek. The consequent modification of French policy led directly, about a year later, to the notorious Angora, or so-called Franklin-Bouillon Treaty, whereby Cilicia was restored to Turkey together with large supplies of French war stores. The conclusion of this

convention set the hands of Turkey free in the south, and, apart from enabling her to concentrate more completely against Greece, furnished her with a material as well as moral assistance, of which she was sorely in need. But its particular value to the Nationalist Government at Angora lay in the fact that it constituted the first open and public breach in the Allied front in the Near East. The breach was never repaired. Though the unity of the Allied Powers was repeatedly proclaimed and reaffirmed, it was never, as the Turks knew only too well, more than superficial, and always failed to stand the test when any strain was applied to it.

5. It is scarcely exaggerated to say that the last hope of obtaining any true Allied unity vanished when M. Poincaré became French President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs in January 1922, after the fall of M. Briand on the golf course at Cannes. His rigid obstinacy, constant disloyalty and narrow logic brought into a situation already sufficiently entangled a personal element, which rendered it almost inextricable. It ensued that in 1922 the Near East, even more than Germany, was a constant cause of friction between the British and French Governments. Nothing had less vitality than the vital points of the Allies, nothing was so elastic or so transient as their unanimous and final decisions.

6. In the critical days of 1917 M. Clemenceau observed to the late Lord Bertie that he had never until then properly appreciated the real cause of Napoleon's consistent success. The war, he said, had taught him that it was because Napoleon had always had to contend with coalitions. Mustafa Kemal found himself in the same advantageous position as Napoleon. In spite of the split between the Constantinople and Angora Governments, Turkey alone was inspired by one mind, and was one united people with one single aim. In fairness it must be said that she utilised to the full the psychological moment and the opportunity which was afforded her by disunion between the Allies and by the political dissensions between Greek Royalists and Veniselists.

7. But, if the victories of Turkey, the extermination of the Anatolian Greeks, and the successful defiance of the Western Powers must be ascribed as due more than anything else to the lack of Allied unity, a second scarcely less contributory cause was delay. The Treaty of Sèvres itself might have been enforced, if it had been presented to the Turks at the beginning of 1919, instead of at the latter half of 1920. Nor was there any justification for delay. A conquered country has at least the right to claim that no time shall be lost in drawing up the terms, to which it is expected to subscribe. In 1918 Turkey was completely crushed. In the year and a half that elapsed before those peace terms were finally evolved, she was slowly but surely recovering her vitality. Instead of completing her disarmament and extinguishing her capacity for

resistance, the Powers, by introducing the Greeks into Ionia, performed the one act which was calculated to galvanise Turkey into a desperate, even though at that time it might appear a forlorn, effort.

8. In a sense, the Western Powers may be regarded as fortunate in material respects, and so far as they themselves were concerned, in not suffering more severely than they did from the evil effects of their discords and delays. "If you have a long armistice and nothing at the end of it, you will be in danger of war." The words of Mr. Disraeli to Lord Derby, at the time of the Danish crises in 1864, nearly proved prophetic. After almost exactly four years of the Mudros armistice, Great Britain, at least at the time of Mudania, nearly drifted into a war, of which practically the whole British nation would have strongly disapproved.

9. It is even not impossible that the events of 1922 may prove, in the end, to be not entirely prejudicial to purely British interests. Turkish ingratitude, the harm which she wrought to the Allied cause during the war, her cruelty to British prisoners and her barbaric atrocities may have tended to obscure larger issues. Certainly the Treaty of Sèvres was entirely contrary to the policy of the integrity and independence of Turkey, the policy of preserving to her a compact territory and a defensible frontier, both in Europe and in Asia, which was so steadfastly followed by British statesmen during the nineteenth century. The outcome of the events in 1922 has been that Turkey has recovered by her own efforts, and in spite of Great Britain, what she had hitherto been enabled to retain solely by grace of British intervention and support.

II. HISTORICAL SURVEY

1. The Paris March Proposals and the Failure of the Greek coup against Constantinople

10. At the beginning of 1922 matters seemed at a deadlock in Asia Minor. The Greeks in 1921 had advanced a considerable distance into the heart of Asia Minor. They had been checked at the battle of the Sakaria, but the Turks had not been strong enough to take advantage of their success. Both sides were exhausted by the heavy fighting in the preceding summer. Their numbers were approximately equal, and neither had the capacity to add to them. Though competent observers had already expressed the opinion that the Greek army would crumble if the Turks were capable of pushing an attack home, the Turks also seemed to have shot their bolt. Neither side, in fact, seemed capable of doing more than stand on the defensive.

11. But there was a vital difference. The Turks had a definite object, namely the expulsion of the Greeks, whereas the latter had already the

impression of being an army in the air. This impression became a conviction after the March decisions in Paris.

12. In Angora, though the evidences of growing opposition were not lacking, Mustafa Kemal's influence was still supreme. Though the nationalists were suspicious of Russia, and were receiving from her smaller quantities of arms and money, though the country was infested with bands and there was much internal discontent, though money was lacking and though the Grand National Assembly was an ignorant rabble, the external position of the Angora Government had been greatly strengthened by the French Convention and by agreements with Moscow and the Ukraine, the Caucasian republics, and Afghanistan. The isolation of Anatolia from the West had intensified the chauvinism of the Turks, and it was clear that there was no possible prospect of Angora accepting any peace terms substantially short of the National Pact, unless compelled by force to do so. The lack of Allied unity was an effective bar to the employment of force.

13. Parallel with this chauvinism was a deepening hostility to the Sultan and the Sultan's Government in Constantinople. The Sultan himself reciprocated the hatred of the "revolutionary gang" in Angora, but his Government was discredited and powerless. Though the fiction that it was still the *de jure* Government of Turkey, was still upheld by the Powers, and the idea of using the Sultan, after judicious concessions, as a figurehead to overcome the intractability of Angora was still capable of consideration, it soon became evident that His Majesty had not sufficient backing to make the attempt worth trying. To all intents and purposes the whole of Turkey was united in demanding the total evacuation of Asia Minor, of the shores of the Straits and the Marmora, and of as much of Thrace as possible.

14. Such was the situation at the beginning of 1922, when the Allies determined to make yet another attempt to solve the Near East question on the basis of the Sèvres Treaty. It was, however, realised that they would have to go much further than they had hitherto done to satisfy the Turks in Asia, if not in Europe, while preserving for themselves the control of the Straits, erecting safeguards for minorities and making provision for the protection of Allied financial, economic and personal interests.

15. The meeting of the three Allied Foreign Ministers for this purpose was to have taken place early in January, after the Cannes Conference. It was postponed until the 1st February in consequence of the fall of M. Briand's Cabinet. M. Poincaré, who succeeded M. Briand as President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, had on more than one occasion, taken exception to conferences, and stated his preference for settling questions through the more

usual diplomatic channels. Two or three days before the 1st February, he gave proof of this predilection for the written document by the communication to His Majesty's Government of a memorandum on the Near Eastern question, of such length and of so controversial a character, that Lord Curzon had no option but again to postpone the meeting, in order to enable the contents of the memorandum to be considered. A still further delay occurred owing to the fall of M. Bonomi's Cabinet in Italy, and the conference only finally met on the 22nd March.

16. Advantage was taken of these delays to enable two Turkish delegations, one from Constantinople headed by Marshal İzzet Pasha, and the other from Angora under Yussuf Kemal Bey, to make their way to Paris with a view to pleading the Turkish cause. An attempt was made by the latter, who passed through Constantinople, to get himself accepted as sole Turkish representative. Though Yussuf Kemal was received by the Sultan, it was only as a private individual and he failed to attain his object. His failure gave considerable impetus to the growing hostility of Angora against the Government of the Sultan, and it was even asserted subsequently in Angora that İzzet Pasha, during his voyage, worked against the Nationalists, and in favour of Great Britain. Incidentally, Angora also endeavoured, but without success, to be invited to assist at the conference at Genoa.

17. On the 1st March Mustafa Kemal was again elected President of the Grand National Assembly, and in an uncompromising speech he announced that the consolidation of Turkish relations with Soviet Russia was an essential factor in Turkish policy. "Friendship with Russia is the basis of Turkish foreign policy." He laid stress on the cordial relations of his Government with the Moslem States of Afghanistan, Bokhara, Persia and Azerbaijan, and its readiness to enter into friendly relations with all those Governments which were prepared to recognise the position of Turkey as defined in the National Pact. At the same time, he said, Turkey was not too weary to continue to struggle by force of arms until her full independence under the Pact was assured. He also described the Turkish peasants as the real masters of Turkey.

18. Mustafa Kemal's speech on this occasion constituted a declaration of the whole policy of Turkey, namely, insistence on the full realisation of the National Pact, by force of arms if necessary, the realisation of a pan-Islamic union under the hegemony of Turkey, and alliance with Russia (though, perhaps, only so long as that alliance was of use to her.)

19. When the Paris Conference opened on the 22nd March, Lord Curzon's difficulties, already sufficiently grave in consequence of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, of M. Poincaré's inclination to regard himself as briefed to defend

the Turkish cause against a British Government, whom he believed to be championing Greece, and of Italy's endeavours to play the part of the honest broker and to make a bargain of her support in order to get for herself commercial and economic advantages in Asia Minor, were still further increased as the result of the unauthorised publication of a telegram from the Viceroy of India, recommending very extensive modifications of the Sèvres Treaty. The ill-advised publication of this telegram had the inevitable effect of giving, on the eve of the conference, an appearance of discord in the British Cabinet itself, and of stiffening the Turkish attitude and French support thereof. Moreover, both France and Italy were clearly indifferent to the fate of the Christian minorities, and the idea of an Armenian home. Nevertheless, after six days' arduous and protracted discussions, an agreement on all points was reached, and the unity of the Allies once more proclaimed.

20. The first step of the three Foreign Ministers had been to devise and put forward an armistice proposal, in accordance with which a neutral zone, 10 kilom. wide, was to be established between the Turkish and Greek armies in Asia Minor. No reinforcements and no withdrawal of effectives were to be permitted during the armistice period. Allied Commissions were to control the execution of the evacuation, and Allied arbitration was to be accepted in cases of dispute. The armistice could not be denounced without fifteen days' previous warning, and the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks was to take place within a period of three months, renewable until the peace preliminaries had been accepted by both belligerents.

21. These armistice proposals were communicated to Greece and Turkey on the 23rd March, and were immediately accepted by the former.

22. The final agreement respecting the terms of the general settlement was reached on the 27th March. In prefacing them, the Allied Governments announced that their aims had been to restore peace between Greece and Turkey on a basis implying defeat for neither, to re-establish Turkey within her ethnical frontiers with Constantinople as the capital, to maintain the secular and religious authority of the Sultan, to compensate Greece for her sacrifices by leaving her scope for economic progress, to protect minorities both Greek and Moslem, to prevent future wars between Turkey and the European Powers, and, above all, to be impartial.

23. With these aims in view the conference proposed:

(1) The evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek troops and the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over all Asia Minor;

(2) To invite the League of Nations to co-operate in suitable measures for the protection of minorities on the basis of existing treaties;

(3) The maintenance of the Allied occupation of Gallipoli in order to ensure the perpetual freedom of the Straits. The demilitarised zone round the Straits was to be maintained, but reduced in extent;

(4) The restoration of a suitable proportion of Eastern Thrace to Turkey, the frontier of which was to run from Ganas in the Marmora to Mount Strandja near the Bulgarian frontier and thence to the Black Sea, thus leaving Rodosto to Turkey, and Adrianople to Greece;

(5) Special régimes for Adrianople and Smyrna, in the administration of which Moslems and Greeks should participate respectively;

(6) The restoration of Constantinople with full authority to the Government of the Sultan, and the retirement of the Allied troops on the ratification of the treaty. An increase of some 30.000, i.e., up to 85.000 men, was to be permitted in the size of the Turkish armed forces, but no conscription was to be authorised;

(7) The grant of easier financial conditions;

(8) The appointment of a commission, with Turkish participation, with a view to preparing a judicial scheme of reform to replace the Capitulations.

24. In recapitulating these proposals in the House of Lords on the 30th March, Lord Curzon described them as a fair and equitable solution. They did not, he said, constitute an ultimatum, but no departure from their broad fundamental outlines would be permitted. Nor would any haggling be tolerated lest the whole structure should collapse. It was a peace just to all parties which would prevent the renewal of war, and give Eastern Europe a fair chance to recover her prosperity and to return to ordered government. It was this standpoint which Lord Curzon endeavoured to uphold during the succeeding months.

25. The Paris proposals were communicated to the Sultan's Government and to the Nationalist representative in Constantinople on the 28th March. The fundamental consideration underlying them was the acceptance prior to all else of the armistice, the three months period for which was to run as from the 5th April. Thus the evacuation of Smyrna could only begin after the expiration of the armistice. It was on this rock that the March proposals were destined to be shipwrecked.

26. While the Greek government had at once notified its willingness to accept the armistice, Angora did so only in principle, and on condition that the Greeks should withdraw at once from their advance lines of Eski-Chehir to Afion-Kara-Hissar, and that Asia Minor were evacuated prior to the termination of the armistice. The reply of the Sultan's Government did not sensibly differ from that of Angora, while it contained a curious statement that the armistice question must be left to the decision of the army, *i.e.*, of the Nationalists. Both Constantinople and Angora were in fact inclined to imagine that the territorial proposals might be used as a basis for further discussions and further concessions. Both undoubtedly were unwilling to accept a frontier which excluded Adrianople from Turkey, and left Greece established on the coast of the Sea of Marmora. Great exception was taken also to the maintenance of military restrictions in any form.

27. The Allied Governments, in a note drafted by the French, lost no time in replying to the two Turkish Governments. After taking act of Turkey's adhesion in principle to the armistice, the Allied Governments pointed out that the evacuation could only begin after the expiration of the armistice, since the text itself of the letter expressly prohibited all movements of troops, and since its essential object was to allow discussion of the preliminaries of the peace, of which the evacuation formed a part. One slight modification was, however, admitted. Instead of only beginning after the signature of the peace preliminaries, it was agreed that the evacuation could commence earlier, if in the meantime the body of the peace terms was accepted under reservation of the discussion of any special points (*"sous réserve de la discussion des points particuliers"*).

28. Inasmuch as it was arguable how far this wording might enable the Nationalist Government to regard Gallipoli and Adrianople and other major issues as "special points", Sir Horace Rumbold before communicating the reply to the Turkish representative in Constantinople, was anxious that this version should be altered to "points de détail." The French Government would not, however, accept this modification, and the Allied reply as originally drafted was communicated to Angora on the 15th April. Subsequent events largely justified Sir Horace Rumbold's apprehension.

29. In the meantime the Genoa Conference had met and broken up. Its principal feature was the announcement of the Russo-German agreement and all prospect, on which a certain store had been set, of ensuring Russian neutrality in the Near East thereby vanished. There is no doubt that this result had considerable influence on the future attitude of Turkey. The reply of the Nationalist Government, dated the 22nd April, was evasive and defiant. It constituted a wilful and complete misapprehension of the spirit of the March

proposals, and was clearly intended for purposes of procrastination and propaganda. It raised the question of Greek atrocities in Asia Minor, it insisted once more on immediate evacuation simultaneously with the acceptance of the armistice, as the sole means of saving the Moslem population of Asia Minor. Its terms were so drawn up as to make a bid for sympathy in India and Moslem countries. It pointedly dismissed an Allied reference to the position of the Sultan, and it requested more precise information as to the exact meaning of the words "special points." It concluded by inviting the Allies to send plenipotentiaries to Ismid for preliminary negotiations.

30. By thus indicating their desire to reopen at Ismid a question, which the Powers regarded as settled in Paris, the Angora Government hoped to drive the Allies into a position where the responsibility for a breakdown could be attributed to them. Acceptance would have added another stage to the March proposals involving a radical departure therefrom, and the violation both of the spirit and of the letter of the Allied plan arrived at in Paris with much difficulty, but adopted at last unanimously. Moreover, the Angora Government's note of the 22nd April implied that both the Greek Government and that of the Sultan were to be excluded from the meeting at which, being held in Turkish territory, the Turkish representative would presumably preside.

31. Nevertheless, the French Government was prepared to swallow the humiliation of seeing both the Paris proposals upset the Allied representatives summoned to Nationalist territory. It was in favour of acceptance and professed to discover in the Turkish note a real desire for an understanding. It believed that if negotiations were once begun particularly with the participation of Mustafa Kemal, which the choice of Ismid afforded, that it would be more difficult for hostilities to be resumed. It even offered the hospitality of a French warship for the Allied representatives at the meeting, and pressed for a final measure of Allied conciliation.

32. On the other hand His Majesty's Government, while recognising the dangers of delay resulting from Soviet assistance to Angora, from the Greek impatience and Moslem unrest, regarded the Ismid suggestion as an ignominious surrender likely to end in a disastrous fiasco. They urged the supreme importance of upholding the Paris scheme as the only solid basis on which to stand. Rather than modify it Lord Curzon, with a view to showing to the world the length to which the Allies had gone to avoid failure, and to make clear who was responsible for the obstinate rejection of the Allied proposals, threatened to liquidate it altogether, commencing with the publication of the entire correspondence between the Allies and the Governments of Athens, Angora and Constantinople. They proposed therefore a carefully worded and explicit communication to all concerned, reiterating the proposals of the March

note and insisting on definite acceptance or refusal within a stipulated period. In making this proposal His Majesty's Government were inspired by the conviction that no good result could be obtained, unless it could be proved to the belligerents that the Allies were determined to stand united behind their project of mediation.

33. M. Poincaré objected to this course on the ground that such a *mise en demeure*, if it failed, would throw the responsibility for the resumption of hostilities on the Allies. In the face of French opposition, His Majesty's Government were unable to enforce their point of view, and were obliged ultimately to accept the principle of a preliminary conference, provided that they received a formal assurance that the three Allied Governments would present a united front on the basis of the March proposals, that Beicos or Constantinople should be selected as the venue of such a conference rather than Ismid, that pending a settlement the three Allied Governments should agree to the application of the usual international maritime laws in Near Eastern waters, (e.g., enabling Greece to exercise her right of visit and search of merchantmen carrying contraband of war to the enemy) and should consider the possibility of strengthening the Paris resolutions in regard to the provision of the additional safeguards for the protection of minorities, which had been proved to be necessary by the Yowell disclosures respecting the Kharput massacres.

34. The French answer, which was dated the 13th July, only accepted the four above points conditionally, still preferring Ismid as likely to ensure Mustafa Kemal's participation, and consenting only to the Greek right of search, if the Allied Governments prohibited all export of war material to either belligerent since, otherwise, the right of search would favour only the Greeks. To this note, His Majesty's Government replied, on the 27th July, in a note, which elicited a further answer, dated the 3rd August, from M. Poincaré, objecting to Constantinople, in view of the recent attempt of the Greeks to occupy that city, and insisting again on the absolute prohibition of the export of arms to the belligerents.

35. Unfortunately, while this exchange of notes was being carried on, the fruit of these regrettable delays, which were described as "amounting practically to a diplomatic scandal," was ripening. Allied disunion had been emphasised in April by a separate economic agreement concluded by the Italian High Commissioner in Constantinople with the Sultan's Government. The announcement of its conclusion behind the back of the Allies, produced a vigorous protest from His Majesty's Government, who stigmatised it in view of the pending negotiations, as a sacrifice of general Allied interests in order to gain selfish and probably illusory advantages. They were in fact, both selfish

and illusory. Angora was not a party to it, and by it the Sultan's Government merely granted to Italian companies with Italian capital the right to study concessions for railways and other public works in the Adalia district. The right was to lapse if not utilised within a certain period, and the agreement was, in any case, specifically stated not to be binding on the Central Government's successors. In showing the agreement to Sir Horace Rumbold, Marquis Garroni described it as a scribe of paper, without political significance, and stated that it had merely been concluded in order to satisfy public opinion in Italy.

36. Italy's policy in the Near East was, as it still is, governed by her obsession in respect of the Tripartite Agreement, and her anxiety to secure a field in Turkey for the reception and employment of the Italian surplus population. She was prepared to go to great lengths to replace the loss of the Tripartite Agreement, which she regarded as one of the most tangible advantages acquired by her as the result of the war. Moreover, Italy had never felt any hostility towards Turkey, and had always disliked Greece. She showed her partiality to the former in various ways during this period, by supplying the Turks with arms and by evacuating, in April, the Meander Valley....

41. In June the eccentric General Hadjianestis succeeded General Papoulas as Commander-in-chief of the Greek army in Thrace as well as Ionia, and in the same month the "Averoff" and some Greek destroyers bombarded Samsoun. The object of the bombardment was the destruction of the Turkish munition depots at that port, and was, to that extent, justifiable. But in view of the negotiations proceeding at that time for the meeting of a preliminary conference, it appeared scarcely judicious and was viewed with displeasure by the Allies. It raised afresh the vexed question of the neutrality of Constantinople, whence the "Averoff" had started on her raid. But His Majesty's Government were averse to consider this aspect pending the Allied discussions, which were fixed to take place in July, for a revision of the whole Near East question.

42. The bombardment of Samsoun was a preliminary to the *coup* which was being contemplated by the Greeks, and for the execution of which General Hadjianestis had probably been specially appointed. In the latter part of July the Greek troop movements into Eastern Thrace took on formidable developments, and the contingency of a Greek attempt to seize Constantinople by a *coup de main* became suddenly possible. Counsels of despair had got the upper hand in Greece, and the scarcely imaginable folly of a Greek army marching on Constantinople, while it was still in Allied occupation, had to be reckoned with. By the 27th July reinforcements amounting to two new divisions, making for in all, had been sent to Thrace, and the despatch of other troops

thither was believed to be in progress. On that day General Hadjianestis also transferred his headquarters to Rodosto.

43. For a few days the menace was a very real one. From the Greek point of view there was much to commend such a *coup*, provided, at least, the Allies were disunited, and one of them fairly complacent. There is good reason to believe that the Greek Government, in fact, confidently anticipated that a Greek occupation of Constantinople would meet no serious opposition on the part of His Majesty's Government, who would accept a *fait accompli* without excessive displeasure. With the prospect of evacuating Asia Minor before them, it was, moreover, a logical manoeuvre for the Greeks to strengthen their position in Thrace, and reinsure themselves against all ultimate eventualities. An advance on Constantinople was calculated to raise the drooping *moral* of the Greek soldiers, and to depress that of their opponents. It was a form of pressure both on Angora and the Government of Constantinople, as well as on the Allied Governments themselves, with a view to forcing an early discussion of the Near Eastern question.

44. Unfortunately for the Greeks, all these previsions were overthrown by the united front adopted in this instance -and practically throughout the year in this instance alone- by the Allies.

45. In a note dated the 28th July, the Greek Government had announced that the blame for the prolongation of the war could not be imputed to her and that, therefore, Greece, unable longer to bear the burden of the existing situation, was obliged to consider the most efficacious measures at her disposal for putting an end to the conflict. His Majesty's Government, though uncertain whether this cryptic statement referred to a plan to terminate the war by the occupation of Constantinople, pointed out the dangers of precipitate action, and stated that any Greek attack on territory occupied by the Allies was insane, would be resisted by all the Allied forces in occupation, and might entail most serious consequences for Greece. On the 31st July Greece, nevertheless, definitely asked for permission to occupy Constantinople. His Majesty's Government unequivocally refused to consider the idea. The replies on the French and Italian Governments were equally categorical.

46. Nor had less unity been shown by the Allied representatives in Constantinople. Without awaiting instructions, and after agreement had been reached between the Allied High Commissioners and generals, a communication, over the name of General Harington, as General Officer Commanding-in-chief the Allied forces of occupation, was published in the press, to the effect that he would use all the forces at his disposal to resist any attempt which might be made to violate the neutrality of the occupied zones, as

defined in the proclamation of the preceding year. The communication made had a reassuring effect on the local population, which was beginning to grow restive (the Central Government had even offered to put some 20.000 Turkish troops under General Harington's orders), and made it clear to the Greek Government that an attack, if attempted, would be resisted not only by the French, but also by the British troops.

47. The loyal co-operation of the British on this occasion contrasted vividly with the disloyalty which was to be shown some six or seven weeks later by our allies, when the menace to the neutral zones came from the side of the Kemalists.

48. The united front thus shown by the Allies in Constantinople and their respective Governments, dashed the wild hopes which had been entertained by the Greeks. Though the danger of a conflict arising out of an incident continued for some days, until the Greek advanced posts had been withdrawn to a distance of some 20 kilom. from the Chataldja lines in Thrace, the *coup* fizzled out, and, by the 1st August, all danger had practically passed.

49. The fiasco of the Greek menace to Constantinople was the final blow to the Greek cause in Asia Minor. Even the proclamation which the Greek Government proceeded to issue, to the effect that Ionia could never again revert to Turkish administration, was stillborn. The Allies merely reminded Greece that she was not entitled to initiate any régime of a permanent nature for the Smyrna vilayet, since the ultimate disposal of this territory was dependent on the eventual settlement between the Allies and Turkey.

II. The Greek Collapse in Asia Minor and the Mudania Convention

50. For a little while things slipped back into their old rut. The months of May, June and July had been spent in inconclusive communications, principally between the French and British Governments, and endless discussions on the alternatives to Ismid, and on the merits of Constantinople or Prinkipo, Therapia, Beicos or Moda, Rhodes, Venice or Lausanne as a suitable meeting place for a conference, if there were to be one, of Allies and belligerents, with a view to explaining to the latter the March proposals. It was not until August that it was finally decided that such a conference should be held, but it should be an informal and preliminary one and quite distinct from the conference contemplated in the third stage of the Paris March proposals. After playing for a while with the idea of Rhodes, Venice was selected as the most suitable meeting place, and even the date had almost been fixed when events once more upset all the plans of the Allies.

51. Angora had been making full use of the opportunities which Allied disunion and delay and the ill-advised action of the Greeks had afforded them. The military equipment of the Nationalists had been restored through supplies furnished by Russia, and from French and Italian sources. They were greatly encouraged by the attitude adopted by the Powers in the matter of the Greek threat to Constantinople. The seeds of demoralisation in the Greek army, already dislocated by the transfer of troops to Thrace, had grown apace in consequence of the reaction, which set in after their high hopes of occupying Constantinople had been baulked. As the *moral* of the Greek army in the country, which they were fated sooner or later to evacuate, grew lower, so did the *moral* of the Turkish troops rise. The Angora Government were emboldened by the failure of the Reparations Conference in August, by the almost open support afforded them by the French, and scarcely less concealed partiality of the Italians. Four months had elapsed since the Angora reply of the 22nd April, to which they had received no answer. They set little store on the preliminary conference, for they realised that Great Britain was more hostile than she had been in March, and that even less favourable terms than then were possible. An exaggerated importance was attached to the romance that Lord Curzon, who was ill at the time, had refused to receive Fethi Bey, who visited London in July, and who was, in fact, received at the Foreign Office by Sir William Tyrrell and Mr. Lindsay. Their exasperation at the speech made by Lloyd George in the House of Commons on the 4th August on the Near East question was more justifiable. They regarded that speech as foreshadowing a revision of the March proposals in a sense unfavourable to Turkey, and possibly even a reversal of the decision not to allow the Greeks to occupy Constantinople. They felt that an issue must be forced by arms, if they were to improve their position at the Venice Conference, and while the Allies were still discussing the form of invitation and the terms of reference. Mustafa Kemal, believing the opportunity to have come, made up his mind to strike. The success which was achieved, must have been far in excess of the wildest Turkish hopes.

52. After a feint in the Meander Valley, the Turks launched their offensive on the Afion-Kara-Hissar front on the morning of the 27th August.* With the almost sole exception of the force under the command of a certain Colonel Plastiras, who was to make his name later, they met nowhere with any real resistance. The campaign is described elsewhere in this report. It suffices here to say that by the 4th September, Afion-Kara-Hissar, Kutahia, Ushak, and Eski-

* 26 Ağustos öfmalı. - BNS.

Şehir had been occupied by the Turks after the battles of Uşak and İn-cunu; General Tricoupis, the Greek Commander-in-chief, had been taken prisoner; and the remains of the Greek army had retired behind the Alashehir line, the last position before Smyrna. It also was abandoned without resistance, and the Turkish troops entered Smyrna unopposed on the 9th September. For a brief moment, the northern Greek army seemed capable of holding its ground. It did, in fact, retire in fairly good order to Panderma, but Broussa fell on the 11th September. In its retreat the Greek army had committed grave excesses. Wherever it had passed, the country-side had been devastated. Eski-Şehir, Uşak, Kutahia, and other towns and villages had been burnt. Broussa itself was only saved from a similar fate through prompt Allied intervention.

53. The Turkish cavalry, which were the first troops to enter Smyrna, were well in hand, and no disorders occurred. The infantry followed on the 10th September. Some resistance was apparently organised by the Armenians in the city. On the following day a fire broke out there, and spread thence unchecked to the European quarter, practically the whole of which was destroyed. Terrible scenes ensued. The whole of the British colony, with the exception of an aged resident, Dr. Murphy, who was murdered by looters, was successfully evacuated, but a great number of Ottoman Christians perished. Thousands were rescued by the British fleet, under Admiral Brock, which had left for Smyrna on the 2nd September, and by the American, and in a lesser degree by French and Italian warships.

54. The origin of the Smyrna fire is likely to remain for ever a disputed point. British reports are practically unanimous in describing it to Turkish action. But even foreign opinion is not entirely concordant. The Turks, of course, absolutely deny their responsibility. I am personally not inclined to believe that it was the result of a premeditated plan. But once started, and realising the direction in which it would spread, the Turks preferred to encourage the fire rather than to attempt to check it.

55. The Turkish victories induced the Allies to suspend the issue of the invitations to the Venice Conference, which were nearly ready, since it was felt that events must be allowed to develop until the military situation was stabilised.

56. But the Turkish advance had been too rapid for the Allies to take any concerted action with a view to securing an armistice and protecting Smyrna. Moreover, intervention in that sense would have been courting a rebuff, and it was feared at first, apart from admitting the bankruptcy of the Greek cause, that such a proposal would have encouraged the Turks to insist also on the evacuation of Eastern Thrace, and Allied recognition of the National Pact.

57. Nevertheless, the complete collapse of the Greek army and the exaltation of the Turks produced a situation fraught with threatening possibilities. The centre of gravity shifted from Anatolia to the Straits and Thrace. The evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks endangered the British position in Iraq, and that of the Allied forces in Constantinople, who were regarded by the Turks as barring the road to Thrace. It was also a serious menace for Syria, and the French began at last to realise the folly of their disloyalty, and to regret its consequences.

58. When, therefore, the Greek Government itself appealed to His Majesty's Government to intervene, the Allied High Commissioners were instructed, on the 7th September, to request the Nationalist representative in Constantinople to telegraph to his Government to propose a meeting of Greek and Turkish generals with Allied military representatives, in order to conclude an armistice which might prevent further useless bloodshed. Their appeal in this respect was supported by the Pope in a personal message to Kemal. With a view to avoiding an immediate answer, the Angora Government replied by enquiring whether this armistice proposal had been put forward officially by the Greek Government, and whether its object was merely to discuss a suspension of arms, or also general peace terms.

59. Mustafa Kemal had, in truth, no desire to arrest so early the advance of his troops, and forego the pressure which he was thereby exercising on the Allies. By the end of the first week in September that advance constituted a direct menace to the Allied control of the Straits in general, and the position of the British forces at Chanak in particular.

60. The British Cabinet had, in the meantime, met on the 7th September, and had adopted the policy that, while liquidating the situation in Anatolia, the Allied position in Europe must be maintained, and could not be altered without the consent of the Powers. His Majesty's Government were opposed to holding Chanak unless France and Italy joined in its defence, which was considered unlikely, and authorised General Harington to withdraw to the European side of the Straits. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government announced that they had no intention of abandoning Gallipoli, and would send reinforcements to hold the peninsula, alone if necessary. Constantinople was to be held at all costs, but the Ismid Peninsula, for the same reasons as Chanak, was to be evacuated.

61. Prior to the receipt of the views of His Majesty's Government, the Allied High Commissioners and generals and admirals had met in Constantinople and had decided that the principle involved in the Turkish threat to the Straits was the same as in the recent Greek menace to

Constantinople, and called for similar measures. They had accordingly agreed to resist the Turkish advance, while asking for an assurance from their Governments that the means of enforcing this principle would be supplied. Small French and Italian detachments were despatched to Ismid and Chanak to demonstrate Allied unity, and the Nationalist representative was warned on the 11th September that the Allies would not tolerate any violation of the neutral zones. In view of this unexpected loyalty, His Majesty's Government reversed their policy of evacuating Chanak and Ismid, which could be held in pawn pending negotiations with the Kemalists for an armistice.

62. The last of the Greek army in Asia Minor was evacuated on the 16th September, when Panderma was occupied by the Turks. In that respect, therefore, the situation was not stabilised, as the Allied fleet in the Marmora lay between the Turks and their victims. On the 16th September, however, the British Prime Minister published a declaration issued to the British dominions, inviting them to co-operate in sending military assistance to resist any attempt of the Turks to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula.

63. The effect of this appeal on Anglo-French unity was electrical. The French High Commissioner in Constantinople was instructed to leave immediately for Smyrna on the pretext of looking after French lives and interests, but in reality to see Mustafa Kemal. It is not difficult to guess that General Pellé was directed to assure Kemal that France in no way associated herself in the British Prime Minister's action. On the 19th September, M. Poincaré, terrified of fresh entanglements, announced *urbi et orbi*, in the French Chamber, that there would be no French war against Turkey, and simultaneously the French, followed by the Italian detachments were withdrawn from Chanak and Ismid.

64. All semblance of Allied unity had thus vanished, at the first hint of action, into thin air. For by this time British ships and troops, the Sussex, Gordons, and North Staffordshire and other regiments, marines, artillery and aeroplanes were being rushed out to the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Two battalions of the Guards were under orders to leave, and Admiral Brock had received instructions to prevent by all means in his power, and in such manner as he thought fit, any attempt of the Turks to cross from Asia into Europe. Serbia and Roumania had also hinted at possible co-operation, though the offer of the latter was somewhat discounted by the fear of a Russian attack on Bessarabia. The Christian population of Constantinople was gibbering with terror, the loyalty of the Turkish police serving under the Allied Police Commission was doubtful, and preparations had been completed to evacuate the British colony from Constantinople.

65. Once more Lord Curzon stepped into the breach and left for Paris to fit the broken pieces of Allied unity together again. He protested indignantly to M. Poincaré against the French withdrawal from Chanak, an act of infidelity in glaring contrast to the British loyalty at Chatalja. Such a withdrawal was a repudiation of Allied obligations and implied that France was at liberty to tear up an alliance, as soon as French lives were in danger. If so, it was, he said, a novel interpretation of the duties of an ally. Was the Allied invitation to a conference to be anticipated by a triumphal march of the Kemalists against the Straits and Constantinople? Would, he asked, France assist Great Britain in preventing a Kemalist irruption into Europe? If not, Great Britain was ready, if necessary, to act alone.

66. M. Poincaré's reply was that nothing could prevent the Turks crossing to Europe when they pleased. He accused His Majesty's Government of pursuing a war policy. General Charpy had acted *ultra vires* and had been tricked by General Harington into sending a French detachment to Chanak. Public opinion would not tolerate a shot being fired by Frenchmen on the Turks, and France was morally and physically incapable of resisting a Turkish advance.

67. Lord Curzon declined either to listen to M. Poincaré's insinuations respecting General Harington, or to bribe Kemal by conceding his demands in advance of a conference. A conference under such conditions would, he pointed out, be utterly futile. Kemal must be made to realise that no final arrangement could be come to except after full discussion and the consent of all parties concerned, including the Balkan States. All however that could be wrong from M. Poincaré was that while France would co-operate with Europe, she would not join in any action south of the Straits. In short, by conceding all essential points in advance, France was willing to try to purchase Kemal's forbearance.

68. After discussions which lasted several days and were at times of an acrimonious nature, Allied unity was patched up on the basis of a compromise and a note was telegraphed on the 23rd September to Mustafa Kemal inviting him to meet the Allied generals at Mudania with a view to liquidating the military situation, and to appoint without delay, representatives to a conference (no longer preliminary) to be held at Venice or elsewhere to conclude a final treaty of peace between Turkey, Greece and the Allied Powers. In an unfortunate moment Lord Curzon also invited M. Poincaré to use his good influence with Kemal to restrain him from action which might prevent the assembling of the conference. M. Franklin-Bouillon was the emissary chosen by M. Poincaré and was sent forthwith to Smyrna for this purpose.

69. In addition to Turkey, it was announced that Japan, Greece, Roumania and Serbia would also be invited to send delegates to attend the Peace Conference. But to induce Mustafa Kemal to accept, a sop had to be provided, and the three Allied Governments declared that they were prepared to admit the restoration of Thrace as far as the Maritza, and Adrianople to Turkey, provided that during the peace negotiations the Turks did not invade the neutral zones and on the understanding that, with a view to the maintenance of peace, certain zones in Turkish territory would be demilitarised in order effectively to assure the freedom of the Straits and the protection of the minorities. The three Governments also undertook to support the admission of Turkey to the League of Nations, and to withdraw their troops from Constantinople as soon as the Peace Treaty came into force. In return for Allied intervention in arranging for the retirement of the Greek forces behind the Maritza, the Turks, in addition to engaging not to violate the neutral zones, were not in the interval to cross the Straits or the Sea of Marmora.

70. The Allied note of the 23rd September conceded so much that it was supposed, not without reason, that the dangerous moment of the situation had passed. In addition, to avoid any appearance of unneutrality, lest the British preparations at Chanak be regarded as a measure to allow the Greek army to reform behind them in Thrace and in view of the denial of Thrace to the Turks, Sir Horace Rumbold decided to ask Admiral Brock to insist on the withdrawal of the Greek warships from Constantinople. The Greek military mission had left the city on the 26th September, and Admiral Ipititis was requested to leave with the "Averoff" on the following day. She left, but without Admiral Ipititis, for on the 26th a revolutionary Government headed by Colonel Plastiras, Gonatas and Krokidas had established itself at Laurium, King Constantine had abdicated and the Diadoch had been proclaimed King. The crew of the "Averoff" had joined the revolution, and Admiral Ipititis who happened to be on shore was not allowed by his men to re-embark. The passage of the Dardanelles by Greek warships and transports had also been prohibited.

71. But on the very day when the invitation to the Peace Conference was telegraphed to Angora, a small detachment of Turkish cavalry invaded the Chanak neutral zone at Erenkeuy. It was withdrawn, but, in reply to General Harington's protests, Angora declared that they had never agreed to nor could recognise the existence of the neutral zones - a shameless perversion of fact, since Nationalist officers had actually assisted at the demarcation of Ismid zone. General Pellé had returned from Smyrna on the 21st September. His account of his interviews with Kemal was not reassuring. The latter had declared his intention to march on Constantinople, and demand the restoration of Thrace up to the Maritza. Aralov, the Soviet representative in Angora, was expected to

join Mustafa Kemal in Smyrna, and the latter was said to have promised to make no agreement respecting the Straits, from which Russia was excluded.

72. The tension locally showed, in fact, no sign of slackening as the result of the note of the 23rd September. The Turkish cavalry at Erenkeuy, which had retired on the 24th September, reappeared 1,500 strong on the 25th September. The cavalry were followed by other troops in increasing numbers and drawing ever closer round Chanak. There was a daily danger of a collision. British patience at home and the patience of the British troops on the spot, was being sorely tried, and on the 30th September General Harington was informed that he could count on the full support of His Majesty's Government in demanding by means of an ultimatum, the immediate evacuation by the Turks of the neutral zone. The ultimate maintenance of peace was largely due to the wise and forbearing use made by General Harington of the discretion thus allowed him.

73. In the meantime M. Franklin-Bouillon had reached Smyrna on the 27th September, and according to his own account had spent thirty-six hours in continuous and eloquent discussions with Mustafa Kemal, at the conclusion of which the latter, it would almost seem from that account, as a personal favour to M. Franklin-Bouillon, had consented to give orders for an immediate halt of all his troops on their present positions, provided His Majesty's Government undertook to send no further reinforcements, and to construct no further entrenchments. Mustafa Kemal had also agreed to the meeting of the generals at Mudania and had instructed his Chief of Staff, General Ismet Pasha, to represent him there on the 3rd October.

74. M. Franklin-Bouillon arrived in Constantinople with these tidings on the evening of the 1st October. With no small histrionic ability but with an egregious display of vanity, he described that night at a meeting of Allied High Commissioners, generals and admirals at the British High Commission the herculean efforts which he had furnished on behalf of the Allies in general and of Great Britain in particular. He made it clear that he regarded himself as the *deus ex machina* who had averted hostilities and saved the British forces in Asia Minor from annihilation by 150,000 victorious Turks, with 150,000 more in reserve and 3 million Moslems behind them again. He also read to the meeting the official reply of the Angora Government, signed by Yussuf Kemal Bey, to M. Poincaré's telegram of the 23rd September accepting Mudania, and undertaking to give a reply in a few days to the invitation to the Peace Conference.

75. M. Franklin-Bouillon laid great stress on the importance of losing no time in agreeing with the Turk quickly. He ignored, perhaps was ignorant of, the fact that by this time the British force at Chanak was solidly entrenched and capable of resisting almost any attack for at least several weeks, while the Greek

army, under the impulse of the revolution, a part of whose programme was the defence of Thrace, was reforming in that province. In his zeal for Great Britain, M. Bouillon seemed to forget the weak points of the Turkish position in panic-stricken anticipation of a British disaster.

76. Up to the last minute it was impossible to achieve any real unity of views on the attitude to be adopted at the Mudania meeting by the Allied generals. Generally speaking, however, General Harington's instructions were to fix a line in Thrace behind which the Greek troops were to retire, but to exercise no pressure on them until the Kemalists had withdrawn from the neutral zone, to discuss alone all questions affecting the position of the British troops on the Asiatic side, to restrict the discussions as far as possible to military matters, to enter into no definite engagements without the authority of the Allied Governments respecting the future administration of Thrace, and to make no final agreement until the reply of the Angora Government to the Allied note of the 23rd September had been received and proved acceptable.

77. General Harington left for Mudania on the night of the 2nd October on board H.M.S. "Iron Duke," flying the flag of Admiral Brock. The French general, General Charpy, proceeded there in the French warship "Edgar-Quinet," in which left also Hamid Bey, the Nationalist representative at Constantinople, and the ubiquitous M. Franklin-Bouillon. General Mombelli was accommodated in the Italian stationnaire, the "Archimede." The Greek representatives, General Mazarakis and Colonel Plastiras, reached Mudania a day or two later.

78. M. Franklin-Bouillon's presence was unfortunate. He exaggerated Turkish pretensions by holding out to them the hope of their obtaining more than Great Britain was ever likely to grant. He gave a false impression of British unwillingness and inability to fight, and encouraged the Turkish attempt to inveigle the Allied generals into discussing political questions.

79. The first meeting was held on the 3rd October. The Allied generals were well received, and Ismet Pasha declared that the Angora Government, by sending him as their representative to Mudania, had accepted the note of the 23rd September in principle. There was a slight retirement of the Turks from the Chanak zone. This favourable commencement was not long sustained; a deadlock ensued on the 5th October.

80. The object of the conference was to bring the Greco-Turkish hostilities to an end and to fix a line behind which the Greek army in Thrace was to retire. But the Turkish aims were more ambitious, and they proceeded to demand that the whole of Eastern Thrace, including Karagatch, a suburb of Adrianople,

should be handed over in full sovereignty to Turkey at once, without awaiting the decision of the Peace Conference, and should be evacuated by all the Allied commissions and contingents within thirty days. The Turks also refused the right of the Allies to limit the number of Nationalist gendarmerie to be sent forthwith into Thrace, and insisted on their own right to continue military operations until the Allied Governments had accepted the Mudania Convention. A time limit until 2.30 p.m. on the 6th October was given to the Allied generals in which to accept either these demands or the responsibility for their refusal.

81. At the instigation of M. Franklin-Bouillon, General Charpy declared to the Turks his willingness to agree to the immediate restitution to them of Eastern Thrace. Such a course was absolutely contrary to the Allied note of the 23rd September and to General Harrington's own instructions. He refused to join in the French complaisance, and the Allied generals returned to Constantinople to consult their High Commissioners on the evening of the 5th October. The French and Italian High Commissioners, appalled by the prospect of war, were in favour of unconditional surrender. Sir Horace Rumbold alone showed any spirit and solidity. He declined to agree to anything outside the Paris proposals of the 23rd September without instructions from the Allied Governments. Though it was quite clear that Turks, such instructions could not be received within the period of the time limit set by the Turks, Sir H. Rumbold's decision prevailed. But the situation was so grave that Lord Curzon left once more for Paris on the 6th October to discuss the situation with M. Poincaré. Pending the result of their meeting, General Harrington was instructed to sign nothing.

82. With those instructions in his pocket, General Harrington returned with the Allied generals to Mudania on the afternoon of the 6th October. They found there a *détente* and the Turks unprepared to execute their ultimatum, though they extended their violation of the neutral zones by further infiltrations, this time in the direction of Ismid.

83. Lord Curzon once again succeeded in achieving Allied unity, though it was at a heavy price. On the 7th October the Allies in Paris consented to the withdrawal from Eastern Thrace of all the Allied forces within thirty days after the withdrawal of the Greek army. Karagatch, however, was not to be surrendered, and the number of Turkish gendarmerie was to be limited. Lord Curzon also insisted on the retirement of the Turks from the neutral zones.

84. Some confusion was caused owing to the instructions sent to the French and Italian High Commissioners not coinciding in all respects with those received at this High Commission. It was not stated what constituted the

neutral zones, whether they were to be those laid down in 1921 or whether they were to be new lines defined by the generals. Nor was it stated whether the number of the gendarmerie was to be limited to what was strictly necessary or to a fixed number. Generals Charpy and Mombelli returned to Constantinople on the 8th October to elucidate these points, which were settled by leaving to General Harington's discretion the interpretation to be placed upon them. It was thus possible to draw up a final protocol, which was submitted to the Turks on the 9th October. This time it was Ismet Pasha who asked for an adjournment until 5 p.m. on the 10th October, in order to enable him to ascertain the definite views of the Angora Government. During this period the Allied generals once more returned to Constantinople, and a final meeting of the Allied High Commissioners was held on the 10th October.

85. Prior to the general meeting, Sir Horace Rumbold, Admiral Brock and General Harington had discussed the ultimatum which the latter proposed to hand to Ismet Pasha if the reply from Angora proved unsatisfactory. It gave the Turks thirty-six hours in which to evacuate the neutral zones, and at the expiration of which General Harington would use all the measures of force at his disposal to expel them therefrom. Simultaneously with the presentation of this ultimatum, Admiral Brock was to issue a proclamation for clearing, after thirty-four hours' notice, the Bosphorous of all shipping, which was to be concentrated in the Golden Horn. After driving back the Turkish advance guard in the Ismid zone, General Harington was to retire to Scutari, which he would hold as long as possible before evacuating his troops to the European side.

86. At the general meeting, General Pellé and Marquis Garroni were anxious that, if the Turks made reserves as to accepting the final protocol, the matter should once more be referred back to the Allied Governments. It was pointed out to them, however, that on military grounds, and in order to ensure the safety of the British troops, it was impossible that the present situation in the military zones should be allowed to continue. The British representatives insisted that, if satisfactory guarantees respecting the military zones could not be obtained, General Harington's ultimatum to the Turks would have at all costs to be presented. It was at the same time however, agreed that the Allied generals could make, on their own account, alterations in form in the final protocol, and could also refer back to the High Commissioners questions of principle, except in so far as the neutral zones were concerned.

87. It was obvious that both the French and Italian High Commissioners were relieved that the ultimatum, if it had to be produced, would be on a purely British issue, and at the close of the meeting, after an agreement had been reached on the above lines, General Pellé somewhat shamefacedly announced that he had received a telegram from M. Poincaré declaring that in no event

would France go to war with Turkey. Marquis Garroni associated the Italian Government in this declaration, which effectually demonstrated that the unity of the three Powers was a myth not intended to stand the test of action.

88. It was fortunately not subjected to such a test. The Allied generals returned for the last time to Mudania on the afternoon of the 10th October. After a sitting which lasted, with but brief interruptions, from 5 o'clock that afternoon till the sun was rising over the Anatolian hills on the following morning, the convention was finally signed. On the ground that their instructions precluded them from accepting any arrangement which did not threat the frontiers of Eastern Thrace as being those of 1915, the Greek representatives abstained from signing the convention, but the adherence of the Greek Government was obtained three days later in the form of written declaration handed by the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in Constantinople to the Allied High Commissioners and communicated by them to the representative of the Angora Government.

89. In addition to terminating the Turco-Greek war, the Mudania Convention laid down that the Greek troops should retire within a period of fifteen days behind the River Maritza, the right bank of which should be occupied by Allied contingents as a form of buffer until the final conclusion of peace. A mixed railway commission was to control the Svilengrad-Kouleli-Bourgas branch of the Orient Railway. The Greek civil authorities were to be withdrawn from Eastern Thrace within a period of thirty days after the evacuation of the troops. Their place was to be taken by Turkish officials supported by a force of gendarmerie not exceeding 8,000 in number. The Allied missions were to control the transfer of authority and Allied contingents (about seven battalions) were to ensure the maintenance of order. These Allied missions and contingents were also to be withdrawn thirty days after the evacuation by the Greek troops.

90. The Turks for their part recognised the neutral zones as defined by General Harington, as well as the presence of the Allied troops in the territories in which they were actually stationed, territories which the Grand National Assembly undertook to respect until the decision of the Peace Conference. In addition, Turkey undertook not to transport troops nor to raise an army in Eastern Thrace until the ratification of the Peace Treaty. It was not found possible to include in the convention any provision for the reciprocal exchange of prisoners of war.

91. By the Mudania Convention the Nationalists had secured Eastern Thrace without striking a blow. They had forced the Western Powers to make important concessions and to treat with the Angora Government - a matter of

vital importance to the Nationalists - as the real Government of Turkey. The Convention could not fail in many respects to be regarded as a victory for Asia over Europe. Nevertheless Mudania also proved that Great Britain still held the dominant position in the councils of the Allies. If it had not been for the British reinforcements which were hurried out during this period, the horrors of Ionia and Smyrna might well have spread unchecked to Europe and the Balkans. At the moment when the Allied generals left Mudania, the Turks were elated by their facile victory which they regarded as having been won no less over Great Britain than over the Greeks. France and Italy had been ready to throw up the sponge. But Great Britain had not, and the presence of the British forces and the conviction that they would be used in the last resort, had induced the Turkish leaders to pause, and to realise that there was a limit to British forbearance. At the same time the patience, tact and conciliatory firmness of General Harington, coupled with the praiseworthy restraint of the British troops themselves, had extricated the British Empire from a position, whence it might easily have drifted into war.

92. The convention came into force on the 15th October. Thrace was totally evacuated under Allied supervision within the stipulated period. Thanks to the supervision, the devastation which accompanied the Greek retreat in Asia Minor was avoided. With the Greek troops and administration left the whole Greek and Christian population of Eastern Thrace, amounting to at least a quarter of a million. Though the exodus must have caused much suffering, it was accomplished without undue difficulty and the entire operation reflects much credit on those charged with controlling its execution. Greece, it is true, brought certain accusations against the French authorities of improper action in retaining Greek cereals and cattle, but on the whole incidents were rare. Some unpleasantness was caused between the French and His Majesty's Government owing to the French demand, which had to be rejected, that General Charpy should be given command, as a separate force, of all the Allied contingents in Thrace.

93. While this operation was proceeding, Dr. Nansen was endeavouring to open direct negotiations with Angora for the return to Greece of the male refugees still detained in Asia Minor, and for the exchange of prisoners of war and of populations. Dr. Nansen's intervention was not particularly felicitous. His efforts were not appreciated by the Turks, nor even by the Greeks and he failed to obtain permission to go to Angora.

94. While the Allies were thus striving loyally to carry out their obligations, the Nationalists were preparing to realise their preconceived programme and to interpret their engagements to suit their own interests.

III. The Abolition of the Sultanate and the Fall of the Central Government. The Flight of the Sultan and the Capture of Constantinople by the Nationalists. The Lausanne Conference.

95. The preliminary stage having thus terminated, and Greco-Turkish hostilities having ceased, attention turned towards the Peace Conference. The Angora Government had, on the 4th October, accepted the invitation to attend. It persisted, however, in regarding Smyrna as the most suitable locality and suggested the 20th October as a convenient date. It also asked that, inasmuch as Serbia and Roumania were invited to participate in the conference, Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia should do so likewise. At the same time the Turkish note took act of the Allied recognition of Turkish rights in Eastern Thrace, and the Allied assurances respecting the evacuation of Constantinople, "which Turkey awaited with impatience."

96. Though the Smyrna suggestion could obviously not be entertained, the reply of the Angora Government, in spite of a somewhat cavalier reference to the League of Nations, her admission to which the Allies in their note of the 23rd September had undertaken to support, was regarded as sufficiently satisfactory. The French Government indeed was ready to accept Smyrna and only yielded to His Majesty's Government's insistence on this point. After some discussion between the Allied Governments, it was agreed to fix Lausanne as the meeting place, to limit the number of representatives to be sent by each Government to two, and, since His Majesty's Government were anxious to avoid any step, which might be construed as a *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government, to restrict Russian participation to matters concerning the Straits. It was also agreed to invite the Bulgarian Government to send representatives, but only to assist in discussions affecting Bulgaria. The date selected was the 13th November, and on the 27th October invitations to the above effect were addressed to all the interested Governments including that of the Sultan. The Government of the Grand National Assembly at once accepted Lausanne, but at the same time conveyed in a separate reply a definite threat to the effect that, if the representatives of the Sultan's Government actually attended the conference, those of Angora might be prevented from attending.

97. Agreement having been reached as to the venue, His Majesty's Government were anxious that a preliminary meeting of Allied experts to study the financial and economic provisions of the future treaty, should be called together in London. This proposal had to be abandoned owing to the acrimonious spirit in which M. Poincaré received it, and his insistence on Paris as the rendez-vous. Nor did French obstruction end there. For various reasons, such as the Turkish attitude in Constantinople and the recent advent to power of M. Mussolini, but largely owing to the British general election, necessitated

by the fall of Mr. Lloyd George's Cabinet in October, having been fixed for the 15th November and the opening of Parliament for the 23rd November, His Majesty's Government considered it desirable to postpone the date for the summoning of the Lausanne Conference. They were profoundly conscious of the fact that no good effect could come of the conference, unless a united front were previously established as to the attitude to be adopted by the Allies towards Turkish demands.

98. Incidentally the necessity for securing this unity was emphasised about this time by the attempt made by the Italian Government to send M. Maissa, a former Italian High commissioner in Constantinople, to Angora in order to get special privileges and concessions for Italy in return for her abandonment of the Tripartite Agreement. M. Maissa was only recalled at the last moment, after his journey from Haidar Pasha had already begun, as the result of a personal appeal to M. Mussolini.

99. Lord Curzon accordingly suggested a preliminary interchange of views between the Allied Ministers themselves, and the postponement of the conference to the 25th November. But M. Poincaré had been irritated by references to French defeats in Cilicia made in a speech by Mr. Lloyd George on the 14th October, and again refused, though a large section of French opinion not only in Turkey but also in France had begun to realise the danger of excessive submission to Turkish pretensions.

100. In spite of M. Poincaré's refusal to meet Lord Curzon in London, he was, however, obliged to yield in respect of the date for the opening of the conference, which was eventually fixed for the 20th November. Furthermore, having at last realised that Lord Curzon would not come to the conference at all unless the French Government agreed to show a common front on all the main issues, he at length accepted in principle a British memorandum setting forth the points on which His Majesty's Government considered a prior agreement to be essential, and gave an assurance that complete accord would be preserved in resisting any impossible Turkish claims.

101. Lord Curzon thereupon proceeded to Paris on the 17th November, and after satisfactory conversations with M. Poincaré, left with him on the 19th November for Territet where they met M. Mussolini. İsmet Pasha had arrived at Lausanne some days earlier having reached Constantinople before he was aware of the postponement of the date of the conference. Lord Curzon was joined at Lausanne by Sir Horace Rumbold as second British plenipotentiary, who had left Constantinople on the 15th November. Marquis Garroni, the Italian High Commissioner, was also a plenipotentiary together with Baron Montagna, the Italian Minister at Athens. General Pellé alone of the three High

Commissioners in Constantinople was not invited by his Government to represent it at Lausanne, the two French delegates selected being M. Barrère and M. Bompard. The first meeting of the conference was held on the 20th November.

102. It is necessary at this point to revert to the events in Constantinople after the Mudania armistice. The conclusion of that convention put an end to a situation full of dangerous possibilities and brought peace, if not the peace. Essentially a military convention for the cessation of hostilities between Greece and Turkey, it had avoided so far as possible all reference to other and especially political questions. Two of its clauses however related to the areas occupied by the Allied military forces, and article 12, somewhat loosely worded, ran: "The presence of the Allied troops shall be maintained in the territories where they are at present stationed, territories which the Grand National Assembly of Turkey undertakes to respect until such time as a decision shall have been reached by the Peace Conference."

103. The Turks accepted the Mudania Convention as binding, but only in the manner interpreted by them. They proceeded to interpret article 12 as implying that only the presence of, and in no sense the occupation by, the Allied forces was recognised in those territories. They based their contention in fact on the wording instead of on the spirit of the convention. Nor did they loose any time in attempting to put their contention into effect. On the 15th October, the day after the convention had come into force, the Angora Government appointed a Governor for Gallipoli, thus clearly indicating their claim to take over the civil administration of the occupied zones. The selection of Gallipoli for the first step was adroit, since that district was in fact an administrative portion of Eastern Thrace in which full Nationalist sovereignty had been recognised at Mudania. Though the danger of the extension of this procedure was foreseen by the British High Commissioner, the Nationalist claim in this respect was, for various reasons, not resisted and the thin edge of the wedge was firmly in the crack. A similar claim was put forward in respect of the Ismid zone, and the Angora Government openly announced their determination to replace the officials of the Central Government by Nationalists. The inability of the Allies to resist this claim sounded the deathknell of the Central Government, already tottering to its fall, and the drama opened with the arrival of Refet Pasha on the 19th October.

104. Refet Pasha was a stalwart of the Nationalist movement. He had fought with some distinction in the great war and had been Minister of National Defence in the Angora Government. He was appointed Military High Commissioner for Eastern Thrace and should rightly have proceeded directly thither. He preferred to stop - and was unfortunately not prevented from so

doing - in Constantinople in order to gain his two objectives of overthrowing the Sultan and his Government and of undermining the position of the Allies in the city.

105. It took him less than a month to achieve both these objects.

106. Prior to Refet Pasha's arrival the Allied High Commissioners and generals had agreed that he himself, but none of his gendarmerie, should be allowed to traverse Constantinople on the way to Thrace. When he arrived with 126 gendarmes, the latter were therefore refused permission to land in spite of the protests of the Nationalist representative in Constantinople, Hamid Bey, who endeavoured, entirely without success, to make out that General Harington had agreed at Mudania to allow a passage through Constantinople for the gendarmes destined to Thrace. On the following day, however, they were permitted, entirely contrary to the joint decision taken by the Allied High Commissioners and generals, to disembark on the ground that they were Refet's personal attendants. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that with these 126 gendarmes, Refet succeeded in exactly a fortnight in imposing a Nationalist Administration in Constantinople.

107. Refet had been accorded on his arrival an enthusiastic reception by the Turkish population of the town. He did not conceal his intentions. In addressing the Grand Vizier, Tewfik Pasha, he was careful to omit the title of Grand Vizier: in thinking the aide-de-camp whom the Sultan had sent to meet him he said, "Convey to the high office of the Caliphate my sentiments of religious devotion": to the Minister of the Interior who also met him he remarked, "Our Government is a democratic Government, wholly directed by the people on the principal of national sovereignty, but I cannot recognise a Minister of the Interior in the name of my Government." In the speeches at the various functions which he attended, he emphasised the point that the early Caliphs did not require the title of Sultan, and that Constantinople was merely the seat of the Caliphate. He described the foreign policy of the Angora Government as being the National Pact and its home policy as the fundamental law which had been adopted early in 1921 by the Grand National Assembly. He preached the doctrine that it was possible to abolish the Sultanate without destroying the Caliphate, as well as that of the federation of Moslem states with the Caliphate as a common bond, and Turkish hegemony secured by its establishment at Constantinople.

108. The ground having been thus prepared, the attack was launched. A decree was passed by the Grand National Assembly declaring all acts, treaties, contracts and financial engagements of the Constantinople Government since 1920 to be null and void. The financial credit of the Sultan's Government was

ruined by this decree, which imposed a financial blockade of a nature to render it incapable of functioning. The Allied High Commissioners made a vain attempt to counter this move by selling, in order to provide for the immediate needs of the Central Government, some of the Turkish gold earmarked for the payment of the interest on internal loans which had been sequestered in 1920, and by applying to their Governments to assist it in carrying on spite of the decree. But before any decision in this respect could be arrived at, the Central Government had fallen.

109. The reply of the Angora Government to the invitation to the Peace Conference was an assault scarcely less effective. That reply had stated that the participation of the Central Government at the conference might prevent Angora from sending its delegates to Lausanne, and was contrary to the spirit and even to the existence of the Mudania Convention. The Allied reply to this threat had been to the effect that, in inviting both Governments, the Powers had merely followed the procedure hitherto followed, and that it was for Turkey to arrange for the despatch of a single delegation, a course which should not be difficult since Angora asserted that Constantinople was a mere administrative district. The Angora Government took action accordingly.

110. Refet Pasha visited the Sultan on the 29th October, and asked him to dismiss his Government. His Majesty, in declining to do so, had said that he would consult his Ministers. Tewfik Pasha had telegraphed to Angora to suggest that a joined mission to Lausanne should be concerted. He received no reply. He had appealed for advice to Sir Horace Rumbold, who had been obliged to inform him that the questions of the resignation of the Government, and of the despatch of a delegation to Lausanne were internal matters, which the Government must decide for itself. It must have been clear to Tewfik Pasha that the Cabinet was doomed.

111. The decisive blow was struck on the 1st November on which date a unanimous decision was adopted by the Grand National Assembly decreeing that the office of Sultan had ceased to exist, that under the fundamental law the Caliphate was vested in the house of Osman but that the Caliph must be elected by the Assembly, and that the Turkish State was the support on which the Caliphate rested. It announced that the sole sovereignty of Turkey was vested in the Grand National Assembly as representative of the Turkish people, and that no other Government had existed since March 1920. The text of this historic resolution is attached as an annex to this report.

112. Incapable of further resistance the Sultan's Government resigned on the 4th November, and Refet announced himself to be the representative of the Grand National Assembly and the *de facto* Governor of Constantinople. The

introduction of the Nationalist Administration into Constantinople was received with much apparent rejoicing by the population. The abolition of the Sultanate was acquiesced in without comment, which was either stifled or unappreciative. Abroad opinion varied from enthusiastic and uncritical endorsement of Ankara's action to cautious opposition based on Islamic law which precludes any divorce between spiritual and temporal power.

113. The first part of Refet's programme having been thus successfully accomplished, he was able to proceed with his offensive against the Allies. On the 5th November, Hamid Bey communicated to the Allied High Commissioners two notes asking for the withdrawal from Constantinople of the Allied military and naval forces. It was stated that as a result of the abolition of the personal sovereignty and at the spontaneous wish of the population of Constantinople, the Grand National Assembly had taken over the administration and was responsible henceforward for the maintenance of order and the transaction of public business in the Vilayet of Constantinople. In these circumstances the Ankara Government deemed the presence of the Allied forces in the city to be no longer necessary or even possible.

114. Such an impudent demand could not be considered for a moment, and joint replies were immediately addressed by the High Commissioners to Hamid Bey declaring in unmistakeable terms that the Allies could not admit this standpoint, which was contrary to the terms of the Mudros armistice, the Paris note of the 23rd September and the Mudania Convention. It was also made quite clear verbally to Hamid and in a communiqué to the press that, while the Allies had no intention of interfering in any way in the internal affairs of Turkey, no alteration in the Allied régime in Constantinople would be admitted and that so long as the occupation lasted the Allies would retain the control of the administration, whatever its form might be.

115. The demand for the withdrawal of the Allied forces was undoubtedly bluff, and was not persisted in; but no attention was paid to the clearly expressed determination of the High Commissioners to maintain their administrative control. On the following days a whole series of measures were introduced of a nature entirely contrary to that régime. The control of the Turkish police hitherto exercised by the Allied Police Commission was assumed by Refet. The specific customs tariff in force in Anatolia was introduced in place of the 11 per cent, *ad valorem* tax which had been imposed by the Allies in Constantinople. Instructions were issued that all customs duties should be paid henceforth direct to the Nationalist financial representative instead of the Ottoman Bank for the account of the Provisional Financial Commission, and that the 3 per cent share of the customs duties should no longer be paid to the Ottoman Public Debt. The Mixed Judicial Tribunal was ordered to cease

functioning and the International Sanitary Commission was notified that all sanitary control would in future be exercised by the Angora Government. No Ottoman subjects were to be allowed to leave Turkey without obtaining the visa of the Turkish police.

116. These measures constituted an open defiance of Allied authority, which the Allies could not tolerate without losing all prestige, and without betraying the confidence which the population still had in them. They were equivalent to the abolition of the Provisional Financial Commission and the Ottoman Debt. They threatened the economic life of Constantinople. There was every probability that they would be followed by other measures entailing the expulsion of the Greek population, the indiscriminate confiscation of property, arbitrary arrests, &c. They had one immediate effect. On the 6th November Ali Kemal, a former Minister of the Interior and editor of the violently anti-Nationalist newspaper "Payam Sabah" was kidnapped by Nationalist agents in the Grand Rue de Pera, smuggled across the water to Ismid and there barbarously murdered. The fear of the like fate drove about 150 Turks of anti-Nationalist tendencies to take refuge in the grounds of the British Embassy. They were escorted thence to the Tash Kishla Barracks and eventually shipped out of the country, most of them to become a burden to His Majesty's Government in Cyprus, Egypt and elsewhere.

117. It was clear that remonstrances without action would have no effect, that it was a question of a trial of strength and that the Allies must either ignominiously capitulate or resort to extreme measures. The Allied High Commissioners unanimously decided on the latter course and after consultation with the Allied generals invited their Governments to give authority for the institution of martial law in the city as the sole effective method of maintaining Allied prestige, of protecting the population and of preventing the establishment in Constantinople of the same régime which the Nationalists had already introduced in Smyrna, and which amounted to the abolition of the Capitulations, a *fait accompli* which the Turks desired to bring about for obvious reasons before the meeting of the Conference.

118. His Majesty's Government gave a prompt and unqualified concurrence in the proposal for the declaration of martial law, and expressed their satisfaction at the united front shown by the Allied representatives in Constantinople. The French and Italian Governments undertook to express similar concurrence but, owing to an interruption in the telegraph cables, three days passed before replies were received by the French and Italian High Commissioners. When they did arrive, the concurrence was grudging and conditional and the unity of the Allied High Commissioners and generals had not survived the delay. The latter, after maturer reflection, had come to the

conclusion that martial law, entailing, as it might, the disarmament of the Turkish police and gendarmerie would be likely to lead to an armed conflict in Constantinople and be followed by an advance of the Kemalist army in Anatolia. They were of the opinion that the forces at their disposal were inadequate except for a limited period, either to resist an attack in Asia or to control the city, or to provide the personnel for continuing the administration of the city. They were therefore not prepared to impose martial law without at least a promise of immediate reinforcements.

119. General Pellé and the Marquis Garroni were easily impressed by the arguments of the Allied generals, and showed great unwillingness to risk precipitating matters on the eve of the conference. The French Government refused to send reinforcements and His Majesty's Government who, in order to do so, would have been obliged to order a partial mobilisation declined to send reinforcements alone. In these circumstances there was no option for Sir Horace Rumbold but to agree, most unwillingly, that the risk was excessive, and that it was inexpedient to attempt for the moment to declare martial law, which must be reserved as a measure to be used in the last extremity. The Italian Government even proposed as the only means of escaping without loss of dignity from an untenable position that all the Allied forces should be withdrawn from Constantinople, rather than remain inactive witnesses of the arbitrary acts and methods of the Nationalists. M. Mussolini to this intent suggested the postponement of the conference, and to draw upon the Turks the responsibility for the withdrawal in the face of demands which were contrary to the terms of the Mudania Convention. The proposal was at once rejected by His Majesty's Government, who pointed out that the Italian Government should have acted on the suggestion made by their representative at Constantinople a few days earlier in favour of martial law, that the sole means of saving the situation and of preventing loss of dignity was to preserve an Allied front and that conditions at Lausanne would be impossible if Constantinople were evacuated.

120. The failure of the Allies to impose their will by force at this critical juncture was in fact deplorable. They abandoned their standpoint that, whatever the form of administration, the Allied control in Constantinople should be no less supreme than it had been in the time of the old Central Government. The Customs Régime, the Provisional Financial Commission, the Mixed Tribunal and the Sanitary Commission which they had set up were abolished, and even the Ottoman Public Debt was deprived of some of its chief sources of revenue. The Allied position in Constantinople was hopelessly prejudiced, and Turkish aggressiveness correspondingly encouraged. All those who had set their faith in the Allies, realised that they could no longer be

protected, there was a great exodus of Ottoman Christians and Greeks from Constantinople, and the Sultan himself decided that the moment had come to fly for his life.

121. On the afternoon of the 15th November, I was informed by General Harington that a Turk calling himself Zeki Bey had come to general Headquarters that morning and had stated that the Sultan, considering his life to be in danger, begged the general to assist him in escaping immediately from Constantinople. As His Majesty's Government in 1920 had given to the Sultan, through Admiral Sir John de Robeck, at that time British High Commissioner, a definite promise, which had been subsequently renewed, that the British Government would do their utmost to protect His Majesty's person in case of imminent danger, General Harington and I agreed that if the message was a genuine one, the request must be acceded to. His Majesty had in fact real cause for alarm. Since the abolition by the Grand National Assembly of the Sultanate and the subsequent overthrow of his Government, his position was an invidious one. Angora had even announced its decision to put him on trial, his Turkish guards had been changed by order of Refet Pasha, he could no longer count on the loyalty of his own servants, and the abandonment of the Allied intention to impose martial law in Constantinople had shown the inherent weakness of the Allied position in the city. By remaining any longer His Majesty could hope to serve neither his own interests nor those of his people.

122. Steps were accordingly taken to verify the authenticity of Zeki Bey's message. Once this had been established, the acting first dragoman accompanied by an aid-de-camp of General Harington, had a personal interview at a late hour in the night with Zeki Bey himself at Yildiz Palace, when it was arranged that His Majesty should leave in the early morning of the 17th November. On the 16th November General Harington received a personal letter from His Majesty, signing himself Caliph of the Mussulmans and stating that, considering his life to be in danger in Constantinople, he took refuge with the British Government and requested his transfer as soon as possible to another place. The plans for His Majesty's departure were most skilfully made by General Harington, and carried out without a hitch on the following morning. The Sultan, accompanied by his ten year old son, Ertogroul, and eight members of his suite left palace at 8 o'clock in the morning by the side door leading to the Yildiz Barracks, which were occupied at that time by a battalion of the Grenadier Guards. He was met there by Colonel Steele and the acting first dragoman and a company of the Grenadier Guards. The party was conveyed in two military motor ambulances to the naval base at Tophané where the Sultan was met by General Harington and myself, and accompanied thence to H.M.S.

"Malaya" where he was received with naval honours by Admiral Brock. By 9.30 a.m. His Majesty was well on the way to Malta in the "Malaya."

123. Before leaving and in thanking His Majesty's Government for the protection thus afforded to him, the Sultan made it quite clear that he had not abdicated, and that he did not intend to do so. In spite of the trying moments through which he must have passed, he was perfectly calm and composed, and showed considerable dignity. His departure had passed completely unobserved, and it is possible that the Angora Government was not unrelieved at this removal of an obstruction to its plans.

124. The Turkish press, probably by order, belittled the whole affair, but the Grand National Assembly lost no time on the 18th November in electing as Vahidettin's successor to the Caliphate (for which post he had disqualified himself by taking refuge with a non-moslem power) the legitimate heir, the Crown Prince Abdul Medjid. The latter was invested as Caliph of all the Mussulmans in Constantinople on the 24th November. The ceremony differed in one essential respect from that of the enthronement of past Turkish Sultans. The latter had invariably proceeded with much pomp and ceremony from the palace to the ancient sanctuary of Eyoub, where they were girded with the sword of Osman. In view of the abolition of the sultanate, this ancient ceremony was for the first time abandoned, its place being taken by one of a purely religious nature as befitting the elected head of the Moslem world. In no sense moreover, could His Majesty's reception by the population, though to a certain extent organised, be regarded as enthusiastic. The spectators must have realised that an elected Caliph was a mere figure-head, and that deprived of all temporal power he even did not exercise those spiritual powers, which are possessed by other religious chiefs. It is interesting to note that in spite of the abolition of the temporal power, the title of His Majesty is still used by the Nationalist Government in referring to the Caliph.

125. Refet Pasha might well have been content. In the space of a few weeks he had succeeded in overthrowing the Sultan's Government, in inducing the Sultan himself to take refuge in flight and in making good his claim, as against the Allies, to control the civil administration of Constantinople. Refet himself did not deny that the presence of the Allied troops in the city, textually recognised by the Mudania Convention, implied the enjoyment of certain rights inherent to the safety of those troops. But since the Allies refused to accede to the request for the withdrawal of their forces, Refet set to work to restrict those rights to their absolute minimum, and to acquire for himself as extensive a control as possible of the dual régime, Allied military and Turkish civil, which henceforward existed in the occupied territories.

126. By constant pressure the authority of the Allies in Constantinople was gradually and considerably curtailed. The Allied press censorship was abolished and assumed by Refet, in return for an undertaking that nothing would be published in the newspapers which was contrary to Allied prestige. The Allied military control of the Ottoman posts and telegraphs was abandoned, though maintained in spite of Turkish insistence, so far as the Eastern Telegraph Company was concerned, and the proceedings of the Allied military tribunals were suspended. But the most important issue was the question of police control. It was settled after prolonged discussion by a compromise which in itself constituted a further stage in Refet's programme. Under a verbal agreement all Ottoman subjects, Christian and Moslem alike, were subjected to the jurisdiction of the Turkish police though Allied subjects and neutrals, including Russians and Hellenes, were to continue to enjoy the protection of the Allied Police Commission. The inclusion of the latter was only obtained after strenuous opposition. A division of the population of Constantinople in this manner into Ottoman and non-Ottoman subjects was perhaps the only logical solution, once the principal of dual control had been conceded. The abandonment of the native Christians constituted nevertheless a humiliating surrender which was consummated on the 5th December, when after an incident which only just avoided developing into a serious conflict between a company of British marines and some hundreds of Refet's secret police and gendarmes, the Allies were compelled to admit that every Ottoman subject desirous of leaving Turkey must henceforward be supplied with a Turkish passport. Refet undertook however to make an exception for compromised Ottomans, in respect of whom he made with General Harington a special agreement, whereby up till the end of the year they could smuggled out of the country without reference to, or interference by, the Turkish authorities.

127. The successful accomplishment of this part of the task which he had set himself, enabled Refet to turn his activities to questions affecting Allied and foreign interests and to effect a serious breach in the principle of capitulatory privileges. Owing to the impossibility of obtaining unity among the Allies as to the methods to be employed in resisting encroachments, similar to those already effected in Smyrna, Refet's attempts achieved a large measure of success. The Turks again made no concealment of their intentions. The High Commissioners had addressed a strong protest to the Angora Government declining to recognise the validity of the measures introduced in Smyrna. Their protest merely elicited a reply from Raouf Bey, that the Grand National Assembly did not consider itself bound by capitulations, which had been incontestably and legally abolished, and which were not compatible with the rights appertaining to an independent State.

128. One of the first steps taken in Constantinople was the publication of an official notice calling upon foreign companies to register under the Turkish company Law of 1914, and thereby to subject themselves to all Turkish laws and regulations. It is true that as a result of protests made in Lausanne, as well as in Constantinople, the Turks agreed to the application of this law being postponed for three months. But the principle of the right to apply it was maintained by its mere postponement. Among other measures of the same character, which the Turks endeavoured to enforce, were the liability of foreigners to the payment of municipal taxes, the imposition of discriminatory sanitary taxes on foreign shipping, the insistence on a Turkish visa for foreigners coming to and leaving Constantinople, as well as a claim that foreign warships could not enter Turkish ports, and especially Smyrna as a fortified place, without complying with Turkish regulations on the subject.

129. Thus the year closed in Constantinople with the Allied High Commissioners and generals standing on the defensive and attempting to resist by written protests the accomplished facts, with which the Turks in a vigorous offensive were constantly presenting them. But words carried no conviction. Only forcible action could have availed to remedy this unfortunate state of affairs, but even His Majesty's Government were unwilling to resort to force if an incident were likely to be thereby created, which might lead to hostilities or, as a preliminary thereto, to the evacuation of Constantinople, the continued occupation of which they rightly held to be a trump card in the negotiations at Lausanne.

130. The situation at Lausanne, after six weeks of discussion, was equally unsatisfactory, and the chances of a rupture were multiplying. The Turks had gone to the conference with a very definite programme: the complete scrapping of the Treaty of Sèvres, a plebiscite for Western Thrace, the restoration of Mosul, the freedom of the Straits, but within the independence of Turkey and provided the safety of Constantinople were ensured, no military restrictions, no minority provisions other than those in the European treaties, no financial or economic control, no Capitulations but the full sovereignty and independence of Turkey; in a word, the National Pact in its entirety. The show of Allied unity and the appearance of a Balkan bloc had begun by disquieting the Turks, who had given way in respect of the plebiscite for Western Thrace. But the minority and Straits questions led to a crisis. The news was disturbing from Angora where the extremists were believed to have got the upper hand. Raouf Bey, in a truculent speech, had announced that by the army alone could Turkey obtain her legitimate aspirations. There were rumours of a Turkish rupture at the conference, of military preparations on an extensive scale in Anatolia. The 6th Corps was actually transferred from Smyrna, and concentrated at Balıkesir.

whence it could strike at either Ismid or the Chanak zone; there was even some movement of troops towards the Irak front. The year, in fact, ended with the noisy clank of Turkish sabre-rattling.

III. FOREIGN RELATIONS

131. The external policy of the National Government during 1922 was purely empirical. Its object was the realisation of the National Pact, and nothing but the entire National Pact, with the expulsion of the Greeks from Smyrna and the recognition by the Allies of the Government of Angora as the sole Government of Turkey as preliminary stages. Every other consideration was subordinate, and in its relations with other countries the National Government was guided solely by the extent to which foreign countries were obstacles in the way of, or could be made to serve, its purposes.

Great Britain.

132. The arch enemy was Great Britain. She was held to be responsible for the Treaty of Sèvres, the despatch of the Greeks to Smyrna and for all the ills which Turkey had suffered therefrom, for the occupation of Constantinople in March 1920, for the Malta deportations and for the alleged severity which was being exercised in the occupation. She was regarded as the opponent of any modification of the Paris March proposals, as the inconvenient champion of minorities and even as the supporter of the Sultanate, the abolition of which had become in 1922 one of the aims of Mustafa Kemal.

133. Though the feeling towards Great Britain was one of bitter hatred, it was tempered with a certain fear and respect. It was largely in order to satisfy their own sentiments on this score as well as to enhance its value, that the Kemalists proclaimed their victories over the Greeks in Asia Minor to be triumph over Great Britain. Nevertheless, the defeat of the Greeks seriously damaged British prestige, which had already been much diminished in Eastern countries in consequence of the harsh terms imposed on Moslem Turkey by the Treaty of Sèvres, and British partiality for Greece since the armistice. However harsh those terms, the Turks might yet have submitted to them if England had herself enforced them. But they furiously resented the use of the Greeks for this purpose, and were correspondingly elated when she proved incapable of saving her mercenaries from disaster. The fate of the Christian minorities in Turkey also was a severe blow to British prestige.

134. Great Britain regained some of her lost credit by the firm stand which she took after the fall of Smyrna. She alone was prepared to resist the advance of the victorious Turks towards the Straits and Europe. She proved her

determination in this respect by the despatch of troops and ships and material. She did not leave it to words to carry conviction, and the Turks, impressed by the only argument which they really understand, hesitated and stopped.

135. The effect of this display of force was salutary. The pro-British party in Turkey which had almost faded out of existence after the Treaty of Sèvres, began once more to take form. Even the most fervid Nationalists reflected on the magnitude of the task of reorganising Turkey which lay before them and on the importance of ensuring British goodwill. The fall of Mr. Lloyd George, which was regarded almost as the crowning triumph of the Nationalists, and the advent to power of the Conservative party in England with its traditions of Turkish friendship, encouraged the Turks to hope for a radical modification of British policy. The pre-eminent position filled by Lord Curzon at the Lausanne Conference had also struck the imagination of the Turks and did much to enhance British prestige. Before the year ended there were indications of a returning desire for British friendship, and a growing appreciation of the necessity of good relations with Great Britain, if only for the sake of the financial assistance which she could provide.

136. But the hatred of Britain has taken deep root since the Mudros armistice. It is allied to a distrust which Turkey never felt before 1915, and British consent to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia. Too many prominent Turks suffered, either as Malta deportees or in other ways, as the result of British policy during and since the war for Turkey soon to forget. Turkish policy both politically and commercially is likely to be appreciably influenced thereby for many years to come. Moreover it is doubtful whether Turkish professions of friendship can ever be sincere, as long as Angora dreams of a pan-Islamic union with Turkish hegemony.

France.

137. Nationalist relations with France during 1922 ran an entirely contrary course to those with Great Britain. During the greater part of the year the relations between Angora and Paris may almost be described as friendly. M. Franklin-Bouillon had sown the seed of Allied discord when he signed his agreement in 1921. That seed was Angora's opportunity, and the Nationalist Government assiduously laboured it to grow. Nationalist statesmen such as Yussuf Kemal and Fethi Beys in the course of their visits to Paris were profuse in promises. All facilities were granted to Colonel Mougin who was sent to Angora in June, nominally to represent General Gouraud for the purpose of supervising the execution of certain provisions of the Cilician agreement, but in fact as the unofficial representative of the French government. Angora had its own unofficial representative in Paris, Ferid Bey.

138. The friendliness of the Nationalist Government was entirely justified. Throughout the year the French Government was the catspaw of Mustafa Kemal. Literary Frenchmen visited Constantinople and made themselves supremely ridiculous by the grotesque and slavish eulogisms of everything that was Turkish. The principal of these, Claude Farrère, was even granted an interview with Mustafa Kemal at Ismid, whither he was conveyed in a French warship. Later at the height of the September crises, first General Pellé and afterwards M. Franklin-Bouillon met Mustafa Kemal at Smyrna. Their rôle was practically to intercede, and the effect of their interviews was profoundly detrimental to the Allied cause in general. The fact was that the French Government were obsessed by the fear of Moslem troubles in their north African colonies and were prepared to go to any length of subservience and to swallow any humiliation rather than risk the possibility of a conflict or even incur the animosity of the Turks.

139. Their truckling to Angora did not avail them, and the Nationalists showed no sign of gratitude when, their aims being in a fair way of achievement, French friendship became no longer indispensable. The attitude of the Kemalists, after their victory, towards institutions in Smyrna and Mersina, caused grave disillusionment to the French, first in the Near East where it was better understood from the beginning that conciliation is always regarded by the Turks as weakness, and later even in Paris. The French Government was obliged to warn Angora that unless it changed its methods, it would no longer be able to count on French support at Lausanne. The Turks resented what they regarded as a *volte-face* and France by the end of the year had lost much of liking which was certainly felt for her at the beginning.

Italy.

140. Italy had never shown any special hostility to Turkey. The sympathies of the mass of the nation, hating Greece, were entirely on the side of Mustafa Kemal. She was never regarded with more than indifference by the Turks, who were well aware that her sole objective in Turkey was to secure economic advantages for herself. The prospect of these was held out to her with a view to serve the useful purpose, from the Nationalist point of view, of still further splitting up Allied unity. The military equipment supplied to the Nationalists from Italian sources was however, gratefully received, and the more vigorous attitude of M. Mussolini, when he came into power in November, created a certain impression upon the Turks.

Other Countries.

141. With the rest of Europe, with the exception of Russia, Angora's contacts were very slight. The United States however, were active and manifestly

desirous of pushing American trade in Turkey. An American consular agent, Mr. Imbrie, took up his residence in a railway truck at Angora, and the commercial secretary of the American High Commission in Constantinople was sent there on a mission with the avowed object of investigating the commercial possibilities of Anatolia. The Turks for their part, inspired by no mistrust of obscure political aims, showed an evident willingness to favour the development of American enterprise in the country, but the persistent efforts of the American High Commissioner to foster these beginnings were greatly handicapped by the Yowell revelations, which placed Admiral Bristol in the difficult position of having, by his attitude towards them, to antagonise one or other of the two sections, commercial, and educational and missionary, of the American community in Turkey.

142. In no form was the empiricism of the foreign policy of the Nationalists more strikingly demonstrated than in the case of their relations with Soviet Russia during 1922. During 1921 Turkey had been most entirely dependent on Russia for moral and material support. At the beginning of 1922 Turkish policy had a strong Russian orientation, but never to the extent of allowing Moscow to dictate to Angora. So long as Turkey had need of Soviet money and military equipment, the Russian alliance was the keystone of Angora's foreign policy. The alliance was, however, purely one of convenience, with enmity to the Western Powers as the common link, and the two were never happily married. Already, in 1921, the conclusion of the Angora treaty with France had created much misgiving in the mind of Russia. The quarrel was patched up owing to the anxiety of Angora to reinsure with Russia before the meeting of the Allied conference in Paris, which had then been fixed for January, and Russo-Turkish friendship was reaffirmed by the despatch of Aralov to Angora as Soviet Ambassador.

143. Aralov's influence was predominant at Angora during the first half of the year. He had undoubtedly great ability, and his activities were favoured by the breakdown of the Genoa Conference in the late spring. There was even a rumour of the conclusion of a Russo-Turkish offensive and defensive alliance, and the entry of Turkey into the Russo-German orbit.

144. But Turkey never abandoned her liberty of action, and in her dealings with Russia, friction was never wholly absent. There was Moslem propaganda in the Caucasus and Communist propaganda in Anatolia. Both countries resented the activities of the other in this respect, though Aralov succeeded in obtaining permission for the Turkish Communist newspaper, "Yeni Dünya," which had been suppressed, to reappear. There were mutual concentrations of troops on the Trans-caucasian frontier, and there was a serious incident in Moscow. For some time past, relations between the Turkish

Ambassador and the Moscow Government had been none too cordial, and in May Soviet agents invaded the Embassy, seized the Turkish cyphers and even arrested some of the members of his staff. Ali Fuad Pasha was recalled to Angora, and until September, Turkish interests in Russia were in charge of Riza Nour Bey, who chanced to be in Moscow on a special mission. But Turkey was still unwilling to risk the substance of the Russian alliance for the shadow of Western support, and the incident was closed by an expression of regret on the part of Aralov.

145. It was not until the victory over the Greeks had been consummated, that the Angora Government felt itself strong enough openly to resist Russian pressure. There is no doubt that, in order to serve Soviet ends, Moscow, at the time of Mudania, put forth all his influence with a view to driving the Turks to push matters to extremes. A new treaty of alliance was even proposed to the Nationalists Government. But Russian policy received its first real set-back on that occasion, and, by the end of the year, Turkey seemed to be reflecting on the desirability of abandoning her Russian orientation in favour of the renewal of better relations with the Western Powers.

146. The friendly relations which Nationalist Turkey cultivated with Moslem countries were on a different footing from those with Russia. From them little or no material support had been received or was to be anticipated. Their moral support, was however, valuable, particularly in order to bring pressure to bear on Great Britain by means of a pan-Islamic agitation. This was particularly noticeable in India, where the Greek policy of His Majesty's Government had provoked unrest and dissatisfaction, and induced the Moslems to make common cause with the Hindus against the British 'raj'. It was also the case in Persia, whose adoption of political pan-Islamism was necessary as the essential connecting link between Islam of Turkey and the West, and Islam of Central Asia and India.

147. During the year repeated efforts were made, chiefly under the aegis of Russia, in the direction of Turco-Persian-Afghan alliance, up to the beginning of 1923, the negotiations had not reached any definite conclusion. Distinct progress was, however made towards the opening of official diplomatic relations between Angora and Tehran. The first step in this direction was taken in June 1922, with the arrival at Angora of Mumtaz-ed-Dowleh, who had for some time before been engaged on a mission to the Caucasian republics at Tiflis. This event caused considerable dissatisfaction in the Persian Embassy at Constantinople, to which Isaac Khan had just been appointed as Ambassador. The latter, at the time, professed himself as ignorant of the nature of the mission entrusted to Mumtaz-ed-Dowleh, who, however, it appears established, did present to Mustafa Kemal credentials as Ambassador Extraordinary. Much

capital was made of this by the Nationalist press, banquets were given in honour of the newly-arrived envoy, and the representatives at Angora of the various Eastern States once more proclaimed their solidarity and community of purpose.

148. At the same time the Angora Government were overtly dabbling in petty subversive intrigue in Persia, through the instrumentality of Simko, Lahudi Khan and others, and in spite of the warm reception accorded to Mumtaz-ed-Dowleh, his mission achieved little beyond arranging for the despatch to Tehran of a fully accredited Kemalist representative in the person of Muhieddin Pasha.

149. The relations of the Nationalist Government of Turkey with Afghanistan had already been regulated by the Treaty of Alliance concluded between the representatives of the two countries at Moscow on the 1st March, 1921. This treaty had been ratified by Angora on the 21st July, 1921, but ratification by Afghanistan was delayed until October 1922. In the meantime, each country sent diplomatic representatives to the capital of the other and the friendship and solidarity of the two peoples was publicly proclaimed. Turkish military officers, including the active Bedri Bey, were already in Afghanistan, and in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, other officer instructors were also sent by Angora in the early summer of 1922.

150. Early in 1922, Djemal Pasha, who had proceeded to Kabul on a military mission in 1920, visited Germany and France for the purpose of purchasing war material for the Afghan army. Some time later Mustafa Kemal himself proposed to send Djemal to Afghanistan, but difficulties were raised by Moscow, and eventually it was learnt that the Ameer would only permit Djemal's return as a private individual, and subject to a proviso that he would not dabble in politics. The question was never put to the test, as Djemal was assassinated in Tiflis in July.

151. Abdurrahman Bey, the first Kemalist envoy to Afghanistan, did not, it appears, possess the full status of an Ambassador, which was however, accorded to his successor, Fahri Pasha, the defender of Medina and one of the Malta deportees, who proceeded to Kabul in the latter part of April. Throughout the year Afghanistan's interests at Angora were in the hands of Sultan Ahmed Khan. Diplomatic intercourse between the two countries has been confined almost entirely to the exchange of complimentary speeches. On the other hand, unofficial Kemalist agents in Afghanistan were actively disseminating pan-Islamic propaganda, but these were also somewhat fettered, more particularly towards the end of the year, when the Ameer remained the only important Moslem prince with full temporal power. Even though the spiritual leadership

of Turkey had been recognised in the Turco-Afghan Treaty, the Ameer was, therefore, a possible rival to the puppet Caliph at Constantinople, for recognition as the supreme head of the Moslem world.

152. Little mention need be made of Nationalist Turkey's relations with the Caucasian States, with which the Treaty of Kars had been concluded on the 13th October, 1921. This treaty was ratified by Azerbaijan on the 3rd March, by Armenia on the 20th March, and by Georgia on the 4th April. These States were however, becoming more and more subject to the orders of Moscow, by whom their foreign relations were almost entirely controlled.

153. In February Ghalib Pasha was appointed Kemalist Ambassador at Bokhara, and it appears that his appointment received the approval of the Russian Ambassador at Angora. He left for his post early in April, accompanied by the so-called representatives of Bokhara, and when passing through Castamouni, seized the opportunity to deliver a speech, in which he significantly included Russia among the oppressed oriental peoples, and alluded to the growing strength of the Islamic world. Ghalib Pasha eventually arrived at Bokhara, but on the receipt of an intimation from Enver Pasha that he would not be allowed to stay in that town, he abandoned his mission and returned to Angora early in July.

154. In the meantime Hamdullah Suphi Bey, a pan-Turanian idealist and an ex-Minister of Public Instruction in the Nationalist Government, had, during March, left Angora for Turkestan, ostensibly for the purpose of archeological study. Even less success attended his mission, however, than that of Ghalib Pasha, as the Bolsheviks refused to permit his entry into the Caucasus. The Nationalist Government maintained a complete silence regarding the failure of both missions, but, so far as is known, did not again during the year broach the question of the despatch of a representative to the Government of Bokhara. The exact rôle played by Enver Pasha in and about the borders of that State and the circumstances of his end have remained obscure.

155. The representation of the Government of Azerbaijan at Angora was throughout the year entrusted to Ibrahim Abilov, who never ceased to figure prominently in the accounts of functions held at Angora to demonstrate the solidarity of Nationalist Turkey with the nations of the East. Even his position was however, for some time in doubt, as during May he was appointed Minister of Public Instruction in his own country, and the press announced that he would shortly leave Angora. The same announcement significantly added that no successor to Abilov would be appointed, but that the Soviet Ambassador would discharge the duties of representative in the name of the Caucasian Federation. This report doubtless emanated from Russian sources, which desired Abilov's

recall owing to the belief that he was endeavouring to negotiate a Turco-Azerbaijan Agreement behind the backs of the Bolsheviks. Assisted by the part which he played in the settlement of the quarrel between Angora and Moscow over the Ali Fuad Pasha incident, however, Abilov was able to maintain his position, and on the 21st June the Azerbaijan Government issued a communiqué categorically denying its reported intention of abolishing its representation in Turkey.

156. As regard the Nationalist Government's relations with the Ukraine, the only events of note hinged on the treaty signed by the representatives of the two Governments, at Angora, on the 2nd January. Great importance was attached by Angora to this event, which it was hoped would dissipate any idea that relations with Soviet Russia were strained. There was in fact, little doubt that the Ukraine representative was acting as much for Russia as for his own country, and that the main object of his mission was to reconsolidate Russo-Turkish relations.

157. The treaty itself was on all fours with the Treaty of Moscow between Nationalist Turkey and Russia, and in general principles with that of Kars between Turkey and the Caucasian republics, and by a special clause the provisions of these two instruments were accepted by the Government of the Ukraine. The conclusion of further conventions relating to economic, telegraphic, postal and consular matters was envisaged, each party undertook to prevent revolutionary propaganda against the other, and the establishment of diplomatic relations on the ratification of the treaty was provided for. It was further stipulated that the exchange of ratifications should take place at Kharkov within a period of three months, and that thereafter the treaty was to be definitely in force. The treaty was ratified by Ukraine on the 22nd March, and ratifications were exchanged at Kharkov on the 24th June.

158. So far as is known, diplomatic relations were never established between the two countries, but in the critical days of autumn, when Angora desired to be reassured in regard to Roumania, the Nationalist Government enquired whether the Ukraine would be prepared to guarantee her against an attack from that quarter. The reply eventually received was regarded by Angora as unsatisfactory, as it enlarged on the difficulties to be encountered in undertaking military operations during the winter months. The Ukraine Government did however, promise to exert as much pressure as possible on Roumania with a view to preventing her from interfering to the detriment of Turkey.

IV. INTERNAL POLITICS

159. For ten months of the year there existed two Governments in Turkey, a *de facto* Government at Angora, and the Government of the Sultan, which the Allies treated as the *de jure* Government, at Constantinople. The latter merely existed in virtue of the Allied occupation, maintained physically by the bayonets of the Allied troops, morally by the support of the Allied High Commissioners, and financially through the efforts, albeit unwelcome, of the Provisional Financial Commission. It sank gradually into greater impotence and deeper financial embarrassment. Its struggle for existence virtually ended at Mudania. Its continuance thereafter merely constituted a complication in the way of the meeting of the Peace Conference. The Allied policy which had upheld it was bankrupt. Angora was bent on its destruction. Its position was clearly untenable. Finally, on the 4th November, three days after the decree of the Grand National Assembly abolishing the Sultanate, Tewfik Pasha, the last of the long succession of Grand Viziers, resigned his office, and Constantinople became a simple administrative district of the new Turkish State.

160. The internal situation at Angora was governed by two main factors: the personal ambitions of Mustafa Kemal, and the necessity for absolute unity at home if the victory abroad was to be won. In the face of external pressure, internal dissensions were as far as possible relegated to the background. But to a certain extent friction was unavoidable between a Grand National Assembly, increasing jealous of its own prerogatives, and Mustafa Kemal, firmly determined to impose his personal authority.

161. The proceedings at the end of 1921 had already revealed the existence of a decided opposition to the Ghazi Pasha. Roughly speaking there appeared to be three parties at Angora, Kemalists, Enverites and Sultanites. Reouf Bey, who was at that time Minister for Public Works, and Refet Pasha, Minister for National Defence, had resigned. The ostensible reason given for these resignations was that of health, but it was believed that Reouf at any rate had broken with Kemal in consequence of the latter's policy towards the Sultan Caliph.

162. Nevertheless, so long as the main purpose of the Nationalist Government was not accomplished, the Turks showed a singular capacity for sinking their political differences, and Mustafa Kemal a marvellous ingenuity for reconstruction and adaptation. Reouf Bey returned to the fold and was reabsorbed as Vice-President of the Grand National Assembly, and Refet Pasha was to emerge again later as Military High Commissioner for Eastern Thrace.

163. Mustafa Kemal himself was re-elected President of the Grand National Assembly in February, but in April there was a further epidemic of resignations. There were scarcely of importance from the point of view of foreign policy, but they indicated a state of internal political unrest, and showed that the Assembly was none too submissive to the Ghazi's control. There was some delay of filling the vacancies caused by these resignations, but ultimately one of the outgoing Ministers, Hassan Bey, was reinstated as Vekil for Economic Affairs, his former portfolio of Finance being given to Hassan Fehmi Bey. In May, Kemal was reaffirmed, though not by a unanimous vote, as Commander-in-Chief, for a further period of three months.

164. The position remained unchanged till July when the adoption by the Assembly of a new law whereby all Ministers were to be directly appointed by it, induced the entire Government to resign in a body. The law constituted a curtailment of the powers which Kemal had hitherto exercised in this respect. Anti-Kemalist risings about this time at Konia and Bolu, though suppressed without much trouble, were further evidence of the difficulty which he was finding in preserving his ascendancy.

165. The Assembly had, in virtue of the new law, the opportunity of confirming or annulling the mandates of the former Ministers. But July was a month of external crisis, and the Assembly was still faithful, above all, to the yet unrealised National Pact. It re-elected practically all the members of the old Cabinet. Nevertheless, there was one important change. Reouf Bey, Mustafa Kemal's most serious rival, became President of the Council, a position hitherto nominally held by Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of General Staff. Mustafa Kemal was prolonged, this time indefinitely, as Commander-in-Chief, but at the same time the Assembly reserved to itself the right to withdraw the powers thus conferred, whenever it chose to do so. The July crisis between Kemal and the Assembly may, in fact, be said to have ended with honours easy.

166. The Turkish victories over the Greeks, the recapture of Smyrna and the attainment of the primary Nationalist war aim, the total expulsion of the Greeks from Asia Minor, greatly enhanced Kemal's popularity with the army and consequently the strength of his position at Angora. Ismet Pasha, one of his most devoted adherents, was sent to Mudania as the Nationalist representative and shortly afterwards appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, in place of Yussuf Kemal Bey.

167. All opposition was for the moment disarmed, and the Ghazi Pasha promptly seized, as it was inevitable that he should do, the opportunity for furthering his personal ambitions. A docile Assembly decreed on the 1st November the abolition of the Sultanate and the temporal power of the Caliph,

and thereby removed from Kemal's path the only existing obstacle between himself and the supreme position in the State. Such an upheaval of the old order of things was, however, not likely to meet with general satisfaction. The decision added greatly to the number of his secret enemies: nor was it accepted without overt disapproval. Abdullah Azmi Effendi, the Minister for Religious Affairs, resigned from the Cabinet. He was succeeded by Hodja Mehmet Vehbi Effendi, who presumably was found more accomodating in respect of the strict tenets of Islamic law.

168. With this accession of strength to encourage it, the opposition to Kemal grew bolder. It even came out into the open in connection with a new election law which was submitted to the Assembly in December. Under this law, as originally framed, all persons born outside the National Pact frontiers or not possessing a five year's domiciliary qualification, could not be elected as Deputies to the Assembly. Kemal himself would thereunder have been excluded from re-election. The law was ultimately amended, but the very fact that it was submitted, with such obvious intention, to the Assembly was significant.

169. But, in spite of the fact that personal animosities and the jealousies of a young and doctrinaire Assembly have proved a drag on the wheel of his ambitions, the will of Mustafa Kemal has continued to dominate at Angora throughout the year. He was favoured by the successful issue of the policy which he incarnates. Every further turn of that wheel will however add to the number of his enemies. So long as Turkey is exposed to danger from without, it may be possible to stifle internal trouble. Yet it is difficult to believe that the clash can ultimately be avoided or to foresee its outcome. There is this much to be said for Kemal. He has shown himself a consummate master of his own destiny as well as of that of Turkey. The only form of Government which the Turk understands is the immediate personal one, and if Turkey is to be governed by one man, there is no rival so fitted to govern her as Mustafa Kemal.

V. PAN-ISLAMISM

170. The liberation as a result of the war of the Arab countries from Turkish domination appeared to have split the Islamic world. Yet the pan-Islamic idea provided the chief weapon whereby Nationalist Turkey sought to attach the Eastern States to herself. A certain success had already, at the beginning of 1922, been achieved in Persia, India and Egypt, while the treaty concluded by Turkey with Afghanistan in 1921 recognised the leadership of Turkey in the Islamic world.

171. Russia also saw advantages to be gained from an Islamic union, which she might be able to direct both as a means of pressure on Western Europe, and

as a check on the activities of Enver Pasha in Bokhara and Turkestan, which at the beginning of the year were considerably disturbing the Soviet Government. The only stipulation made by Russia in return for her support was the inclusion of Afghanistan in the union. Her motive in this was, no doubt, to strengthen her hold on this country as a base for the propaganda campaign in India and for her schemes of territorial expansion in Central Asia. The Angora Government only accepted the Russian stipulation with reluctance, for it saw in the Ameer of Afghanistan a possible rival for supremacy in the Islamic world.

172. At the beginning of the year the Nationalist Government was actively canvassing the convocation of a pan-Islamic Congress at Angora in March. At first it was desired that only the Moslem countries of Asia and the Caucasus should participate, but subsequently invitations were issued to representatives of all Moslem countries. Some Moslem notables did in fact arrive at Angora but finding that discussion was likely to turn on such questions as changes in connection with the Caliphate, they pleaded incompetence in such weighty matters and the Congress did not take place.

173. Following the abandonment of the March Congress, there was much talk, chiefly at the instigation of Russia, of a pan-Asiatic Congress to be held either in Moscow or in Angora. This too failed to materialise. In July however, the question was again broached, and a series of meetings of leading Kemalists, together with the Afghan, Persian and Azerbaijan representatives was held at Angora. The Sheikh Senoussi, who throughout the year was one of the most active of the Kemalists pan-Islamic propagandists, did not himself attend these meetings, but it is understood that he was consulted at every stage of the discussions. No agreement could, however, be reached as to the venue of the congress, and although fitful rumours as to the imminence of other such meetings have from time to time cropped up, all idea of the convocation of a universal Islamic Congress appears to have been postponed.

174. Meanwhile the Russians, finding it increasingly difficult to impose their will on Anatolia, began to realise that pan-Islamism, of which they had hoped to make an instrument, might equally be used to their detriment. They therefore proceeded to suppress the Turkish Propaganda Committees at Baku, Bokhara, Samarkhand and Khiva and initiated in Anatolia a vigorous, though to a large extent fruitless, Communist propaganda campaign which was directed by the Propaganda Bureau at Tiflis. Russian assistance was likewise given to a number of young Moslems in Transcaucasia, who preached Bakkaism or "Modern Mohammedanism" under the aegis of Stalin.

175. The proclamation of the 1st November by which the Angora Government decreed the abolition of the temporal power of the Caliphate, has

been dealt with elsewhere in this report. Such an assertion of the absolute predominance of the Grand National Assembly in the Moslem world was not at first readily accepted even in Turkey, and still less so in other Moslem States, whilst Shia opinion was frankly hostile. The flight however, on the 17th November of Sultan Mehmet VI, his subsequent disposition by the Turkish Government and the election of Abdul Mejid, the Heir Apparent, to the dignity of the Caliphate, shorn of all temporal attributes, did much to placate the dissatisfied elements of Orthodox Islam and by the end of the year the great bulk of Sunni opinion tended already to accept the *fait accompli*.

VII. RUSSIANS IN CONSTANTINOPLE

189. The past year had witnessed a steady advance towards a solution of the problem of Russian refugees in Constantinople, whose numbers had been reduced by November to about 28,000, of whom 8,000 had permanent and 15,000 temporary employment. These results are due in the main to the energetic handling of the question by the local commission of the League of Nations under the able direction of Colonel Procter and Mr. Childs, to which added impulse was given by the visit of Sir Samuel Hoare early in the year.

190. Whilst the League of Nations' principal efforts has been directed towards evacuation of the refugees to countries lending themselves more favourably than Turkey to the absorption of this class, the actual maintenance of Russians having no means of livelihood continued until the 1st July to be undertaken by the "International Relief Fund," which enjoyed some measure of State assistance in the form of surplus army stores handed over to it by the Disposals Board. The American Red Cross too, despite its declared withdrawal from this work, gave considerable help both in caring for the sick and infirm and by evacuation of valid refugees. Useful work has also been done by a British organisation, the "Russian Relief and Reconstruction Fund," which founded and has conducted with success a school for Russian children in the Imperial Russian Embassy at Buyukdéré.

191. The principal difficulties to be overcome have been those of finance. In July the "International Relief Fund," was compelled to cease work for lack of funds. American relief organisations, however, again lent their assistance and, besides undertaking direct relief work, were able to make up the balance of the £30,000 required by the League of Nations for evacuation of refugees, towards which His Majesty's Government had made a contingent grant of £10,000.

192. As regards the direct British interests involved: Tuzla camp was finally liquidated in May by the grant of a small bonus to the remaining

refugees and their evacuation by the League of Nations to various destinations outside Turkey.

193. The liability of His Majesty's Government in respect of the refugees removed to Serbia from the camps in Lemnos, Egypt and Cyprus was terminated in the course of the year by the grant of a lump sum to the League of Nations which has now assumed the responsibility for their future maintenance.

194. The only question of this nature which still remains outstanding is that of ultimate compensation for the requisitions effected in 1919-20 by the three Governments in the 'Princes' Islands with a view to lodging the refugees evacuated from Odessa and Novorossisk. This matter can only be disposed of when an agreement has been reached between the Allies as to what scale of compensation, if any, is to be paid.

VIII. THE OECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE

195. In the face of much intrigue and dissension, the Veniselist faction achieved a distinct success by the election of Mgr. Meletios Metaxakis as Oecumenical Patriarch on the 18th December, 1921. The Turkish Government, however, declined to recognise the validity of the election, and in January 1922 the Allied High Commissioners were instructed to maintain purely informal and unofficial relations with Mgr. Meletios, and, as far as possible, to deal only with the patriarchate as an institution. Though several attempts were made, both before and after the enthronement of Mgr. Meletios, to induce the High Commissioners, and more particularly the British High Commissioner, to modify their attitude, these were all unsuccessful and relations were maintained on that basis throughout the year. In February, however, much interest was aroused by an official visit paid to the patriarchate by the Apostolic delegate, in order to return thanks for the former's condolences on the occasion of the death of the Pope. This was stated to have been the first visit of its kind made since the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

196. Mgr. Meletios was enthroned as Patriarch on the 6th February, none of the Allied High Commissioners being represented at the ceremony. From the beginning, his position was beset with difficulties, for, in addition to his non-recognition by the Turkish Government, and to the sentence of destitution pronounced on him by the Church in Greece, which was subsequently confirmed by the Greek Government, acute divisions existed in higher church circles and in the ranks of the Ottoman Greeks themselves. He realised, however, that these dissensions, were inimical to the interests of Hellenism, and sought to further the union of the Constantinist and Veniselist factions, and

thereby to consolidate his own position. By the end of April a certain success had attended his efforts. He had received the recognition of the Patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch, and the Patriarch of Alexandria alone held out. Independence had been accorded to the Church in Serbia, and of the seven bishops who had refused to participate in the patriarchal election, one had already made his submission, while negotiations with the others were actively in progress. These, however, eventually proved fruitless and little further advance towards reunion was ever effected.

197. In the meantime, the attention of the Patriarch had been, and was, in the following months, increasingly directed towards events in Asia Minor, where the Micrasiatic movement of resistance to evacuation was widely supported. There is no doubt that the Patriarch was in warm sympathy with the movement, and in close touch with its leaders. During May he delivered in Constantinople a series of speeches, in which he called for a united Christian front against the Moslems, protested against the proposed restoration of Smyrna to the Turks, and incited the Greek population of Ionia to resist evacuation. As such utterances were calculated to inflame Moslem fanaticism, and, at the same time, to expose Greeks in other parts of Turkey to the worst reprisals, an inflammation was conveyed by the British High Commissioner to the Patriarch that his liberty of action in Constantinople was due only to the presence of the Allied forces, and that that liberty should not, therefore, be abused. This warning had the desired effect, and for the future Mgr. Meletios ceased to play any active part on the political stage, which was so fundamentally changed by the events of the autumn.

198. Throughout the year, the question of the jurisdiction of the patriarchate and the execution of its decisions engaged the attention of the Allied High Commissioners. As a result of the ill-considered action of the patriarchate in severing, in the early days of the armistice, all relations with the Turkish Government, the Turkish authorities refused to recognise these decisions, for the execution of which, in the case of Ottoman Greeks, the patriarchate became dependent, from September, on the Allied Police Commission. The new arrangement was, however, shortlived, for with the fall of the Constantinople Government in November, the Allied authorities ceased to exercise any control over Turkish subjects. From then onwards, the patriarchate endeavoured to adapt itself to the changed situation. To his own flock the Patriarch counselled patience and discouraged panic, while he appealed to the Turks to forgive and forget. He continued however, to uphold his rights of Oecumenical Patriarch as against those of a Patriarch of the "Orthodox Turks", and thus, in a situation alike menacing to himself, to his office and to his

people, he showed an undoubted courage, which was, at the same time, combined with a certain pathetic dignity.

IX. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS

199. The period under review is remarkable for its two distinct phases:

Phase I.

- (A) The régime of the Central Government in Constantinople.
- (B) The Greek Administration in occupied territory.
- (C) The Nationalist régime, or that of the Grand National Assembly of Angora.

Phase II.

The establishment of the Nationalist régime, or that of the Grand National Assembly in Constantinople.

Phase I.

200. The task of the Allies in maintaining the administrative machinery of the Central Government has not been an easy one. The High Commissioners were not only obliged to take steps, through the Provisional Financial Control Commission, to ensure the payment of salaries in connection with essential services, but also to consider and take such steps as were thought advisable with regard to sanitation, food supplies, relief and other measures connected with the administration and the welfare of the capital, besides safeguarding the commercial and other interests of their nationals.

201. As the activities of the Nationalist party increased, those of the Central Government diminished, especially in so far as frank co-operation with the Allies was concerned. Much passive resistance was manifested against any scheme involving the slightest shade of Allied control, even when such a scheme was inspired in the interests of the Turkish Administration itself. The resistance was particularly apparent in questions interesting the work of the Provisional Financial Control Commission, in the promulgation of laws and in matters governing municipal surveillance.

202. The Allies were also faced with many intricate matters arising out of the continued occupation by the Greeks of large tracts of country in Anatolia and Thrace. This occupation not only affected the food supply of the capital, owing to the numerous difficulties put in the way of commercial traffic between

Constantinople and Anatolian ports, but also the interests of the Ottoman Public Debt, and commerce in general.

(A) *The régime of the Central Government at Constantinople.*

203. Among the several economic questions that have been dealt with were:

(1) *The Drafting of a Law Governing the Storage of Inflammable Liquids.*

This law which was drawn up by a mixed commission, consisting of the Allied and Associated delegates on the Advisory Trade Committee, a delegate of the Prefecture and of the Ottoman Public Debt, together with delegates of the Standard Oil Company of New York and the Asiatic Petroleum Company, was submitted to the Sublime Porte and to the prefect of the city. Notwithstanding that the law was drawn up to provide for up-to-date conditions for the storage of inflammable liquids in and about Constantinople, the Turkish authorities remained passive to the pressure brought to bear by the Allied High Commissioners with a view to promulgating the law, owing, no doubt, to the ever-growing shadow of Angora looming in the background.

(2) *Storage of Inflammable Liquids in Barges Afloat.*

This question was the subject of much discussion, and it was finally decided that in the draft law referred to governing the storage of inflammable liquids, a delay of three months, to date from the promulgation of the law, should be granted in order to enable firms importing and storing inflammable liquids afloat, to take the necessary steps for erecting installations for the storage of such liquids ashore. In view of the Government's attitude in abstaining from promulgating the law, the Allied High Commissioners finally decided to fix the 15th October last as the time limit for all storage afloat.

On the expiration of the delay, a limited number of barges were hauled up by their owners and placed within cemented enclosures. In this way some firms found it possible to continue their work whilst conforming to the new conditions. Firms which were unable to dispose of their stocks stored afloat in barges within the time limit were obliged to remove their barges from their anchorage in the Bosphorus to special berths in the Marmora which were allotted to them until such time as their stocks could be reasonably disposed of.

(3) *The Itfai Tax (fire Tax).*

Towards the end of the financial year 1921 a mixed commission, consisting of the delegates of the Advisory Trade Commission, of the

municipality and fire insurance companies, revised a scheme drawn up by the late prefect of the town, Djelal Bey, providing for the institution of a "fire tax," the proceeds of which were to be affected to the entire reorganisation of the fire brigade of the city, the purchase of a number of modern fire-engines, hoses, &c., repairs to and establishment of new fire stations.

This tax was to be derived from (1) a contribution by fire insurance companies to the prefecture, and (2) an annual payment on a sliding scale to be levied on all landed proprietors in the town.

This scheme did not mature owing to the fact that the insurance companies interested in the matter insisted on participating in the administration of the sums levied to this effect, a participation which the Turks persisted in refusing.

(4) *Municipal Taxes.*

A record of this question as it stood at the end of the previous year was furnished in the annual report for 1921. It was found impossible to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement owing to the Central Government's opposition to any form of Allied control or surveillance. Every effort was made by the authorities concerned to find a loophole whereby they might revert to their previous opposition. This attitude was due, as already stated, to municipal changes and to the Central Government's growing fear of Angora. Negotiations were still in progress when the Greek *débâcle* in Anatolia occurred. Allied subjects, however, did not pay any of these taxes up to the end of this year.

(5) *Taxes.*

The mixed commission referred to in the annual report for 1921, which sat at the Sublime Porte under the presidency of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and was composed of representatives of the Allied and Associated High Commissioners and of the Ottoman Public Debt, examined several draft laws governing taxes.

The new taxes referred to in the annual report for 1921 came into force in April 1922. These taxes consisted of-

(1) A luxury tax of 15 per cent. on the net rental value of tea shops, coffee houses, bars, restaurants, public kitchens, "pâtisseries et confiseries."

(2) 30 per cent. on the net rental value of the same establishments possessing orchestras as well as on music and dancing halls and certain clubs.

- (3) 100 per cent. on net rental value of brothels.
- (4) 10 per cent. on the value of theatre tickets, circus tickets and entrance tickets to race courses and similar places of entertainment.

Several amendments to existing laws were made in connection with revenue ceded to the Ottoman Public Debt. These amendments provided for-

- (a) A ten-fold increase in the cost of fishing licences in the area of Constantinople and its neighbourhood.
- (b) A five-fold increase in the fishing licences in other areas.
- (c) A five-fold increase in the cost of sponge and coral fishing licences.
- (d) A five-fold increase in the cost of licences to sell tobacco and tombak.
- (e) A dry stamp duty of ten per cent. on skins.
- (f) A five-fold increase in the stamp law rates.

Some difficulties were encountered in the collection of the new taxes under 1, 2, 3 and 4, but arrangements were made by the High Commissioners that the Allied police should assist in the collection of these taxes in cases where Allied subjects remained passive to the appeals of the Turkish revenue collectors.

(6) *Control of Drugs.*

Draft regulations governing the control of drugs, submitted by the Sublime Porte and revised by the Urban Sanitary Commission, were approved of by the Allied and Associated High Commissioners in so far as Allied and Associated subjects were concerned. These regulations provide for a control on the sale of drugs, such as cocaine, morphine, &c.

(7) *Customs.*

Many claims and complaints in connection with ordinary customs matters arising out of the application of the *ad valorem* régime last year were dealt with by direct liaison with the customs. Payments of duty in kind were not frequent, and the mixed commission referred to in last year's annual report, which was instituted for the purpose of settling difficulties between merchants and the customs in connection with such payments, was rarely called upon.

(B) Influence of the Greek Administration on the Economic Situation

204. The Greek occupation of large tracts of Anatolia and Thrace directly affected commercial enterprise, the proper collection of revenue ceded to the Ottoman Public Debt, the food supply of the capital and economic conditions in general. The Allied High Commissioners were obliged on more than one occasion to make urgent representations to the Greek authorities in connection with the transport to Greece of the entire grain crop of Thrace; the activities of the Greek fleet in connection with small Turkish vessels plying between the Black Sea ports and Constantinople; the seizure of customs revenue in different ports on the Asiatic littoral of the Sea of Marmora and other areas occupied by the Greeks, and at Aivadjik of olive oil, the property of the Government and of the Ottoman Public Debt, and the forced circulation of the drachma.

205. Restrictions and prohibitions applied by the Greeks and Turks alike on the shipment of foodstuffs to the capital, in addition to fiscal impositions on trade between Ottoman ports, was particularly aggravating to commerce already faced with barriers due to the military operations.

(C) The Kemalist Régime

206. The Kemalist régime in Anatolia was also most detrimental to trade in general, as from an economic point of view the Nationalists treated the Central Government's area of administration on the same lines as any other foreign country, even levying import duty on goods shipped at Constantinople for ports under the Kemalist régime on specific tariff rates.

207. In 1921 the Grand National Assembly manifested a protectionist tendency, for a large number of articles were subjected to heavy specific rates, whilst the import of several others was prohibited. Consumption taxes were also levied on certain essential commodities over and above those levied at Constantinople on first importation into Turkey.

*Phase II.**The Kemalist Régime or that of the Grand National Assembly*

208. The prospects of peace seemed more hopeful in the spring of 1922. Merchants generally were hoping that some solution would be found whereby a peaceful evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks could be effected against compensation and without loss of prestige. The resumption of hostilities by the Turks ending in the Greek *débâcle* completely changed the situation. It has not only been a calamity to the Greeks, but to foreign commerce and enterprise as well.

209. Traders are now faced, it is feared for some time to come, with far more serious obstacles than any that may have been contemplated as a result of a peaceful settlement. The reconquest of Smyrna and of large tracts of country in Anatolia by the Turks at the point of the bayonet, instead of the retrocession of these territories to Turkey through Allied initiative, has completely altered the situation. Foreign trade and enterprise are confronted by a régime which, in the light of experience up to date, proved itself the reverse of encouraging or satisfactory. The position might have been far more serious, however, were it not that the advancing Turk was obliged to halt, thus providing an interregnum during which the new Angora Government was allowed slowly to infiltrate into, and to replace the old régime at, Constantinople without a military occupation, thus avoiding a calamity even more serious than that which befell Smyrna and allowing time for a general easing down of exaltation, fanaticism and desire for revenge, and saving, it is hoped, further serious losses to foreigners.

210. In order to form some opinion as to the future economic prospects of the country, it is necessary to review the attitude of the new régime from the time of its establishment in Constantinople. It was through a number of speeches made by Refet Pasha on his arrival here, especially those on the occasion of a dinner given in his honour by the various guilds of Constantinople and by the students of the medical college at Haidar Pasha, that the Sultan, the Central Government and the population of Constantinople got a real inkling as to the form of administration and the intentions of the Grand National Assembly. The words "sovereignty of the people" particularly attracted certain classes of the population, especially the guilds, which are numerous, as well as the rag-tag-and-bobtail of the town. One of Refet Pasha's first acts was to enforce the immediate application of a number of laws promulgated by the Grand National Assembly in Angora, which caused much perturbation in commercial circles and entailed considerable losses in many quarters.

211. On the 6th November the Specific Customs Tariff Régime and Regulations promulgated by a law dated the 16th March, 1916, and abolished by the Central Government in 1921 as far as Constantinople was concerned, was again applied without previous warning being given. This régime, aggravating to merchants in general, was especially so to importers of French goods, for the original tariff rates and regulations of 1916 had been amended on more than one occasion by the Grand National Assembly. These amendments consisted of:-

(a) The increase of the specific rates by five times in accordance with a law dated the 28th July, 1920.

(b) In May 1921 a further law was promulgated whereby a large number of articles were subjected to an increased rate of fifteen times the original

specific tariff rates, instead of the five-fold rates referred to in (a), and moreover, the import of a large number of articles figuring in the specific tariff and entitled by the Grand National Assembly "articles de luxe" were prohibited. Many of these articles were essential to a European residing in Turkey.

(c) Storage rates were also increased in accordance with a law dated the 2nd August, 1922.

(d) Customs regulations promulgated in April 1918, on the assumption that the Capitulations were abolished, were confirmed. These regulations provide for the right of search for contraband in merchants' depots and on board foreign vessels in Turkish waters.

(e) Exemptions granted to schools and religious institutions were annulled.

(f) Merchants wishing to ship away from Turkey goods subjected to the higher tariff rates and lying in transit or ordinary customs sheds, were called upon to deposit pecuniary guarantees equivalent to the higher specific rates of duty, whereas, previously, shippers of any goods lying in depots or in customs sheds were called upon to present duplicates of original bills of lading only, in cases where such goods were shipped by regular lines possessing an established agency in Turkey.

(g) Monetary guarantees equivalent to the value of prohibited goods were exacted on reshipment of the same.

(h) Alcohol was subjected to a 20 per cent. *ad valorem* rate in cases where such a rate exceeded the specific rate.

212. It is therefore not surprising that for a short period, trade and commerce were at a complete standstill, as it was impossible to obtain any precise information as to the administration of the new customs régime. The customs officials themselves were doubtful as to the right interpretations to be given to the various orders pouring in from Angora. There was no guiding hand in the person of the Director-General of Customs in Constantinople, owing to the abolition of the central administration of customs similarly with all Ministries and headquarters of Turkish Government Departments under the Central Government.

213. Co-ordination as between the customs houses was therefore non-existent. The Allied High Commissioners while protesting against this new customs régime, considerably relieved the situation caused by the illogical attitude of the new régime. Thanks to their local intervention here and to the attitude of the Allies at Lausanne, the difficulties under (f) above were cancelled

and duplicate bills of lading were accepted as formerly, the goods on the prohibited list of imports were granted a month's delay to be cleared through the customs on payment of the higher specific tariff rates (fifteen times the original rates) and some co-ordination between the Galata and Stamboul customs offices established.

214. A step has also been made towards the establishment of a head office, for an Inspector-General of the Constantinople Custom-Houses has been recently appointed as well as a staff of inspectors. Kemalledine Bey, the Director-General of the Customs Administration at Angora, who is one of the old customs officials under the late Sir Richard Crawford, has employed some of the staff of the suppressed head office. His selection has been a good one, for the heads of both the Stamboul and Galata customs as well as their assistants were men who had been in close touch with Sir R. Crawford.

215. With the exception of certain difficulties in connection with the classification of a number of articles for the payment of import duty, and of the losses to merchants and immobilisation of capital deposited under (f) and (g), British trade has not suffered very severely in so far as the application of the new customs régime is concerned, especially as compared with the French, for it will be found that in the case of a large number of articles imported from the United Kingdom, the specific rates as compared to an *ad valorem* basis do not exceed 11 per cent. *ad valorem*. It is, in fact, generally considered that the present régime in so far as the specific rates are concerned, is not a serious obstacle to the development of British trade with Turkey, especially as regards export, for under the present regulations export prohibitions and export duties have been abolished.

216. In April 1922 the Grand National Assembly made certain amendments in connection with laws governing consumption taxes. These amendments were applied here on the institution of the new régime.

Articles	Increase	Actual Rates
Sugar	5 piastres per kilog.	15 piastres per kilog.
Coffee	10 " "	20 " "
Tea	20 " "	40 " "
Petroleum	3 " "	6 " "
Box of 50 matches	5 paras per box	20 paras per box
Wax matches	20 " "	1 piastre per box.
Briquet and Amadou		25 piastres per piece.
Carnet of 50 cigarette papers	20 paras per carnet.	1 piastre per carnet.

The following articles were submitted to a consumption tax of:

	Piastres per kilog
Rice	10
Margarine	80
Candles	30
Ordinary soap	5
Sacks (old and new)	5
Spices	30

Moreover all sweetstuffs, glucose, biscuits, chocolate, condensed milk and helva were subjected to a consumption tax of 15 piastres per kilog., according to the degree of sugar they contained.

217. The application of these consumption taxes and the higher customs rate on flour and wheat, viz., fifteen times the original specific tariff rates, as applied on the 5th November caused a considerable panic in the town, and the Allied Food Control found great difficulty in maintaining the bread tariff then in force for a period of seven days on current prices of flour lying in transit sheds or in depots in the town, or purchased by bakers at prices inclusive of customs dues on an 11 per cent. *ad valorem* basis.

218. There was a run on bakeries by the lower classes, who, fearing a considerable rise in the price of bread, endeavoured for the first two or three days to obtain a supply over and above their daily needs. There was therefore a shortage of bread in the town for three days, the demand exceeding the output of the bakeries.

219. On pressure being brought to bear, however, by the Allied Food Controller, who urged the prefect of the town to obtain preferential treatment in favour of flour and wheat as well as for other commodities of primary necessity, Refet Pasha, the representative of the Grand National Assembly, issued instructions that the following articles should only be subjected to the original specific rates as promulgated in March 1916, which in most cases were far more favourable than 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, owing to the depreciated currency: flour, wheat, sheep, lamb, fresh meat, barley, rice, hay, sugar, haricots.

220. As a result of this measure there was an appreciable decrease in the price of bread. Prices of other commodities such as sugar, coffee, rice, petroleum, tea, biscuits, chocolate and milk increased considerably as a result of the new customs rates and consumption taxes. With the suppression of the

Allied food Control Section and the restriction of the duties of the Allied Police Commission, prices of these articles rose still further.

Registration of Foreign Companies

221. Towards the end of November an official communication was made in the local press notifying foreign companies that they were to conform with the provisional law of November 1330/1914 governing the registration of foreign companies and with that object in view, companies were called upon to get into touch with the Department of Economy at Angora. The Allied High Commissioners considered that such a law could not be applied to foreign subjects as long as the capitulations were not modified or abolished by the future Treaty of Peace. Owing to the fact, however, that certain companies had already conformed to the law, thus possibly prejudicing the interests of the others in the future, which had abstained from doing so, it was decided to call a representative meeting, consisting of the Judicial and Advisory Commissions and representatives of foreign companies to review the position.

222. This meeting was held on the 9th December and the following articles of the law were considered the most undesirable and prejudicial to foreign companies:

Article 12, which threatens to close companies which do not conform to the law.

Article 13, whereby companies agree to submit to all Ottoman laws, present and future.

Article 15, demands the transformation into Turkish companies of those companies whose fundamental operations are effected in Turkey.

223. It transpired that very few companies had registered in 1914 shortly after the declaration of war. Others, consisting of the greater majority, had not complied with the law to date, and, it appeared that to the knowledge of those present at the meeting, no contact had as yet been established between companies here and Angora as a result of the official notification referred to.

224. Among the companies having complied with the law in 1914 were a French insurance company, L'Union, MM. Orosdi-Back and the Crédit Lyonnais. It was also noted at this meeting that two French companies in Cilicia had already been compelled to stop operations, owing to non-compliance with the law.

225. There was a divergency of opinion between the representatives of the companies: some considered that the law should be completely ignored; others considered it necessary that the application of the law in so far as foreign companies were concerned should be delayed until after the Lausanne Conference. Others held that the law as it stood did not constitute any real danger at present, and that the future would depend entirely on the decisions taken at Lausanne. The majority were disposed to admit of registration without prejudice to the decisions taken at Lausanne.

226. The two commissions took the view that from a juridical point of view the law of 1930/1914 could not be recognised at the present juncture. It was felt however that the non-recognition of this law depended entirely on the attitude of the Allies as to whether they would be prepared to render effective protection to companies refusing to recognise the law. In case this was not possible, it was decided that a policy of prudence should be adopted and that in consequence it should be suggested to foreign companies to act according to what they considered most beneficial to their own interests, and, that in case of some of the companies deciding to register, such operation should be covered by a declaration of reserve in accordance with a formula to be drawn up by the Juridical Commission.

227. At the same time the High Commissioners protested officially and notified the Turkish authorities that the declaration made by the foreign companies would in no way prejudice or affect any decision that may be taken at Lausanne as regards the economic clauses of the Treaty of Peace. As a result of local presentations here and of the attitude of the Allies at Lausanne, who informed İsmet Pasha on the 13th December last that they did not consider the law of November 1914 as applicable to foreign companies, the Grand National Assembly decided to grant a delay of three months as from the 18th December.

228. At the time this communication was sent to İsmet Pasha and to Refet Pasha at Constantinople, it was hoped that peace would not be far distant, and that the Allies and the Turks would have arrived at an early settlement as regards the economic clauses of the treaty. Subsequently, however, as the expiration of the delay approached, the High Commissioners requested Adnan Bey to invite the authorities at Angora to publish a further official notice to the effect that in so far as foreign companies were concerned the Law of November 1914 was not applicable until after the Treaty of Peace was put into effect.

Sanitary Dues

229. In December it was announced that the rates of the sanitary taxes in force in Anatolia would be applied in Constantinople. The new rates were

reported to be: 5 piastres per ton foreign vessels and 2 piastres per ton for native vessels, instead of being, as previously, uniform for vessels of all nationalities on the following scale:

2.5 piastres per ton for vessels up to 500 tons.

1.5 piastres per ton for vessels from 500 to 1,000 tons.

1 piastre per ton for vessels over 1,000 tons.

It transpired that vessels were subject to:-

(1) The old rates on arrival of vessels here at Constantinople.

(2) The additional excessive rates on arrival of the vessel at the first Anatolian port.

230. In this manner vessels touching at Constantinople as well as at other Turkish ports were subject to the payment of the sanitary rates twice over, the rates levied at the Anatolian ports being excessively high.

231. It was generally agreed that with the suppression of the Allied Sanitary Control (a result of the institution of the new régime) the Turks denounced an international agreement whereby the Turkish Government was authorised to levy a sanitary tax. Hence from a legal point of view, whatever the rates may be, the payment of any such taxes was at present illegal.

232. The president of the Maritime Chamber, M. Fonzi, stated, however, that it would be difficult to refrain from submitting to these new exactions in Anatolian ports, for such action would no doubt lead to reprisals against shipping. It was consequently decided to advise shipping firms not to refrain from the payment of the higher sanitary rates. At the same time however the attention of the delegates at Lausanne was drawn to the illegality of these taxes.

Registration of Foreign Trade Marks

233. Shortly after the institution of the new régime in Constantinople, a law promulgated at Angora on the 7th June, 1920, rendering nul and void all contracts, conventions and other engagements entered upon by the late Government as from March 1920 appeared in the local press.

234. The authorities, no doubt in conformity with the new conditions, declared that all patents and certificates of registration of trade-marks issued by the late Government after the 13th March, 1920, were cancelled. Thus all persons who had obtained patent rights and who had registered their trade-

marks were deprived of all protection granted by the late Government. The attention of the Allied Delegation at Lausanne was drawn to these new conditions.

235. The trade-marks and patents obtained in Turkey since the 13th March, 1920, to date are as follows:

<i>Trade-Marks</i>		<i>Patents</i>	
British.....	261	British.....	35
American.....	256	American.....	50
French.....	18	French.....	2
German.....	48	German.....	13

Summer Time

236. The new régime having expressed its desire that summer time should be abolished this year, the High Commissioners decided that in view of the fact that such a measure was now a question of internal administration, it was for the Turkish Government to decide as to its abolition or not. Summer time was accordingly not introduced in 1923, though it had existed in 1922.

The Excess War Profits Tax

237. Among the several laws promulgated by the Grand National Assembly, which have been appearing in the "Official Journal" of the Vilayet of Constantinople, is that dated the 25th October, 1920, authorising the Finance Department at Angora to proceed with the collection of the excess war profits tax, which was created in 1919 and promulgated in December of that year. This tax is applicable to excess war profits made in 1916, 1917 and 1918, and consists of a fixed and a progressive rate. The Turks are making an effort to collect this tax from foreign firms and foreign subjects operating and doing business here during the war.

238. At present the economic prospects of the near future under the present régime are far from being rosy. There is no doubt that the Nationalist Government has done its best completely to discourage foreign trade and enterprise. The cry in Angora of Turkey for the Turks, passed on by Refet Pasha on his arrival here to such elements as the guilds in Constantinople, and to other bodies only too ready to take it up in their own interests, has for the time being further intensified the commercial stagnation prevailing in Constantinople.

239. The chauvinistic campaign of the Nationalist Government has already had a certain success. It has eliminated a large proportion of the Greek and Armenian elements, for in Constantinople alone at least 110 Greek firms have closed down, as well as twenty-one prominent Armenian firms trading cotton goods and having direct contact with buyers in Anatolia. A large number of foreign firms also have reduced their import business to a minimum, especially in respect of orders for forward delivery. The British fire insurance companies have practically decided to withdraw from the country altogether as a result of a new law governing the registration of foreign companies. The new régime's chauvinistic attitude and its warning to foreign institutions as to the employment of a large proportion of Turks therein, and the adoption of the Turkish language in their correspondence and business transactions, threatens further to compromise trade and enterprise.

240. The Nationalist régime, doubtless for political reasons, has also for its own ends encouraged the constitution of new factors, such as:

(a) The Confederation of Guilds. The lightmen's section has already shown signs of its activity in its aggressive attitude to shipping, employing their own lighters for the shipment or discharge of goods in the port of Constantinople. It should be noted that British shipping lines are principally affected by this. Such a confederation will always be a menace to trade and commerce, as the more advanced elements in the different guilds have gradually awakened to the fact that a strike in many instances has been successful in obtaining higher wages and a reduction in working hours. Boykoting the trade of a country is not unknown to the guilds of Constantinople.

(b) The "Union du Commerce", whose programme consists in the elimination of non-Moslem intermediaries, and aims at direct relations between Turkish and foreign firms.

(c) The Economic National Pact for-

(1) The boycotting of economic institutions in Turkey, which do not employ the Turkish language or which do not submit to Turkish laws.

(2) The destruction of the supremacy of any class of individuals.

241. Such is the situation at present, but the time will come, although possibly not in the very immediate future, when this régime, if then in power, will realise that its present policy means complete ruination to the country, for it is hardly conceivable that the régime is desirous of reducing Constantinople to the level of Angora as regards civilisation. It will, therefore, be obliged to change its policy as a result of bitter experience, for it is obvious to anyone with

any experience of the country that the Turk is to-day incapable of replacing the Christian element of the country or the foreigner.

242. The "Union du Commerce" referred to above, has limited its activities to the publication of an elaborate règlement, but its "Bureau Central d'Information" does not appear to have recorded much data. The financial status of the active members is negligible.

243. The following local criticism of the Turkish paper "İleri" of the Economic Congress in Smyrna is interesting:-

"Le Pacte économique"

"Nous attendions de Smyrne l'indication d'une politique économique, dans le domaine technique; nous en avons reçu des conseils religieux et de bonne morale; cela ne nous satisfait pas. En ce siècle la vie est de l'économie politique, on doit l'assurer donc d'une manière plus sérieuse. Notre espoir est grand cependant, nous en sommes encore au premier congrès. Inshallah dans les congrès suivants nous edifierons notre pacte économique sur des bases plus scientifiques et plus pratiques."

244. The present Government has succeeded in discouraging the Christian and foreign element, thus reducing to a minimum commercial relations with foreign countries, but has the régime made any attempts to fill in the gaps caused by the liquidation of Greek and Armenian firms? The Turkish Chamber of Commerce can record no new Turkish element, but from information obtained from different sources, the Commissariat for Economy has registered two companies here as follows:-

(a) The Société anonyme nationale d'Importation et d'Exportation de Turquie. Capital, £T. 1,000,000, composed of £T. 1 shares and founded by fifty Angora Deputies. Head office at Angora, with a branch office at Constantinople.

(b) The Société turque de Commerce national. (Importation and Exportation.)

Capital, £T. 100,000, consisting of 4,000 shares of £T. 25 each. Head office at Constantinople.

245. It will be a long time, if ever, before such companies will be able to acquire the import trade of firms that have closed down. The moderate and better-class Turk knows full well that he is incompetent successfully to enter into direct relations with firms abroad: he has no branches or correspondents, and

he lacks the commercial "flair" of the local Christian and the business experience of the foreigner. It is to be hoped that the change of policy referred to is nearer than it would appear, this as a result of a change of Government and administration, brought about by the opposition consisting of the moderate and more experienced element; therefore, every effort should be made, not only to recoup our past important trade with Turkey, but also further to develop it. It is true that the import trade has been curtailed owing to the liquidation of the several Greek and Armenian firms already referred to, but existing firms here should have an opportunity of taking over their business when peace is signed and more normal conditions prevail here and in Anatolia.

246. Contact with a large number of buyers has been lost owing to the Armenian and Greek exodus from Anatolia, but it should not be difficult for firms here to get into touch with buyers of firms that have closed down, for once peace is secured, and, with the revival of agriculture in Anatolia, the peasant will again, no doubt, revert to his pre-war habits and procure cotton goods. There will also be a field for modern agricultural implements.

247. A revival of trade with Russia is possible for the more venturesome, for Constantinople with its banks, firms and accomodation is a likely jumping-off place for Bolshevik Russia, thus compensating for the loss of customers from outlying and lost provinces of Turkey, such as Alexandretta, Beyrouth, Tripoli, &c.

248. There will be an unpleasant period when peace is signed, as the foreigner will, no doubt, be harassed by the Turk, for the latter having broken his chains and acquired his independence will parade it as a child a new toy. British tenacity should however, win in the long run, and British trade should hold its own, for the Turk is unable by nature to keep anything going for a prolonged period, and he will soon tire of his toy; consequently, things will gradually settle down to more normal conditions.

249. British firms here as well as the foreigner will have, however, to make up their minds that the new Turkey, whatever the régime may be, will greatly differ from the pre-war Turkey, and they would do well, perhaps, to employ a certain proportion of Turks in their new business. There are good men in Turkey, and when paid regularly and under control they make good clerks. They will also be more welcome to Turkish officials in liaison work between the firms and the different Government administrations. It is also advisable for firms to adopt the Turkish language when corresponding with Turkish administrations; this will save time. Firms employing their own lighters will have to come to some arrangement with the Lightermen's Guild by employing crews for such lighters from the guild itself.

250. It might also be well for manufacturers at home to reconsider the question of the reduction of the size and weight of the pressed bales containing cotton goods, which are difficult to handle and to stevedore owing to their bulk. The difference in the stevedoring and the clearance from the customs of Italian cotton goods in small pressed bales and British bales is remarkable. This is a factor which, in time of port congestion, is of some importance, and it should be borne in mind that a possible serious competitor may be Italy, for during the armistice a large number of Jews have become Italian protected persons, and every effort is, no doubt, being made by the Italians to make the best use of them for furthering Italy's trade.

X. LABOUR

(1) *The Hamals or Porters' Guild.*

251. In the early days of the Constitution, the Committee of Union and Progress was successful in absorbing the customs Kurdish hamals into their party, even going so far as to appoint a liason between the guild and the Government.

252. This guild, which consists entirely of Kurds, was successful in eliminating the Armenian hamals, who were employed as customs hamals, porters and office guardians.

253. On several occasions since the present armistice the guild came into contact with the authorities. This was mainly due to the late chief or president of the council of the guild, whose attempts to absorb all the Kurdish hamals of the town into the guild and so create a monopoly for manutention, not only on the quays and wharves, but in the town itself, were partly successful. For instance, this guild went so far as to attack porters of hans, porters attached to shops and private messengers.

254. Owing, however, to internal dissension as between chiefs of gangs and to rivalry on the part of the more influential chiefs, the president of the guild was obliged to resign, and another head was appointed. The new appointment is reported to be unpopular with a large number of hamals, who remained loyal to their late president, and consequently a split between the adherents of the two parties occurred, and at present the hamals of the Stamboul and Galata customs are more or less independent of one another.

(2) *The Lightermen's Guild.*

255. This guild, which is composed mostly of Lazes from the Black Sea coast, has always been an annoyance to shipping. The guild considers that it has

the entire monopoly of the lightering of the port. Several attempts have been made by the guild to interfere with firms possessing their own lighters for the discharge and loading of vessels. The lightermen have been particularly irritating to British shipping, as the great majority of British vessels do not moor along the quay, and are consequently obliged to employ large numbers of lighters.

256. Although the attempts of this guild have been unsuccessful to date owing to Allied intervention, the time will come when firms employing their own barges, which in many cases are larger and more up-to-date than those of the guild, will be obliged to come to some understanding with the Lightermen's Guild.

257. There are several guilds of minor importance than the aforesaid, such as the Bakers', Grocers', Butchers' and Coal-heavers' Guilds, all of which have formed a confederation, the official recognition of which has been applied for to the Grand National Assembly. This confederation aims at a monopolisation for account of the Turkish Moslem element of all trade and enterprise.

258. There are also other associations, such as the Union of Workmen, consisting at present of the outdoor employees of such companies as the tramways, the Metropolitan Tunnel, the electric light company, railways and ferry services. This union or guild, which was constituted shortly after the establishment of the new régime, has replaced the Socialist party, whose chief, Hilmi Bey, was murdered some time ago.

259. The Union of Workmen is under the presidency of a certain Mehmet Bey, a retired major in the army, who is reported to be a friend of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

260. The programme of the union, as in the case of the Confederation of Guilds, is both elaborate and extensive. The object of the union is to-

Defend the social and economic rights of the workmen in accordance with the laws of the country.

Establish common action as between labour in all questions that may interest the workmen.

Represent all the working classes in cases of necessity.

Act as liason with the Government, with a view to bettering the condition of the workmen and to develop professional morality.

Act as arbiters in labour questions.

Constitute saving banks for the workmen and establish co-operative societies for their benefit.

Grant indemnities to infirm workmen.

Establish hospitals, workmen's clubs, hotels and places of amusement.

Reduce working hours to minimum.

Establish a weekly holiday and overtime pay.

Suppress night work where possible to do so.

Guarantee the payment by employers of pensions to workmen who have been injured in their services.

Establish holidays for workmen.

261. Under the present régime, such a programme will no doubt attract a large number of workmen, who, although having to subscribe as members, hope to reap some benefit by such support as that indicated above.

262. There is no doubt that for some years past, and especially of late, there have been influences at work with a view to stirring up labour questions and unrest. This was certainly apparent in so far as the tramway company's employees were concerned, who were successful in carrying out a strike for a short period last winter.

263. These influences were also manifest among a large proportion of bakers' apprentices. The seeds of unrest were originally reported to be sown from abroad. Dissatisfaction was primarily apparent among the Christians elements, who succeeded however, in recruiting a large number of Turkish adherents. More than one strike was threatened, but successfully averted.

264. The political party of the Committee of Union and Progress considered that powerful organisations under its control were useful factors. No doubt Mustafa Kemal and his Popular party share the same views. Such organisations as the Lazes and Kurds would be useful instruments should the party desire to wage an economic campaign against the trade of any given country or further a political enterprise against its opponents, but the future will show whether such advantages compensate for the possible trouble to which the Government may be put by its fatherly policy towards these organisations, which may be found difficult to cope with a future date. In this connection, the work of Communist propaganda in Constantinople and Turkey should be considerably facilitated at this juncture, for, with the economic crisis entailing

unemployment, the heavy taxes which are being levied on all sides by the new régime and the destitute condition of 15,000 Government officials out of work furnish a fertile field for the sowing of seeds of dissension.

XI. JUDICIAL QUESTIONS

265. The year 1922 opened with a telegram, dated the 18th January, addressed to the three Allied Commissioners by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, whose existence was at that time scarcely known to, much less acknowledged by, the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople.

266. The telegram protested against the creation at Constantinople by the Allies of extraordinary jurisdiction in criminal and civil cases between Allied subjects and natives. The Inter-Allied Military Tribunal and the "Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission", whose institution was reported on pp. 37 and 38 of last year's report, were declared by Yussuf Kemal, the signatory of the telegram, to be illegal.

267. No notice was taken of this communication, which was considered at the time merely impertinent, and the courts in question continued to work until after the peaceful penetration of the Kemalists towards the end of the year.

268. The Allied members of the Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission were

British: Judge Linton Thorp and Mr. Matthews.

French: MM. de Laforcade and Guinet.

Italian: MM. Tripepi and Podestà.

269. It sat regularly at the Turkish Ministry of Justice, and on the 25th April the High Commissioner reported to the Foreign Office that the number of cases actually pending was over eighty. Applications were soon received from other Allied Governments that their subjects should be admitted to the benefit of this jurisdiction, and, with the consent of the Sublime Porte, the Belgians and Greeks were admitted, but the Porte refused to admit Russians, Serbs, Poles and Czechoslovaks on the ground that they possessed no capitulatory rights in Turkey.

270. On the 22nd June a supplementary Imperial Trade was issued, extending the jurisdiction to nationals of other European countries allied to the French, British and Italian Governments, subject to the provision that members representing Powers other than those already decided upon should not be

admitted. This disposed of the claim made by certain governments to be represented on the commission by a judge of their own nationality.

271. This claim was also raised by the United States of America, and in their case only received the support of the three Allied High Commissioners; but the negotiations on the subject between the United States High Commissioner and the Sublime Porte were not concluded when the court, on which great hopes for judicial reform in Turkey had been built, came to an untimely end.

272. On the 6th November, the Allied members were informed by their Turkish colleagues that the new Government had forbidden them to sit, and the Mixed Judicial Commission was *ipso facto* suspended.

273. The Inter-Allied Military Tribunal still continues to sit, although, by an agreement between the Allied military authorities and the Kemalists, it does not now try Ottoman subjects, who are handed over to the Turkish courts.

XII. MILITARY EVENTS

274. By the end of September 1921, active operations between the Greek and Turkish forces in Asia Minor had come to a standstill. The Greeks had failed in their attempt to advance to Angora, never in itself likely to be a very profitable undertaking, unless it would be combined with the destruction of the Turkish army, whilst the Turks had made an equally signal failure of their own original intentions, namely, to allow the Greeks to advance well into the interior of Asia Minor and then to destroy them. Both sides, considerably exhausted by their autumn campaign (shortly described in last year's annual report), had proceeded to take up defensive positions for the winter. The Greek forces, divided into two groups based on Brussa and Smyrna respectively, had remained in firm possession of Eski-Shehir and Afion-Kara-Hissar. The Turkish troops had taken up defensive positions 2 to 4 miles from the Greek lines.

275. Early in February 1922, advantage was taken by the Allied Powers of the deadlock which had apparently been reached by both belligerents, in so far as the past and the prospects of any future military operations were concerned, to renew diplomatic efforts with a view to bringing about peace. On the 1st February a conference was held in Paris between representatives of the Allied Powers, and proposals for an armistice between the Turks and the Greeks were drawn up as a preliminary to the opening of peace negotiations. These armistice proposals provided for the definite evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks, once peace was signed, as well as the return of a considerable portion of Eastern Thrace to the Turks. From a Turkish point of view, they marked a very

great advance on anything that had as yet been suggested. The Greeks were willing to accept these proposals, but the Turks held out for the Greek evacuation of Anatolia to commence concurrently with the opening of the peace negotiations, *i.e.*, to form an immediate condition of the armistice and not merely a prospective condition of the peace that was to follow. As a result of this and other conditions put forward by the Turks, and found unacceptable either to the Greeks or the Allies, the negotiations for an armistice dragged on through April and May without arriving at any result.

276. In the meantime certain changes had been effected in the command and organisation of the Greek forces. Early in June, General Papoulas, the Greek Commander-in-chief in Anatolia, who was commonly believed to disagree with the policy of evacuation, now openly accepted by the Greek Government, was replaced by General Hadjianestis, and shortly afterwards the Greek forces in Thrace, which had hitherto constituted a separate command, were placed directly under the latter's orders. This change in the Greek High Command, coupled with the incorporation of the Greek corps in Thrace with the forces in Anatolia, under the new Commander-in-chief, synchronised with reports, which had been current for some time, to the effect that the Greeks were meditating the occupation of Constantinople. Transfers of Greek troops from Anatolia to Thrace during the months of July, and military movements in Thrace itself, soon made it clear that such might indeed be the Greek intention. By the end of July these movements had developed to such an extent that it became obvious that the Greek forces in their present strength and situation, whatever their real intentions might be, constituted a direct menace to the security of the Allied occupation in Constantinople. Sir Charles Harington, the Allied Commander-in-chief, accordingly reinforced the French troops, to whom the defence of Constantinople from the European side had been entrusted, with British and Italian contingents, and, at the same time, issued a public warning of his intention to maintain the neutrality of the zones of Allied occupation against all comers. This action, supported by diplomatic representations at Athens, resulted in a definite undertaking from the Greek Government not to advance on Constantinople, without the consent of the Allied Powers.

277. In the meantime the Turks seem to have come to the conclusion that the time was now ripe for some action on their part. From a political point of view it was desirable to show that they, like the Greeks, had still an army to reckon with, whilst, from a military point of view, the moment was particularly favourable for action. The withdrawal by the Greeks of two army corps, or their equivalent, to Thrace, had reduced their forces in Anatolia to numerical equality with the Turks. The knowledge that their Government had made up its mind to evacuate Anatolia had already affected the *moral* of the Greek forces,

and the Turks could justifiably assume that there would be little disposition to fight seriously for ground which was shortly to be evacuated in any case. Finally, the Turkish army was now well supplied with arms and equipment of all sorts, obtained surreptitiously and otherwise from various sources, unlike the Greeks, the rank and file had still a definite and encouraging objective before them, i.e., the expulsion of a hated enemy from their soil.

278. With all these elements in their favour, the Turks left nothing undone to secure success. Early in August they opened their operations by skilfully-spread reports that they were concentrating their forces in the Ismid Bilijik area, thus giving the impression that Broussa was to be their main objective. As a subsidiary means for misleading the Greeks as to their real intention, a strong force of Turkish cavalry carried out a raid against the Smyrna-Aidin Railway at Ortakja, thus inducing the Greek command to detach half an infantry division as well as a cavalry regiment to that area. In the meantime the most stringent measures were taken to secure secrecy as to the main objective of the Turkish attack. All Anatolian ports were closed, and all land communications between Anatolia and Europe severed. In reality the plan of the Turkish higher command was to deliver a crushing blow with all available forces upon the Afion-Kara-Hissar salient, and then push on to Smyrna, thus isolating the Greek corps in the Eski-Shehir salient, and leaving it to be dealt with later. With this object in view, the Turks had concentrated five infantry corps and one cavalry corps east and south-east of the Afion-Kara-Hissar salient, now held by two Greek corps, leaving a single corps (the 3rd) further to the north, ready to deal with any counter-attack which the Greeks might attempt to make from the Eski-Shehir direction, where the remaining Greek corps (3rd) held the line.

279. On the 26th August the Turkish offensive began. The attack, which opened with a fierce bombardment, and came as almost a complete surprise to the Greeks, met with instant success. The 1st and 4th infantry corps and 5th cavalry corps of the 1st Turkish army, and the IInd and IIIrd Army Corps of the 2nd army, with the VIth Army Corps in reserve, attacked the Afion-Kara-Hissar salient (held by the 1st and 2nd Greek corps) from the east, south-east and south. The 5th (cavalry) corps, which opened the attack from the south against the southern base of the salient, immediately broke through the Greek lines, here weakly held by one regiment of infantry, and pushing rapidly north, succeeded in establishing itself on the Smyrna railway behind the 2nd Greek corps, thus cutting off the Greeks from all railway communication with their base. By the evening of the 28th August, Afion-Kara-Hissar had fallen, and the two Greek corps in the salient began a general retirement, with the intention of falling back to, and fighting on, the strong and well prepared Tonlu Pınar position in front of Ushak. But a further attack by the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th Turkish

corps, whose movements throughout were directed and executed with masterly skill and energy, upset this movement, forcing the 5th, 12th, 9th and 13th divisions north of the impassable massif known as the Murad Daglı, which ran roughly parallel to the Greek line on retreat, and driving the 1st, 2nd, 4th and part of the 7th divisions south of this formidable obstacle towards Ushak.

280. The Turkish offensive had now already succeeded in-

(a) Complete isolating the Greek corps holding Eski-Shehir.

(b) Cutting the only remaining Greek forces on the Asia Minor front, *i.e.*, the 1st and 2nd corps, from their base, and dividing them into two isolated parts, which were rapidly degenerating into a mass of demoralised fugitives.

281. Continuing their advance with unceasing vigour the 4th, 5th and 7th Turkish corps then concentrated their attacks upon the portion of the Greek forces which had been driven north of the Murad Daglı, and were now vainly trying to extricate themselves, and rejoin the southern mass, by moving down the defile, parallel to and north of this mountain range. These further attacks resulted in the capture or destruction of the greater part of the 9th, 12th and 13th Greek divisions, the 5th only succeeding in extricating itself in a more or less fighting condition. By the 30th August the rout of the Greek southern force was complete. Such of it as had avoided capture or destruction had lost all resemblance to a military force. Like a half demented mob of fear stricken civilians it made for Smyrna - and the sea. On the 9th September the leading troops of the Turkish cavalry entered Smyrna evacuated some forty-eight hours earlier by the Greek headquarters, which had fallen back to Chesme, whence the remnants of its troops were eventually embarked for Greece or the Greek islands. Meantime, as the Turkish higher command had satisfied itself that it could safely do so, on the 30th August it had detached the 3rd corps to mop up the 3rd Greek troops, left isolated and in the air at Eski-Shehir as explained above. The advance of this Turkish corps northwards through Kutaya was slightly delayed at first by an encounter with a Greek division which formed the only general headquarters reserve in Asia Minor. But, driving this division westwards, it pushed on to Inönü, arriving too late, however, to intercept the withdrawal of the 3rd Greek corps on Broussa. The latter, which had not been seriously engaged and still maintained a large percentage of its fighting value, succeeded in reaching Broussa, but in its subsequent retreat on Mudania and Panderma some stiff fighting took place between it and the 3rd Turkish corps, with which detachments of Turkish regular and irregular forces from the Gemlik area now co-operated.

282. In this fighting the 11th Greek division lost two regiments and thirty-two guns. By the 19th September the rest of the 3rd Greek corps had been safely embarked at Panderma. The total Greek losses in this short campaign of barely three weeks duration, but of such vital influence on subsequent events, were estimated at about 45,000 men (of whom the greater part were taken prisoner) and 180 guns. Great quantities of stores of all sorts which it had not been possible to evacuate or destroy also fell into the hands of the Turks.

283. From a military point of view and apart from its political results the Turkish offensive was a praiseworthy achievement, and its somewhat interesting to note its resemblance in many respects to Lord Allenby's campaign in Palestine, both in its conception and execution. In both cases one may observe steps carefully taken to conceal the real point of attack, simultaneously with measures to disperse the enemy's forces, and weaken them at the vital point, then a violent blow, with all available forces, and in which cavalry was to play an important part, against the true and well-chosen objective, followed by a vigorous advance to exploit the initial success, developing finally into a relentless pursuit of a thoroughly demoralised enemy.

284. The Greek débâcle in Asia Minor, and the simplicity with which it had been accomplished, had now whetted the Turks' appetite, and convinced them that their army was invincible. Once more the situation of the Allied force in Constantinople threatened to become critical. By the 22nd September the 5th Turkish corps which had been directed northwards from Smyrna, and was being followed by the VIth Army Corps, had come into contact with the British outposts at Chanak. With the consent of the local French and Italian military and political authorities, small French and Italian detachments were hurried to Chanak. Their mere presence alongside their British comrades might, it was thought, successfully impress the Turks with the determination of the Allies as a whole to resist any advance on Constantinople, as effectively as similar measures taken by Sir Charles Harington had impressed the Greeks two months previously. But no sooner were these measures made known to the French and Italian Governments than the latter immediately took steps to have them cancelled, and the detachments withdrawn, thus making it clear to the Turks that under no circumstances would they take any share in resisting their further advance.

285. A period of considerable tension followed, during which the opening of hostilities between the British and the Turkish forces at Chanak was more than once but narrowly avoided, and was only ended by the opening of the Mudania Conference on the 5th October. At this conference, in which the Allied generals as well as Turkish and Greek military representatives took part, the terms of an armistice between the Greeks and Turks were drawn up and

accepted by both sides. The terms of this armistice included the immediate evacuation of the Greek army from Thrace, and so removed any pretext for the continuation of the Turkish operations against the Greeks. It also provided for the recognition of the inter-Allied occupation of Constantinople pending the definite conclusion of peace at a conference to be summoned at Lausanne. By the end of November the evacuation of Eastern Thrace by the Greek forces, up to the line of the Maritza, had been duly completed, under the supervision of military inter-Allied commissions, and the peace Conference at Lausanne had commenced its labours.

XIII. NAVY

286. The condition and state of the Turkish navy have not appreciably altered since described in the previous annual report. The Minister of Marine, Salih Pasha, resigned when the Constantinople Government was replaced by Nationalist representatives on the 4th November, and a fortnight later all the senior officers at the Ministry and in other appointments were superseded by officers appointed from Angora, and the service was directed by Captain Nazmi Bey, with the title of "Commandant Maritime". This officer, who had previously occupied a responsible position in the Ministry, had been removed from his appointment at the instigation of the Allied Commission of Control, for alleged complicity in the removal of naval war material from the arsenal to the Nationalist forces in Anatolia. The Ministry officials however, have since continued to work in ostensible harmony with the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control, and there has been no friction or disposition to question the control imposed.

287. The Allied Port Control continued to work satisfactorily throughout the year under review, and the Allied authorities have endeavoured to effect such improvements in the port as were possible with the money and material at their disposal. Minor difficulties have occasionally arisen with the Turkish authorities over the imposition of fines on Turkish subjects, but the authority of the Allied captains of the port in such matters has never been seriously disputed, nor has the local Nationalist Government, in its efforts to shake off the Allied yoke, attempted to interfere with the Allied Port Control, except in regard to the status of pilots and the administration of the pilotage service, and in this matter an amicable compromise has been reached. There have been several attempts made by the Corporation of Turkish Lightermen to boycott and prevent the use of private lighters, but the Allied naval authorities, having decided to maintain the principle of "free lighterage," have threatened to use naval forces to assist private lighters in the working of ships' cargos, and no further trouble is anticipated. With the evacuation of the Allied forces it is

inevitable that the corporation will resume their former monopoly, so detrimental to the interests of foreign shipping.

288. Regulations were brought into force early in the year, whereby enemy vessels were allowed to pass the Straits and visit non-Turkish ports in the Black Sea, without, however, being allowed to call at Constantinople. A large number of such vessels, principally German, have taken advantage of this privilege.

289. During the early part of the year, various ameliorations in the war restrictions imposed by the Allies on merchant shipping were effected, including relaxation of the Naval Examination Service and Passport Control, which enabled vessels to arrive at, and depart from, Constantinople without incurring abnormal delay.

290. The continual presence of the Greek fleet at Constantinople, and its activities in the Marmora and the Black Sea, formed the subject of many protests from both the Constantinople and Angora Governments. Instead of endeavouring to interfere with the trade in munitions between the Russian and Nationalist ports, their activities were principally directed against small Turkish coasting craft employed in the victualling of Constantinople, and were rarely justified on the naval grounds of preventing supplies reaching the enemy. In certain cases, notably that of the steamship "İneboli", seized by a Greek torpedo-boat in the territorial waters of the neutral zone of Constantinople, the Allied High Commissioners were compelled to take measures to procure the release of the vessels. The bombardment of Samsoun on the 7th June was another instance of the misuse of these naval forces, this operation producing no military success, and merely serving to emphasise the anomaly of the utilisation by the Greeks of Constantinople as a naval base. With the occupation of Smyrna by the Nationalist troops, it became clear that this anomaly must cease, and on the 27th September, under pressure from the Allied Governments, the Greek fleet finally quitted Constantinople. It was not, however, until the 18th October, following on the Mudania Convention and the withdrawal of the Greek army beyond the Maritza, that Greek warships were actually prohibited from using the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles.

291. Practically all the British warships on the Mediterranean station were concentrated on the vicinity of Constantinople in the latter part of July, and dispositions were made for the fleet to assist the Allied forces of occupation, should an advance of the Greek army in Thrace have rendered necessary the defence of the neutral zone of Constantinople. The situation necessitated the retention of these ships in Turkish waters for the remainder of the year, and the concentration of the Nationalist forces after the fall of Smyrna in the

neighbourhood of Ismid and the Dardanelles led to the despatch of considerable British naval reinforcements to Constantinople. Two British battleships and other units were stationed at Smyrna during the events leading up to and after the occupation of Smyrna by Nationalists, and considerable assistance was rendered by them in the evacuation of British subjects and other refugees.

Annex

Text of Resolution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on November 1, 1922

The Ottoman Empire having at last passed into history, after having been violently shaken for centuries by great calamities, due to the ignorance and debauchery of the Palace and the Sublime Porte, the Turkish Nation, the founder and true owner of that Empire, rose up in Anatolia against its foreign enemies, and also threw itself into the fight against the Palace and the Sublime Porte, who allied themselves with these enemies and worked against the nation. After constituting the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, its Government and its armies, and in the midst of the great difficulties and sorrowful privations which are known, it commenced the struggle by acts and by arms against the foreign enemy, the Palace and the Sublime Porte, and had to-day obtained its deliverance.

When the Turkish Nation saw the treason of the Palace and of the Sublime Porte, it promulgated the law of fundamental organisation, which, by its first article, took the sovereignty from the Sultan and invested it in the nation itself, and, by its second, placed the executive and legislative powers in its own strong hand. By its seventh article it assembled in the person of the nation all the rights of sovereignty, such as the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace. As from that time, therefore, the old Ottoman Empire was overthrown and its place taken by a new and National Turkish Government, the Sultanate abolished and the Grand National Assembly put in its place. That is to say, that the council which exists to-day in Constantinople possesses no lawful and non-foreign force or national assistance regularly to protect its existence and is as a shadow which has disappeared.

The nation has established the administration of a popular Government, protecting the rights and guaranteeing the happiness of the peasants and of the mass of the people, in place of the government founded on personal sovereignty, and on the debauchery of the people, of the Palace, and of its surroundings. In view of this state of affairs, we are astonished to see that in Constantinople people who have been collaborating with the enemy are talking of the rights of the Caliphate and Sultanate and of the rights of the dynasty. It

is rare in history that a document is seen so strange, so astonishing and so contrary to fact as the telegram of Tewfik Pasha. The Grand National Assembly has, therefore, decided to promulgate the following articles:-

"1. By the fundamental law the people of Turkey decided to invest with representative rights and to use effectively the moral personality of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which is the true representative of its sovereign rights and sovereignty, in a manner admitting of no abandonment, divisibility or renunciation, and not to recognise any power or body founded on the national will. It therefore does not recognise any form of government other than the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, within the limits of the National Pact (or 'within the National Pact frontiers'). Consequently the people of Turkey consider as having passed into history as from the 16th March, 1336, and for ever, the form of government in Constantinople which is founded on personal sovereignty.

"2. The Caliphate is vested in the House of Osman, and the member of this house most qualified and suitable in respect of learning and moral character is elected to the office of Caliph by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The Turkish State is the support of the Caliphate."

November 1, 1922.

F.O. 371/9176/E. 10937

No. 160

Acting Vice Consul at Mitylene to Mr. Bentinck, Chargé d'Affaires, Athens

Confidential

MITYLENE, November 9th, 1923

Sir,

With reference to your Despatch No. 46 of the 9th ultimo, addressed to H.M. Consul at Syra and enclosing a copy of a despatch No. 3913/109 from Constantinople concerning the "Comité Révolutionnaire d'Anatolie", I have the honour to refer you in the first instance to Mr. Hadkinson's despatch No. 6 of April 12th last, reporting the inception and activities of this Committee at Mitylene.

2. I am now informed that the representative of this Committee at Mitylene is a Turk named Raffet Effendi the editor of "Kioylou", a Smyrna anti-Kemalist newspaper, but that the headquarters of the movement have been transferred to Bucharest under the direction of one Hodja Vazfi, late Minister of Justice at Constantinople, who left that city at the time of the Sultan's flight. The chief members of the Committee at Constantinople are Reouf Bey and Rahmi Bey, who was formerly civil governor of Smyrna, to which town he still pays occasional visits. Previous to Kemal's entry they are said to have had their office at Bahtiyar Han, but meetings are held now only in private houses. There are also two representatives at Athens, Eshref Bey and Reshit Bey, Circassians who were at one time in Mitylene. Eshref Bey, referred to in Mr. Hadkinson's above-mentioned despatch, is a clean-shaven, well-educated man, who came here from Berlin. Ali Salahaddin Pasha, the commander of one of the Kemalist Armies which entered Constantinople on the British evacuation, is said to have been won over to the movement. He is, it would seem, unsuspected as yet and is free to go to and fro between Constantinople and Smyrna.

3. In Asia Minor Nouredin Pasha, who commanded the Turkish army at the taking of Smyrna, is said to control the anti-Kemalist irregulars between Angora, Sivas and Smyrna, and to be in touch with Kurdish anti-Kemalist bands. Ali Ihsan Pasha is in command at Trebizond and Shefket Bey at Aidin.

4. I also learn from Rahmi at Constantinople has written to Raffet here that they are waiting for the great Powers to ratify the peace treaty before they make a move against Kemal (though the reason for this is not apparent), but after that they propose to eject him (it is not stated how). The idea of the movement is to reinstate the Sultan.

5. The above information I obtained from a Cypriote and resident of Mitylene named Halil Ibrahim, who inter alia possesses two letters signed respectively by Mr. Matthews at H.M. Legation, Athens, and dated November 17th, 1916, and by Mr. Gilton at the British Embassy, Washington, and dated October 15th, 1918, thanking him for services rendered in affairs relating to Turkey. He holds certificate of British Nationality No. 7566 given at Nicosia on June 21st 1921. He formerly owned property, I am told, at Keimer and Pilit-Kioy, Asia Minor, but is now a refugee, a violent anti-Kemalist and a member of this Committee. I understand that in his private dealings he is untrustworthy but that in this matter his information may be considered fairly reliable. He desires to be employed body, although I fancy he would rather object to being sent to Turkey.

6. Halil Ibrahim Effendi's story is partly confirmed by Armenian refugees and prisoners lately liberated from Turkey and sent to Mitylene by the Near

East Relief. They report that near Angora there is a certain Demirji Efë connected with the Committee, who has under him seven thousand irregulars, while at Sparta and Aidin there are forty thousand anti-Kemalist troops, mostly in scattered bands but with a nucleus of twenty thousand men. I may observe here from my own experience that prisoner's tales do but rarely lack imagination.

7. Since the signing of the treaty of peace, the Greek authorities have withdrawn, as far as I can ascertain, any support they may have given to the Committee and to the roving bands in Asia Minor, and to have adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality. Nevertheless, as is well known in Athens, the Greek Government is even now giving relief and free accomodation to many anti-Kemalist Turkish refugees, generosity which is, I submit, scarcely conceivable if based alone on sentiments of philanthropy.

8. Your despatch under reply was transmitted to this Vice Consulate in Mr. Ricketts' despatch No.52 of the 15th ultimo, but in view of the lapse of time since that date and seeing there is no direct communication (to my astonishment) between here and Syra, I am replying direct to you, informing Mr. Ricketts of my action. I am also forwarding a copy of this despatch to Smyrna for the information of H.M. Consul General.

I have the honour to be, Sir, &c.

(Signed)
Acting Vice Consul

F.O. 371/9170

No. 161

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 756

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 20, 1923
(Received November 26)

My Lord,

Adnan Bey called on me yesterday to enquire whether it would be necessary to furnish Yussuf Kemal with letters of credence before proceeding to London. I told him that clearly none would be required until the treaty had been ratified. Whereupon Adnan Bey gave me to understand that Yussuf Kemal would probably be given a letter addressed to your Lordship, presumably by Ismet Pasha. I gather from this insistence upon furnishing him with some form

of credentials that the Turkish Government is apprehensive in regard to Yussuf Kemal's reception in London. On that account it is also possible that his arrival will be postponed until after the elections in England.

2. Adnan then took the opportunity to ask whether His Majesty's Government had come to any decision as to the appointment of a British representative to Turkey after the entry into force of the treaty, and, on my replying in the negative, whether their decision was likely to be affected by the notification which he had made to me and which was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 746 of the 14th instant, to the effect that Angora was the capital of Turkey.

3. I asked Adnan, in reply, why he had not, as I had suggested, informed me, simultaneously with that notification, of the special arrangements which the Turkish Government proposed, in the absence of suitable accomodation for the foreign missions in Angora, to make for the transaction of diplomatic business at Constantinople. Since the foreign representatives were the guests of Turkey, it was obviously indispensable that any proposals to this effect should be initiated by the Turkish Government.

4. After attempting, without success, to prove that it was more proper that foreign countries should take the first step in this matter, Adnan Bey finally explained that his Government was precluded from putting forward any general suggestions for special arrangements for the following reason, which is probably a partially true one. The Greek and Bulgarian Governments had, he said, already agreed that their representatives should reside at Angora. If the Turkish Government announced that a special régime would be instituted for all the diplomatic missions in Constantinople, Greece and Bulgaria would at once withdraw their representatives from Angora and allow them to live in the greater comfort of Constantinople. Such a contingency his Government regarded as disastrous and intolerable. Adnan confessed, in fact, that the difficulty baffled him, and expressed the intention of leaving it to Yussuf Kemal to settle with your Lordship in London.

5. The position is undoubtedly complex. On the one hand the Turkish Government is unwilling to propose, publicly and officially, even a temporary régime for the foreign missions in Constantinople, both for motives of principle, with the studied intention of inducing the Powers to send their representatives to Angora, and thereby of ensuring satisfaction for Mustafa Kemal's prestige and ambitions, as well as on the grounds mentioned to me by Adnan, namely, lest as a result, those countries who have already yielded, either definitely or conditionally, should go back on their undertaking to maintain their representatives at Angora and thereby undo the progress already achieved

towards the conversion of that town into the capital of Turkey. There is also the complication of the extreme present bitterness of Angora against Constantinople, which indisposes the Grand National Assembly to any exceptional treatment of the latter.

6. On the other hand, the present inadequacy of Angora as a capital is evident and the Turkish Government appreciates the fact that, for the moment, anyway, it is physically impossible for the representatives of the greater Powers, be they Ambassadors or only Ministers, permanently to reside there, unless and until suitable accomodation has been specially constructed for them.

7. In this connection Adnan repeated to me the formal offer of his Government to make a free gift of whatever land might be required for His Majesty's Government to build such accomodation. But there again, Adnan himself realises that Foreign Governments may well object on the ground of expense or may, at least, hesitate untill the Turkish Government has itself erected the buildings which are necessary for its own use in the town that is destined to be the capital of the country.

8. Adnan Bey also observed that if His Majesty's Government only appointed a Minister, the latter would still be unable at present to reside at Angora while he would be at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the representatives of other Powers, such as Soviet Russia and Persia, whose representatives were already Ambassadors. He added that he had reason to know that Germany also was ready to appoint an Ambassador and to built a residence for him at Angora, and mentioned that he had information to the effect that Herr von Rosenberg was destined to be the future German Ambassador to Turkey.

9. I view the situation as follows: The retention of Angora as the seat of government is an indispensable factor in the scheme of Mustafa Kemal's ambitions. Unless he and the present Grand National Assembly disappear unexpectedly from the scene, Angora is likely to be the capital for several years to come. Even their disappearance, unless it be followed by a restoration of the Sultanate, does not necessarily imply a return to Constantinople. Apart from Kemal, there is a strong school of thought in Turkey against the re-establishment of Constantinople, in view of its exposed position, as the seat of government. The possibility cannot, therefore, altogether be excluded that, if not Angora itself, then some other town in Anatolia may ultimately become the capital of the Turkish Republic. Generally speaking, however, I regard two years, the duration of the life of the present Grand National Assembly, as the minimum period during which Angora is likely to remain the seat of government. Though the magnetic force of Constantinople is undoubtedly strong, it may well be longer than two years before it succeeds in drawing the

Turkish Government back to the Bosphorus. I even would not go so far as to assert with absolute confidence that this city would ever again be the capital of Turkey.

10. What attitude then, do the Powers propose to adopt during the intermediary period, which may last two, four, or an indefinite number of years, before the Turkish Government, if it ever does so, returns to Constantinople? The question has a double aspect. It will have to be decided whether, on the entry into force of the treaty, and even if the titular heads be not immediately appointed, the missions of the Great Powers in Turkey shall revert to the status of Embassies or be reduced to that of Legations. This aspect of the question, however, though more immediate, is of minor importance as compared with the decision as to whether the Powers intend definitely to maintain their missions in Constantinople, where suitable accomodation already exists, or whether they contemplate the necessity of their eventual, even though perhaps temporary, transfer to Angora, where such accomodation is not merely inadequate, but totally lacking, and will have to be, constructed at considerable expense. It is no less impossible for a Minister than for an Ambassador to reside with his staff at Angora until that accomodation is built.

11. It must be recognised that so long as the Turkish Government remains at Angora, diplomatic representation at Constantinople, if the willingness to proceed after a while to Angora be not made clear, is likely to be ineffectual. By every form of obstruction and hindrance the Turks will exert pressure with a view to inducing the foreign mountains to come to the new Mahommed. Owing to the exigencies of the situation, the Turkish Government will be obliged, for a period of six months to a year, to tolerate a special arrangement whereby the missions of the greater Powers shall continue to reside in Constantinople, and their obstructiveness during that period will be in proportion to the readiness which each respective Power shows to make up its mind to contemplate the possibility of an eventual transfer to Angora.

12. An expression of the readiness of His Majesty's Government to do so would, of course, be peculiarly gratifying to the Turkish Government and to Mustafa Kemal. It would constitute, on the other hand, a concession which I imagine that His Majesty's Government would regard as distasteful and even somewhat derogatory. Nevertheless, since, once the treaty comes into force, close relations with the Government at Angora are indispensable, even though it be through a diplomatic liaison officer, or a consular agent under the orders of a head of the mission residing in Constantinople, His Majesty's Government may be well advised at least to consider the offer of that Government of a free gift of land at Angora. It would be unnecessary, in the first instance, to build the larger accomodation required for an Embassy or a Legation. To begin with, a

single building might be erected, suitable as a residence either temporarily of the liaison officer, or permanently of a consular agent, or intermittently of the head of the mission as a residence during the periodical visits which he will be obliged to make to Angora.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/9164/E. 11304

F.O. 424/259, p.74, No.77

No. 162

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 757

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 20, 1923

(Received November 26)

My Lord,

There has been no notable change during the past week in the political general situation in Turkey. So far as their public expression is concerned, the violent controversies which followed the establishment of the Republic have shown on the whole a tendency to subside. Whether this comparative lull is the precursor of fresh storms in the immediate future it is too soon to say. The leaders of the opposition to Mustafa Kemal are keeping their own counsel, and it is still uncertain whether they think the time has come to try conclusions with him or not. If the question depended only on Constantinople, they are already assured of sufficient support here to act immediately, but there is nothing to show that Mustafa Kemal has lost his hold on Angora. I incline to think that his opponents will wait awhile in order to give the opposition in that place time to develop.

2. On the 10th November Kiazim Karabekir Pasha arrived at Constantinople. As your Lordship is aware, this personage has at any time during the last three years appeared to be cast for a leading rôle in politics. No one has ever quite known what that rôle is to be, and, when the Pasha materialises in any non-military connection, he distinguishes himself chiefly by a keen but innocuous interest in such matters as pedagogy and economics. His movements in Constantinople have been much advertised. He seems to have thrown in his lot with Reouf Bey and Refet Pasha, but there is still nothing to show that he has much individual importance as a politician. He visited the

Caliph on the 12th November, and on the following day he, with Reouf and Refet, were the principal guests at a tea-party given by the Labour Union. All three delivered speeches, the most notable passage of which was that in which Reouf Bey said, "May God be your helper always; may He preserve all of us from haste, from nervousness, from precipitate decisions; may He grant all of you and all of us success."

3. If this reference to precipitate decisions was, as seems probable, an allusion to the recent constitutional changes effected at Angora, it is perhaps significant that it should have been made at a Labour gathering in the last speech delivered by Reouf Bey during his visit to Constantinople. To mobilise Labour and to use the elements composing it, especially the old-established guilds, for political purposes has become one of the aims of every group of politicians which seeks to establish its ascendancy in Constantinople. Reouf Bey left for Angora the next morning. Refet Pasha who was at one time said to intend to accompany him, stayed behind, but he also is expected to proceed to Angora in the near future.

4. Nothing has as yet been heard of Reouf Bey's activities since his return to the capital. The press has been busy assigning Embassies abroad to him and others. According to a recent report, there is a talk of sending Refet to Paris, Riza Nour to Berlin, and Reouf himself to another post, possibly Washington. So far as Refet Pasha is concerned, neither Adnan Bey nor the French High Commission has any knowledge of the rumoured appointment. I doubt whether he would accept such a post, and still more whether Reouf would consent to be relegated to a position abroad, however distinguished.

5. The question of the Caliphate and the present Caliph's position has continued greatly to exercise the public mind, but during the last few days there has been a lull in open discussion of this question also. My impression is that Mustafa Kemal, having tasted the opinion of the country at the expense of much indecent publicity, has decided to let the matter rest for the present, after having cheapened the Caliphate and somewhat alarmed the Caliph by proving that no institution and no person, except possibly the President of the Republic, are too exalted to form the subject of discussion in a free and democratic country. As against this advantage, the attacks on the Caliph, the rumours of his possible transfer to some place in the interior like Brussa or Konia, or even of his removal from Turkey, and the suspicion that Mustafa Kemal may himself aspire to be Commander of the Faithful, have given an impetus to the idea of substituting a constitutional monarchy for the Kemalist dictatorship. This idea would commend itself to many in Union and Progress and other circles, who to-day profess loyalty to the republic. It would be popular in the country if it were launched with any prospect of success. It would not be the least of its

merits in the eyes of easy-going and moderate people that it would almost certainly solve the question of the capital in favour of Constantinople.

6. In this connection it is worth mentioning that a rumor was circulated a few days ago that the Caliph had asked that his provisional monthly allowance of £T.26.000 should be increased to £T. 50.000. This has been denied. The rumour looks like a further attempt to discredit His Majesty.

7. The jealousy between Constantinople and Angora shows no sign of abatement. Its expression has crystallised during the last week in recriminations regarding the dismissal of the Angora director of the press, a certain Zekeria Bey. The removal of this gentleman from office followed very shortly on the publication of a communiqué to the effect that the Government had no intention of restricting the liberty of the press. Certain organs in Constantinople allege that Zekeria Bey was dismissed because he published this communiqué on his own initiative. Why, they ask, should the Government have taken so severe a view of his action, which, if they really stand for liberty of speech and criticism, amounted at most to a technical omission to consult his superior, viz., the Minister of the Interior?

8. Ismet Pasha, who for the time being retains the prestige gained at Lausanne and is therefore the least criticised of the leading personages in the Ministry, has endeavoured to pour oil on the troubled waters by a statement which appeared in the "Vakit" newspaper of the 17th November. I enclose a French version of this as published in the "Stamboul" of the same day. It deals more particularly with the questions of the Caliphate and the press, but it touches also on certain other questions in a rather anodyne fashion.

9. The alleged maltreatment of Moslems in Greece continues to be exploited in all sections of the Turkish press. Ismet Pasha's wise endeavour to discourage the demand for reprisals against the Greeks here, in the speech reported in my despatch No.745 of the 13th November, has unfortunately produced little effect. A great meeting of protest against the alleged atrocities was held at Angora on the 15th November. What is more serious, a similar meeting is projected in Stamboul on the 24th November, and it is freely said in the press that the object of this gathering will be not merely to protest against Greek action, but to support the demand for reprisals.

10. It will not have escaped your Lordship, in reading my recent reports, that, while the proclamation of the republic was in one sense a revolutionary step forward, it had, from a constitutional point of view, its conservative aspect, inasmuch as it was accompanied by the restoration of the Cabinet system of Government, which two years ago was anathema to the extreme democrats of

Angora, and of which Mustafa Kemal was at that time the most ardent opponent. In this connection it is interesting to note some minor instances of the same conservative tendency. The re-establishment of the Directorate-General of Customs in Constantinople (see my despatch No.688 of the 23rd October) is now an accomplished fact. A proposal to revive the Council of State has once more been mooted and has the support of the Government. The Assembly recently voted a law authorising the transfer of the Court of Cassation from Sivas to Eskişehir, a measure which will bring it within much easier reach of the established commercial centres, such as Constantinople and Smyrna.

11. An element of comic relief has been imported into the general situation by the sudden collapse of the Turco-Albanian negotiations at Angora. It was announced some days ago that these negotiations had been crowned with success and that a treaty of perpetual friendship had been initialled. The text was published, and reference was made to an accompanying, "établissement" convention which was to follow. Great complacency was exhibited in all the press articles on the subject, which were copiously illustrated by the portrait of Shukri Kaya Bey, one of the less attractive members of the first Turkish delegation at Lausanne, who had conducted the negotiations with the Albanians. It only remained to sign the treaty to the accompaniment of the usual banquet. These formalities were fixed for the 18th November. The banquet actually took place, but it was announced immediately afterwards that the treaty could not be signed, as a hitch had arisen over the question of the nationality of Albanians in Turkey. The hitch was apparently a serious one, for it was also announced that both sides had resumed their full liberty of action and that the Albanian delegates would leave Angora on the 19th November. I enclose for the sake of record a translation of the draft treaty as published in the "Journal d'Orient" of the 18th November.

12. Apart from this episode, there is little to report regarding the various negotiations with foreign Powers which the Angora Government have at present in hand. They continue with the Hungarians in Angora and the Austrians and Americans here. The negotiations with the latter, which relate principally, if not entirely, to claims, do not appear to be making much headway.

13. Turkish official and public opinion continues to be concerned, without being unduly excited, over the delay in the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty by the Great Powers. Some apprehension is expressed lest, as a result of the general election, e.g., if Mr. Lloyd George should return to power, Great Britain should not ratify the treaty at all. The "İleri", the foremost Kemalist organ in Constantinople, suggested on the 18th November, in a leading article on the enclosed statement by İsmet Pasha, that the other Powers were waiting for Great

Britain to take the lead, and intimated some resentment at this supposed subservience on their part.

14. A local paper of no particular authority stated on the 18th November, without disclosing the source of its information, that the recent incident at Erivan, which led to the precipitate departure of the Turkish representative from that place, had been liquidated by an official apology conveyed by Suritz to the Angora Government, that the Turkish representative at Erivan was returning to his post, and that various consuls whom the Bolsheviks had prevented from proceeding to their posts in the Caucasus would now do so. I have no confirmation of this report.

15. In general the Turkish public is much more concerned with internal politics than with international relations. There is a general feeling that the present situation at home is both unsatisfactory and unstable. If the opponents of Mustafa Kemal should succeed in giving him a good shove it would not take much to topple him over. He is, however, a past-master in the art of adapting himself to new situations. His opponents are a motley crowd. Even if they should achieve sufficient cohesion to destroy his position, there is no reason to suppose that a more stable general situation would result. It would be premature to attempt to estimate the effect of such a change on Turkey's internal policy and international relations. It is enough to say for the present that under any régime the now prevalent xenophobia would die very hard, and, as regards larger international issues, that elements even more hostile to the West than those now in power would have as great a chance of obtaining the ascendancy as those which sincerely desire the re-establishment of good relations with, for instance, Great Britain. Fortunately, we are dispensed from the necessity of attempting to influence the course of events in Turkey; but it may well be that the evils of the Kemalist régime which we know are less than the potential evil of some future régime which we know not of.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

No. 163

*British Secret Intelligence Service to Foreign Office, Eastern Department**Secret*

CX/9092/1a

17.12.1923

Opposition to Turkish Khalifate Policy

It has been ascertained at first hand that Musa Shefik Khalidi, Said Hussein and Sheikh Rifa'at, Moslem leaders of the Arab Nationalist Movement in Palestine, recently addressed letters to Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the subject of the Khalifate question.

In these letters Mustafa Kemal was warned of the danger of depriving the Khalifate of that position upon which its prestige depended, and the writers urged that the Khalif should be accorded a position in consonance with the dignity of his office. Otherwise, the writers stated, the prestige of the Turkish Khalif would disappear and the Islamic World might turn to another candidate for the office, such as King Hussein, with the result that Islam would fall again under foreign influence.

More recently it was ascertained, from an independent informant in Cairo who had received such a notification from the Angora Government, that that Government, apparently as the result of warnings of this nature from Palestine and from Egyptian Ulema and elsewhere, had notified Islamic Associations abroad that the convocation of an Islamic Congress was no longer considered to be necessary, because Abdul Mejid had been acknowledged as Khalif by the whole Islamic World with the exception of Morocco. The congratulations addressed to the Khalif upon his accession from all parts of the Moslem World, and the mention of his name at prayers in most Islamic countries, were cited by the Turkish Government as proof of their contention.

F.O. 371/9176

No. 164

Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department

No. 4589

28.12.1923

Your telegram dated the 3rd December 1915.

Instruction to Henderson dated 6th December that mission might proceed to India on conditions indicated crossed report from him that Lutfi Simavi had

been replaced by Rassih Effendi who is stated to be a deputy and a Hodja and a strong supporter of Mustafa Kemal. S.I.S. reports that following passage in letter said to have been addressed to Indian Khilafat Committee by Mustafa Kemal on 27th November is believed to refer to Red Crescent Mission.

Begins Peculiarities of position will be fully and clearly explained to you by those persons who will shortly visit India on our behalf Ends

I am enquiring as to proposed date of departure of mission.

F.O. 371/9175

No. 165

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 12

· CONSTANTINOPLE, January 2, 1924
(Received January 7)

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 878 of the 26th December, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 27th December the Court of Independence by majority found Lutfi Fikri Bey guilty of an offence under article 1 of The Law on Treason, but decided to sentence him to five years' penal servitude under article 8, rather than to death under article 2, on the ground that his opposition to the decision of the 1st November, 1922, regarding the Sultanate and the Caliphate had been manifested not by the acts, but by writing only. The court held that Lutfi Fikri's offence was aggravated by the fact that he, a man of such intellectual capacity as to be able to appreciate what the country had gone through, had lent himself to efforts to destroy the peace and tranquillity of the nation and had urged the Caliph to subversive action, "with the simple object of promoting the ideas designed continuously to poison the conscience of the people with the evil intention of again destroying and upsetting our country from without." The sentence was therefore fixed at five years in excess of the minimum penalty.

2. Lutfi Fikri Bey received his sentence with sang-froid, and he and his lawyers announced later that they would contest it in the Court of Cassation under another article of the law. It is, however, more doubtful whether his contention that that article applies will be admitted, as it is generally held, and is indeed laid down in the Law on Courts of Independence, that the decisions of

those courts are final, subject only to the necessity of sanction by the Grand National Assembly for the execution death sentences.

3. The trial of journalists was resumed on the 29th December and occupied three lengthy sittings on the court on that and the two following days. Certain witnesses, one of whom was Dr. Riza Nour Bey, were heard for the defence of Velid Bey. Riza Nour testified to Velid Bey's patriotism, especially during the Lausanne Conference, when he was the only journalist who fully supported the Turkish delegation. Incidentally, he took the opportunity in this connection to have a fling at Jahid Bey, who, as your Lordship may remember, violently attacked Riza Nour for his conduct at the conference. He attributed any lapses on Velid Bey's part to neurasthenia. Another witness, who was heard *in camera*, appears to have testified to Velid's activity in forwarding war material from Constantinople to Anatolia during the Allied occupation, and capital was made later by defence of his services in this direction. Otherwise there is little worth reporting in the long speeches by the lawyers and the accused themselves, except that the advocates attempted to curry favour with the court by various onslaughts on the conduct of the Allies during the armistice period, and one of them, speaking on behalf of Jahid Bey, referred to alleged intrigues of Mr. Fitzmaurice, chief dragoman of the Embassy, at an earlier period. Towards the end of the trial Jahid himself, provoked by certain allusions in the public prosecutor's final speech, passionately defended his honour and said, among other things, that a time would come when he would sit in the public prosecutor's place and bring to account those responsible for blunders committed and rights sacrificed at Lausanne.

4. The trial ended late on the 31st December, but the court reserved its sentence. From various remarks let fall by the president and the public prosecutor during the last sittings, it seems possible that it had already been decided, even before hearing the case for defence, to acquit the accused. The issue is nevertheless very doubtful, for the hostility to Jahid Beys in Angora is extremely strong.

5. Ismet Pasha scored a success in the Grand National Assembly in the final decision of the 26th December on the question whether all sentences of the Court of Independence should be subject to review by the Assembly. The report of the Committee of the Drafts, recommending that the opposition proposal in this sense should not be entertained, was accepted by 112 votes to 44, with four abstentions. It was generally felt that Ismet had strengthened his position, although there were a fair number of Deputies, perhaps as many as thirty, who did not attend the sitting and who must be reckoned in the potential strength of the opposition. Within the last couple of days, however, a critical situation seems again to have arisen. The Minister of Finance Hasan Fehmi Bey,

resigned on the 31st December, and rumours of a reconstruction of the Cabinet, or even its resignation, are again current. Angora is greatly preoccupied with internal, and to some extent with foreign, affairs. It is open secret that great difficulty is being experienced in forming the budget for the coming year without admitting an estimated deficit of over L.T. 50,000,000. A report that official salaries will have to be reduced has provoked much criticism, all the more bitter because of the increase in army pay a couple months ago. The question of the Anatolian Railway is again on the tapis, and various other matters tend to increase the difficulties of İsmet Pasha and his Government in the Assembly. These difficulties may possibly be increased by the absence of Mustafa Kemal, who left for Smyrna on 31st December. It has apparently been decided not to appoint an Acting President of the Republic, but to refer important matters to Mustafa Kemal during his absence, which is expected to last two or three months.

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

P.S. - The verdict on the journalists was pronounced this afternoon. All were acquitted, amid general applause in court. According to the report which has just reached me, the court held that the letter of the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali contained passages contrary to the Law on Treason, but acquitted the accused on the ground that there had been no connivance between them and the authors of the letter.

N.H.

F.O. 424/260, p. 4-5, No. 4

No. 166

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 14

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 2, 1924

(Received, January 7)

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 851 of the 19th December, 1923, relative to Greek patriarchal affairs, I have the honour to state that on the 27th December the Anatolian Telegraph Agency published a telegram from Angora contradicting a report in a Salonica newspaper to the effect that the Patriarch Gregorius and four other Metropolitans were to be tried for treason.

2. In view of the semi-official character of the Anatolian Agency, this *démenti* is significant, having regard more particularly to the widely advertised efforts of Papa Eftimi a couple of weeks ago to induce the Court of Independence to purge the Greek patriarchate of what he considers to be pro-Hellenic elements. It is a further indication that the Turks are for the moment on their best behaviour as regards the patriarchate.

3. On the other hand, the Turkish Government have not yet committed themselves to official recognition of the new Patriarch. Announcements have appeared from time to time that inquiries are being held as to the manner in which the election was held. Mustafa Kemal Pasha returned a correct reply to the telegram addressed to him by Mgr. Gregorious after his enthronement, but the text of the reply given in the local newspapers does not show whether the President addressed him by the style of Patriarch. I have not thought it advisable to inquire regarding this point, as I prefer in present circumstances, in the interest of the patriarchate itself, to avoid any appearance of concerning myself with the affairs of that institution.

4. I may mention in this connection, that I have refrained from sending any message of congratulation to the new Patriarch on his election or enthronement. It will be for consideration later whether the visits which it is customary for a member of my staff to pay to the Greek Patriarch and other heads of communities at Easter, a purely religious festival, should be continued.

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/10191/E. 185

F.O. 424/260, P. 5, No. 5

No. 167

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 30

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 9, 1924

(Received, January 14)

My Lord,

I have endeavoured during the past year to keep your Lordship very fully informed of internal developments in Turkey, feeling as I have done that the geographical situation of this country, its international position and its importance as a factor in the evolution of relations between East and West gave

those developments an interest out of proportion to the size of the new Turkish State or the numbers of the population directly affected by them. My despatches having necessarily abounded in detail, I think it may be useful if I indicate in a broader fashion some of the general features which strike me as I look back over the fourteen months which have elapsed since the decision taken by the Grand National Assembly on the 1st November, 1922, to abolish the Sultanate.

2. When that decision was taken the Angora Government were at pains to attenuate its effect on Turkish and Moslem opinion by representing the Caliphate as a great institution which the Turks held, as it were, in trust for the whole of Islam and the authority of which rested on the support of the Turkish State. Their efforts in this direction were aided by their avoidance of any positive definition of the new form of the State, and by the fact that it was possible without political inconvenience to "elect" to the Caliphate the Prince, who under the old rule of succession would have come to throne on the disappearance of the late Sultan. Even so, they were taking a considerable risk, for many had felt that one of the few things which might outrage the much-tried and hitherto docile Anatolian peasant would be a direct attack on the throne. The event justified their boldness. The peasants accepted the change, as he had accepted every other innovation. He was doubtless ignorant of its significance, but his ignorance was itself due to that patient indifference to all but immediate personal concerns which is one of his chief characteristics.

3. It is as true as ever that there is no public opinion in Turkey in the European sense of expression. Yet this statement must be qualified by an admission that during the last four years there has been a great increase in the number of the people who take a lively interest in public affairs, people who from one point of view may, for want of a better term, be described as patriots, although the standard of patriotism is low, and who, from another, may be described as constituting the *intelligentsia* of the country. They are a small minority relatively to the bulk of the population, but they are now numerous as a class, and it is among them that one must look for the various trends of opinion which influence the course of events, so far as it is influenced at all by moral forces. They belong to every class possessing any sort of education or stake in the country - officials, *khojas*, army officers, professional men, journalists, schoolmasters, students and local notables. To them the controversies of the day mean something real, and, while they include large numbers of more or less conservative persons and large numbers of subservient opportunists, they include also a strong and rather more homogenous element of radicals. All, except the opportunists, have one thing in common, namely, a violent doctrinairism, which finds its completest expression in the political

debates at Angora and the columns of the press in all the more important centres. The sheep-like people look up and are fed only with words, but the words have come to have a real meaning for the doctrinaires who deal in them.

4. The ideas of the advanced members of this class have crystallised about such expressions as "national sovereignty", "republic," "liberal" and – a notable addition to the vocabulary of the Turkish revolution – "laic." Older systems of ideas have disintegrated to a large extent. To be a constitutional monarchist of the 1908 type is now to be a reactionary. To go to further back and to wish to see any real power restored to the throne is to be a traitor. Once this position had been created, it was not hard for Mustafa Kemal, within less than a year of the *coup* of the 1st November, 1922, to elicit an express definition of Turkey as a republic and to engineer a campaign to discredit not so much the Caliph and the institution of the Caliphate. He is a great man, and a man, according to his lights, of genuine patriotism, as are many of his supporters, but it is not unfair to say that ambition and fear have driven him and them to extreme courses.

5. The fear to which I refer is partly fear of the Western Powers. The Turks, with all their arrogance and sense of triumph, realise that those Powers could crush them if they chose to exert their strength, and they imagine that some at least of the Powers still look at the newly won liberty of Turkey with jealous eyes, at her undeveloped resources with covetousness and at her territory with a desire to carve out of it new dependencies. And it is partly fear of the Caliphate, as the possessor of a tradition of personal sovereignty and the possible rallying-point of the incoherent and partly latent, but potentially strong forces of Conservatism in the country. It is now not so much the present Caliph, who has learnt caution, as the whole House of Osman which is mistrusted. To Mustafa Kemal, the ambitious creature of fortune, that house is a rival. To Mustafa Kemal, the doctrinaire patriot, and to the doctrinaire patriots who are the best of his followers, it is the incarnation of the evils of the past. They have got to the point of being prepared, by reducing the Caliphate to a simulacrum, perhaps even by destroying it, to sacrifice the prestige which the possession of the Caliphate gives Turkey in a large part of the Moslem world rather than see it retain enough of it its own prestige at home to make the restoration of the temporal power and of the old régime possible.

6. This is the most striking development of a general kind during the last year. It has been facilitated by the rapid growth of what, again for want of a better term, may be called irreligion in the educated class. Here I am not speaking of new phenomenon. What is new is the open enunciation by certain publicists of principles inconsistent with Islamic conceptions, the efforts of others less courageous, to read new and subversive meanings into old Islamic formulae and the facility with which it is recognised that the applicability of

those conceptions and formulae to life under a republican régime is a suitable subject for public discussion. In using the word irreligious, I am conscious of using a rather misleading expression, for it covers not merely agnostic or sensual indifference to the claim of Islam to regulate every concern of human life, but a whole series of phenomena, such as, for instance, the growing emancipation of women, the frequentation by Turks of both sexes of European balls and other social functions, the Caliph's son dancing with the rest; the tendency to make monogamy, with only a little relaxation, the law of the land; the frank handling of the prohibition question as merely an economic and administrative problem, in which Turkish liquor merchants no less than others have vested interests at stake; the suggestion that religious law courts should be done away with; and the recognition that, if Turkish law is to be adopted to the needs of modern life, it must be divorced much more completely than was done in the middle of the 19th century from the law of Islam.

7. If Turkey is to be reorganised on the lines of an European State, and that is the ambition of those Nationalists who are now beginning to be called Liberals, many of these things are necessary to that end. The trouble is that those who have abandoned Islam in all but name have found no new basis of real principle; that they still retain of Islam its intolerance doubled by the intolerance of infant Nationalism; and most of all, that they have no real sense of how the problems which they ventilate so lightly are to be dealt with in a practical and constructive manner. Constitutional questions are solved by sewing Republican patches in a more or less haphazard fashion on to the fabric of the now unrecognisable, but not wholly abolished, Constitution of 1876. Economically, the country is going to rack and ruin, while politicians and fortune-hunters play with schemes for building railways and reconstructing devastated areas. The financial situation is so bad that for the coming year a deficit of over LT. 50,000,000 is spoken of as probable in a budget of not more than three times that about, and, although this will certainly be reduced on paper to a very much smaller sum, it is much more likely to represent the true state of the case than the actual estimates which will be submitted to the Assembly. In the administrative services there is a general indiscipline, and in the lower branches, at any rate in Constantinople, a formidable aggravation of the time-honoured system of *bakhshish*. In Anatolia the scourge of brigandage, the product of misery and imperfect control, has once more assumed such proportions that the Minister of the Interior had recently to admit in the Assembly that after the arrest of over 1,000 brigands there were some 3,000 to 4,000 still at large.

8. To cope with these varied evils, so largely economic in their nature or origin, a cautious, but really constructive, policy is needed. Such a policy cannot be conceived without a broadness of view, which the present Grand National

Assembly entirely lacks, nor can it be put into execution without a powerful driving force, which for the moment no party and no individual is capable of providing. After the reconquest of Smyrna in the autumn of 1922 it looked as though Mustafa Kemal himself might supply the driving force for an economic revival. His speeches at that time showed an apparently sincere conviction that only by such revival could Turkey hope to retain her newly won independence. Had he thrown his full strength into the realisation of what he then preached he might have imposed on the country the bases of a sound economic policy and seen it through by the force of personality, notwithstanding his ignorance of the details of economic questions. Hampered by political difficulties, however, and broken in health, he has dropped, at least for the time being, into a background of watchful detachment. Nor could even Mustafa Kemal have triumphed easily over the obstacles which the Nationalists have themselves placed in the way of economic development by encouraging rampant xenophobia, by ignoring the principle that fresh foreign capital can only be attracted to Turkey by showing some serious sense of the sanctity of existing obligations, and by their attitude to the non-Moslem minorities, whose practical elimination from Anatolia has largely upset the old balance of commercial life and whom it is the settled policy of Angora to eliminate still further.

9. There are not lacking Turks who realise the situation, but such of them as have influence are too disunited to effect a cure. The political antagonism between Constantinople and Angora has its counterpart in a growing recognition in the old capital that its whole economic life is menaced. This, as much as anything, is responsible for the fact that nearly every Turkish paper in Constantinople is either definitely in opposition to, or at least critical of, Angora. But the opposition elements, though it is becoming the fashion to call them Conservatives, are for the most part as chauvinistic regarding foreigners, existing obligations and non-Moslems as are the pure Nationalists. Republicans or Liberals, whatever name be applied to them. This it is that makes it unwise to expect that the advent of any other party to power would mean an early improvement in the situation from a British or general European points of view. Whatever Turks assume power, they will continue to wrangle at the cost of the true interests of their country, to squeeze or frighten away the foreigners and non-Moslems, of whose collaboration they have need, and to discuss great schemes instead of effecting slow and gradual reconstruction. They will only learn in the hard school of experience that, if Turkey is to achieve stability as a really independent State, there must be a change in her present mentality. Unfortunately for her, the lesson may be learned too late to retrieve the damage which is now being done. Meanwhile the extreme Nationalists are probably no worse than any other element which is at all likely to come into power. They have among them one great personality, namely, Mustafa Kemal, who, if he recovers,

may yet succeed in pulling the country together. They have, moreover, one advantage from a British point of view, namely, that they have become so mad on nationalism that pan-Islamism is rather at a discount among them, and for some time to come they are likely to put aside dreams of Imperialist expansion or any serious hegemony in the Islamic world, and to confine themselves to cultivating the idea of Turkish *irredentas* in Northern Irak and Northern Syria.

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 424/260, p. 7-10, No. 10

No. 168

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson

No. 4

SMYRNA, January 11, 1924

Sir,

As I had the honour to report in my telegram of the 2nd instant, the President of the Turkish Republic arrived here on that date. The local authorities had got ready for him, with the owner's consent, the house, at Boudja, of Mr. David Forbes, a British subject, who is absent. The house has been very badly looted by Turkish marauders after the destruction of the town, and, owing partly to the present dearth of skilled labour and of materials, the efforts of the municipality to make good the ravages were not very successful. Jewish carpet merchants in the bazaar were forced to lend carpets for the occasion, but not more than the first floor could be made habitable. Mustafa Kemal and his wife moved suddenly the next day to the house of Latife Hanem's father, Muammer Bey, at the suburb of Karantina.

2. As Muammer Bey's house is near the water, this unexpected move produced reports that Mustafa Kemal had a yacht waiting to take him off if the political situation should develop against him. There is, so far as I can make out, no such yacht in the whole gulf. Latifa Hanem is in a delicate state of health, and that seems a sufficient reason for Mustafa Kemal Bey (*sic*) moving his quarters.

3. The Italian consul-general, who is the senior consular officer here, enquired through the Vali whether the President wished to receive the consuls. The reply was that, as his visit was a private one, he did not; but the Vali hinted

to me that Mustafa Kemal Pasha might change his mind later on. My colleagues and I, therefore, merely left cards.

4. The Ghazi Pasha has received the visits of Turkish notables. His public appearances have been few and unostentatious. On the 8th instant he visited the barracks and the municipal building. On the 9th, he drove through Bournabat to visit Cordelio. His movements have been watched with interest rather than enthusiasm. There has been a little bunting displayed to order, but, so far as I can learn, no acclamation. It is true, though, that he does not court ovations, for he ordered that there should be no special preparations for his welcome, and, on the few occasions when he has appeared, his car has been driven so quickly that he could scarcely be recognised.

5. The Pasha has only a small escort of soldiers, but a number of police and detectives guard his movements. These measures seem not to be without reason, for, according to information which I believe true, a man in the crowd drew a revolver on Mustafa Kemal's first arrival at the station and was instantly shot down by police, while another man, who got out a revolver, was bayoneted by soldiers.

6. Mustafa Kemal Pasha cannot be said to be popular hero in Smyrna. Public opinion here seems to be against the present Government. It has been noticeable that during the trial of the journalists at Constantinople there has been a keen demand for the "Tanin." The Turkish population seems to be hoping for the Committee of Union and Progress to come out into the open again, but the old Committee of Union and Progress leaders here, whatever they may do in secret, show no open activity. I understand that they expect Mustafa Kemal Pasha to be carried off before long by an incurable disease from which he is believed to suffer. He certainly looks ill.

I have, etc.

W. S. EDMONDS

No. 169

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 55

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 16, 1924

(Received January 21)

My Lord,

The acquittal of Jahid Bey and his fellow-journalists, which I reported in the postscript to my despatch No. 12 of the 2nd January, was received with universal relief in Constantinople, and Angora has put a good face on it. On all sides the result was acclaimed as a triumph of justice appropriate to a republic. The young ladies of the university -- one of the strongest centres of Nationalism in Constantinople -- presented bouquets to the accused as they left the court. The flow of soul reached it climax a few days later when the Turkish Press Association invited them and the members of the Court of Independence to a tea-party.

2. The court has since been dealing with minor cases, but its proceedings have ceased to excite much interest. On the 7th January the Khoja, Ibrahim Ethem, was sentenced to a year's imprisonment, under article in the ordinary Penal Code, for writing and preaching in a sense hostile to the new order of things. On the 12th January the court began the trial of Ali Osman and Hassan of the Lightermen's Guild and three other persons for being concerned in a plot against Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the republic and for inciting other persons to treason. The trial has made little progress and the details of the alleged plot have not been disclosed.

3. On the 8th January Ekrem Bey, the aide-de-camp of the Caliph, who was arrested within a day or two of the arrival of the court in Constantinople, was suddenly released. No explanation either of his arrest or of his release has ever been vouchsafed. The decision not to proceed against him is a further indication of the extent to which Angora realises that the sending of the court to Constantinople was a political blunder. Yet another proof of the unpopularity of the whole business is that there is already a strong movement on foot for pardon of Lutfi Fikri Bey, whose condemnation to five years' penal servitude for treason I reported in my despatch No. 12 of the 2nd instant.

4. Altogether there has been a very distinct lull in Constantinople during the past fortnight. The opposition newspapers are naturally displaying great caution. Jahid Bey once more writes leading articles in the "Tanin," but confines himself for the most part to generalities. Velid, of the "Tevhid-i Efkiar," has desisted from writing anything over his own name.

5. During the same period the attention of Angora has been concentrated on two subjects, namely, the budget for the coming financial year and the future of the Anatolian Railway. The new Minister of Finance, Abdul Halik Bey, a former Malta deportee, whose experience at home has principally been in civil administration, and the budget committee of the Assembly have managed to produce a budget showing an estimated expenditure of LT. 128, 900,000 and estimated receipts of approximately LT. 121,000,000. It is asserted that the former estimate provides for all services (except that of the Public Debt), without reduction of civil salaries. The lie has thus been given - on paper - to the prophecy of the "Vatan" correspondent that there would be a deficit of LT 53,000,000. The final estimates have gratified, without altogether convincing, the public, but the budget has still to pass the Assembly.

6. The controversy regarding the Anatolian Railway came to a head at a meeting of the People's party on the 10th January. Zekiai Bey, who, as Your Lordship will remember, served in the Turkish delegation at Lausanne as a economic expert, attacked at great length the proposed agreement between the Government and the existing company, and advocated the repurchase of the concession by the State. Mukhtar Bey, the Minister of Public Works, who negotiated the draft agreement with M. Huguenin, the former managing director of the railway, defended his proposals. The sense of the meeting was reported to be strongly favourable to Zekiai Bey. The debate was to have been resumed on the 13th January, but a further postponement was arranged probably in order to enable Ismet Pasha to shape his course of action. It was realised that the rejection of the Huguenin Agreement might precipitate the fall of his rather shaky Government, although it had been put about that he could not make the question one of confidence, and he had avoided any final expression of his personal views. In the meantime, the situation was complicated by the publicity given to a telegram from M. Huguenin to the effect that, as a result of the recent meeting of the foreign interest concerned at Venice, those interests would themselves require certain modifications of the draft agreement. On the 14th January the Minister of Public Works tendered his resignation, which was accepted, and rumours of the impending resignation of Said Bey, the Minister of Justice, again became current.

7. On the same day on which Mukhtar Bey resigned, Ismet Pasha issued to the People's party a statement of his general policy of the coming year. He outlined in somewhat conventional terms the aims of the Government regarding the economic development and progress in other directions, with a special mention of the need for railways, but without any reference to the burning question of the Anatolian Railway. He went on to say that his programme differed from those to which the country had been accustomed,

inasmuch as no attempt would be made to run the Administration on the basis of a considerable deficit in the budget. The country must take stock every January of its progress in matters relating to railways, finance, economic affairs, public health and education. The estimates included a proposal to vote 8,000,000 l. during the coming year in order to start work on the Sivas Railway. He then quoted the total of the estimates as already announced, and said it was hoped to cover the deficit by revenue in excess of the estimates and by economies. No provision had been made for the services of the foreign debt, but Turkey was quite ready to meet her obligations in this respect, and the only reason for the omission was that amount of the debt still had to be determined in accordance with the peace treaty. He invited the views of the party on the general lines of his programme. In framing the budget, recourse had not been had to measures like the suppression of vilayets and kazas. Increase of the pay granted by the Assembly had not been interfered with. The utmost economy would be exercised in the Ministries, but provision had been made in the budget for the employment of experts to reform and reorganise public departments. The publication of this statement was apparently a manoeuvre to divert the attention of the party from the Anatolian Railway to the budget. The party met next day, the 15th January, and engaged for six hours in a stormy debate. The telegraphic accounts of it differ considerably, but it is clear that the party, a good deal influenced by Reouf Bey, refused to be put off the discussion of the Anatolian Railway business. İsmet had to agree that this should be dealt with before the budget or anything else. Fethi Bey, the President of the Assembly, created some sensation by taking a strong line against the Government, and insisting that the principle of repurchase should be admitted. After a good deal of tactical manoeuvring, İsmet was driven to accept a middle solution regarding the railway question, by which it was decided that the whole matter should be again reviewed by a new commission specially constituted, and that this commission, after going into all the accounts, should recommend for or against the repurchase of the concession. İsmet linked up his adhesion to this proposal the question of confidence in the Government. On a division, ninety-eight members of the party voted for the motion and the confidence in the Government and forty-eight against, three members abstaining.

8. So the matter stands at present. The debate of the 15th January has revealed even greater disunion in the People's party than was already known to exist, and İsmet Pasha's position is clearly becoming very difficult. The open opposition of Fethi Bey to the Huguenin Agreement will not make that position any easier. One of the most interesting features of the situation is that, while the draft agreement is much criticised in detail by its opponents, the gravamen of their hostility is well-known to be mistrust of proposals which, it is thought, would give Great Britain control of an important strategic and economic artery.

owing to the controlling interest acquired by a British group in the existing Anatolian Railway Company.

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 424/260, p. 19-21, No. 17

No. 170

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson

No. 8

SMYRNA, January 17, 1924

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the Vali of Smyrna, Aziz Bey, resigned last week and has been replaced by the Vali of Angora, Murat Bey.

2. For the last two months Aziz Bey's friends at Adrianople have been urging him to accept the governorship of that vilayet. The arrival of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his dissatisfaction with the arrangements made by the Vali for his accommodation in Mr. Forbes's house may, however, have hastened Aziz Bey's resignation. It is said that words passed between the two.

3. Aziz Bey is about 40 and a native of Rumelia. He was a junior in the Political Department at Adrianople during the Balkan wars and has a grateful recollection of Colonel Samson, then His Majesty's consul at Adrianople, who obtained his release from the Bulgarian forces of occupation. In 1918 Aziz Bey was secretary of the Committee of Union and Progress, and I believe that it was he who escaped with the archives and cash of the Committee of Union and Progress when the Allies were upon the point of entering Constantinople. He is probably identified with the Committee of Union and Progress rather than with the Kemalist party, and it may be that he finds it opportune to sever his connection with the present régime. He is a man of some intelligence, energy, experience and ability. His administration here has been weak, but I believe that that has been due in some measure, firstly, to his lack of sympathy with the Angora policy; and, secondly, to the personnel appointed by Angora, which seems more than usually inefficient or corrupt. Aziz Bey has been in Germany and, among other things, has studied the rise of Protestantism. A crank of his is the Turkification of Islam in Turkey. He regards the Arabic element in Islam as an obstacle to national developpement and, with a view to greater freedom of thought, he would like to see the Koran translated into Turkish.

4. Murad Bey is a native of Aidin and between 30 and 40. In 1908 he was a judicial official in Monastir. Later he came to Constantinople, and in 1914 he was an Assistant Director of Public Secretary in Constantinople. He is a man of very little education. His appointment here seems a bad one, for the economic life of the place is paralysed by excessive policing and is pining for more enlightened administration.

I have, etc.

W.S. EDMONDS

F.O. 371/10208, E. 847

F.O. 424/260, p. 22, No. 21

No. 171

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

No. 69

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 23, 1924

(Received January 28)

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 55 of the 16th January, I have the honour to state that on the 19th January the Grand National Assembly accepted by a practically unanimous vote the nomination of Suleiman Sirri Bey as Minister of Public Works in succession to Mukhtar Bey, who resigned over the question of the Anatolian Railway.

2. Suleiman Sirri is one of the Deputies for Constantinople. This is his first Ministerial post, and have not heard that he has any strongly pronounced political antecedents. He is by profession an engineer, and has, I understand, held various administrative posts in the former Ministry of Public Works in Constantinople.

3. From various pronouncements by the new Minister and others, it is evident that the Government are doing everything in their power to disarm the opposition to the late Minister's proposals to provide for the future of the Anatolian Railway by a new agreement with the present company, represented by M. Huguenin. They are attempting, not without success, to delay a settlement of the question, while creating the impression that they are in no way averse from the opposition proposal to repurchase the concession, provided it can be shown that this is financially feasible. I am dealing at greater length with this subject in my reply to the Foreign Office despatch No. 57 of the 14th January.

4. Ismet Pasha's tactical handling of the Anatolian Railway question appears for the moment to have strengthened his general position. There have been no political excitements during the past week.

5. The question of proposed modification of the Constitution continues to be discussed at Angora, but the committee in charge of it seems to be proceeding in a very desultory fashion. In this matter also it is pretty evident that the Government are playing for time.

6. In Constantinople also the lull continues. The trial of the lightermen and others implicated in the alleged plot against Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the republic continues to occupy the Court of Independence at longish intervals, but so far it has excited little interest. Ekrem Bey, the aide-de-camp to the Caliph, whose release I reported in my despatch under reference has resigned his appointment at the Palace.

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 424/260, p. 23, No. 22

No. 172

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 104

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 6, 1924)
(Received February 12)

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 69 of the 23rd January, I have the honour to acquaint you that there has been little change in the internal political situation in Turkey during the last fortnight, excepting the new move of Ismet Pasha as regards the Anatolian Railway question, which I reported in my despatch No. 86 of the 10th January. There have, however, been certain minor developments which, though not the most part of little individual importance, are sufficiently significant to be worth recording.

2. The Court of Independence has continued at intervals of a few days to hear the case against the lightermen and others accused of plotting against the republic and Mustafa Kemal Pasha. These proceedings have excited little interest. On the 29th January the Public Prosecutor asked for the condemnation

of five of the accused, including two who disappeared when the arrests were being made, under an article in the ordinary Penal Code (not the Law on Treason), and for the acquittal of three others. On the 5th February the court sentenced the lighterman Ali Osman to one year's imprisonment, being the minimum penalty for the mildest offence defined in the article invoked by the Public Prosecutor, and acquitted all the other accused, including the two fugitives, who were politically the most important persons implicated, one of them having been a Governor-General and the other a Deputy.

3. Meanwhile the Grand National Assembly had decided, on the 30th January, to terminate the existence of the Constantinople Court of Independence as soon as it had disposed of current business, i.e., the trial of the persons mentioned above. So with the condemnation of Ali Osman the most futile episode in the history of the young Republic of Turkey comes to an end. Except for the condemnation to five years' penal servitude of the unfortunate Lutfi Fikri Bey, who will probably be pardoned, the court has done nothing to justify the panic decision to send it to Constantinople. Even the temporary effect which it produced at first of stifling criticism of the Government in the Constantinople press is rapidly wearing off. The net result has been to aggravate the hostility between the old and the new capital and to diminish the credit of İsmet Pasha's Government.

4. An accidental quarrel in Angora has to inflame the hostility between the two capitals so far as Deputies and journalists - the two most vocal elements in the community - are concerned. On the 23rd January a certain Ali Saib, member for Urfa, conceiving his honour to be outraged by some reference in the "Wakt" newspaper to his part in the recent vote of the People's party in favour of an increase in the salary of Deputies, assaulted the Angora correspondent of that paper. Upon this the correspondents of all the Constantinople papers agreed not to send any telegram to their papers for three days. This demonstration has led to much acrimonious controversy, a decision of the authorities to exclude journalist from the corridors the Assembly House, an outcry in most of the Constantinople papers that the liberty of the press is threatened, proposals and counter-proposals for modifications in the press law, a demand on the part of certain Deputies for stringent measures against journalists who disparage the principles of Islam, and, to complete the agitation in the teacup, a motion by Ali Saib that duelling should be sanctioned by law. This last proposal is now being solemnly considered in committee.

5. Side by side this rather artificial storm there is much real alarm in Turkish circles at the deplorable economic situation in the country, and more particularly at the way in which the commercial activity of Constantinople is menaced by short-sighted Government measures, the disorganisation and

indiscipline of labour in the port, and a number of other factors. The press abounds in articles on this subject and all sorts of bodies such as the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and the group of Deputies representing Constantinople, are occupying themselves with the question of remedies. There is much talk of engaging foreign experts to assist in economic reorganisation, and some writers in the press are bold enough to hint that foreign loans may be necessary to give the country a new start. It is noteworthy that the "İleri," the one Constantinople paper which is devoted to the person of Mustafa Kemal, blows hot and cold, now defending the Government, now accusing the Ministry of incompetence and dwelling on the economic chaos which prevails.

6. Mustafa Kemal himself remains at Smyrna, but there are signs that he is preparing to resume a active part in public affairs. On the 3rd February the semi official Anatolian agency published a report by his doctor to the effect that the Pasha's illness had been merely a nervous disorder due to overwork, and that he was now completely restored to health. It almost looks as though Mustafa Kemal may have deliberately allowed his illness to be exaggerated in order to retire into the background while İsmet Pasha tackled thorny questions like the budget and the constitution changes, realising perhaps, moreover, that the spectacle of growing chaos in the country would incline people generally to accept his eventual assumption of supreme authority as the only solution.

7. However this may be, it is a significant fact that the "İleri" of the 5th February published an attack on the Caliphal House of a kind more insidious, and at the same time rather more gross than any which has hitherto come to my notice. The article is introduced by successive headlines as follows: "The Liquidation of the Sultanate"; "Shall we still give monthly salaries to the House of Sultanate?"; "If the members of the House expect money from National Treasury without doing any work, it is a very strange thing in a Republic." These headings sufficiently indicate the trend of the article. What gives it its special character is that it is illustrated by a caricature representing an elderly gentleman not unlike the Caliph with a coarse looking female, seated on a sofa of a type familiar to visitors to the Palace, with an aged and disgruntled peasant pouring paper money over the back of in from a cornucopia.

8. Two other incidents of the past week suggest reflections regarding Mustafa Kemal Pasha's outlook on the future. The first of these, trivial in itself, is that the band of the "Ertogrul," the Imperial yacht, has gone to Smyrna to be at the Pasha's disposal. The second more important, is that the editors of all the Constantinople newspapers, except one, have gone in a body to Smyrna to wait upon the President. This journey, which must obviously have been carefully led up to, was publicly mentioned in the Constantinople press for the first time on the 1st February. On the 2nd February the journalists left, and on 4th February

they were received for four hours by Mustafa Kemal, the editor of the "Tevhid-i Efkar" alone being excluded, because he had stated that it was the Pasha who had taken the initiative in arranging the visit. Up to the time of drafting this despatch no announcement had been made regarding what passed. Whether the President summoned the editors or merely acceded to a wish of theirs, he would appear to be anxious to placate the discontented press of Constantinople and is probably endeavouring with his usual tactical skill to construct a new basis for future activity.

9. If Mustafa Kemal resume the active management of affairs, the chances of Angora being maintained as the capital, unless and until some change amounting to a revolution should occur, will be materially increased. The Assembly is reported to have voted on the 2nd February LT. 114,000 for the erection of a new Parliament house there.

10. The Constitutional Committee of the Assembly is now working systematically on what seems to be intended to be a complete new Constitution for the republic. They have elaborated up to date some thirty-four articles, providing, *inter alia*, for a four years' duration of the Assembly, a seven years' tenure of the presidency of the republic, and a right on the part of the President to refer back legislation. As the law will doubtless give rise to much discussion when it is laid before the Assembly, it seems unnecessary to enter into the committee's proposals at greater length at present.

11. The women of the intellectual class in Constantinople share in the general unrest and dissatisfaction with present conditions. At least one meeting has been held to assert the feminine interest in the question raised by the proposed family law which is still a subject of discussion at Angora. One of the subjects which has been much ventilated in the press is the question of making polygamy illegal; not that is now very commonly practised among Turks properly so-called, but because it is felt by the more advanced sections of the community that is, in principle, vicious to allow it by law in a modern State.

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

No. 173

*British Consul-General at Batavia, Java, to Mr. J. Ramsay MacDonald*No. 24
Confidential

BATAVIA, February 7, 1924

Sir,

I have the honour to invite reference to the despatch from His Majesty's Foreign Office No. 76 of November 9th last (E. 10758/10145/44), forwarding copy of a despatch from the Acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople relative to the suggested despatch to British India and Java of a delegation of the Red Crescent Society, in connection with the Commission formed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to collect subscriptions on behalf of the Greek Muslims who are to be exchanged for Turkish Christians.

News of the coming of this delegation has been current in native circles here for some time past and has aroused no little interest. An Arab named Syed Oemar Alatas has set about preparing a reception for the mission, which, it is said, is being regarded by the ignorant as diplomatic one, having for its object the investigation of complaints by Mohammedans in Java as to their treatment by the Dutch authorities.

From the Dutch Police authorities I learn in confidence that the mission is expected to come here after visiting British India and that it will consist of three persons from Constantinople. It is thought that, whilst these persons will ostensibly be engaged in collecting subscriptions for charitable purposes, the real purpose of their tour will be to indulge in pan-Islamic propaganda.

In this connection, it may perhaps be relevant to note that, in the middle of October last, a British Indian subject named Mohamed Ali was collecting money at Pandang (West Sumatra) for what was called the "Angora Fund". In return for donations received he issued receipt or tickets printed in Arabic and in British Indian script. I have been supplied by the Dutch Police with photographs of one such receipt or ticket, and a copy is enclosed herewith. I am told that the Arabic characters include the words "Holy War". Mohammad Ali did not collect many subscriptions at Padang, and he left shortly afterwards for Singapore.

I have, etc.

J. CROSBY
Consul-General

Copies to:

The Secretary to the Government of India, Political Department, Delhi,

HM Minister at the Hague,

The Director of the Political Intelligence Bureau, Singapore.

F.O. 371/10195/E. 2208

No. 174

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson

No. 19

SMYRNA, February 9, 1924

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 4 of the 11 ultimo, I have the honour to report that very little is known of the doings of the President of the Republic here. At the middle of last month, the newspapers, for few days, reported his movements. This was perhaps to give the lie to Greek reports that he had been seriously wounded. On the 14th January, the press stated that "our beloved President, our great deliverer" got into an ordinary tram, then rode through the Turkish quarters on the slopes of Mount Pagus and returned home by car. The language in which this information was conveyed seemed mildly ironical. On the previous day he received members of the municipality; on the 16th January he visited the industrial school, and on the 27th January he drove with Latifa Hanum through the eastern outskirts of the town.

2. The press gave great prominence to the visit of the Constantinople journalists. Some of their local colleagues, and Haidar Bey, Deputy for Denizli, and Shukri Kaya Bey, Deputy for Mentesh, went some way up the Cassaba line to meet them *en route*. On arrival at Cordelio, Dr. Nazim, the Committee of Union and Progress leader, presented them with a laurel branch, but when they reached Smyrna, the local authorities were conspicuous by their absence. Next day the press published articles by certain of them. The theme of Subhi Nuri Bey, of the "İleri," was: "We have won the war, but our present position is precarious. Our great Ghazi will give us guidance and inspiration." Ahmed Emin, of the "Vatan," wrote: "We have come to see the President and to get into touch with opinion and to remove misunderstandings." The keynote of Hussein Jahid's article was: "We do not hate, but pity, those who restrict the freedom of the press. Moreover, we want to convince them that they are wrong." Mehmet

Asim, of the "Vakt," avoided the real issue. The gist of his article was: "Our glorious armies drove out the Greek, but we have to restore devastated Smyrna. Foreign Powers failed us during the armistice. We shall, therefore, employ our own means and only use foreign capital as additional help." Similarly, Ahmet Jevdet, of the "İkdam," confined himself to saying little more than: "We have to restore our stricken country. Officials, private persons, all of us, must work hard and quickly."

3. Mustafa Kemal received the Constantinople journalists on the 4th February, the day after their arrival. Velid Bey alone, the paper stated, was not received, and that because he had given out in the "Tevhid-i Efkar" that anyone could be received for the asking. The President received the journalists again on the evening of the 5th, presented them to Latifa Hanum, and kept them to dinner - a function which was official enough for the band of the guard to perform. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's speech was reported as follows:

"Gentlemen, I am pleased to see the esteemed leaders of the press of the Turkish Republic together here and to be seated at the same table with them. A very great revolution has taken place. This revolution has been carried out in the name of the safety of the nation and in the name of right. Our nation, by establishing a democratic Government, has conquered the enemy's armies and has saved the fatherland from invasion. The victories of our glorious armies in the field have borne fruit in domain of politics. The new Government of Turkey, after showing its quality by deeds and by successes, made its name known to the whole world, thus making clear what its nature is. Contrary to what some people have alleged, it has proved that it is not hesitating and has no intention of going backwards. A republican era has opened in Turkish history.

"Gentlemen, the spirit of the nation, which was thought to be embodied in the Sultan, has been brought to the life again, although the Sultan's crown and throne have been smashed to pieces. Relying on the reawakening of the nation and on the nation's desire for progress and development, and fully confident of the nation's determination we shall fulfil all the functions of the republic.

"Comrades, the Turkish press should form a castle of steel, a castle of thought and intellect, around the republic, which is the real voice of the nation and the manifestation of its will. The republic is entitled to claim this from the leader of the press.

"It is imperative that the whole nation should be honestly united and equal. The safety and happiness of the country depend on this. The struggle is not over. It is the duty, the most important duty, of the press to convey this truth to the ear and the conscience of the nation.

"Gentlemen, we must admit that the world still needs enlightenment about New Turkey, about the Turkish Republic. We must show by irrefutable proofs that our enlightened and progressive compatriots in particular have set themselves this task.

"Those who are working in various ways for the national cause must help one another, and must comprise their difficulties in such a way that they will succeed in reaching the common goal. We know that we are faced by many difficulties and questions. We shall examine them all, and with determination, with faith and with the unshakeable strength of patriotism we shall settle them all – that patriotism which, in spite of all, is an unquenchable strength and fire within us."

4. To this Jahid Bey is reported to have replied that he found it hard to believe he was not in a dream. Everything they had longed for since the Hamidian régime had come about. And it had all been accomplished by the determination of the people and by the devotion of a national leader and deliverer. Jahid Bey said that he was going to devote himself to remedying the present position of the press. They had, as the Ghazi Pasha said, made a castle round the republic, and it was of something even stronger than steel. But unfortunately there were sometimes misunderstandings, not about their objectives and principles, but about their words. However, in principle there was no difference between them. Freedom was won by violence, but could be kept only by a considerate and generous indulgence, and not by getting angry. He was happy to see this exemplified in the Ghazi Pasha. He then drank to the health of the President and Latifa Hanım.

5. The above is all that is known of the visit of the Constantinople journalists. What its real significance may be is here only a matter of speculation. Yesterday Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his wife went by special train to Aya Soluk, where Mahmoud Essad Bey, the former Minister of Public Economy, entertained them at his farm. The President, who wore stockings, patent leather ankle-boots and spurs, took an escort of thirty cavalry with him. The railway bridges and level crossings were guarded. The party included Colonel Tewfik Bey (the delegate for the Mosul negotiations), Harun Alitcheh Bey and Shukri Kaya Bey. They went by car through Scala Nova to Sokia and returned last night. The Pasha looks unhealthy, but those who saw him a year ago notice no difference in him now. He seems to be alert in both body and

mind. It is announced that Ismet Pasha will leave Angora on the 11th instant in order to take part in a war game here, and that he will leave Smyrna with Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the 20th February.

I have, etc.

W. S. EDMONDS
Consul-General

F.O. 424/260, p.55-56, No. 39/1

No. 175

Colonel Baird to Mr. Henderson - (Enclosure in Constantinople despatch No. 124 of February 13, Received February 18)

No. 3

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 11, 1924

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on the 4th February I paid a visit to Fevzi Pasha, Chief of the Turkish General Staff. The latter had already been some weeks in Constantinople, but various suggestions made at intervals to Shukru Naili Pasha by myself, as well as by some of my colleagues, that we should like him to arrange for us to go and call on the marshal had met with the usual promises that this would be arranged, and the usual, i.e., negative result. Neither I nor any of my colleagues had as yet succeeded in seeing Fevzi Pasha. On my last visit to Shukri Naili Pasha I had mentioned the matter again, and latter, after expressing very well simulated, if not genuine, surprise at my not having yet brought off this call, had immediately telephoned to Fevzi Pasha in my presence (forgetting that he had previously told me that he could not telephone to him direct), and had there and then arranged my present visit.

2. I found Fevzi Pasha at his private residence in Kadikeuy apparently enjoying, as the press had given out that he was doing, some well-earned leave in the bosom of his family.

3. The marshal, who was in mufti, received me in a small and very simply furnished sitting room, next door to which, as was rather painfully obvious throughout my call, one of his younger members of his family was having her music lesson, whilst others seemed to be taking it in turn to gape at their father's visitor through a convenient break in the glass panel of the door.

4. After a few preliminary remarks about the weather, etc., I drew the conversation to the forthcoming visit of some Turkish officers to England, for the purpose of seeing our musketry and artillery schools, and mentioned that the British Government had at once expressed its readiness to receive these officers and give them all facilities, but that in order to facilitate the arrangements for the visit, the War Office had asked for some further details, including the date of the probable arrival of the party in England. A request for these details simultaneously with the announcement that the visit would be acceptable had been forwarded by you through the appropriate channels over a month ago, but no reply had yet been received. The marshal, whilst evidently pleased that the visit was to come off, and apparently anxious that it should do so, seemed to see nothing remarkable, much less discourteous in this delay. He merely remarked in an encouraging tone, "Peut-être vous aurez une réponse bientôt!" I then drew his attention to the difficulty in which I and my colleagues, of whom I was the senior, and I could speak for them all, found ourselves, owing to the absence from Constantinople of any representative of the Turkish Ministry of Defence, to whom we could turn for official information such as was always made readily available to military attachés in other countries – such information for example as the peace organisation, etc., of the Turkish army. The marshal agreed that we ought to have such information, but pointed out, of course, that everything was now centred at Angora, an obvious hint that that was the place in which information should be sought. However, on my remarking that there were difficulties in the way of my going there at present, and on my asking whether the marshal himself could not give me, or let one of his officers give me, such simple items of information as were obviously not of confidential nature, he readily agreed to do so. I accordingly arranged to pay him a second visit before his departure for Angora, when I would bring him a list of the information I desired.

5. During our further conversation, in the course of which the marshal's manner expanded into almost cordial affability, I gathered the following information:

(a) Mustafa Kemal is still Commander-in-chief of the army. The law appointing him so had been passed before his election to the Presidency of the Republic, and had never been repealed. It was, however, likely that his dual appointment would in due course be abolished, and another Commander-in-chief appointed.

(b) The appointments held by Kiazim Kara Bekir, Ali Fuad and Djevad Pashas were army inspectorates and not army commands, as frequently but incorrectly stated in the press. Their headquarters were at Angora, Konia and Sivas respectively.

Kiazim Kara Bekir had been specially selected for the western inspectorate, and others for their respective inspectorates, because they had not previously held commands in those areas, and it was desirable that each of them should be acquainted with the various fronts, so as to be able to take command efficiently on any front on which hostilities break out.

(c) The army was now on a peace footing, and most units were already in what was intended to be their peace stations. One or two divisions, whose peace stations would be at places like Trebizond, Kars and Erzerum, had temporarily and exceptionally been kept in the west as the winter was not a suitable time to carry out the moves to their proper stations.

(d) The reason why some divisions with such high numbers as the 41st, 57th and 61st still existed was, that during the great war, when a division became exhausted, instead of filling it up with reserves, a new division was formed, and so that by the end of the war a very high number had been reached, without this meaning in the least that divisions up to that number actually existed as fighting formations. When the campaign against the Greeks took place, certain of the divisions with high numbers still existed in suitable strength. These had therefore been maintained and kept up, and, in the case of the three he had mentioned, they had still been maintained under the present peace organisation, and the regiments comprising them had kept their original numbers. The lower numbered divisions, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. had, however, been reorganised, and I rather gathered, though this was not expressly stated, that this reorganisation was still going on.

(e) The problem of finding employment for ex-officers now surplus to establishment was, as in every other country, a difficult one. It was hoped to solve it by finding work for them as gymnastic instructors and teachers in various grades of schools and the universities. A great number of them would also be employed in connection with the construction of the many railways, which, as no doubt I knew, the Turkish Government intended to build in Anatolia.

(f) Angora was quite an agreeable place. The lack of accommodation was rapidly being made good. A hundred new houses had already been built, and 200 more would soon be ready. On my remarking that I had heard that it was rather bleak and short of trees, to give shade in summer or shelter in winter, the marshal admitted that this was so, but quite a number had recently been planted.

6. Field-Marshal Fevzi Pasha speaks French fairly fluently, looks about 50 years of age, is of good physique though rather on the stout side and of average

height. He looks like a man who has the courage of his opinions and plenty of determination to carry them out.

I have, etc.

A. W. F. BAIRD
Military Attaché

F.O. 371/10215/E.1432

F.O. 424/260, p. 49-51, No. 35

No. 176

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 117

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 11, 1924)

(Received February 18)

My Lord,

The Prime Minister of Australia, accompanied by Major-General Sir Fabian Ware, vice-chairman of the Imperial War Graves Commission, arrived at Constantinople on the 6th instant. The Turkish authorities had arranged for all the necessary facilities to be granted to him, and he was, I understand, welcomed at the frontier by a representative of the Vali of Adrianople.

2. Mr Bruce spent the day sightseeing, and the Old Saraglio was specially thrown open by the Turkish authorities for his benefit. I also arranged for Sir Fabian Ware, together with Colonel Hughes, the Director of Imperial War Graves Commission at Kilia, to have an interview with Dr. Adnan Bey, who showed them every civility. In the evening I entertained Mr. Bruce to dinner at His Majesty's Embassy.

3. H.M.S. "Calypso," Captain C. S. Scott, arrived at Constantinople at 8 A.M. on the following morning, and, after exchanging the usual salutes with the Turkish shore batteries, anchored off Haidar Pasha. I took Mr. Bruce and his party off in the Embassy launch "Makook," and accompanied them in the "Calypso" down to Kilia, which we reached about 6 o'clock in the evening.

4. The 8th February was spent in visiting the cemeteries of the Cape Helles area, and the 9th February those of Anzac and Suvla. In the two and a half days that he was down at Kilia, Mr. Bruce managed to inspect every single cemetery throughout the peninsula.

5. Mr. Bruce's pilgrimage and the circumstances which attended it, more particularly the placing at his disposal for the purpose of a British warship, are likely to produce the very best effect. The visit will have brought home to the Turks the imperial aspect of those cemeteries and the very deep and fervent interest taken by Australia and New Zealand in the graves of the members of their first expeditionary forces. The experience which the Turkish army had of the Australian and New Zealand troops during the war is, indeed, not calculated to encourage it to risk a second encounter with them. It was not without significance that the kaimacam of Gallipoli - who asked for an interview with Mr. Bruce, Sir F. Ware and myself on the Saturday - informed us that he had recently received definite instructions from Angora to facilitate in every way the work of the commission.

6. I trust that this declaration of good intention may prove sincere and lasting, and that Mr. Bruce's observations to the kaimacam will be faithfully reported to Angora. There is however, a factor to be reckoned with, namely, a hitherto ineradicable conviction among the Turks, and not only among them, that the cemeteries are a cloak for ulterior and sinister designs. In conversation with me, Adnan Bey has more than once somewhat shamefacedly referred to these suspicions. In rebutting them I have suggested that those who hold them should go down and see for themselves. In speaking to the kaimacam I expressed the hope that Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself would inspect the cemeteries once the work on them had been finally completed. I am of opinion that an official visit to them by the President, who himself fought on the peninsula, would, if it can be arranged at some later date, be of real value.

7. Mr. Bruce left Kilia on the 10th instant on board H.M.S. "Calypso," for Port Said. I returned myself by the Khedivial steamship "Fezara" on the same day to Constantinople. Sir F. Ware was to remain at Kilia a few days longer, in order to have an opportunity of a more detailed inspection.

8. I cannot refrain from taking this opportunity of a personal visit to Kilia to pay a warm tribute to the excellence of the work which, in spite of climatic and other difficulties, and of Turkish distrust and sometimes open obstructiveness, has been and is being performed by Colonel Hughes and the other members of the commission on the peninsula. Colonel Hughes is himself a most efficient and capable officer, with great driving power and initiative. He has moreover, established with Turks on Gallipoli those excellent personal relations which are indispensable if the work is to be carried on without interruption.

9. I was much impressed by the arrangement of the cemeteries and the simplicity and good taste of the designs. They constitute in this south-eastern

highway of Europe a wonderful memorial of the magnitude of the rôle played by the British Empire in the great war.

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 424/260, p. 47-48, No. 33

No.177

Colonel Baird, Military Attaché, to Mr. R.C. Lindsay, British Representative

No. 4

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 15, 1924

Sir,

I have the honour to draw attention to the Military Conference which is now being held at Smyrna, and which, to judge from the status of the members reported to be attending, may be of some importance.

2. Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself, Ismet Pasha, Marshal Fevzi Pasha, Chief of the General Staff and his assistant Assim Pasha, as well as practically every Army Corps Commander are said to be taking part.

3. According to the Turkish Press reports Shukri Naili Pasha, the Commander of the 3rd Army Corps, has stated that the conference has been summoned for the purpose of reviewing the conduct of the late campaign against the Greeks, apparently much as it is usual in European countries to hold conference at the conclusion of Army Manoeuvres, to discuss the various orders issued and the episodes which occurred, with a view to pointing out mistakes, and nothing for future guidance the special points, if any, which the manoeuvres have brought to light.

4. To hold a conference of this sort after actual field operations would be somewhat of a novelty, as far as I know. The inconveniences and difficulties which would result from a free and unfettered discussion of orders and actions of officers who, in some cases, are no longer alive, or on which criticisms have already been passed, and for which rewards have already been issued, are quite obvious.

5. It therefore seems hardly likely that this conference at Smyrna has really been summoned, as has been given out to the Press, for nothing more than a retrospective review of the late campaign against the Greeks, though the presence of Ismet Pasha, who was in command of the Western front, would of

course be practically indispensable if indeed this were the case - or it was desired to simulate its being so.

6. In the meantime rumours as to its real purpose are of course already in circulation. The French Consul General is said to have reported to his Government that an early campaign against Syria is under preparation. The 'Times' correspondent here has heard, from a Turkish source, that a Russian campaign is in contemplation on the Caucasian front. A distinguished British resident of long experience in Turkey is reported to be convinced that Mosul in particular, and Irak in general, will monopolise the conference's attention. And, had I only a Greek and Bulgarian colleague here, I should no doubt have heard that the expansion of Turkey in Europe was to be the chief item in the agenda.

7. If I may venture to express an opinion, it is, that the conference will discuss any and every problem, whether it be of an interior or exterior nature, with which the Turkish Army may have to deal in the immediate future, and that the explanation for which has been given out to the public is merely a typical Turkish, and childish, attempt to conceal what might otherwise strike the public, as it certainly appears to be doing, as a rather alarming indication of further trouble in store.

I have, etc.

A.W.F. BAIRD
Colonel
Military Attaché

P.S.

The translation below of a Turkish Press extract of 17th February, 1924, which appeared after I had written the above, seems to bear out the views expressed in paragraph 7.

"Mustafa Kemal Pasha in his speech on the occasion of opening of the Smyrna War Council declared that the object of the present discussion was to secure the greatest benefits for the defence of the country. The military movements of the Nationalist war would be reviewed and judged and the progress of the civilised world in technical questions would be taken into consideration. He invited Ismet Pasha to give explanations on world politics and the Turkish foreign situation. The proceedings were thereafter secret, all except Commanders being requested to withdraw. The secret discussions lasted three hours. The War Council will be resumed to-morrow."

F.O. 371/10215

No.178

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Lindsay

No. 23

SMYRNA, February 16, 1924

Sir,

I have the honour to report that early on the morning of the 11th instant the ex-Khedive's yacht "Nimetullah" arrived here under the Turkish flag and with a German crew. The Khedive was on board and also a man named de Averino who seems to have various nationalities. The Khedive landed in the afternoon and was received by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. He with Latifa Hanum and various generals he attended a charity performance at the cinema and made a substantial contribution L 350 sterling. The "Nimetullah" left the same night. I have not learnt that anyone or any material was taken on board her here, but this might have happened without detection. Her destination was said at Dalaman (Deirmen), north of Marmarice. It is reported that Sheikh Ahmed es Senussi will be here in a few days.

2. Almost at the moment of Khedive's arrival İsmet Pasha, Kiazim Pasha (the Minister of Defence) and other senior officers reached Smyrna by train and were welcomed with kisses by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff arrived later. Others who are reported to have come are Generals Kiazim Karabekir, Ali Fuad, Fahredin, Assim, Shukri Naili (3rd Army Corps), Ali Hikmet, Said, Kemaleddin Sami, Osman Shevket, Emin Assim, Jafer Tayar, Halid (formerly in command of the Koja Eli group and now apparently retired and deputy), Nazmi, İzzeddin (1st Army Corps), Jevad; divisional commanders colonels Hussein Husni and Dervish; and staff colonel Osman Zati. The Generals have had a good reception.

3. The object of this gathering is given out as being a war game. It was announced that the President of the Republic was very pleased with the game as played on the 11th inst., and that Latifa Hanum was there too. To-day it is stated the game was played yesterday afternoon in the Ghazi's presence by all the officers assembled here. There are no military movement and nothing is noticeable except military officers driving furiously in cars. Telegraphic communication was quite closed down without explanation or warning from Feb. 11th to 13th inclusive - i.e. exactly for the time of the Khedive's stay. Postal communication was probably cut off too, but posts are so irregular that it is difficult to be sure of this. Telegrams which I despatched to the Foreign Office and Admiralty were at first refused and then accepted but garbled. A telegram which I sent to His Majesty's Consul General at Alexandria may have got

through. On the 14th I was able to send, by a safe opportunity, despatches to His Majesty's Legation at Athens briefly reporting the above events, and also to report the Nimetullah's departure, by wireless to Athens and Alexandria before cables were free from congestion.

4. The feeling that something was being hatched and the impossibility of learning what it was caused a little uneasiness here. My Italian colleague was on the look-out for preparations for the Khedive to land with Turkish support somewhere in Egypt or Tripoli, but, I believe, found no indication of this. A report that the Caliph had had a difference with Mustafa Kemal Pasha culminating in the Caliph's flat refusal to hand Dolma Bagcheh Palace over to the Pasha, suggested that the Kemalist Government might be sounding the ex-Khedive about his assuming the Caliphate. My French colleague tells me he has it on good authority that the assembly of generals is planning an offensive in case the treaty should not be ratified. He adds, perhaps with truth, that without military adventure this government must fall. On the other hand the assembly of the Kemalist generals may be rather a sequel to the visit of the Constantinople journalists. It is now fairly certain that Hussein Jahid Bey criticised the government much more roundly than was publicly announced. (Please see paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 19 of 9th instant). In any case the reason for the holding up of communications remains obscure. Well-informed Turks of C.U.P. sympathies seem to expect an internal upheaval in a month or two. On the other hand there is a fairly persistent rumour here that the Italian Government contemplates a coup against Smyrna. I happen to know that my Italian colleague has been asked to be more regular in reporting naval information.

I have, etc.

W.S. EDMONDS
Consul General

F.O. 371/10215

No. 179

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 142

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 20, 1924
(Received February 27)

My Lord,

The fortnight which has elapsed since the date of Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 104 of the 6th February has been marked by the same absence of

striking developments in the Turkish political situation as the period reviewed in that despatch. There have again been a certain number of minor portents which are worth according.

2. The Court of Independence disappeared unostentatiously from Constantinople within a few days of termination of the abortive conspiracy trial which ended on the 5th February. The whole business was finally liquidated by the Grand National Assembly on the 15th February when it was unanimously decided to pardon the three persons convicted by the court, namely, Lutfi Fikri Bey, the "khoja" Ibrahim Ethem, and lighterman Ali Osman.

3. Nothing has been disclosed as to what passed between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Constantinople editors of the four hours' interview which he gave them on the 4th February. On the following day the Pasha entertained the journalists at dinner and speeches were delivered. These speeches have been published but are of no great interest, except that Jahid Bey, the spokesman of the journalists, seems to have hinted pretty plainly that if the President wished for the support of the press, he must treat it with consideration. I enclose a copy of a despatch from Mr. Edmonds giving the gist of the speeches and other particulars of the editors' pilgrimage.

4. Indications subsequent to the return of the journalists to Constantinople make it probable that Mustafa Kemal, whose intention of entering on a definite new phase of his career is increasingly clear, secured on certain terms the support of the leading editors. What those terms may have been is still a matter of surmise, but it seems probable that the support to be accorded is personal to Mustafa Kemal Pasha and does not extend to Ismet Pasha's Government. It is indeed suggested in some quarters that the President has already decided to discard Ismet Pasha and to give the Opposition leaders, including the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress, a place in his next combination.

5. Be that as it may, the note struck by the principal editors in the leading articles in which they recorded their impressions of their journey was one of loyalty to the President and the Republic combined with insistence on the crying need for better Government. "Had the editorial columns of the 'Tanin,'" says Jahid Bey in his leading article in that paper of the 8th February, "contained articles written by His Excellency Ghazi Pasha, my readers would undoubtedly have found in them writings far more courageous than my own. But what Cabinet is to give effect to these ideas? What a pity it is that I see the Ghazi Pasha so luckless as regards his comrades in idea, resolution and will."

6. It is not difficult to see a connection between the reception of the journalists by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the gathering of military leaders at Smyrna, a report on which, by my military attaché, is enclosed in my despatch No. 146 of the 20th February. It is as natural that in constructing a new basis for his future activity, the Pasha should seek to assure himself of the support of the army as to the placate the press. Rumours of disaffection towards him in high military quarters have long been rife and it may safely be assumed that one of the objects, if not the principal object, of collecting round him at this moment practically all the officers holding commands is to arrive at such an understanding with them as will enable him to count upon them and their troops in any contingency. It is noteworthy that at the outset of the proceedings on the 15th February, the President asked Ismet Pasha for a statement on the political situation of the world generally and the foreign situation in Turkey in particular, and that, after Ismet Pasha had spoken for over an hour, the staff officers present were requested to withdraw in order to leave their superiors free to engage in secret discussion which lasted three hours.

7. I learn indirectly that when the editors visited him at Smyrna, Mustafa Kemal evinced a feeling towards the Caliphate which could only be described as hatred. This, taken in conjunction with the statement published unofficially that he contemplates a tour in the spring which will include Constantinople, suggest the possibility that he may have in mind action designed to diminish still further the position of the Caliph, as for instance his removal from Constantinople. The situation would certainly be a delicate one if the President of the Republic came here and had to decide what should be his attitude toward the Caliph, in residence, more especially as the attack on His Majesty mentioned in Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 104 of the 6th February has been followed up by others of a less offensive, but equally insidious character. It has been suggested that no member of the ex-Imperial family, other than the Caliph himself, should be granted an allowance from the Treasury, that His Majesty should lead a simple life and be content with one palace, and that the titles of honour still given to other members of the family should be discontinued. There was quite a breeze in the Assembly on the 9th February over use of those titles in the budget estimates.

8. In this connection would draw attention to an interview with Mustafa Kemal which recently appeared in the "Revue des Deux Mondes" and to which prominence was given in all the important Constantinople papers of the 11th February. In this interview the Pasha held language regarding the Caliphate the trend of which it is difficult to follow, if it be read by itself, but which appears to have been equally intended to discredit the Caliphate at home and to exonerate Turkey from the suspicion of wishing to use it for pan-Islamic purposes abroad.

I have not seen the original of the article, but the Turkish papers state definitely that the interview was given before the proclamation of the republic and that it has appeared in Paris.

9. The Constitutional Committee of the Assembly has continued its labours and has produced the draft of a new Fundamental Law, consisting of about 100 articles, which is expected soon to be laid before the Assembly. Some stir has been created by the proposal that all non-foreign inhabitants of Turkey should be called Turks and should enjoy equal rights, irrespective of creed. At least two Constantinople Turkish papers criticise this suggestion adversely. One of them, the ultra-Islamic "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," in its issue of the 16th February, attacks the proposal with characteristic violence, on the ground that it is not fair to assimilate the poisonous non-Moslem elements to the Moslem inhabitants, who are alone entitled to be called Turks. In other circles, it is not thought that the use of a common name for Moslem and non-Moslem citizens will of itself be much more efficacious than similar provisions in previous constitutional measures since 1839. Nevertheless, it must in fairness be said that papers like the "Tanin" advocate a more generous and national attitude toward non-Moslems than has been observed of late, and the proposed wording of the new law is of some value as indicating that responsible people at Angora are inclined, at least in principle, to subscribe to this moderate view.

10. It is anticipated that Ismet Pasha will return to Angora towards the end of the present week. According to the latest unofficial reports, he and Mustafa Kemal, with various other persons, who have attended the military conference at Smyrna, will probably return together, on the 23rd February. In any case, Mustafa Kemal is expected to return before the 1st March, when he will presumably open in person the proceedings of the Grand National Assembly for the new financial year. Altogether, what with the imminent discussion on the budget and the new Constitution, and the return to activity of Mustafa Kemal, there can hardly fail to be important developments in the near future. It remains to be seen what the attitude of Ismet Pasha's opponents will be. On the 12th February, Ismail Djambolat and Reouf Beys created an incident in the Assembly by alleging that letters addressed to them had been opened in the post. Three days were allowed for an enquiry, at the end of which time the Minister of the Interior seems to have had little difficulty in satisfying the Assembly that there had been no irregularity. The approved explanation of any apparent tampering with letters appears to be that, if opened at all, they are opened in Jugoslavia, and that, for the rest, letters would be less likely to arrive open if the senders used stationery prepared with better gum.

11. An indication that the Opposition, so far as it is an Opposition to Mustafa Kemal, has either been squared or intimidated, is afforded by the fact that Reouf Bey left Angora rather unexpectedly on the 18th February. He is

reported to be going to Carlsbad for reasons of health, but there is also some talk of his having been entrusted with a mission which will take him, in due course, to Berlin, Paris, and possibly London. Some little time earlier, a hint was given that discipline was to be maintained in the People's party by the expulsion from it of one apparently the resolution in favour of increasing the salary of Deputies.

12. I have mentioned in a separate despatch the Turkish attitude towards Great Britain, as manifested on the occasion of my own arrival here as the first representative appointed by the new British Government. As regards France, there was a violent, though brief, press campaign on the 6th February and the following days, arising out of the report that the French Government intended to make their ratification of the Peace Treaty dependent on their obtaining satisfaction regarding French schools in Turkey. The "İleri," of the 10th February, published an interview with the French representative here, in which he sought to attenuate the seriousness of the controversy. This elicited a further protestation in the same paper, on the 12th February, that no privileges could be granted to French schools. Since then little more has been heard of the matter, possibly because of the return of Colonel Mougin to Angora, and an assurance by him, in an interview in the "Hakimiet-i-Millî," of the 12th February, that the treaty will be ratified in March, have encouraged the hope that the French Government will ratify without imposing conditions.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/260, p. 53-55, No. 39

No. 180

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Lindsay

No. 26

SMYRNA, February 22, 1924

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the following is the speech which Mustafa Kemal Pasha is reported in the press to have made at the opening of the "War-Game" on the 15th instant.

2. "Gentlemen - We have had few opportunities of meeting during the last year and half. Before then we used often to meet on the battle field. I have greatly regretted to have been so long unable to meet my trusted comrades. I did not wish to leave it to chance to bring us together again. I therefore arranged a meeting here in Smyrna. You will understand that it was impossible

for me to be content with arranging for a meeting of the senior officers who represent the whole army and of those of my comrades who were able to come here. I am however happy to be with you now. I offer to you and to the valiant armies of the Republic as represented by you my respectful greetings.

3. "My comrades, Smyrna and this assembly of commanding officers recalls to us memories of many things which bound us together in the field of battle and which I think will unite us until we die.

4. "At the same time this meeting will be of the highest importance to the interests of our army and the nation. During the days which we shall pass together playing a war-game, we shall have in view the higher interests of the country and its defence. We shall examine the results and experiences gained in the recent victorious years, by the armies of the Republic and their esteemed comrades.

5. "We shall have in view the latest development of the world's science and industry. We shall pay attention to bringing the equipment of our heroic army and its system of instruction into harmony with its real requirements.

6. "Comrades, with all solemnity I say that the Republic cannot be negligent in the defence of its independence and sovereignty which it knows to be sacred "

7. It is briefly announced that this morning that the "War-Game" has come to an end. What really passed at these meetings remains unknown. As I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 8 of today's date Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Latifa Hanum and Ismet Pasha left by special train for Angora in the early hours of this morning. No ceremony preceded their departure. It is announced that Fevzi Pasha and the rest of the generals who had come here will leave tomorrow. To-night they are to be entertained at a big dinner at the only hotel.

I have etc.

W. S. EDMONDS
Consul-General

F.O. 371/10215 - 828/97/1924

No. 181

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald (Received March 3)

No. 162

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 26, 1924

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 142 of the 20th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the draft Turkish Constitution

prepared by the Constitutional Committee of the Grand National Assembly.* This translation appeared on the 19th February and the following days in the French edition of the "Tanin," a new journalistic venture of Jahid Bey's.

2. Many of the proposals embodied in the draft will probably be hotly debated in the Assembly, unless, indeed, they are first submitted to the People's party for consideration. This procedure has been restored to in more than one recent instance, but there has been no suggestion so far that it will be applied in the case of the draft Constitution. When used, it a considerable weapon in the hands of the Angora leaders, because practically every Deputy is a member of the party, no one has hitherto been willing to ban it by his own act, and it is a rule that decision taken by a majority of the party must receive the support of all its members in the Assembly.

3. The following points in the draft Constitution merit special attention:

There is no mention of the Caliph except in the one article which disqualifies him and all members of his family for membership of the Grand National Assembly. This omission is the more noteworthy as it was laid down in the Constitution of 1876 that the Caliphate was vested in the person of the Sultan of Turkey, and when in 1922 the Sultanate was abolished it was expressly stated that the Caliphate was vested in the House of Osman, that the Caliph was to be elected from among the members of that House by the Grand National Assembly, and that the Turkish State was "the support of the Caliphate."

4. No distinction of sex is made in the articles defining the qualifications for the vote for membership of the Assembly or for Turkish citizenship. It can hardly be assumed that this means the enfranchisement of women, but it is quite probably intended to leave the question open.

5. There is no provision for Senate or a Council of State. There is, however, a growing feeling in favour of both, especially a Council of State, and the question of instituting such bodies is likely to be broached in the course of debates.

6. Otherwise the draft shows considerable signs of what may be described as a conservative tendency. The fiction that all power, executive, legislative and judicial, is vested in the Assembly, and is exercised by that body through suitable persons of its own choice, practically disappears. The executive, once brought into existence, is invested with considerable powers. They include the

* Ciltte yok. - BNS.

right of ordering new elections, the right of referring back legislation, with the important stipulation that a two-thirds majority in the Assembly is necessary for instance on legislation so referred, and the right of pardon in individual cases. The principles that the President of the Republic chooses the Prime Minister, that the Prime Minister selects his colleagues, and that the Cabinet is collectively responsible are clearly affirmed.

7. The position of the executive, and more especially of the President of the Republic, is still further strengthened by the proposals that the Assembly need not necessarily sit for more than six months in the year, that the President shall hold office for seven years (while the life of the Assembly, though doubled, is still to be only four years), and that the Government may proclaim martial law, if the Assembly be not in session.

8. It will be further observed that the President of the Republic must not be member of the Assembly, and that his personal immunity is to be very considerable.

9. So long as Mustafa Kemal Pasha retains his personal ascendancy it may be expected that these proposals, if passed, will tend to consolidate his authority, whatever the theoretical effect of some of them may be.

10. The stipulation in article 23 that no public function, except that of Minister, under-secretary or professor in the university, may be combined with the office of Deputy is novel and important. Hitherto not only have many military officers sat in the Assembly, but many various high posts both at home and abroad have been conferred on Deputies.

11. The question of supreme command of the army has been reserved. As you are aware, it is still exercised by Mustafa Kemal, not *ex officio*, but in virtue of a special law.

12. The articles on the rights of Turkish citizens call for little comment. In my despatch under reference I dealt with the proposal that all citizens should be called indiscriminately "Turks." These articles also imply that even Moslems are free to change their faith. Otherwise they assure to the citizen of the future rights similar to those which were conferred by the Constitution of 1876, to go no further back, and which successive Turkish Governments have always found means to disregard.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 182

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald*No. 166
*Confidential*CONSTANTINOPLE, February 27, 1924
(Received March 3)

Sir,

I venture to suggest that my telegram No. 33 of the 25th February, relative to the position of the Caliph, should be read in conjunction with paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 142 of the 26th February, in which I draw attention to the silence of the proposed new Constitution of Turkey regarding the relations between the Caliph and the Turkish Republic.

2. Just before I called on Adnan Bey on the 25th February, Sir Adam Block told me that he had heard from Javid Bey, that the Angora leaders had decided to get rid of the Caliph. I had already heard from a very secret source, which I believe to be independent, that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had decided that the Caliph and all the members of his family, except a few old ladies, must be banished, and that the Pasha's conferences with journalists and military officers at Smyrna were intended to prepare the way for this. I was therefore not unprepared for the substance of Adnan Bey's statement, but I was astonished at his comparative outspokenness. It was my first business interview with him, and even with persons whom he knows better he is, as a rule, discreet to the point of reserve.

3. The "laic" tendency on which Mr. Henderson laid stress in his despatch No. 30 of the 9th January, manifests itself more and more openly. It renders easy the task of those who feel, like Mustafa Kemal Pasha, that the republic must divorce itself entirely from religious conceptions, and that it cannot be secure so long as the House of Osman retains even a vestige of its former authority and prestige. I was much struck at the frankness with which Yusuf Kemal Bey elaborated this theme to me in a conversation I had with him before leaving London.

4. The press now abounds in suggestions that not only the Caliphate but other religious institutions bound up with the fabric of the old Turkish State must be dealt with in a radical fashion by the republican régime. It is openly stated that the Caliphate is a useless burden on the finances of Turkey; that it should be maintained in a simpler and less costly style; and that, indeed, there is no reason why Turkey should alone be responsible for the expense entailed. The last of these suggestions is one which has been ventilated during the last

few days. It is particularly tendentious, for while it helps to discredit the Caliphate as being a drain in the resources of the country, it is difficult to conceive any practical plan by which a Turkish Caliph could be made to rely on the contributions of the Moslem world without a complete alteration of his status. It is urged at the same time that religious tribunals and religious schools as at present constituted are anomalous and anachronistic in a modern republic, and that it is equally absurd to retain a Minister of Moslem Religious Affairs (corresponding to the former Sheikh-ul-Islam) in the Cabinet.

5. These indications and tendencies make it very probable that when Mustafa Kemal makes his statement of policy in the Grand National Assembly on the 1st March, he will outline some definite scheme for asserting the lay character of the republic. There is a widespread feeling that he will not confine himself to religious tribunals and schools, or to elimination of the Minister of Religious Affairs from the Government, but will tackle once for all the problem of excluding the Caliph from any possibility of intervention in State affairs. Should this be his intention, it is difficult to see how it can be realised without some sort of *coup*.

6. I may mention, in conclusion, that, according to the secret sources already mentioned, İsmet Pasha told the generals assembled at Smyrna that he hoped that the banishment of the Caliph family and the nationalisation of the ex-Imperial property (which is also said to be part of the plan) would allay British suspicions of pan-Islamism, and would tend to make His Majesty's Government less intractable on the question of Mosul.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/260, p. 59-60, No. 45

No. 183

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald

No. 139
(Telegraphic)

PARIS, March 4, 1924
(Received March 5)

"TEMPS" to-night displays a tendency to defend the action of the Grand National Assembly in suppressing the Caliphate. It affects to understand that this event will be used as propaganda in India "against the friends of Turkey

and against the independence of the Asiatic nations," and proceed to urge that in reality the Caliphate is of no importance and was not so in the past. What is of importance is Turkish military power, and Mustafa Kemal's recent words expressing confidence in the courage of the Turkish army, which are likely to create more impression in India than pleadings on behalf of the ex-Caliph. "Temps" concludes with rather a significant citation of French grievances against Turkey, contrasting the recall of Colonel Mougin from Angora with the opening of Turco-German negotiations.

The "Journal des Débats," after explaining that the disappearance of the Caliph is the logical consequence of events since 1908, recommends reserve in judging of its consequences. It, however, remarks that this step means the ruin of French schools and institutions in the Near East, and ends on the same plaintive note as the "Temps."

F.O. 424/260, p. 60, No. 46

No. 184

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 188
Confidential

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 5, 1924
(Received March 10)

Sir,

Since the date of my despatch No. 166 of the 27th February, the question of the Caliphate and, in a lesser degree, the proposed measures for asserting the lay character of the Turkish Republic and for dissociating the army from politics – in fact, the whole plan for "completing the revolution" to use a phrase now much in vogue – have absorbed public attention in this country. In my telegram No. 43 of the 4th March I reported briefly the final decisions taken at Angora on the preceding day. I have now the honour to relate in greater detail the course of events during the past week and the steps taken in Constantinople to give effect to the decision to depose and expel the Caliph.

2. Rumours of impending crisis and anti-Caliphal propaganda continued to abound in the Constantinople press during the last days of February. It was more than ever evident that a strong hint had been given to prepare the public mind for great changes. Among the straws in the wind was an announcement that the Palace band had been summoned to Angora. It was universally anticipated that Mustafa Kemal's speech in the Assembly would mark the

inauguration of a new era. Telegrams flowed in from Angora foreshadowing the liquidation of what had survived from the old Ottoman Empire. "Radical reforms" were to be the order of the day. Mustafa Kemal Pasha and İsmet Pasha held long conferences, on the 26th February, with Mustafa Fevzi Efendi, the Minister of Religious Affairs. A meeting of the People's party was announced for the forenoon of the 28th February, at which, it was stated, grave questions would be discussed, such as the excision from the budget of the credits for the Caliphate, the expulsion of the Imperial family, the exclusion from the Cabinet of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the abolition of religious courts and the adoption of a uniform system of public instruction in place of the dual system of religious and lay schools. The way for this meeting was paved at a budget debate in the Assembly itself on the 27th February, when Vassif Bey, lately Public Prosecutor of the Constantinople Court of Independence, and others made fiery speeches.

3. On the 28th February, however, no final decisions were taken on the graver issues. The party meeting was adjourned to the 2nd March. In the Assembly itself Fethi Bey, the President, whose re-election had been decided on by the party, delivered his speech on the occasion of the end of the financial year, and an interim budget for the month of March was adopted. For the rest, it was left for Mustafa Kemal to announce his programme on the 1st March, although fairly accurate forecasts of the "radical reforms" were published broadcast. On the 29th February a midnight conference was held at the President's private house near Angora.

4. Mustafa Kemal's speech, when actually delivered, was somewhat of an anti-climax as regards its outward form, but it has to be read in the light of what was already known to be in the mind of himself and his associates. In contrast with many of his previous utterances, it had somewhat the character of a Presidential Message, almost of a Speech from the Throne. It contained allusions of unmistakable significance, but it left the Assembly to evolve the actual measures to be taken. Thus there was no mention whatsoever of the Caliphate. What the Pasha said was: "The nation asks that the republic should now and in the future be protected from all attacks absolutely and for ever." I enclose a report of the speech as published in the "Journal d'Orient" of the 2nd March, and, though they are not relevant to the subject of the present despatch, I would direct particular attention to the concluding passage dealing with foreign relations, the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne and the attitude of Turkey towards the League of Nations.

5. On the 2nd March the People's party again met. Four draft laws had been prepared, dealing respectively with the abolition of the Caliphate, the abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the unification of public instruction and the abolition of the Ministerial post of Chief of the General

Staff, to be replaced by a new Chief of the General Staff outside the Cabinet. Article 1 of the first of these Bills as originally drafted ran: "The Caliph is deposed and the office of Caliph is abolished." Article 2 forbade "eternally" the residence in Turkey of the deposed Caliph, all princes and princesses of the blood and the wives and husbands of living princes and princesses. All, except the children of princesses who were not to be considered members of the dynasty, were to leave Turkey within ten days and to lose their Turkish nationality. They were to liquidate their affairs and property in Turkey within a year. Imperial as opposed to personal property was to pass to the nation. Travelling expenses were to be paid, but the Bill made no provision for maintenance in exile.

6. The Bill for the Abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs proposed the creation of a "Presidency of Religious Affairs," the incumbent of which was to be appointed by the President of the Republic on the nomination of the Prime Minister, and was to exercise stated functions in connection with appointments to mosques, etc. The Bill made no mention of religious tribunals, the suppression of which is perhaps either implied or left to be dealt with in the new Constitution. The third Bill provided that all educational establishments should be placed under the Ministry of Public Instruction, that a theological faculty should be instituted in the university and that minor schools should be created for the training of subordinate person exercising religious functions. The fourth laid down that the new Chief of the General Staff should in time of peace exercise supreme command in the army, as substitute for the President of the Republic, that he should be independent in his functions, that he should be appointed by the President on the nomination of the Prime Minister, and that the Minister of National Defence should be responsible to the Assembly for the military budget.

7. The party meeting debated these Bills at intervals throughout the whole of the 2nd March. They were finally adopted without considerable modification, except that the saving clause in the Caliphate Law in favour of the children of princesses was rejected (the number of persons to be expelled being thus greatly increased), and the clause providing for the abolition pure and simple of the office of Caliph was amplified to the phrase "the function of Caliph being essentially included in the meaning and connotation of government and republic, the office of Caliph is abolished."

8. This formula was a compromise between the original proposal and a suggestion that the office of Caliph should be vested in the Grand National Assembly or in the Presidency of the Republic. Its precise meaning is obscure, and to some it presents the appearance of a contradiction in terms. It must, I think, be interpreted in the light of the discussions on the subject. The parties to those discussions were much concerned with the original conception of the

Caliphal office in and after the time of Prophet. They were equally concerned with modern conceptions of popular government in an extreme democratic form. Faced with two abstract theories which involve in reality an irreconcilable conflict between theocracy and democracy, they restored to a formula which for them means, not that *the* Caliphate is merged, much less vested, in *the* republic, but that the Caliphate, or the function of Caliph in the abstract, as conceived in the early days of Islam, merges in government and republic, *i.e.* popular government, again in the abstract, as conceived to-day. While hazarding this theoretical explanation, I need hardly say that the formula lends itself to more practical subsequent interpretations, and may easily be used at some future time to justify a revival of the Caliphate in some form suitable to the convenience of the Turks, as the situation in Turkey and the Modern world develops.

9. It only remained for the laws to be passed by the Grand National Assembly. This was done on the 3rd March. Their adoption was a forgone conclusion after the party meeting, but the debates were nevertheless heated. One Deputy had the courage to oppose the Caliphate law as a whole, and was howled down. Another reverted to the proposal to maintain in some form the office of Caliph, while depriving the House of Osman. He dwelt upon the political importance of the institution, the announcements during the national struggle that the Caliphate was to be saved, the prevalence of the belief that if there were no Caliphate there could be no Friday prayer, the danger of unfavourable repercussions at home, the impression created by indifference of the pilgrimage and mistaken policy in Arabia. İsmet Pasha and others contested these arguments, and the law was adopted, apparently by a crushing majority. The chauvinism of the Assembly is best illustrated by the fact that when Mustafa Kemal himself proposed, at a meeting of the party held in an interval in the debate, that princesses should be exempted from expulsion order, his supporters refused to accept the proposal.

10. The law allows ten days for the departure of the dynasty which has reigned in Turkey for six centuries and a quarter. The Caliph is so powerless and unsupported that this modest delay might have been accorded to the prince for whose Person even extreme Nationalists profess respect and esteem. To the Angora Government it seemed otherwise. The Director of Public Security had been sent to Constantinople. He, with the Vali and the Director of Police, waited up on the evening of the 3rd March for official orders from Angora. Having received them, they went late at night to the Palace and informed the Caliph of his deposition. A few hours only were allowed him to make his preparations for departure. In the early hours of the morning of the 4th March (it happened by an ironic coincidence to be the Feast of the Ascension of the Prophet) he with his son and other members of his immediate family were hurried off by motor-car to the station of Chatalja on the railway between

Constantinople and the Bulgarian frontier. Up to the evening of the 4th March it was not certainly known what had become of them. It is believed that they were placed in the Simplon express train in the evening and were to proceed to Berne, but nothing is publicly known as to the arrangements made.

11. It is too soon to judge of the effect of this bold stroke of the Angora Government. There is undoubtedly much disquiet in men's minds. There must be many who think in their hearts with a poor madman who on the 3rd March snatched a green coverlet from a shrine in Stamboul and ran through the streets, crying "O Caliph, whither art thou going?" There are, however, no signs of covert opposition to the decrees of Angora. Should saner people think to follow the madman's example, they have had their warning in unofficial intimation from the capital that an addition is to be made to the Law of Treason making it an offence against that law to criticise the reforms, and that independence courts, with power to inflict the death penalty without reference to the Assembly, are to be set up in various places, including Constantinople. It is a proof of the despair of the Conservatives that on the 2nd March Velid Bey, the editor of the one strongly Islamic daily paper in Constantinople, left unexpectedly for abroad.

12. The question of the maintenance of the Caliph and his numerous relatives promises to be a serious problem. Before the recent decisions take final shape it was anticipated that certain lump sums would be granted to them. The law, however, speaks only of travelling expenses, and, unless this term is widely construed, it will fare hard with many of the family, for, while some have means of their own, there are believed to be a great number who are practically without any personal fortune.

I have, etc.

N. HENDERSON

F.O. 424/260, p. 72-74, No. 52

No.185

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 200

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 8, 1924
(Received March 17)

Sir,

Adnan Bey called on me to-day to apprise me of a telegraphic correspondence which had just taken place between Mustafa Kemal Pasha on

the one hand, and Shaukat Ali, in India, and one Abdul Hamid, in Egypt, on the other, regarding the abolition of the Caliphate. Abdul Hamid, he thought, was a member of the Hizb-el Watani.

2. These two gentlemen had sent telegrams to Mustafa Kemal, the nature of which Adnan Bey did not repeat to me. They were, however, clearly critical of the action taken here. Mustafa Kemal had answered in order to clear up the misconceptions under which Shaukat Ali and Abdul Hamid were labouring. From the somewhat confused account given me by Adnan Bey I gathered that the pasha had answered that the action taken this week was a purely domestic concern of the Turkish people, for whom the Caliphate had been a cause of embarrassment and trouble in both internal affairs and foreign relations. In the days of the Prophet, when the Caliphate was founded, the institution was intended to connote precisely the same thing as Government, it being at that time contemplated that Islam would spread its influence over the whole world. The lapse of time had proved that this consummation was impossible, and the original idea of the Caliphate thus fell to the ground. There was therefore nothing contrary to Islam in the action taken in those last days in regard to the institution.

3. Adnan Bey said that this exchange of telegrams might come to the knowledge of the British authorities, and give rise in their minds to exaggerated or erroneous impressions; he therefore desired me to know their contents. He impressed on me that his communication was quite unofficial, but I have no doubt whatever that it was made to me on direct instructions from Angora. This sudden desire for correctitude towards His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Turkish Government may therefore confirm the report mentioned in my despatch No. 166 of the 27th February, paragraph 6, that, with especial regard to the Mosul negotiations, they intend to exploit the abolition of the Caliphate as proving that pan-Islamism is dead, and that Great Britain henceforth has no reason to fear in the future the troubles in her Mahommedan dependencies which it has caused in the past.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 186

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr. MacDonald

No. 64
Telegraphic

CAIRO, March 11, 1924
(Received March 12)

There is general disapproval in vernacular press and in Egyptian circles of proclamation of King Hussein as Caliph; his pretensions are characterised as arrogant and absurd, and are attributed in some quarters to British instigation.

Prayers were offered for Abdel Megid last Friday in most of the mosques, including Azhar. In one important mosque omission of prayer caused protests among congregation.

General tendency is to express sympathy with Abdel Megid and resentment against Mustafa Kemal and Turkish Government, and a proposal by ulema to refuse to recognise latter's action pending convocation of a Moslem congress in Cairo has received marked popular support.

There is also some talk of restoration of Caliphate to Egypt, in which connection King Fuad has been mentioned.

(Repeated to Beirut, Jerusalem, Constantinople and Bagdad.)

F.O. 424/260, p. 74-75, No. 54

No. 187

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 202

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 11, 1924
(Received March 17)

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 43 of the 4th March, I have the honour to report that on the 5th March Ismet Pasha presented the resignation of his Cabinet, and was immediately requested by the President of the Republic to form a new Government.

2. It had been anticipated that in order to provide a plausible ground for Ismet Pasha's resignation arrangements would be made for the rejection of the

budget by the Assembly, it being evident that the budget would in any case require considerable readjustment in consequence of the decisions regarding the Caliphate, etc., recorded in my despatch No. 188 of the 5th March.

3. In the event, however, the budget discussions were resumed and continued in a normal fashion on the 5th March, and the reason given for İsmet's resignation was simply that he wished, in view of the recent fundamental changes in the distribution of the functions of Departments of State, to afford an opportunity for a Government to be formed on the new basis.

4. The list of the new Ministers was communicated by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the Assembly on the 6th March, and was agreed to after a discussion in the People's party, the most interesting feature of which was that İsmet Pasha asked the party to agree to his list without having the names formally submitted, and submitted the names only under pressure. When he had yielded thus far, the list was agreed to in the party by 103 votes against 60, eight Deputies abstaining. It was afterwards passed by the Assembly without difficulty.

5. The new Government, which does not greatly differ from the old, is constituted as follows:

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs: İsmet Pasha (no change).

Minister for Religious Affairs (suppressed).

Minister of Interior: Ferid Bey (no change).

Minister of National Defence : Kiazim Pasha (no change).

Minister of Finance: Abdul Halik Bey (no change).

Minister of Justice: Nejati Bey (transferred from Ministry of Reconstruction to replace Seid Bey).

Minister of Commerce : Hassan Bey (previously head of Ministry of Economic Affairs, now divided into separate Ministries of Commerce and Agriculture).

Minister of Agriculture: Zekiai Bey (new).

Minister of Public Instruction: Vassif Bey (new in place of Sefa Bey).

Minister of Public Works: Suleiman Sirri Bey (no change).

Minister of Public Health: Refik Bey (no change).

Minister of Reconstruction: Jelal Bey (new).

6. On balance, three Ministers leave the Government, namely, Mustafa Fevzi, head of the now suppressed Ministry of Religious Affairs, Seid Bey and Sefa Bey; while three new Ministers are brought in, namely, Zekiai Bey, Vassif Bey and Jelal Bey.

7. None of the outgoing Ministers has played a prominent political rôle, but Mustafa Fevzi played an important part in the final discussions regarding the Caliphate and the question of religious tribunals and schools, and Seid Bey, who is usually reported to have Union and Progress associations, has been much involved in the controversies over the family law. It was at first thought that Mustafa Fevzi would receive the Ministry of Justice by way of compensation for the suppression of his previous post, but this idea seems to have been dropped.

8. Of the new Ministers Zekiai Bey is well known from his having played an important part as an economic expert at the Lausanne Conference. He is intelligent, but difficult to deal with. Vassif Bey was Public Prosecutor of the Court of Independence sent to Constantinople, and has been one of the loudest promoters of the expulsion of the Ottoman dynasty. It will be remembered that in one of his *réquisitoires* in the Court of Independence he accused Great Britain of seeking to make the Caliphate a tool. Know little of Jelal Bey, except that he is probably the same Jelal Bey who was for a short time previously Minister of Economic Affairs and who in December 1921 launched an abortive scheme for destroying the position of Constantinople as a transit centre by encouraging direct trade between Anatolia and foreign markets. That, however, was at the time when there were political reasons for endeavouring to starve out Constantinople.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/260, p. 79-80, No. 57

No. 188

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 221

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 12, 1924
(Received March 17)

Sir,

In my despatch No. 189 of the 5th March, relative to relations between the Russian and Turkish Governments, I omitted to state that on the 27th February

Comrade Souritch presented his credentials as Ambassador to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. This event attracted little notice among the more considerable developments which were at that moment being prepared at Angora. It was nevertheless the subject of a lengthy telegram issued by the semi-official Anatolian agency. My attention having been recalled to the subject by reading in print a "Note on the 'Head of State' in Russia," prepared in the Foreign Office on the 31st January, I think it may be of interest to summarise the telegram with special reference to the points raised in the Foreign Office paper.

2. Mustafa Kemal received Comrade Souritch with all the usual ceremonial. He was attended by İsmet Pasha as Minister for Foreign Affairs. A high official of the Ministry fetched Comrade Souritch and his staff from the Embassy in motor-cars provided by the Turkish Government. The Ambassador was received with a military salute, and a band played the "International March." The President received Comrade Souritch standing.

3. The telegram gives no particulars of the letters of credence, but reproduces textually the speeches exchanged. The following is a literal translation of the opening portion of the Ambassador's speech:

"Your Excellency the President of the Republic, I have the honour to present to you the letters of credence containing my appointment to you (*'auprès de vous'* gives the sense of the Turkish better) by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Russian Soviet Republics (*'Soviets Republic'* is still more literal) in the quality of plenipotentiary bearing the title of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary."

After a reference to the friendship between the two countries and the Turkish national struggle ending in a great victory and the institution of the Turkish Republic, the speech goes on:

"Almost all the republics have in the course of time concluded treaties and conventions with Turkey. The Union of Soviet Republics will as a whole devote attention to the execution of those engagements (or 'will devote attention to the execution of those engagements as a whole') and to the development on strengthening of the fraternal sentiments which are their foundation."

This is followed by references to the Peace Treaty which, after a victorious struggle for independence, has opened up new highroads of development for Turkey to the common ideals of the two countries and to the sympathy shown in Turkey on the occasion of the death of Lenin, whose "point of view will always remain the basis of the Presidency of the Union of Soviet Republics."

4. Mustafa Kemal Pasha replied in a shorter, but not less cordial, speech, at the outset of which he reproduced exactly the terms used by Souritch in the opening passage quoted above. It is noteworthy that in these, the most formal portions of the two speeches, the accreditor is described as the "Central Executive Committee of the Union of Russian Soviet Republics," although the word "Russian" is omitted in some other passages. The authority to whom the Ambassador is accredited is unmistakably the President of the Turkish Republic. Indeed, it is clear, from the unfortunate experience of the Persian Ambassador when he went to Angora, that Mustafa Kemal would have tolerated no other form.*

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10212/E. 2356/1333/44

F.O. 424/260, p. 82, No. 59

* Bu raporun altına Foreign Office'de şu notlar düşülmüştü:

"So the Turks have got at any rate one Ambassador at Angora." - D.G. Osborne 19/3.

"The gentleman in question is presumably our old friend SURITS." - P.M... 1.4

No. 189

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 224

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 12, 1924

(Received March 17)

Sir,

Since the events recorded in my despatch No. 188 of the 5th March, the Turkish authorities here have been busy deporting the various members of the Imperial Family. Reports appear daily that none of them any longer remain on Turkish soil, and as a matter of fact all those of any importance appear to have been already expelled.

2. Having been approached privately on the 1st March on behalf of the Caliph's brother, Prince Seifuddin, who has connections in Egypt, and who wished to proceed to that country, I enquired by telegraph of Lord Allenby on the 2nd March whether he could allowed to do so. Later in the day I enquired more generally what would be the attitude of the Egyptian Government regarding other members of the Turkish Imperial Family, as I had seen reports

in the papers that several of them, including the Caliph himself, were anxious to go to Egypt.

3. In the event all the deportees were sent to various destinations in Europe and Syria. The Turkish authorities, who themselves made all the passport arrangements, did not ask for facilities for Egypt except in the case of one husband of a princess and some eunuchs. This was put forward on the 4th March in the form of a request that they should be allowed to leave by a ship sailing that afternoon, and I could naturally only reply that time did not admit of arrangements being made.

4. On the 6th March I received a telegram from Lord Allenby to the effect that the Egyptian Government could not allow members of the Caliphal family to land in Egypt. Having had no applications from Adnan Bey other than that mentioned in the previous² paragraph, which had lapsed, I did not communicate this decision to him officially, but a member of my staff mentioned it in conversation to his assistant, with the result that considerable publicity was given in the press to the fact that Egypt would not receive members of the family. One newspaper represented this as a decision of the British authorities.

5. In one case—that of Prince Abdul Mejid, son of Sherif Ali Haidar, and husband of Princess Rukie (a grand-daughter of Sultan Murad)—I issued a paper recommending him to the good offices of British authorities. I did this in virtue of his position as a member of the Shereefian family, and having regard to the difficulty which he will have in establishing a definite national status. I was careful not to give the paper the form of a passport or pass.

6. As I anticipated, the departure of the Caliph and his relatives has been unattended by any form of demonstration. The Turkish authorities have managed the whole business with great efficiency, whatever may be thought of their harshness and the pains taken to belittle the victims in every way, e.g., by issuing to the Caliph a passport as M. Abdul Mejid fils d'Abdul Aziz, and informing the Italian Embassy that it was not a case for a diplomatic visa. A sum of money was given to each of the deportees for travelling expenses. It is understood that this will be supplemented, but there is no talk of any permanent provision being made for the maintenance of the princes and princesses.

7. The authorities took special measures to ensure that all mention of the Caliph should be omitted from the Friday prayer in the mosques on the 7th March. Prayers for the nation and the republic were substituted.

8. Various rumours are current as to the disposal of the Imperial palaces. It seems probable that the old Seraglio will be converted into a museum, but no decision appears to have been taken regarding the two other principle palaces—Yildiz and Dolma Bagtche, where the late Caliph resided. It has been suggested that Dolma Bagtche will be assigned to the use of the President of the Republic.

9. Little has been heard of the more interesting question of the relics of the Prophet, the possession of which has come to be regarded in popular estimation as one of the titles of the Caliphate. They will certainly not be allowed to leave Turkey, nor is there any present prospect of the restoration to Medina of the treasures removed from the Prophet's tomb in 1917. The latter objects are in different category from the more sacred relics; but it will be remembered that the Turkish delegation contended at Lausanne that the treasures from the tomb in the Caliph's disposal. In this connection I may mention that the local press has given full publicity to reports of the assumption of the Caliphate by King Hussein. There has been some little attempt to represent him and his sons as British instruments and to discredit King Hussein's pretensions to regard, but on the whole there has been very little comment. There are, however, indications of some official anxiety over the manner in which the abolition of the Caliphate is being regarded in non-Turkish Moslem countries.

10. Reports have been current in the last few days that in order to complete the "purification" of the country a large number of persons connected with the old régime and their families, together with the families of persons already in exile, will be expelled. The authorities here have been at some pains to discredit these reports, but it is still widely believed that some such action will be taken in the near future, and that it may apply to such personages as the ex-Grand Viziers Tewfik, İzzet and Salih Pasha, besides other former Ministers and the families of persons associated with the ex-Sultan Vahiduddin. These reports merit attention, as it is stated that such expulsions would be independent of the proscription of the 150 persons mentioned in the protocol attached to the Lausanne Amnesty Declaration, in which case they would constitute, at least in many instances, a flagrant violation of that declaration.

11. There is also a strong campaign in the press, conducted with a certain appearance of official countenance, in favour of abolishing the Patriarchates and the Grand Rabbinate on a supposed analogy between these institutions and the Caliphate. Suggestions are similarly being put forward, but in this case without the same appearance of official backing, that non-Moslem schools have no longer any *raison d'être*. I do not for the moment attach an exaggerated

importance to these suggestions, but they are of evident interest from the point of view of minorities clauses of the treaty.

12. As the excitement over the deposition of the Caliph and other laicising legislation has subsided, renewed attention has been directed to foreign affairs. The question and the prospects regarding Allied, more especially British, ratification of the Peace Treaty. The only really novel feature, however, is a definite attempt to connect the settlement of the question of the interest on the Public Debt with the execution of the article in the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement providing for the establishment of a special régime for Antioch and Alexandretta. It has been alleged that the Angora Government will refuse to discuss the former question until the special régime in these places has been set up. A telegram from Angora in certain morning papers of the 12th March, which purports to give the result of enquiries in official circles there, lends some colour to these reports, but is couched in more guarded terms.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/260, p. 83-84, No. 60

No. 190

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 244

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 19, 1924
(Received March 24)

Sir,

No foreign diplomatist in this country, in conversation with a Turk, is ever spared the very embarrassing question, "Are you going to Angora, and when?"

2. At frequent intervals the Turkish press publishes inspired paragraphs to the effect that the Government have no intention of returning to Constantinople. Mustafa Kemal himself said so categorically a short while ago, and only this week the Assembly passed an article of the new Constitution decreeing once more that Angora is the capital. Yet few Turks imbued with the Constantinople atmosphere would maintain even to European that this decision is irrevocable or indeed likely to prevail for more than a few years.

3. Opinion in favour of maintaining the capital at Angora is principally held at Angora itself, and is therefore difficult to analyse with confidence from

here, but first of all comes the view that Constantinople is the sink of iniquity from which emanate all those corrupting and enervating influences which have ruined the Turkish State. This is really the present-day expression of a latent feeling which existed even before the revolution —that the Turks are an Asiatic tribe, and to Asia they ought to return. For 300 years increasingly closer contact between Turkey and Europe has coincided with a persistent decline in the strength of the Turkish Empire, and it is natural that many Turks should regard European thought and culture, as distinguished from European institutions and inventiveness, as purely deleterious and entirely to be avoided; from their mountain-top the Deputies of Angora clamour for railways, electricity and all the material benefits of European civilisation, but they propose to bring their plans to execution in Angora and within the framework of a Turkish —not a European —culture; the principles of an advanced democracy, which they do not understand but have escaped from a small band of leaders, can likewise come to fruition only in a Turkish atmosphere; their fundamental mentality remains unchanged, and finds its principal expression in a passionate attachment to Angora.

4. From this state of mind emerge, partly at any rate, arguments of a more practical character. In Constantinople the Government must always be under the possible threat of European military pressure, and only in Angora would it be free to develop the future of the new State along the lines it may regard as most suitable. Again it was Anatolia and not Constantinople that, unaided, lifted Turkey from the prostration of 1919; both justice and expediency require that in the new Turkey a more even balance shall be held between the interests of Anatolia and those of Constantinople, between town and country, and between the small peasant and the small official. This can only be done by maintaining the capital in Angora.

5. These views are held by the leaders who now govern Turkey in degrees that vary with each individual, but their importance lies in the fact that they are held whole-heartedly by many of the rank and file of the Assembly, who have a purely Anatolian outlook. Whatever the true opinion of the leaders may be, this heavy mass of ignorance and obscurantism limits their capacity of action. I should infer that, if anything untoward happened to the Assembly, a considerable step would have been taken from Angora in the direction of the Bosphorus.

6. To turn now to the considerations which make for a return to Constantinople, too much weight must not be attached to the personal ambition of Mustafa Kemal or to the social ambition of Latifa Hanum. Both decidedly exist, and the disappearance of the Caliph has cleared the way for the entry of new actors on the Constantinople stage; but the Ghazi moves

prudently, and it is unlikely that ambition will come into play until all danger has been eliminated of its receiving a check. Still less importance is to be attached to the undoubted desire of many people at Angora to return to the fleshpots of Constantinople and the comforts of modern life. The impulse to return the shores of the Bosphorus comes from more important than merely personal motives. There is acute economic distress throughout Turkey and an ever-increasing desire for better administration than the present Government has hitherto been able to provide. The pressure on the Government comes mainly indeed from Constantinople, but also from Anatolia. The more intelligent leaders cannot but have asked themselves whether they can ever hope to meet the demand, when their decision must for ever governed by an Assembly whose members have a largely Anatolian outlook. If the pressure from Constantinople increases, they may well come to the conclusion that it is easier to govern Angora from Constantinople than to govern Constantinople from Angora.

7. The foregoing paragraphs give an imperfect view of Turkish thought in which almost every sentence requires qualification and no account is taken of the highly complicated cross-currents of opinion. The point which it is desired to make is that the question of Angora versus Constantinople is not a simple one to be decided on superficial grounds—it is really part of a conflict between various schools of thought, in which even the schools may be divided against themselves and the individual politicians may be inspired by self-contradictory ideals. The conflict involves issues of the deepest importance of the future of the Turkish State, and the question of the capital is only one of them, though an important one. The inference to be drawn is that in the conflict matters of personal consideration, and even questions of national *amour-propre*, will count for little in the decision, and it will be less than useless for European Governments to endeavour to influence the decision by suggesting that they can accredit Ambassadors to Turkey only if the capital remains at Constantinople or by putting forward other conditions of this character. As to what the outcome of the conflict will be, so far as the immediate issue is concerned—viz., that of the capital—I have a dislike, which you will understand of uttering prophecies in this place, and the utmost I dare say now is that some day Constantinople will almost certainly again be the capital of Turkey, but not for several months at the very soonest. Unfortunately His Majesty's Government have to decide what they wish their representative to do within a very few days.

8. In a previous despatch I have briefly touched on the disadvantages under which we at present labour in the transaction of business with the Turkish Government. Adnan Bey, head of the Constantinople delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is an agreeable, gentlemanly person, with descent

education, fairly intelligent, capable of seeing another person's point of view, and, I think, anxious to avoid difficulties. He is our only means of communicating with the Government at Angora. What we communicate to him in writing I have no doubt he faithfully transmits to the Ministry, and such written answers as we receive from him are, I am sure, textually what Angora has instructed him to send; but I have the gravest doubt as to whether the fair verbal arguments with which every diplomatist loves to accompany his written exhortations ever find any echo outside the four walls of his room, and he himself is never able to add anything verbally to the answers, almost always terse and unsatisfactory, which he passes on to us. Bad as this is, the situation is likely to be even worse if and when, as is now threatened, Adnan Bey is replaced by an official of even lower standing. There is now no real contact between the Government of Turkey and those of the Great Powers of Europe and America, and no sufficient means by which the latter can make their views known to the former, or apply any methods of pressure or persuasion. It will be all the more important to remedy this state of affairs when the Treaty of Lausanne comes into force and the application of its stipulations has to be insisted on. Nor can any serious attempt be made to wean Turkey from her violent xenophobia until some more efficient contact has been established.

9. The conversation I have had with my French and Italian colleagues show that they are just as alive to the difficulties of the situation as I am. M. Jessé Curély has the tactical advantage of being able to answer, when he is asked if he is going to Angora, that he has only acting rank, and that no decision can be taken till his chief returns to Constantinople. He himself is the last person who would go to such a place without absolute orders to do so; but his Government has so far committed itself to the Angora principle as to earmark 3,000 square metres of ground there for the future Embassy of Legation house. Signor Montagna, on the other hand, my Italian colleague, is a realist, and all out to win striking successes. I have not the slightest doubt that he is longing to get off to Angora, but, like the cat in the adage, he is torn in two directions; he has instructions and is personally anxious to work in with this mission so that he would dearly love the fish of success, he is unveiling to wet his paws by stealing a march on me. Still, I should not be surprised to learn any morning that he was on his way to the Turkish capital.

10. In these circumstances, I have the honour to recommend that I be generally authorised to pay a visit to Angora. You will not require to be persuaded that nothing but a stern sense of duty would induce me to put this recommendation forward.

11. If you approve of this recommendation, then one or two subsidiary points require to be dealt with:

(1) I should not propose to go to Angora for more than a few days at a time at more or less prolonged intervals. While ready to pay a homage to the new Turkey by visiting its capital, I do not wish to curry favour by planting myself permanently there. This may not be the best way of doing business, but it would be an improvement on the present. I hope no question will arise yet while of any sort of a house; I should rough it in a hotel or railway carriage.

(2) I should not go to Angora unless I were assured beforehand that I should be received by Mustafa Kemal, whether the treaty is ratified or not. This I should have to arrange beforehand.

(3) I prefer not to deal now with question of a liaison officer at Angora. I should like to look round first and the necessary may be avoided. Meanwhile, perhaps members of my staff wish to volunteer for occasional visits.

(4) The French and Italian Governments ought to be notified of the decision, and enabled to take similar action simultaneously. This could either be done by communication from yourself to Paris and Rome, or by myself to my colleagues here. I should tell them what was about to happen, and give them time to telegraph to their Governments and receive an answer, keeping the matter secret, meanwhile, from the Turks.

(5) As Signor Montagna may at any moment take the bit between his teeth, I should be grateful if you would communicate your decision to me by telegraph; stating also whether you will yourself make it known at Paris and Rome, or whether I should apprise my colleagues here.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/260, p.88-90, No. 70

No.191

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 247

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 19 1924
(Received March 24)

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 162 of the 26th February, I have the honour to state that the Grand National Assembly has set aside one day a week, Sunday, for the consideration of the new draft Constitution of the Turkish

Republic. It was not submitted to the People's party as such before being laid before the Assembly.

2. The debates opened on the 9th March with a general discussion. The *rapporteur*, Jelal Nouri Bey, claimed, in a short introductory statement, that his committee had shown the fullest respect for the principle of national sovereignty and the "unification of the Powers." The Cabinet system they had evolved was based not on the separation of the Powers but on the "distribution of function." The President of the Republic came out of their own midst, and was not like an hereditary sovereign ruling without regard to his qualifications. The committee had consulted either Constitutions, among which he named those of the United States of America and Switzerland as models which had not been followed.

3. Certain Deputies objected to the draft on various grounds, and some of them proposed that it should be sent back to the committee. The principal objections referred to the proposals to give executive power to a body, namely, the Cabinet, distinct from the Assembly, to give the President of the Republic the rights of dissolution and veto, and to vest in the President the supreme command of the army. This last proposal does not appear in the draft as published in Constantinople, but it would appear to be included in the final draft. The question of the desirability of a second chamber was also broached.

4. After these and other points had been made, a discussion ensued as to what majority should be required for decisions on the draft. It was eventually decided that a majority of two thirds of the Deputies present in the House should suffice. The question of how many constitute a quorum was not apparently raised. I am not very clear how this stands at present. I believe the rule to be that, on first discussion, one more than half the total membership of the Assembly must be present, but that a second division on the same question is valid regardless of the number of those present.

5. The general discussion was resumed on the 16th March but was brought to an early end by the adoption of a closure motion after attacks had been made on the committee's proposals regarding the President's right of dissolution and veto. The Assembly then proceeded to consider the individual articles and disposed of the first seventeen at a rate which might be thought to indicate levity in dealing with the fundamental law of republic intended to last for all time. A juster inference would perhaps be that the leaders have carefully thought the matter out themselves, and that they have on the whole now got the Assembly very well in hand, notwithstanding the necessity for allowing a certain amount of freedom of discussion. Docility rather than levity would, in fact, appear to account for the rapidity with which this important business was

transacted in a fairly full House. At one moment there were as many as 181 Deputies present.

6. The Assembly passed articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 and 15 either as they stood in the draft, or with unimportant, for the most part merely verbal, alterations. A proposal to establish a second chamber was withdrawn by the movers in order to be put forward later in connection with article 25. A suggestion that Turkey should be defined in article 1 as a People's Republic instead of a Republic simply was rejected. It might have been expected that after the recent changes regarding the Caliphate, etc., the affirmation in article 2 that Islam is the religion of the State would have been contested. It seems, however, to have been passed without much discussion, a proposal to declare Islam to be the official religion having been rejected. A proposal that article 13, which fixes the duration of the Grand National Assembly at four years should not apply to the present Assembly was rejected by 98 to 69 votes. The fact that the rejection of this motion, whereby the life the present Assembly is prolonged by two years beyond the period for which it was elected, was not carried by a majority of two-thirds appears to have given no trouble. The provision in article 14 for a six months' recess around some criticism, but the article was eventually passed as in the draft. Otherwise few points of interest arose on the articles enumerated above.

7. The position regarding article 3 is not entirely clear. In the version of the draft enclosed in my despatch under reference it continued of two parts. Only the first, which states that sovereignty belongs unrestrictedly to the nation, appears to have survived. The article is, nevertheless, stated in the reports to have been passed in the form in which it was submitted, after a Deputy had suggested that other articles conflicted with the principle laid down in it. There would appear to be some ground for this criticism, but no Turkish statesman or politician could at the present time afford to admit that he was tampering with the principle of unrestricted national sovereignty.

8. Article 11, which as drafted provided that every Turk over 30 years of age was eligible to the office of Deputy, was modified by restricting it to males. Deputies appear to have thought that they were discussing the question of women's rights in connection with both this article and article 10 which relates to the right of voting. A good deal of uncertainty now prevails as to whether the Assembly, by retaining article 10 in the original form and modifying article 11, has more or less accidentally enfranchised the whole adult female population. This point will have to be cleared up later. For the moment it looks as though women had secured the vote, but there is nothing to show what is the preponderating view in the Assembly as between one member who held that nothing could prevent women from coming into her own in ten years, whatever

might be decided now, and an old-fashioned Deputy who exclaimed that when that happened the men would become women.

9. The clause in article 12 disqualifying the Caliph and members of his family for the office of Deputy was omitted for obvious reasons. An addition to the effect that persons unable to read and write should be ineligible was accepted.

10. The form of oath in article 16 was slightly modified, the only change of importance being the insertion of a phrase expressly binding Deputies to pursue no aim at variance with the unrestricted sovereignty of the nation.

11. Article 17 was somewhat modified so as to obviate on the one hand abuse outside the Assembly of parliamentary immunity and to fortify the immunity in other respects. The importance of the first change will appear from a comparison of the first sentence of the article, as given in my despatch under reference, and the new form which runs as follows:

"No Deputy shall be held responsible for opinions expressed or statements made within the Assembly or for the expression outside the Assembly of opinions expressed or statements made inside it."

12. Although the debates summarised in this despatch cover a great deal of important ground, the real test of the feelings of the Assembly, or rather of the readiness of the members to give expression to them, will be afforded only when the articles relative to dissolution, the right of veto, and the supreme command of the army come up for discussion.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/260, p.91-92, No. 71

No.192

Mr. Herbert Dering (Bucharest) to Mr. MacDonald

No. 159

BUCHAREST, March 24, 1924
(Received March 24)

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 117 of the 1st instant I have the honour to report that the Bucharest press of last week reproduced a telegram

emanating from Constantinople to the effect that Mustafa Kemal Pasha was inviting all foreign Powers to transfer the residence of their diplomatic representatives to Angora. I mentioned the report when visiting Monsieur Duca at the Foreign Office on Saturday last. He replied that the idea seemed out of the question. Herr Freytag, whom he had just seen after his return from Angora where he has negotiated a treaty of amity between Germany and Turkey, had told him that Angora as a residence was impossible. There were no facilities for foreign habitations and no comfort; conditions there were of the most primitive; nor were there any hotels. Angora was in fact no more than a large village.

I have, &c.

HERBERT DERING

F.O. 371/10193 / E. 2344

No. 193

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 269

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 26, 1924
(Received March 31)

Sir,

In the last paragraph of my despatch No. 247 of the 19th March relative to the new Turkish Constitution, I observed that the real test of the position in the Grand National Assembly would be the attitude taken up by the Deputies when the articles in the draft Constitution regarding the rights of dissolution and veto and the supreme command of the army came up for discussion. This test has now been applied with results which show that I overrated the docility of the rank and file of the Assembly or of the People's party, which has hitherto come to very much the same thing. Ismet Pasha, who has so far been able to secure a substantial majority in favour of all measures regarded by Government as being of first-class importance, is in a minority on the right of dissolution question.

2. The first overt sign of serious trouble was the failure of Ismet Pasha and his supporters at two meetings of the People's party on the 17th and 18th March, to secure the election of their candidates for the vice-presidencies and committee of the party. Ismet himself as elected President, but the vice-presidencies and most, if not all, the posts on the committee were filled from a list prepared by an Opposition group. Feizi Bey of Diarbekr was elected senior vice-president, a fact the more significant as he has hitherto been publicly identified with the Opposition.

3. It was known that the opposition group responsible for this successful coup held strong views regarding both the veto and proposal to give the President of the Republic a practically unlimited right of dissolving the Assembly as proposed in the draft Constitution. Rumours of a Cabinet crisis began to circulate and a controversy arose as to which was to be hed the greater danger, the despotism of a President or the despotism of an Assembly incapable of being dissolved except by its own act. In Government circles the idea of a Cabinet crisis was scouted and strong efforts were made to effect a compromise on the points at issue. Those efforts culminated in an abortive discussion between representatives of both sides on the night of the 21st-22nd March. The discussion appears to have taken place at Mustafa Kemal's residence, but it is not stated whether he or Ismet Pasha took any part in it.

4. On the 23rd March the debate on the draft Constitution was resumed in the Assembly. Articles 19 to 24 gave little trouble. Article 10 of the draft was modified so as to give the President of the Assembly a right of convoking the Assembly during the recess similar to that conferred on the President of the Republic. Some discussion arose on article 23 as to whether Under-Secretaries of State and university professors should be free to combine their functions with membership of the Assembly. The question appears to have been settled in the negative by the omission of the 2nd sentence of the article as originally drafted.

5. Yunus Nadi Bey, President of the Constitutional Committee, attempted vainly to postpone the discussion of article 25 by admitting that it required reconsideration and asking that it should be returned to the committee for that purpose. This proposal was rejected as contrary to the rules of procedure. Reshad Bey, Deputy for Sarouhan, said that it was the latest member to have visited his constituency and that the young men in that part of the country wished to know whether the principles affirmed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself had been forgotten. The nation would keep the Pasha's word and would not part with a jot of its sovereignty. This elicited a challenge from Ismet Pasha, who asked whether these young men had met and declared the intention of resisting the Assembly should it decide contrary to their wishes. Reshad Bey said there had been no meeting. He spoke of personal contacts. If God himself were President they would not give Him the right of dissolution. After other members had spoken for and against the proposal in the draft article compromises were suggested. The principal of these was a formula proposed by a supporter of the Government, who suggested that the President should have power to recommend dissolution to National Assembly for stated reasons of high national interest and that such recommendation should be effective unless rejected by a two-thirds majority. This proposal was rejected on a division by 122 votes against 71, with two abstentions.

6. Upon this, the Ministers and their supporters gradually left the House. The draft article was then put the vote in its original form and was rejected by

127 votes against 2, again with two abstentions. The number of members present having thus decided to take a further division on the 24th March, when, in accordance with the rule explained in my despatch No. 247 of the 19th March the result would hold good regardless of the number of members present. When the Assembly met next day, the Ministers and their supporters again absented themselves. The new division resulted in exactly the same number of votes and abstentions. The article was thus definitely thrown out.

7. The result has been to create an utterly confused political situation at Angora, the real nature and probable outcome of which it is impossible at this distance to determine. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, with habitual caution, has avoided committing himself to any view. Indeed, it was at one time put about that he was himself averse from having the rights of dissolution and veto conferred upon him. Fethi Bey, the President of the Assembly and a possible Prime Minister, has thrown in his lot with the Opposition. In a normally constituted country a Cabinet crisis would probably be inevitable, but in Turkey even this cannot be regarded as certain, for technically it is not the Cabinet but the Constitutional Committee of the Assembly which is responsible for the draft law. The probability of a Cabinet crisis has, however, been a good deal increased since the 25th March, when İsmet Pasha issued a communiqué to the effect that the managing body of the party had informed him that the Government had not the support of a majority of the Assembly. In consequence of this intimation, he said, a general meeting of the party would be held on the 27th March.

8. In the meanwhile, Yunus Nadi Bey, chairman of the Constitutional Committee, and Jelal Nouri, the *rapporteur*, are said to have resigned. The former published on the 23rd March in his newspaper, the "Yeni Gyun," a flaming article accusing the Assembly of having dealt a blow at national sovereignty at the bidding of self-seekers. He hinted at a possibility of the Assembly being "replaced" without defining what he meant by that expression. This outburst has led to a proposal that he should be expelled from the party.

9. Apart from the question of a Cabinet crisis, there is much talk of other possibilities such as change of Cabinet, a dissolution of the Assembly by its own decision, or a break-up of the People's party. There are some who do not put it past Mustafa Kemal and İsmet to make an end of the Assembly by unconstitutional means, but no one puts as indecent a suggestion into print, for everyone acclaims "national sovereignty," interpreted according to his own ideas, as the one sure foundation.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 194

*Memorandum by Mr. Nevile Henderson
on
Future Diplomatic Representation in Turkey*

The entry into force of the Treaty of Lausanne can now scarcely be much longer delayed. Normal relations will then have to be resumed with Turkey and it will be necessary to make a definite announcement to the Turks as to the status of His Majesty's Representative in Turkey and his place of residence.

I gather that His Majesty's Government are practically committed to the temporary appointment of an Ambassador, with the very distinct reservation that he shall reside at Constantinople. The unsuitability of Angora is sufficiently obvious and notorious to make it probable that the Allied and Associated Governments at least will concur in His Majesty's Government's standpoint in this respect. Nevertheless the situation, with the Turkish Government at Angora, will be anomalous and it remains to be seen whether (a) in the long run it will prove a practicable arrangement and (b) whether the Turkish Government will acquiesce in it.

At present the only contact with the Turkish Government at Angora is through the delegate of its Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople. This is clearly inadequate and unsatisfactory. Some form of British representation must be set up at Angora. It appears generally accepted that this should be done through a diplomatic secretary acting as the representative of the Ambassador at Constantinople. The diplomatic secretary will require the assistance of Levant Consular officer (Vice-Consul) with a competent knowledge of Turkish and of at least one clerk (registrar typist). It is probable that the services of a second clerk will be required later, but to begin with one may suffice.

Accommodation with offices for such a Mission consisting, as it will do with servants, of 6 or 7 persons will have to be found in Angora. I do not believe, though I only know of Angora by hearsay, that it can be rented. It will have therefore to be constructed. Moreover it must be recollected that the Ambassador at Constantinople will be obliged to make periodical visits to Angora. It will be essential that he should do so if British affairs are to be satisfactorily conducted. It is equally essential that he should be suitably accommodated during his sojourn in Angora. The building which is to hold the Mission in Angora should therefore comprise spare accommodation for the Ambassador and two members of his staff.

In this connection advantage might well be taken of the Turkish offer to His Majesty's Government of land in the vicinity of Angora for the construction of an official residence. I understand that the French, who received a similar offer, have already selected a site for the purpose. I am of opinion that His Majesty's Government will be well advised to lose no time, not only in accepting the offer but also in starting construction. It seems probable that for at least several years to come Angora will remain the seat of the Turkish Government. (If it remains so for several years it may well remain so indefinitely). Great Britain must have some form of representation at Angora during this period. Even if the Turkish Government were to be moved from Angora after this period, the building could thereafter serve as a Consulate. Its cost need not be excessive. It should be so constructed as primarily to accommodate the staff of the ~~liaison~~ section in Angora of the British Embassy in Constantinople, as intermittently to lodge the ~~Ambassador~~ on his periodical visits to Angora and as ultimately either to be used as a Consulate or ~~as the official~~ (as distinct from private) residence of the British representative in Turkey.

After all the situation in Turkey is such that a certain speculation as to the future is unavoidable. Whatever opinions one may hold it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that the Turkish Government will ever return to Constantinople. Even if Angora does not continue to be the capital some other town in Anatolia may be selected in its place. The Turks were originally nomads and they may well be reverting to type. The fact remains that Angora is at present the seat of Government. It will probably remain so for several years and may remain so indefinitely. The latter is, in my opinion, almost as likely as a return to Constantinople. To speculate on the return of the Turkish Government to Constantinople by refusing to the minimum in the way of setting up proper contact with the present Government at Angora, will give the appearance of an unjustifiable interference in the right of Turkey to select her own capital. As a form of foreign pressure and excessive aloofness in Constantinople will be resented by the Turks and calculated if any thing not to effect its object i.e. the forcing of the Turkish Government to return to Constantinople, but to keep the Turks rooted in Anatolia. The more politic course would seem therefore to meet the Turks half-way by accepting their offer of land and by construction in a small way thereon, without any definite commitments.

For, while we go thus far to meet the Turks, there is another side to this question. By no stretch of imagination can Angora, or any other town in Anatolia, be regarded as a suitable residence for Ambassadors. The setting of Constantinople with its political and historic, strategic and economic importance is one thing but any Anatolian town is another. Nevertheless having

succeeded in getting the Powers to appoint Ambassadors to Constantinople, Mustapha Kemal, in order to add to his own prestige, is likely to endeavour to force them to come and reside at Angora. It is unnecessary to dwell on the obvious fact that that which will add to Kemal's prestige would certainly detract from our own. There is considerable danger lest, however correct we may be in showing our willingness to make a workable arrangement whereby we can maintain our Ambassador to Turkey in Constantinople and relations with the Turkish Government in Angora, the Turks will be less scrupulous and will endeavour by tacit or open obstructiveness to that arrangement, to blackmail us into transferring the residence of the Ambassador to Angora itself.

Even if the Turks do not act in this manner, the arrangement may of itself prove impracticable as a permanent procedure. His Majesty's Government may ultimately themselves decide that it is expedient in British interest for His Majesty's Representative in Turkey to reside at Angora.

But whether it be as the result of Turkish pressure or of our own volition any transfer of residence from Constantinople to Angora, should antail the reduction of the status of the British mission in Turkey to a Legation. The Turks should be made to realise this, quite clearly though he preferably unofficially. They have themselves a proverb to the effect that if you invite the camel driver to your house you must build a stable high enough to hold the camel. Until they have developed Angora into a real capital they cannot grumble if the camel driver only sends a subordinate agent there.

It seems therefore most inadvisable that His Majesty's Government should be committed in any sense to the definite maintenance of an Ambassador in Turkey. In notifying the Turkish Government of Mr. Lindsay's appointment as Ambassador, resident at Constantinople with a representative at Angora, it would be desirable to add some saving clause to the effect. His Majesty's Government have every confidence in the Turkish Government co-operation with a view to rendering this arrangement a workable one capable of being maintained. (The formula would need careful elaboration so as to avoid the appearance of a menace.)

Presumably, if the above suggestions are adopted, the Foreign Office will notify the allied and Associated Governments of the procedure which it is proposed to follow and endeavour to induce them to conform to it. *

March 30th, 1924

F.O. 3712/10193

* Elmindeki fotokopide belgenin son cümlesi okunmamış. Bu belge, Windsor Şatosunda Kral George VI'ye arz edilmiş. Kral, Foreign Office'e aşağıdaki yazılı emri vermiştir.

WINDSOR CASTLE

I approve of these proposals conditionally:

(1)That it is distinctly understood that, in the event of the transfer of residence from Constantinople to Angora, the status of the British Mission in Turkey be reduced to a Legation.

(2)That a building is constructed in Angora with adequate and suitable accommodation for not only the Diplomatic Secretary and Members of the Mission, but also for the Ambassador and his Staff on the occasion of his periodical visits.

G. R. I.

5th. April, 1924

(F.O. 371/10193)

Not: İngiliz kralı ve diplomatları, "bir İngiliz Büyükelçisi Ankara'da oturmaz" demekle büyük laf etmişlerdir. Sonunda İngiliz Büyükelçileri Türkiye'nin başkenti Ankara'da oturacaklardı. Bu konudaki ayrıntılar için bkz. Bilal N. Şimşir, *Ankara...Ankara, Bir Başkentin Doğuşu*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara: 1988, s. 245-343 ve *Ankara'nın Başkenti Oluşu*, Ankaralılar Vakfı Yayını, Ankara: 2001.- B.N.Ş.

No. 195

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 303

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 9, 1924

(Received April 14)

Sir,

In the ninth paragraph of my despatch No. 285 of the 2nd April relative to the debates in the Grand National Assembly on the new Turkish Constitution, I suggested the possibility that the question of the supreme command of the army might not be dealt with in the Constitution, as proposed originally. When however, the debate was resumed on the 6th April, this was the first question taken and for two days it almost monopolised the attention of the Assembly.

2. I have not seen the draft article prepared by the Constitutional Committee, but it apparently proposed that the President of the Republic should be *ex officio* commander-in-chief of the army. The now powerful opposition in the Assembly demurred very strongly to this. They urged that in principle the supreme command must be retained by the Grand National Assembly itself. The discussions were lively, especially on the first day, but the details are not worth recording. On the 7th April a solution was found to the

following formula, which was agreed to by a majority of 111 against 42, two members abstaining:

"The office of commander-in-chief is vested in the moral personality of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and is exercised in a representative capacity by the President of the Republic. The command of armed forces is confident in peace time to the Chief of the General Staff in accordance with the relevant law and in war time to the person who shall be appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers."

3. The meaning of the word rendered above by "exercised in a representative capacity" is somewhat difficult to appreciate in this context. It may perhaps be more literally translated "personified." The motion embodying the formula was led up to by a speech of Ismet Pasha's, and was proposed by one of his supporters. Ismet Pasha urged among the arguments that if the commander-in-chief were chosen by the Assembly he would be above the Government, would be a dictator; and that there could be no objection to the President of the Republic personifying an attribute of the moral personality of the Assembly as he was irresponsible, and he would not exercise the effective command.

4. From the summary given in my despatch No. 188 of the 4th March, 1924, of the recent law on the office of Chief of the General Staff, it will be seen that it was therein laid down that officer should in time of peace have supreme command of the army as substitute for the President of the Republic, and that he should be appointed by the latter on the nomination by the Prime Minister. The upshot of the whole matter would therefore appear to be that both in peace and war time the choice of the commander-in-chief rests with the executive, not with the Assembly. On the one hand, Mustafa Kemal Pasha has sustained a personal rebuff, which has caused his supporters to accuse the Assembly of ingratitude, but, on the other hand, the Assembly has contended itself with the assertion of the abstract principle that the function which it could only exercise by delegation is vested in its moral personality.

5. The formula translated above will be embodied in the new Constitution as article 40. It is sufficiently subtle and elastic to make it doubtful how it will operate in practice. The importance attached to the matter is a measure of the rivalry between the opposition and the two pashas, Mustafa Kemal and Ismet. It is an axiom in this country that no ruler can maintain himself unless he can keep a hold on the army, which is still in the higher ranks a hotbed of politics. Whatever the plans of the two pashas may be, it is of cardinal importance to them to keep his hold. So long as Mustafa Kemal can count on Ismet Pasha and

both on the Chief of the General Staff, the President would appear to be in a fairly strong position, though not as strong as if he had himself secured the supreme command.

6. A report put about some days ago by a Constantinople paper that the Assembly would shortly dissolve itself. The paper asked its readers to wait and see, notwithstanding the contradictions which would be published. The contradictions have duly appeared, but the future of the Assembly must be regarded as quite uncertain. Even though it should not dissolve, or rather order new elections, it is generally assumed that it will adjourn for several months in the near future. It is nearly through with the budget, and the remainder of the Constitution need not occupy many more weekly sittings.

7. The supporters of Mustafa Kemal Pasha display an increasing tendency to accuse the Assembly of seeking to monopolise the authority which really belongs to the people. Thus the "Aksham" of the 7th April had a leading article headed, "Does sovereignty rest with the nation or with the National Assembly?" The last word of it were "Assemblies, like rulers, may be despotic. The despotism of Assemblies is the more terrible." The "İleri" again, whose special function it is to make the pace for Mustafa Kemal, has had articles hinting at the necessity of his authority being respected. These may be indications that is the Ghazi's intention to save the national sovereignty from the National Assembly. It was by the Assembly that he saved it from Sultan and Caliph, but he is a very adaptable man.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/260, p. 102-103, No. 84

No. 196

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 76
Telegraphic

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 17, 1924
(Received April 18)

My immediately preceding telegram.

I presume that this reply is sufficiently favourable to justify my proceeding for a visit to Angora Please reply on this point urgently.

I should try to start as soon as His Majesty's Government have ratified and to return here before Bairam begins.

I understand that neither my American nor Italian colleagues have been received by President of the Republic, and it may therefore be difficult for me to get audience. In this case I should probably defer visit till I present letters of credence. Please, therefore, allow nothing about proposed visit to transpire in the press.*

F.O. 371/10193 / E. 3462

F.O. 424/260, p. 104, No. 86

* Bu telgraf üzerine Londra'da, Foreign Office görevlisi Oliphant şu notu düşmüştü:

"While I have a great respect for Mr. Lindsay's opinion, I question the expediency of his going to Angora at the present moment. Neither his American nor his Italian colleague was received by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The Lausanne Treaty cannot be ratified until we get a definite decision from the Irish Free State and Canada. A draft reply is submitted herewith.

L. Oliphant, 19th April 1924"

No.197

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople)

No. 58

Telegraphic

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 21, 1924

Your telegram No. 76 of 17th April: Journey to Angora.

Ratification is still dependent on necessary action by Canada and Irish Free State and, while every effort is being made to expedite it, date cannot yet be given.

It does not seem advisable that you should go to Angora and not be received there by President of Republic.

In all the circumstances, it would appear preferable to defer idea of immediate visit.

F.O. 371/10193/ E. 3462

F.O. 424/260, p. 104, No. 86

No. 198

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 336

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 23, 1924

(Received April 28)

Sir,

A report began to circulate here several weeks ago that M. Filality, the Roumanian representative, might shortly be expected to proceed to Angora, and that when he did so he would present credentials as Minister to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. From the manner in which this report was ventilated and received it was clear that something of the sort was in the wind, notwithstanding the fact that, although Roumania had ratified the Treaty of Lausanne, she was not and could not be technically at peace with Turkey pending ratification by three of the principal Allied Powers as provided in article 143 of the treaty.

2. The matter hung fire until last week, when M. Filality left somewhat suddenly for Angora. From remarks let fall by Adnan Bey in conversation with me I gather that he knew very little about the matter, and that all preliminary arrangement were made direct between Bucharest and Angora, though the intermediary of the Turkish representative at the former capital. Adnan Bey seemed, indeed, a little disconcerted to find that the Turkish *agrément* to M. Filality's appointment had been given without his being so much as informed.

3. Filality was received by Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the 20th April, and presented his letters. I enclose a translation of the speeches exchanged, based on a Turkish version published in the "Tanin" of the 23rd April.* It will be observed that no reference is made to the conclusion of peace between the two countries, and that the tone is distinctly cordial on both sides.

4. About the same time when the final arrangement were made for M. Filality's visit to Angora, it was on that M. Bratiano, the Roumanian Prime Minister, was about to visit Constantinople. His arrival has been fixed for the 24th April. It is said to be his intention to go on to Broussa, and his journey is described as being a mere pleasure excursion.

5. The significance of these two incidents occurring at a time when relations between Roumania and Russia are so strained is obvious. It is not unnatural that Roumania should seek to consolidate her position with the Turks as in other directions at this juncture. What is rather more remarkable is that Turkey should have shown equal readiness to receive a Roumanian Minister regardless of the fact that the state of war has not been regularly terminated.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha was doubtless flattered by the alacrity displayed by Roumania in ratifying the treaty before any of the Great Powers, and perhaps not unwilling to administer to the latter what might be considered a slight snub; but the principal importance of the matter seems to be that the reception of M. Filality in such circumstances can only be regarded as a deliberate display of indifference towards Russia, possibly even a manifestation of solidarity with a minor Power threatened with Russian aggression.

6. As for M. Bratiano's visit, it is hardly conceivable that the statesman should come here just now with the sole object of seeing the sights of Constantinople and taking the waters at Russia. Reports that he will go to Angora have been contradicted, but the Turks are quite prepared to make a little fuss over him. It is not impossible that M. Filality, who returned from Angora on the 22nd April, may have arranged for some meeting between his Prime Minister and one or more responsible Turkish statesmen.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

P.S. - I understand that news has just been received that M. Bratiano has cancelled his visit to Constantinople on account of his wife's illness.

R. C. L.

F.O. 371/10223/E. 3685

F.O. 424/260, p. 108-109, No. 94

No. 199

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 345

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 29, 1924
(Received May 5)

Sir,

Within the last week three of my colleague's have returned to Constantinople after paying visits to Angora.

2. My American colleague informs me that he asked, when he arrived at Angora, to be received by the President, but was informed that his Excellency was ill. Admiral Bristol says he had no reason to suppose that the President was not ill; but I have information to the contrary. The admiral stayed only a couple of days in Angora and had conversations with most of Ministers. He says he

found them moderate men when spoken to, and he considers that they are quite amenable to reason. It had not occurred to him that perhaps Ministers talking privately may take a far more reasonable attitude than in public or in action.

3. Admiral Bristol lived in his railway-car and was fairly comfortable. He recognises, however, the hard conditions of life for a European in the régime which he prescribes for his liaison officer who lives there. This gentleman for every thirty days he spends at Angora is allowed ten days in Constantinople for recuperation.

4. M. Filality, my Roumanian colleague, went to Angora to present his letters of credence. He would have done this before, but the letters sent to him by his Government were not in proper form. He was officially received by the President, but Ismet Pasha was ill, and M. Filality was therefore unable to see him. At his official audience Mustafa (Kemal) Pasha's demeanour was marked throughout by the utmost aloofness and dignity; he kept the Minister very distinctly at arm's length the whole time, and, while quite gracious, he scarcely allowed a smile to illuminate his features. All proceedings were conducted through an interpreter, both the formal and official speeches and the subsequent conversation, although the President is perfectly familiar with the French language. Nevertheless, the audience lasted altogether for one hour and half M. Filality had been told before it began that after a few minutes conversation he should take an opportunity of proposing to the President to introduce his staff to his Excellency. M. Filality attempted to do this, but Mustafa Kemal waived the proposal aside and continued talking. Twenty minutes later a member of the President's staff put his head into the door with the obvious intention of interrupting the audience. The President signed to him to go out again and continued talking. When finally M. Filality did present his staff, Mustafa Kemal was attracted by the handsome appearance of the military attaché's uniform and continued talking for another twenty minutes.

5. This confirms the information which I have had from another source to the effect that the President is a tremendous talker. Two or three hours is a common period for one of his political speeches, and on one occasion he spoke for six hours without drawing breath. The audiences which he gives are always so long that his entourage exert themselves to make them as few as possible in number, because no day is long enough to include more than one of the without prejudicing business.

6. M. Filality's visit was very short, and he transacted nothing but formal and official business of presenting credentials. He admired the courage which had induced the Turks to plant their capital on the barren side of a mountain,

and he was filled with horror at the conditions under which Europeans in Angora have to live.

7. Signor Montagna was received by Ismet Pasha the very day he arrived in Angora, but he did not have an interview with the President. He conveys the impression to enquirers that, owing to the unofficial nature of his visit, he did not seek for an audience. He had interviews with practically all the more important Ministers to discuss current business with them, especially as Ismet Pasha was ill for the greater part of his stay in Angora.

8. Signor Montagna was immensely impressed by the remoteness, intellectual even more than physical, of the inhabitants of Angora from the realities of life outside their town. He gave the Ministers specific instances of the enormities committed by their subordinates in Constantinople and the provinces, and he is convinced that the Ministers were genuinely astonished at his revelations. He even succeeded in one or two minor instances in obtaining immediate redress. As a result of his visit, Signor Montagna is more convinced than ever that direct pressure or persuasion applied at Angora is necessary for the achievement of any useful business. At the same time he feels that with the present set of men, in the atmosphere by which they are at present surrounded, it is quite hopeless to expect any real progress to be made in the reform and reconstruction of the Turkish State. He thinks that if the present state of affairs continues some sort of crash must ensue sooner or later.

9. He attended the meeting of the Grand National Assembly which took place on the 20th instant, when the last fifty articles of the Constitution were voted into law. The proceedings were extremely disorderly, but he was greatly struck by the atmosphere of violent opposition to the Government which was displayed by the Chamber as a whole. Deputies were leaping to their feet in twos and threes the whole time, firing off objections to the proposals of the Government and amendments to the law which the Government could not accept. It is all the more surprising in these conditions that such astonishing legislative progress should have been made.

10. Ismet Pasha fell ill the day after Signor Montagna was very painfully impressed by the Pasha's appearance. He saw him daily less than a year ago at Lausanne, and he was greatly struck by the change in his appearance which has since taken place. Ismet Pasha appeared to be suffering from some bronchial trouble which gave him a good deal of pain, and, judging from mere external appearances, Signor Montagna regards him as a finished man.

11. Like M. Filality, Signor Montagna was horrified at the conditions of existence in Angora. There is only one hotel there where it is possible to buy

any food, and Signor Montagna took the whole of it, namely, six rooms. There was no kind of attendance, and in the kitchen, which was directly below Signor Montagna's room, the cooks spent whole day in burning mutton-fat. My Italian colleague went to Angora gaily, not believing all the ill that was spoken of it. He has returned more convinced than ever that he will have to go there again at intervals, but confessing frankly that he will be unable to do so without making a great effort over himself.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/260, p. 109-111, No. 96

No. 200

Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Mr. Lancelot Oliphant (Foreign Office)

CONSTANTINOPLE, 29th April 1924

My dear Lancelot,

This letter is a postscript to my despatch No. 345. It is not right that I should report in an official despatch what my colleagues have told me they have not reported to their own governments.

Montagna tells me in the strictest secrecy that when he arrived in Angora he did ask Ismet Pasha if he could be received by the President. Ismet Pasha answered him quite frankly saying that he would have been happy to have arranged it but for the fact that the President had already found it necessary to refuse an audience to another representative he would therefore not be able now to grant an audience to him. This of course refers to Admiral Bristol and disposes of the tale that Mustafa (Kemal) was ill when Bristol asked for his audience.

Of course what the real truth is we still do not know. The Americans being apparently many months away from ratifying their treaty are in anything but good odour here and Mustafa (Kemal) may very well have declined to see Bristol on that account. It is, however, equally likely that considering the great aloofness and dignity with which he seeks to surround himself he may prefer not to unbend so far as to receive any foreign representative whose position is not officially established.

Yours sincerely

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10193/E. 3906

No. 201

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 373

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 7, 1924

Received May 12)

Sir,

In the 11th paragraph of my despatch No. 244 of the 12th March, I mentioned that one of the consequences of the abolition of the Caliphate had been a press campaign in favour of similar action regarding the patriarchates and the grand rabbinate. This campaign subsequently died down, but the question has again come to the fore in the last few days owing to the publication in the local press of a statement said to have been made by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to a correspondent of the "New York Times." I enclose a copy of this statement as reproduced in the French "Tanin" of the 4th May. I am not aware whether it has actually appeared in the "New York Herald."

2. The importance of the President's statements is enhanced by the fact that on at least two previous occasions, namely, the proclamation of the republic and the abolition of the Caliphate, he has foreshadowed action by statements to foreign press correspondents. It must further be borne in mind that, while the Turkish authorities have of late treated the Greek and Armenian patriarchates with considerations, they have carefully avoided any formal recognition of them.

3. The Greek patriarchate continues to be an object of great suspicion. A few days ago, for instance, it was reported that the late Patriarch, Mgr. Meletios, had abandoned or postponed a projected voyage to America, and it was suggested that the reason for this was that he had not obtained leave from the patriarchate. This not unnaturally suggested to the Turkish press a question as to why the ex-Patriarch should still be considered dependent on the Phanar.

4. The Greek Patriarch's position has, moreover, been diminished by the action of the authorities in distraining upon property in the patriarchate in execution of a judgement pronounced against him by default at the suit of the notorious Papa Eftim.

5. It will be remembered that when the present Patriarch was elected, Mr. Henderson refrained from entering into relations with him, but reserved the question whether the usual congratulations should be conveyed to him by a member of the Embassy on the occasion of Easter. When the time came I considered that it would be impolitic from our own point of view and damaging

to the patriarchate if a member of his mission called there. I confined myself, therefore, to sending cards to the Patriarch and such other ecclesiastical chiefs (one of whom was the acting Armenian Patriarch) as had sent me cards a week before on the occasion of the Latin Easter. *

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10191/E. 4101

F.O. 424/260, p. 114, No. 100

* Foreign Office'de bu belgenin altına şu not düşülmüştü:

"There seems little doubt that the Patriarchates will have to go. The loss will be most serious for the Armenians, who cannot look to an organisation abroad for religious administration in the same way as the Greeks and other religious bodies.

G.W. Rendel, 12.V.24"

ENCLOSURE IN No.201

Extract from the "Tanin" of 4 May 1924

UNE INTERVIEW DU GHAZI ACCORDEE AU "NEW YORK HERALD" Le Président Parle de la Suppression des Patriarcats et du Grand Rabbinate

Le Président de la République, Ghazi Moustapha Kémal Pacha, a fait les déclarations suivantes au correspondant du *New York Herald*, sur la question des Patriarcats:

"Après l'abolition du Kalifat, la suppression des Patriarcats orthodoxe et arménien ainsi que du Grand Rabbinate s'impose nécessairement. Comme le Kalifat, ces établissements se sont arrogés depuis des siècles, des privilèges considérables, absolument étrangères à leur caractère religieux. L'opinion publique ne peut se concevoir un gouvernement républicain allant de pair avec des privilèges de cette nature. Dans le passé, et principalement après le détronement d'Abdul-Hamid, on a dépensé beaucoup d'efforts pour amender les lois constitutionnelles du pays suivant les conceptions de la civilisation occidentale. Mais ce fut en pure perte, car à chaque pas on se heurtait aux prérogatives d'institutions religieuses comme le Kalifat et les Patriarcats.

Des siècles auparavant, nos ancêtres turc-musulmans, en conquérant ce pays, y ont trouvé des populations gouvernées par des chefs nantis de pouvoirs politico-religieux. A cette époque, il fut jugé utile de se concilier les éléments

conquis dont les croyances religieuses étaient étrangères à celles des vainqueurs. Dans ce but, les premiers conquérants ont permis aux peuples qu'ils avaient pris sous leur domination, d'être gouvernés par leurs propres chefs religieux, auxquelles ils accordèrent, à cet effet, de large concessions.

Les prérogatives du Kalifat et des patriarchats formaient la base même de notre législation. En supposant un instant que ces mesures fussent, pour l'époque, opportune et avisées, elle n'en demeuraient pas moins dangereuses pour les destinées du pays. Notre progrès a été de ce fait, paralysé, ou tout au moins retardé, et la Turquie est ainsi restée arriérée par rapport à tous ses voisins d'Europe. Il lui était impossible de faire acte de pouvoir, de gouverner. Aucune réforme, aucune idée de progrès ne pouvaient être envisagées sans se heurter à l'opposition des patriarchats ou du Kalifat. Il était impossible par exemple, de modifier nos méthodes d'enseignements, sans attirer la colère de nos patriarches; à la moindre tentative de notre part, ils allaient immédiatement se mettre sous la protection des puissance étrangères.

Depuis des siècles, grâce à l'hégémonie qu'elle exerçait sur le patriarcat grec, la Russie était parvenue à acquérir une influence pernicieuse sur nos affaires intérieures. L'exemple des patriarchats orthodoxe et arménien avaient créé un antécédent qui nous obligea d'homologuer le pouvoir du patriarche grec-catholique et du grand rabbin. De même, quant apparut le protestantisme, nous nous sommes vus forcés de reconnaître un représentant de l'Eglise protestante, et lui conférer des privilèges à l'instar de ceux des Grecs.

Jusqu'à ces derniers temps, la perception des impôts se faisait par le canal des églises! Le gouvernement remettait à des chefs religieux spéciaux, le soin de les prélever dans leurs circonscriptions, sur les contribuables relevant de leur pouvoir spirituel.

Tous les groupements ethniques habitant la Turquie avaient leurs propres écoles et lycées et ils étaient libre dans l'exercice de leur langue et de leur religion. Mais ces écoles n'ont fait que servir des projets de trahison. Les Arméniens se trouvant sous la domination turque, travaillaient ouvertement pour l'avènement d'un gouvernement autonome; et avec l'aide effective d'éléments étrangers, ils ne faisaient qu'ourdir des intrigues continuelles à l'effet de réaliser leurs chimères. Les Grecs qui avaient vécu avec nous pendant quatre cents ans, se sont déclarés, un beau jours, irrédimés, et ont cherché à se libérer du joug des Turcs.

Ils enseignèrent leur religion et leur langue, dans leurs écoles, et ignorèrent le gouvernement sous lequel ils vivaient.

La même situation, les mêmes faits, se sont répétés avec les autres éléments. En Turquie, les écoles et les églises n'étaient que des foyers d'intrigues politiques. Les non-musulmans, et jusqu'aux Arabes musulmans vivant dans les limites de l'Empire turc, tous ont négligé, dans une identique intention, l'enseignement de la langue turque dans leurs institutions scolaires. Nous demandons à la France, à l'Angleterre, à l'Amérique, et à n'importe quel autre pays, combien de temps ils pourraient fermer les yeux devant une situation pareille chez eux? "

F.O. 371/10191/E. 4101

No. 202

Mr. John Balfour (Budapest) to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald

No. 191

BUDAPEST, May 8, 1924
(Received May 12)

Sir,

With reference to Sir Thomas Hohler's despatch No. 150 of the 4th ultimo reporting the ratification of the treaty between Turkey and Hungary, I have the honour to report that Ridvanbeg Oglou Husrew Bei arrived in Budapest on Monday last as newly appointed Minister of the Turkish People's (sic) Republic.

In his interview with the representative of the Pester Lloyd Husrew Bei described himself as having occupied during the war the rank of Major on the general staff of the Turkish Caucasian Army operating on the Eastern Front. He was later general secretary to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and a member of the first Turkish National Assembly. He attended the London Conference as member of the Staff of Bekir Sami Bei, and was subsequently elected to represent Trebizond in the second National Assembly, a post which he held until his appointment as Minister at Budapest.

I have, etc.

JOHN BALFOUR

F.O. 371/10199/E. 4126

No. 203

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 386

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 14, 1924
(Received May 19)

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 245 of March 19th relative to the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Hungary, I have the honour to state that the new Hungarian Minister, Monsieur Ladislas Tahy, who recently proceeded to Angora via Constantinople, presented his letters of credence to Mustafa Kemal Pasha on May 11th.

2. The speeches exchanged on this occasion were cordial. Monsieur Tahy paid a warm tribute to the heroic and successful national struggle of Turkey. Neither speech contained any reference to the past relations of the defunct Empires to which the two countries formerly belonged. Otherwise the speeches present no feature of interest.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Buda Pest.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10199/E. 4367

No. 204

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 391

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 14, 1924
(Received May 19)

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 373 of the 7th May relative to a statement said to have been made to a correspondent of the "New York Herald" by Mustafa Kemal Pasha regarding the future of the Patriarchates and the Grand Rabbinate, I have the honour to state that on the 6th May the semi-official Anatolian Agency circulated a very categorical *démenti* to the alleged

interview had never taken place, and that the statement attributed to the pasha was an entire fabrication.

2. On the same day on which the official *démenti* was published in Constantinople, the newly established Turkish paper "Jumhuriyet" ("Republic"), a Government organ, published independently a similar denial, with the addition that no decisions had been taken regarding the Patriarchates, etc.

3. Before these denials appeared there had been time for a good deal of comment on the alleged statement. The delay was so short, having regard to the distance between Constantinople and Angora, that it may well have been accidental, but it resulted in the statement itself receiving much more attention than the denial. During the interval one paper, which is in pretty close touch with official circles, threw out in fairly plain language the suggestion that the Patriarchates would do well to forestall drastic action by winding up their affairs of their own initiative.

4. I find that the alleged statement appeared in the "New York Herald Tribune" of the 23rd March and was represented as being based on an interview accorded to a certain Ella Priter. From a foot-note it would appear to have been the property not of the paper itself, but of the "World Wide News Service" of Boston. Ella Priter is unknown to the United States High Commission here.

5. The interview, as published in America, is a good deal longer the version enclosed in my despatch under reference. Notwithstanding the denial that it took place, it presents very much the appearance of a statement made, if not by Mustafa Kemal himself, by some authorised person well primed with the Turkish point of view regarding the Caliphate and the Patriarchates. It is obvious that, if it really took place, it must have been over two months ago. This suggests the possibility that the President or someone authorised by him did make a statement which it is now considered advisable for political reason to disavow.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10191/E. 4371

F.O. 424/260, p. 115, No. 103

No. 205

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 417

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 21, 1924
(Received May 26)

Sir,

Since I wrote my despatch No. 357 of the 30th April there have been some minor developments in the Turkish political situation which it now seems worth while to record summarily, although their effect, if any, on the main course of events in this country is still quite uncertain.

2. When the Grand National Assembly adjourned on the 22nd April the campaign against the Minister of the Interior, Ferid Bey, was at its height. It turned principally on the scandal regarding the return of certain rich Armenians and others, and on allegations regarding Ferid Bey's attitude toward the national movement in 1919, when he was a member of one of Damad Ferid Pasha's Cabinets.

3. For a short time the second of these grounds of attack seemed to overshadow the other. Two papers published different versions of a telegram addressed at the time by Ferid Bey to Refet Bey (now Refet Pasha), who was in command of the Turkish troops at Samsoun. This brought Refet Pasha into the limelight. He has for some time been in Constantinople, taking no open part in public affairs. When the Ferid Bey telegram was published he at first observed an attitude of reserve, but on the 1st May he suddenly allowed the local "Aksham" to publish a long and sensational interview, in which he confirmed the authenticity of one version of Ferid Bey telegram, and made various statements which, under appearance of faint justification of the Minister of the Interior, were in reality very damaging to him. Refet Pasha also made reference to past differences between himself and Mustafa Kemal Pasha; said that "Mustafa Kemal and his friends" (apparently those who had been in the national movement from the start) ought to be in power; but added that he himself was so far from nurturing political ambitions that he was resigning his Deputyship.

4. Refet Pasha's motives in making this statement were and remain obscure. In private conversation with Mr. Ryan a few days later he claimed, half jestingly, to have done the Government a good turn by drawing off attention from Ferid to himself. In view of his association with Reouf Bey's hitherto

abortive attempts at opposition, the general impression is that he was attempting to stab the Government in its weakest part.

5. The next episode was the appearance in Constantinople of a new Government organ, the "Jumhuriyet" or "Republic," under the auspices of Yunus Nadi Bey, the editor of the Angora "Yeni Gyun." As I mentioned in my above-mentioned despatch, the "İleri," hitherto the leading Kemalist organ here, had taken a strong line against Ferid Bey. The appearance of the "Jumhuriyet" heralded, if it did not cause, a considerable journalistic storm. This might be set down to mere jealousy and personal quarrels, were it not for the fact that the two principal persons connected with the "İleri," the brothers Jelal and Subhi Nouri have been conspicuous for personal royalty to Mustafa Kemal, and have at times taken the line that the only cure for the country is that he should take matters completely into his own hands.

6. Within the last few days attention has been redirected to the Armenian scandal by the publication of the first report of the commission sent to Constantinople to investigate it. Beyond the fact that it tends more or less to incriminate the Vali of Constantinople and the director-general of police, who had been already dismissed, the report is of little political interest. It has, however, made the position of the Minister of the Interior even more difficult, and the latest news from Angora is that he tendered his resignation yesterday, and that it has been accepted.

7. The significance of these excursions and alarms will doubtless appear at a later stage. All that can be said at present is that İsmet Pasha's Government has lost ground; and that, while İsmet himself is not criticised, he has increased his difficulties by his somewhat inexplicable loyalty to Ferid Bey. Mustafa Kemal has remained entirely in the background. It is conceivable that he is deliberately allowing the Government to become discredited, just as the Assembly was discredited, in order that a stronger call may be made on him in due course to take a distracted country in hand, suppress the politicians and get on with the much-needed economic revival. This is more speculation, but, if it should prove to be true, the various episodes recorded above would fall into place in a more or less rational evolution of the confused internal situation. *

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10172/E. 4585

F.O. 424/260, p. 120-121, No. 108

* Foreign Office'de bu raporun altına şu not dağılmış:

"Mr. Lindsay's hypothesis as to the explanation of the event he records is very plausible.

Kemal has eliminated Sultan, Caliph and (at any rate temporarily) Assembly. The suppression of the Cabinet would be a logical development. - D. G. Osborne, 28/5 L. Oliphant 29/5"

No. 206

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 427

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 28, 1924
(Received June 2)

Sir,

I have the honour to state that Rejeb Bey, Deputy for Kutahia, was on May 21st appointed Turkish Minister of the Interior in succession to Ferid Bey, whose resignation I reported in the 6th paragraph of my despatch No. 417 of that day.

2. Redjeb Bey had been Secretary General of the People's Party since its formal inauguration last year. I believe him to be an active politician of somewhat chauvin type, devoted to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, but little appears to be known about him in Constantinople.

I have, etc.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10172/E. 4802

No. 207

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 496

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 23, 1924
(Received June 30)

Sir,

With reference to previous correspondence ending with your despatch No. 689 of the 16th June, I have the honour to state that the German representative, M. Nadolny, presented his letters of credence to Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the 16th June. The speeches exchanged have been published, but they present no special features of interest. The Turkish version of M. Nadolny's speech does not clearly define his status, but in Mustafa Kemal's reply it is definitely described as being that of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister.

2. M. Nadolny returned to Constantinople on the 20th June. Conflicting statements continue to be published regarding his future residence, but it is evident that he has no immediate intention of establishing himself at Angora. The German Embassy buildings both in Pera and Therapia are at present being repaired. *

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/10191/E.5602

F.O. 424/260, p. 136, No. 133

* Foreign Office görevlilerinden Mr. Osborne, bu yazının altına şu notu düşmüştür:

"There were some fantastic and evidently inaccurate news reports on Herr Nadolny's visit to Angora. The Germans have been perfectly loyal to their promises to us. D.G. Osborne"

No. 208

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 517

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 28, 1924
(Received July 7)

Sir,

M. Nadolny, the German Minister, came to see me yesterday on his return from Angora, after presenting his letters of credence. He said that he was proceeding immediately to Berlin to furnish a personal report on the position here and at Angora, and would be back in Constantinople in about three weeks' time. The instructions which he had received in Berlin had been to be careful only to act in conjunction with his colleagues. He would therefore, he said, before making his recommendations to his Government, be grateful if I would let him know exactly what were the views of His Majesty's Government on representation at Angora.

2. He then went on to say that his conversations there, not only with the Ministers but also with other responsible officials, had convinced him that the retention of Angora as capital was settled policy, which would not be reversed by anything short of a complete revolution against the existing régime. He had been urged to establish his entire mission at Angora, but had told İsmet Pasha that such a course was out of the question at present, and had strongly advised him in that respect to be patient. He had, nevertheless, selected a site outside

the town, in the neighbourhood. I understand, of Mustafa Kemal's villa at Tchankaya, and proposed to set up there temporary ready-made wooden house of which he had previously spoken to me, as reported in my despatch No. 460 of the 7th instant. He had, moreover, actually earmarked a ready-made building for the purpose. His Government had ordered one for the German consul-general at Smyrna. The latter having succeeded in hiring a house, he had at once telegraphed to Berlin, and received his Government's consent to the wooden house thus ordered being used instead for Angora. I gather that it has ten living rooms, five on the ground floor and five above it, and that its erection could probably be completed by October. His plan was, he said, to use his counsellor of legation, M. Holstein, a former German consular officer who knew Turkish and ranked, since the amalgamation of the services, as a diplomatic official, as permanent liaison officer at Angora, and to go there himself from time to time, some of the rooms in the building being reserved for his own personal accommodation.

3. I told M. Nadolny that so far I was aware my Government had come to no absolutely definite and final decision, except on the point that under no circumstances would a British Ambassador reside at Angora. But, when I was over in London in April last, a scheme very much in the lines of his own had been evolved and accepted by the Foreign Office in principle, though so far no steps had actually been taken to put it into effect. It contemplated the appointment of a diplomatic secretary as liaison officer with a vice-consul to assist him, and a residency, either to be build or ready-made, of approximately the same size as the German wooden house.

4. M. Nadolny said that he had pointed out to the Turks the futility of attempting to induce Ambassadors to live in Angora. Not only would the Governments of the Great Powers decline to consider such a course, but no Ambassador would accept the post in Turkey if he had to reside at Angora. Nevertheless, though it was no business of his, he would like to make an observation to me. He had found the Turks still profoundly distrustful of the real intentions of Great Britain, both as regards her general future policy toward Turkey as well as in respect of actual outstanding questions (e.g. Mosul). One of their preoccupations was about British representation at Angora. It would, he felt convinced, have the very best effect, particularly in view of those outstanding questions, if we lost no time in making known our intentions as regards Angora. An announcement on our part would, moreover, from a general point of view, have a practical utility. The Turks were inclined to regard the refusal of the diplomatic missions to leave Constantinople as pressure on them to make the Government to come back there. They, in their turn, were considering the replacement of Adnan Bey by some official of inferior rank as a

form of pressure to make the transaction of business here so impossible than the foreign representatives would be obliged to go to Angora. A statement, if he might be allowed to say so, of the arrangements which Great Britain proposed to make in order to overcome the obvious difficulty connected with representation at Angora would not only reassure the Turks as the absence of any intention on our part to adopt a course calculated to influence Turkish internal policy, but might also induce them to set to work to co-operate with the foreigner generally in making the arrangement a workable one. He added further that in his opinion such pressure as the foreign missions might hope to exercise by stopping at Constantinople would, in any case, be inefficacious. Unity among them was unattainable. The Soviet Government proposed as it was, he said, to construct an Embassy with sixty rooms at Angora, while the Polish Government, which had, of course, no pre-war residence in Constantinople, had also decided to construct its first one in Turkey at Angora.

5. I told M. Nadolny that His Majesty's Government, in finding difficulty in taking their final decision, had no desire whatever to influence Turkish internal policy. Allies had, however, to be consulted, as we wished if possible to adopt a common procedure.

6. The German Minister's opinion was, I am inclined to think, partly inspired by the hope that we would come to an early decision, so as to enable his Government, which will probably not act without us, to adopt his own recommendations without delay. Nevertheless, I have reported his conversation at length, because I believe that his observations were well-meaning and that he had some ground for making them, and also because the views which he set forth coincide generally with my own.

7. Mr. Lindsay, in his despatch No. 419 of the 21st May last, suggested that a useful effect would be produced if the announcement of the final British ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne were to coincide with the rupture of the Mosul negotiations, which was then a foregone conclusion. This proved, unfortunately, impossible, though it is still eminently desirable that every effort should be made to hasten such an arrangement. Diplomatic intervention by the British Mission here is, and will continue to be greatly hampered if not ineffective, except in small matters, until that long overdue communication is achieved. That is the main consideration. The announcement of our intentions as to representation here and at Angora is a minor one, but it would still serve a useful purpose if I were authorised to make it, even unofficially in the event of His Majesty's Government preferring to withhold the official announcement until after ratification. In doing so I might revert to the offer of a site which Adnan Bey made to me some six months ago on behalf of the Turkish

Government, and say that His Majesty's Government proposed to avail themselves of it.

8. Generally speaking I consider that the time has come face the fact of the necessity for representation at Angora and for the erection without further hesitation of a residence there, and advantage might well be taken of Mr. Lindsay's presence on leave in England to consult with him as to the action to be taken. It is, in my opinion, most desirable that the temporary residence, if sanctioned should be erected and habitable before the end of the year.

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/10194/5836

F.O. 424/261, p. 2-3, No. 3

No. 209

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 523

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 1, 1924

(Received July 7)

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 505 of the 24th June, I have the honour to state that the Constantinople press published on the 29th June an authoritative though not official announcement that Nusret Bey, one of the legal counsellors of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had been selected to replace Dr. Adnan Bey as delegate of that Ministry in Constantinople. Adnan Bey confirmed this information in conversation with me later in the day, although he said that the official instructions regarding Nusret Bey's appointment had not yet reached Constantinople. The issue of these instructions appears to be mainly a question of the completion of certain formalities, such as the formal approval of the Council of Ministers and the sanction of the President of the Republic. It will, however, be interesting to see in what terms the appointment is officially announced, having regard to the obviously inferior personal status of Nusret Bey and the doubt, which is still entertained in some quarters, as to whether Adnan Bey is really disqualified for the post of delegate in Constantinople by his decision to retain his deputyship. The Government has taken the view, as Mr. Lindsay reported in his despatch No. 416 of the 21st May, that Adnan Bey must choose between membership of

the Grand National Assembly and the delegation here, but should he or anyone else wish to contest this it will be for the Assembly itself to decide.

2. Even if Nusret Bey's appointment should prove to be provisional, the choice made by the Government is not a very happy one. He is amiable and, so far as I am aware, of blameless life, but he has hitherto held none but subordinate posts in the legal departments of the Sublime Porte and the new Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which has employed him principally as legal adviser to the delegation here. He is hardly known in foreign circles, except as having been an inconspicuous member of the second Turkish delegation at Lausanne. He is also, I believe, a Professor of Law in the University of Constantinople. I do not know him personally, but Mr. Ryan, who has seen a certain amount of him both here and at Lausanne, describes him as a rather retiring man, a capable lawyer of a studious type, lacking in diplomatic and social qualities and quite unlikely to take responsibility of to carry real weight with his own Government. He may, of course, develop unexpected capacity in a semi-independent post, and he may be sufficiently *persona grata* at Angora (İsmet Pasha is said to think highly of him) to exert some influence there, but I cannot believe on my present information that he is a man of sufficient calibre to handle difficult questions satisfactorily with foreign Ambassadors and Ministers. It seems probable that the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs will be more than ever post-box so long as Nusret Bey remains at the head of it.

3. From my private conversation with Adnan Bey I gather that his own appreciation of his successor is pretty similar to that given above. He is too careful and too loyal to depreciate Nusret Bey openly, but his praise is of the faint and damning variety.

4. Adnan Bey has consistently deprecated all suggestions that he is in the running for an appointment abroad, although rumours to that effect have been frequent. His present intention appears to be to rest and, perhaps, to travel with his wife in Europe. He will most probably return to political life in due course. The fact that he has cultivated friendly relations with foreigners and that he is in excellent personal relations with some of the potential opponents of Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pashas, notably with Refet Pasha, may have something to do with his suppression. Personally, I shall greatly regret his departure from the delegation, quite apart from any considerations connected with his successor. He is neither morally nor physically a strong man, but he has always exerted himself to tide over difficulties, and he takes responsible views, even when he is unable to enforce them on other departments here or on the Government at Angora. I have, moreover, established intimate personal relations with him, which I have found of no little value in the conduct of public

business. I may add that his own position and importance have been enhanced, and the maintenance of social relations with him has been facilitated, by the fact that he is married to the well-known Halide Edib Hanum, a lady who has played a notable part in Turkish life, literary, feminist, and to some extent political, since 1908.*

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/10172/E. 5842

F.O. 424/261, p. 3-4, No. 4

* *Adnan Bey (Adınar), Nusret Bey'in atandığı 7 Temmuz 1924 günü aşağıdaki yazıyla İngiliz temsilcisi M. Henderson'a resmen duyurmıştır:*

Adnan Bey to Mr. Henderson

M. le Représentant,

Constantinople, le 7 juillet 1924

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que son Excellence Nusret Bey, Ministre plénipotentiaire, étant nommé délégué du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Constantinople, doit me remplacer et prendre possession de son poste à partir d'aujourd'hui.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

DR. ADNAN

(F.O. 371/10172/E. 6054 & F.O. 424/261, p. 9, No. 10/1)

No. 210

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 524

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 1, 1924
(Received July 7)

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 594 of the 23rd May, and previous correspondence concerning the relations between Poland and Turkey, I have the honour to inform you that on the 25th June Polish Minister, M. Knoll, presented his credentials as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

2. The speeches exchanged on this occasion were for the most part of a conventional nature. M. Knoll, however, emphasised the fact that the two countries were resuming relations which had been interrupted in 1795 and that

Turkey had never recognised the partition of Poland, and used languages which might be interpreted as indicating a desire for future relations of a somewhat closer character than those of ordinary friendship between States. The President, in a cordially worded reply, echoed the reference to the resumption of relations after an interruption of over a century, but used more purely conventional language regarding the future.

3. After his audience with the President, M. Knoll visited Mme. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a fact which is duly recorded in the semi-official report of proceedings. This is the second occasion on which publicity has been given to Latife Hanım's reception of a foreign Minister in circumstances savouring somewhat of regality. The first was when she received the Hungarian Minister and his staff to receive a message from the women of Hungary, shortly after M. Tahy had presented his letters.

4. It is apparently the intention of the Polish Government to establish its Legation at Angora. I adverted to this in my despatch No. 517 of the 28th June, in which I reported the impressions derived from a conversation with the German Minister. The "Jumhuriyet" newspaper of the 27th June reproduces a statement said to have been made by the counsellor of the Polish Legation on behalf of his chief confirming the intention of his Government in this respect and stating that a large Legation building of over thirty rooms will be constructed at Angora next year.*

I have, etc.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/10225/E. 5843

F.O. 424/261, p. 4, No. 5

* Bu yazının altına Foreign Office'de şu not düşülmüş:

"Even if the Poles should build a Legation at Angora, the Allied position in this question is hardly likely to be seriously weakened. The defection of an Allied Power would be more serious...G.W. Rendel 9.VII.24"

No. 211

Sir W. Max Muller to Mr. MacDonald

No. 342

WARSAW, July 2, 1924

(Received July 3)

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 245 of the 13th May, reporting the ratification by Polish President of the treaties concluded at Lausanne on the

23rd July, 1923, between Poland and Turkey, I have the honour to state that normal diplomatic relations between the two countries have now been resumed.

M. Knoll, who was last year Polish representative at Moscow and has recently been appointed Minister to Turkey, has arrived at Angora and presented his credentials to Kemal Pasha on the 25th June, when he took occasion to emphasise the fact that, though relations between the two countries had been interrupted ever since the third partition of 1795, Turkey had never acquiesced in the dismemberment of Poland.

On the same day, İbrahim Tali Bey, who arrived in Warsaw a few days ago, presented his credentials to M. Wojciechowski at the Palais Belvédère.

I have, etc.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER

F.O. 371/10225/E. 5804

F.O. 424/261, p. 1, No. 2

No. 212

British Secret Intelligence Service to Foreign Office, Eastern Department

No. 9218/ Ia.

Dated 24.7.1924

Secret.

Projected Militarisation of the Turkish Government.

You may be interested in the following information which was obtained about the middle of this month from a responsible official of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Angora:

Mustafa Kemal and İsmet had come to conclusion that the affairs of the country would never be satisfactorily regulated until all the real power was in the hands of the Military.

Their present intention, therefore, was to proceed, before the opening of the Assembly, to a re-construction of the Cabinet, which was to be strengthened by the appointment of high officers such as Ali Fuad Pasha, Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, etc., to the more important Ministries. Similarly, in the case of the diplomatic representatives abroad, the civilians were to be replaced by military men.

The same policy was being pursued with regard to administrative posts in many of the vilayets. A little while ago, on instructions received from İsmet, Adnan Bey requested the editors of newspapers to make no mention in their publications of the latest appointments to official posts in certain vilayets, as these officials, though nominated as civilians, were in reality Army Officers. This policy was in process of development, particularly in the vilayets of Trebizond, Adana, Diarbekir and of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles. Already in the Gallipoli and Dardanelles area nearly all the officials, including even minor functionaries, had been supplied by the Army, the majority of the senior officials, and in many cases the mayors of small towns, being actually staff officers distinguished in the civilian capacity. For this service they were receiving three times their normal pay. As regards this particular area, it was intended that two Divisions should be kept up at full strength at Panderma and Balıkesir respectively to facilitate in case of need, a rapid concentration at the Dardanelles.

F.O. 371/10229

No. 213

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 575

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 26, 1924
(Received August 5)

Sir,

I have the honour to report as follows on the various points raised in your circular despatch of the 3rd July relative to the attitude of Turkey and the Turks towards the League of Nations.

2. The attitude of the Turkish Government as such may be described as one of watching and waiting, due to a mixture of suspicion, on the one hand, and the desire, on the other, to do nothing in a hostile sense which might react on the claim of the new Turkey to figure in the European system as an equal, independent and modern State. No forward move has been made since the Lausanne Conference, where, it will be remembered, İsmet Pasha stated on the 14th December, 1922, after a good deal of discussion and under some pressure from Lord Curzon, that "Turkey would be happy to enter the League of Nations on the conclusion of peace." During the second phase of the conference he consulted Sir Horace Rumbold privately as to how soon Turkey could become a member. This aroused some hope that the Turkish

Government might take the necessary steps in the autumn of 1923, but they did not do so. Since the signature of the Peace Treaty the only notable indication of their intentions has been the guarded statement by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in his speech to the Grand National Assembly on the 1st March:

"The entry of the Turkish Republic also into the League of Nations is a point which will be considered after the coming into force of the treaties. We desire that the League of Nations should not be an instrument of domination for the strong, but should manifest itself and develop as an institution which will assure harmony and familiar intercourse among nations and will provide a means of examining and settling differences in accordance with international law."

3. A fuller record of what passed at the conference will be found in the "Lausanne Handbook" p. 75, and the context of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's speech in Mr. Lindsay's despatch No. 188 of the 5th March last.

4. Minor indications of the attitude of the Turkish Government have been afforded by their acquiescence in various clauses of the Lausanne settlement involving recourse to the League; and, more recently, by their refusal to participate in the Conference of Naval Experts to discuss the extension of the Washington Treaty (see my telegram No. 24 of the 31st January), and their participation, on the other hand, in the Second General Conference on Communications and Transit last November. These later indication illustrate, I think, the conflict of motive mentioned above. The explanation given for the refusal to participate in the Naval Experts' Conference was that Turkey was not sufficiently interested, but this polite formula probably veiled an unwillingness to get entangled in anything which might tend to hamper her freedom to develop her armed forces. She was willing, however, and probably pleased, to appear as an invited guest at a conference to discuss so much less contentious a question as communications and transit.

5. Before leaving this part of the subject I may say that the eventual attitude of the Turkish Government will probably depend a good deal on the outcome of the Irak frontier question, should the arbitration provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne actually take place; and that their progress toward membership of the League may also be retarded by their dislike of the mandatory system and their fears regarding the attitude of the League in regard to minority question.

6. Turkish public opinion is ill-informed regarding the League and in the main indifferent to it, except when it deals, or seems likely to deal, with questions of special and immediate concern to Turkey. So far as a positive

attitude can be said to exist, it is one of mistrust inspired by the belief that the League is a combine of Western Powers, dominated more particularly by Great Britain and run by the latter in her own interest. Mandates are regarded as a devices for creating dependencies, and in extreme circles, especially in those with a pan-Islamic tinge, the mandatories entrusted with detached territories are held up to odium as oppressors. This is due more to hostility in the circles concerned towards the particular Powers than towards the League itself, whose rôle is hardly understood. Articulate public opinion is also sensitive regarding the possibility of League intervention on behalf of the Christian minorities, and one episode, the proposal to investigate the alleged detention of Christian women and children in Moslem houses, has left a particular bitter memory. What has been said above regarding the effect of any future decision of the League regarding the Irak frontier applies at least as much to future public opinion as to the future attitude of the Government.

7. There nevertheless already exists in Turkey an "Association for Supporting the League of Nations." This was brought into existence in Constantinople a couple years ago by a group of professors of the university. The president is Churuksulu Mahmoud Pasha, a former Senator and a well-known secondary figure in public life in the time of the Constantinople Government. The prime mover is a professor of international law, named Jemil Bey. He and two other delegates of the association attended the sixth assembly meeting of the International Union at Prague in 1922. Some little time afterwards three Turkish delegates attended a council meeting at Budapest, one being again Jemil Bey, the other two, Churuksulu Mahmoud Pasha and Assim Bey, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador. No Turkish delegate attended the assembly meeting last year, but Jemil Bey attended the meeting held recently at Lyons. The fact would appear to be that the Constantinople Government favoured the activities of the association – indeed, one of Jemil Bey's colleagues at Prague was a diplomat *en disponibilité* very closely connected with the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, İzzet Pasha – but that, after the collapse of the Constantinople Government and until the end of the Lausanne Conference, the leading spirits in the association were either discouraged by Angora or uncertain of its approval. It was not until after the conference that Jemil Bey secured İsmet Pasha's authority to continue his efforts. Thus the career of the association has been somewhat chequered, but it has a membership of about 100 persons, it has published statutes and one or two reports, and it hopes to develop its activities in the near future.

8. The forgoing information supplied to Mr. Ryan by Jemil Bey himself. He spoke frankly and evidently with a sincere conviction of the value of the League of Nations, or rather of a League of Nations, for he made a distinction between the idea of the League and the League as at present constituted. He

admitted that the League was viewed with mistrust in this country and did not demur to Mr. Ryan's suggestion that this was largely due to a belief (which Mr. Ryan said was unfounded) that the preponderance of the Western Powers, and especially Great Britain, was excessive and intentional. He related with some dissatisfaction, but with good temper, various passages of arms with Greek delegation at the international meetings which he had attended. He spoke appreciatively of his relation with such British delegates as he had met, although he had found himself in conflict with them over the question of minorities on one important occasion.

9. The Turkish Government has certainly no separate Government department for dealing with League of Nations questions. I am not fully informed as to the organisations in detail of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Angora, but I think it may be assumed that there is no separate League of Nations section in the Ministry and that any questions affecting the League would be dealt with according to their nature in the ordinary course of departmental business generally.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 424/261, p. 22-23, No. 27

No. 214

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 579

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 29, 1924
(Received August 5)

Sir,

I have the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 524 of the 1st July, to inform you that I received a visit on the 24th instant from the Polish Minister, who came back from Angora a few days ago on a brief trip to Constantinople. M. Knoll has spent a month in the capital and is returning again to-day in order to take up his permanent residence there. He has, so he tells me, rented for one year three small houses – a villa for himself outside the town and two buildings in the town for offices and as quarters for his staff. He is unmarried, but I gather that his counsellor, M. De Swarzburg-Günther, who has a wife, will be more permanently resident in Constantinople, in order, as he explained, to keep in touch with the rest the diplomatic body, than in Angora. M. Knoll, told me that he had sent to Warsaw the plan for a Legation, containing between

thirty and forty rooms, which it was proposed to build eventually in Angora. He anticipated, however, that the Polish Government would wait while before giving their final sanction to these plans, and spoke of the difficulty of getting locally either building material of competent workmen.

2. Poland is the traditional ally of Turkey and the two countries are united by a common danger on their eastern boundaries. Nevertheless, though professing the utmost friendliness, the Turks had, M. Knoll said, officially not been very communicative. He attributed this to the fact that Turkey was not yet sure what the future of Poland would be and whether Polish friendship would be an asset or an inconvenient complication. In his official declarations, Mustafa Kemal had not gone further than lay great stress on the need for close consultation between the two Governments in all matters. Unofficially – and M. Knoll and his staff were in close relations with various members of the President's entourage – it had been made clear that Turkey intended to entangle herself in no alliances and commit herself to no definite policy towards other countries until she had settled all her outstanding difficulties, and, in particular, the question of Mosul with Great Britain. M. Knoll said, however, that everyone whom he had seen in Angora had been very alive to the Russian danger in general, and, in particular, apprehensive of a possible Russo-Italian agreement with ulterior designs in respect of Asia Minor.

3. M. Knoll mentioned the uphill task which M. Simeon Radev was having in conducting the Bulgarian negotiations with the Turkish Government. The principle obstacle was, of course, the minorities question and the unwillingness of the Turkish Government to mention it in any agreement such treaties as those of Bucharest, Saint-Germain, &c. The visit to Angora of M. Pomianov, the Political Director of the Bulgarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had helped matters to a certain extent, and when M. Knoll left, M. Radev had been somewhat more optimistic as to the possibility of finding satisfactory formula and of concluding the negotiations.

4. M. Knoll spoke of Redjeb Bey, the former secretary-general of the People's party, who succeeded Ferid Bey two months ago as Minister of the Interior, as a likely substitute for Ismet Pasha as President of the Council of Ministers. Such a selection, if it materialised, would be interesting, since it would seem to indicate a further realisation of the probable intention of Mustafa Kemal to concentrate all power into his own hands and to surround himself with his more obscure, but devoted, henchmen rather than with the more outstanding, and consequently more independent, figures of the Nationalist movement. Incidentally, M. Knoll told me that he regarded the Ghazi Pasha as being in a class by himself and as head and shoulders in strength of character and intelligence above any other Turk whom he had met. He did not believe that there was any truth whatever in the stories (about which

I have always been myself extremely sceptical) as to excessive drinking on the part of the President. There is no doubt that he is fond of strong drink, but I have the late General Townshend's word for it, after two nights spent till the early hours of the morning in Kemal's company, that the latter took all and more the general could stand without its making the least impression upon him either physically or mentally. M. Knoll also said that, though the rumour was current in Angora, possibly owing to her rare appearances in public, it had been denied to him on good authority that Latife Hanoum was shortly going to provide the President with an heir. *

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/10225/E. 6633

F.O. 424/261, p 25-26, No. 29

* Bu yazı üzerine Foreign Office'de aşağıdaki notlar düğülmüştür:

"It seems very doubtful whether the Poles will take any final decision regarding the establishment of a permanent Legation at Angora until they have seen what the majority of the other Powers will do.

M. Knoll's view of the Turkey's attitude towards Poland is probably correct - though the reference to the Irak negotiations was probably inserted for our own special edification.

There is reason to believe that the Turks are purposely protracting the negotiations with Bulgaria until they have made up their minds as to the prospects of the Tsankoff Government, the stability of which they appear to doubt.

As regard Turkish internal policy, one of the principal difficulties at present is the lack of really capable men. If Mustafa Kemal really tries to get rid of men like Ismet, and to make the Turkish Government a "one man show", the prospects of the country's early recovery will become even more remote than they already are.

G. W. Rendel. 5.viii. 24"

No. 215

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 596

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 6, 1924
(Received August 11)

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the press has now definitely announced the appointment of Kemaleddin Sami Pasha as Turkish representative in Berlin.

2. I have been unable to obtain much information about his previous record, but, when the appointment was first suggested, Adnan Bey informed me that he was a Nationalist general of no political importance, but of great personal courage, who had succeeded in getting wounded seventeen times since 1908, when he was twice wounded by Turkish bullets. His frequent misfortunes in this respect have earned for him in army the nickname of the "lightning conductor."

3. This appointment tends to confirm my impression that Mustafa Kemal intends, as far as possible, to select for the more important posts abroad, as well as in the interior, persons with military rather than civilian antecedents.

4. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. *

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/10191/ E. 6847

F.O. 424/261, p. 28, No. 34

* Foreign Office'de bu yazının altına şu not düşülmüştür:

"We have no further information regarding this man.

It is noteworthy that his diplomatic status is not specified.

C.W. Rendel, 12.viii.24"

No. 216

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 623

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 19, 1924

(Received August 25)

Sir,

The Turco-Bulgarian negotiations, which have been proceeding in Angora for the past few months, were interrupted last week and M. Radeff has returned to Constantinople. They will probably be resumed in the latter half of October.

2. I saw M. Radeff yesterday. He told me that the original intention of his Government had been to conclude a simple treaty of friendship similar to those concluded with other countries, but that the Turkish Government had insisted

on the simultaneous settlement of outstanding questions. He denied that the difficulties with which his negotiations had met had arisen, as apprehended in the Turkish press, in connection with the return of Bulgarian refugees to Thrace. Thousand of Bulgarians had, it was true, evacuated Eastern Thrace after Balkan war, but his Government had no wish to see them emigrate back again. There had been over one question as to the disposal of their properties, but in this matter he had succeeded at long last in coming to an arrangement with the Turks.

3. The real stumbling-block had been the position of the Bulgarian Exarchate and of the Bulgarian schools in Eastern Thrace. The Turks had insisted on the observance in this respect by Bulgaria of the obligations imposed on her after the Balkan war by the Treaty of Constantinople, while declining to be themselves bound by the similar obligations imposed on Turkey. The deadlock had arisen out of the question of reciprocity. Turkey, M. Radeff said, wished Bulgaria to continue to give entire liberty to and to meet out of State funds the expenses for the upkeep of over 600 Moslem schools and over 1,000 mosques with their Moslem teachers and muftis, while the Turkish authorities were to exercise complete control over Bulgarian religious and scholastic institutions in Thrace, and even to have the right to nominate to the Bulgarian schools Turkish teachers whose salaries Bulgaria was to pay.

4. The Turkish Government had been entirely obdurate on this point. They had insisted on the new laic character of the republic and the impossibility, on the grounds of public order, of making any exception in favour of Bulgarian schools. M. Radeff had pointed out that if the Turkish State was as laic as all that, then it need not concern itself with Moslem religious affairs in Bulgaria, and that the obligations under the Treaty of Constantinople might mutually be waived. He had offered to settle the matter either in that way or by agreeing to the reciprocal observance of those obligations, or, if the Turks preferred, by dropping the Constantinople Treaty altogether and by declaring both parties bound simply by the minority clauses of the Lausanne Treaty. The Turkish Government had agreed to none of these alternatives. They had in particular objected to reference to the Lausanne Treaty. They had, M. Radeff said, merely tried to wear out his patience, but they had not succeeded. His Government were glad, rather than otherwise, to see his residence in Angora prolonged, since it was there only that the new Turkish Government could properly be studied. M. Radeff did, however, complain of the Turkish obstinacy and wrong-headedness, and in particular of the defects in this respect of Munir Bey who had been the principal negotiator. As an example, he mentioned that Munir Bey had used as an argument in Turkey's favour that there were only some 7,000 to 8,000 Bulgarians in Eastern Thrace and over half-a-million

Turks in Bulgaria. M. Radeff professed considerable scorn at such reasoning, but, in point of fact, it seems to me to have a certain force as the Bulgarian Government has considerable interest in conciliation their large Moslem population and cannot afford to antagonise it.

5. In the end M. Radeff had left Angora rather than yield, and expressed the hope that by October the Turkish Government would show themselves more reasonable.

6. M. Radeff confirmed to me the impressions which the Polish Minister had given me of the general situation at Angora. Mustafa Kemal was head and shoulders, he used the German expression "himmelweit," above any of the other Turks in Angora. No political question was settled without consulting him. We could, he said, in an hour's conversation with him dispose of questions which it would take months to arrange by less direct methods. His health was good and the stories of his ever being fuddled with drink an absolute myth. The present régime was very firmly established and the army loyal and sufficiently well paid. The Grand National Assembly would obey any order that the President of the Republic gave it. It was absurd to think that an Opposition led by people such as Reouf or Refet would succeed in overthrowing the Government. If Ismet Pasha had to go, he would be followed by Redjeb Bey, or if Mustafa Kemal wished to have a still stronger Government, by Fethi Bey. It was true that the Turks were suspicious of all foreign Powers (Russia alone, he said, had a certain influence at Angora) and distrustful of each other, of the remnants of the Committee of Union and Progress party, of Califatists and Sultanites; but he himself was convinced that if trouble arose, it would be successfully and ruthlessly crushed. As for liberty of elections, of course such a thing was impossible. Even Bulgaria had not succeeded in obtaining that after over forty years of constitutional government!

7. M. Radeff's opinions are valuable. He was educated entirely in Turkey, in Turkish schools and universities. He speaks the language like a native and has many personal friends among the present Turkish leaders. He is, in addition, an extremely intelligent and well-informed individual.

8. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Sofia.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

No. 217

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

No. 653

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 2, 1924
(Received September 8)

Sir,

Turkey has followed the example of other nations in erecting a memorial to the unknown Turkish soldier. The 30th August, the second anniversary of the battle Doumlou Pınar, the decisive engagement of the offensive which began on the 26th August, 1922, and which resulted in the capture of General Tricoupis and the complete and final rout of the Greek army, was selected as the appropriate occasion for the laying of the first stone of the monument to be erected for this purpose. The site chosen was the hill whence Mustafa Kemal himself witnessed and directed the battle, sometimes called the "Battle of the Commander-in-Chief," owing to the fact that it was fought under Kemal's personal supervision and as the result of orders inspired and issued by himself.

2. The widest publicity was given to and the greatest interest taken in the preparations for the ceremony which was attended by the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers, the President of the Assembly and a large proportion of the Deputies, by all the principal Turkish military commanders as well as by representatives of the universities and schools and of the leading institutions and professions in Turkey.

3. Numerous speeches were delivered beginning with that of Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff during the Greek campaign, and closing with an oration by Kemal himself. Though I believe that he is talkative in private conversation, the public speeches of the latter are few and far between. He is sometimes described in this respect as the "silent President." When, however, he does deliver one, it is worthy of attention and reflection. His public utterances are conceived with thoughtful intention and their infrequency adds to their significance. I have been struck on re-reading them in the light of what happened afterwards by the evidences of this intention. Subsequent events gave shown that remarks therein which appeared to be objectless at the time were carefully pointed, with an objective which, it must be admitted, the Ghazi Pasha has generally succeeded in reaching.

4. His oration last Saturday was consequently awaited with expectancy. The occasion was more suited to military panegyrics than to political thought.

Nevertheless, though I need scarcely trouble you with the full text of the speech, it shows certain tendencies which are worth recording.

5. It commences with an account of Kemal's personal share, which he is at no pains to conceal, in this momentous victory. He takes the opportunity for a certain glorification of self rather than of the common Mehmedjik (*Anglicè* "Tommy") to whom the monument is dedicated. It is true that preceding speakers paid full justice to the rank and file. But the "It's" in Kemal's speech are noticeably frequent. He also refers to the Turkish nation as "my nation," and the impression derived is that he intentionally asserted himself and his position and wished to live for posterity as the victor of one of the decisive battles of the Turkish world. Nevertheless, his pride in his achievements is legitimate, and excessive modesty would scarcely have been human or natural.

6. He underlines the immensity of the Greek catastrophe both militarily and morally, and declares the sublime result of the great victory from the Turkish point of view to be "the assumption without any restriction of national sovereignty by the Turkish people." He does not miss the chance thus afforded him of blackening the face of Sultans and Caliphs. He speaks contemptuously and abusively of "a person wearing the title of Sultan and Caliph and an institution called the Sultanate and Caliphate." "After the victory, the Turkish people abolished for ever this apocryphal institution, which was merely a source of misfortune for the fatherland, and meted out to the Sultan-Caliph the fate that he observed."

7. He then reverts to national sovereignty "before which no throne can stand," and urges the necessity, if the Turk wishes to reconstitute his country and live freely and independently therein, of preserving national sovereignty at all price, and of rallying round the republican flag.

8. His references in this respect would imply his wish to confute the allegations of those who attribute to the Ghazi Pasha the desire to assume, at a later stage, the mantle of a Sovereign or even of a Caliph. They do not necessarily, however, mean, in spite of the stress which he lays on the vital importance of national sovereignty that eventually he does not intend to take the substance, even if he foregoes the shadow, and to concentrate power, as far as possible, into his own hands. At present the Grand National Assembly, as a whole, represents the sovereignty of the people. It is significant that he does not once in the course of his speech refer to that Assembly or to the chosen of the people. He could thus, without risk of going back on his own words, ultimately denounce an assembly as being too cumbersome as institution, and assert for himself the claim to be the sole representative of that sovereignty.

9. The latter part of Kemal's speech is the more impressive, and reveals an intense and probably honest patriotism. It defines in general but statesmanlike terms the broad basis on which the new Turkey must be built up if it is to exist. Her needs, he says, are science and knowledge, a high state of civilisation, a free mentality and independence. The Turks must set to work seriously, thinking only of their country and of nothing but their country. He remind his hearers that selfish aims were the characteristic of their former rulers and the bane of the country itself. The objective of all Turks must, he states, be the national ideal. The aim of the nation must be to occupy in the world the rank of a civilised State. Peoples without the capacity to produce the works of civilisation are bound to lose their liberty and their independence. The history of humanity is a proof of this axiom. In order to live it is indispensable to tread the road of civilisation.

10. Kemal proclaims in these word his fixed determination to Westernise the new Turkey. There is to be no survival of orientalism in his ideal of a future Turkish State. Turkey must become civilised, and for this purpose must seek regeneration, "since that alone can lead to success in economic and social life and in the domain of science and art." There is, he points out, a greater victory than Doumlou Pinar yet to be won. A nation that is weak economically cannot attain to civilisation or to happiness and prosperity. Every civilised State thinks first of improving its economic situation before considering its army and its fleet. The defence of a country can only be assured by economic development and extension. All obstacles in the way of such development must be removed. All superstitions and misconceptions must be for ever banned, and he concludes with an appeal to the Turkish youth, endowed by education and instruction with the new ideas which he formulates, to maintain and to elevate the republic which he and his contemporaries have founded.

11. The reference to superstitions and misconceptions is undoubtedly propaganda in favour of the new lay régime and directed against the religious influences which, rightly or wrongly, the youngest Turks hold to have been such a bar to progress in the old Ottoman Empire. The remark concerning the necessity for the nation to give priority to the development of its economic rather than its naval and military resources is, if seriously intended, as I believe it to be, somewhat striking. Turkey is thoroughly war weary. A period of repose after the revolutions and wars of the past sixteen years is absolutely indispensable for a multitude of vital reasons. One of these is certainly the stability of the republic and of the régime which Kemal has created. If the attitude of his neighbours permit of it, Kemal is, I think, sincere not only in his ideal of Turkey as a civilised Western State, but also in his desire to devote, if possible, the slender revenues of his country to economic development and the

internal needs of Turkey rather than to budgeting for naval constructions and an increase in her military forces.

12. After the ceremony the President left with his wife for a villa on the outskirts of Broussa, where he hopes to enjoy nearly a month of complete repose the opening of the autumn session of the Grand National Assembly. *

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/ 10227/ E. 7687

F.O. 424/26], p. 38-39, No. 57

* Bu rapor İngiltere Kralına, Bakanlar Kuruluna ve Dövizyonlara sunulmuş ve Foreign Office'de raporun üzerine şu not düşülmüştür:

"Mr. Henderson attaches great importance to Mustafa Kemal's expression of his intention to place the improvement of Turkey's economic situation before any other objective, points out that Mustafa Kemal generally carries out the programmes which he announces. James Morgan 9.9.24"

No. 218

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson

No. 94

SMYRNA, September 12, 1924

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the second anniversary of the recapture of Smyrna was celebrated on the 9th instant with a considerable amount of genuine enthusiasm. There was a holiday, all public buildings and most cafés and shops were decorated, there were official receptions in the morning, a procession at midday, which was better organised than any that has been seen here, and in the evening indiscriminate pistol firing and fireworks, which was visible in spite of the moon. On the whole the people enjoyed themselves. There was no ill-feeling shown towards foreigners.

2. The procession was organised, no doubt on the instigation of the Government, by a special committee. It was composed of representatives of the public services and of various political, professional, athletic and philanthropic associations. It was remarkable as revealing the extent to which such bodies have sprung into existence in the last two years.

3. During these festivities Mustafa Kemal Pasha's picture was in evidence and his name was cheered, but this was probably not entirely spontaneous. The

celebrations afforded the Government an occasion for working up a little enthusiasm with which to meet latent discontent. The Popular party has lately been extending its organisation throughout this vilayet. This week a congress of representatives from the different branches has met. It is worthy of note that, according to the newspaper report of the proceedings, the resolutions consisted of complaints about the lack of roads, the lack of schools, delays in the distribution of seed and negligence on the part of officials sent to enquire into the damage caused by floods in the Meander Valley.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS

F.O. 371/10172/ E. 8123

F.O. 424/261, p. 48, No. 64

No. 219

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald

*No. 685
(Extracts)*

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 16, 1924
(Received September 22)

Sir,

I have reported earlier in separate despatches on Mustafa Kemal's speech at the ceremony held at Doumlou Pinar in honour of the unknown Turkish warrior, and on the Turco-Greek deadlock in respect of the interpretation of the word "established" as used in article 2 of the convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. These are two of main features of the six weeks which have elapsed since I last addressed to you, in my despatch No. 601 of the 6th August, a general summary of events in this country. The Grand National Assembly is not due to meet again till November, and the past few months have been in the nature of the calm before the storms which are likely to arise when the Assembly is once more in full swing and asking the Government to give an account of its stewardship.

2. There have, nevertheless, been developments, not without interest, in the situation since the above-mentioned despatch was written. In the first place, the Treaty of Lausanne has come into force as from the 6th August for Great Britain, Italy and Japan, and about a month later for France. The final ratification had been so long delayed that its actual entry into force provoked little comment. There was undoubtedly relief at seeing peace with the Western Powers at last finally and juridically consummated, but also resentment at a

delay which seemed to indicate ne feverish anxiety on the part of those Powers to resume normal peaceful relations with Turkey. I think that it was principally on this account that the Turkish Government showed a somewhat sulky temper in refusing to regard the treaty as being legally in force until the receipt by them the official notification from the French Government to that effect. There is nothing to imply such a necessity in article 143 of the treaty, which merely states that the date of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratification is the date on which the treaty shall be regarded as coming into force. The fact, however, remains that for some reason or other the official communication was not made to the Turkish representative at Paris until the 29th August. A serious attempt on the part of the Turkish Government to uphold its thesis in this respect would therefore give rise to considerable complications in various respects, such as, to quote but one example, the date of the application of the tariffs under the provisions of the Commercial Convention.

3. The Turkish Government at Angora have, however, by now received the actual copies of the various *procès-verbaux*, and thus have no further excuse either for delay in proceeding with different acts consequent on the entry into force of the treaty or for violations of its stipulations. I regret to have to state that I have not yet observed any alacrity to abide, where it does not suit them, either by the spirit or the letter of the treaty, notably, in so far as the minority clauses are concerned. I have agreed with my Allied colleagues that it would be expedient, now that the treaty is at last in force, to draw the attention of the Turkish Government, lest they mistake silence for indifference, to this tendency, and to the various evasions which we have observed. A note on the subject will accordingly be drafted by the Allied Juridical Commission for submission in the first instance to the Allied Governments, and will in due course from the subject of another despatch.

4. One satisfactory result of the ratification of the treaty by Great Britain has been the tacit, so far as I am concerned, consent of the Turkish Government to submit the question of the Irak-Turkey frontier to the Council of the League of Nations. Several days after the announcement of Fethi Bey's appointment as Turkish delegate to Geneva for this purpose had appeared in the press, the Turkish representative here repeated to me that, though he believed the news to be correct, he was without any official confirmation. I presume that the Turkish Government notified the League direct, but it would seem as if they wished to lay stress on the fact that their submission was voluntary and not due to pressure by this mission of by His Majesty's Government. I consequently carefully refrained from any contact whatsoever with Fethi Bey nor his mission during their stay in Constantinople. It might be noted in passing, firstly, that the future attitude of Turkey towards the League is

bound to be largely influenced by the latter's decision in respect of the Irak frontier dispute; and, secondly, that, though I have made to the Turkish Government during the past few months various official communications on this subject, I have received nothing but purely verbal communications in reply. The dislike of the Turk for the written word is traditional and ingrained, but in this matter it has been curiously emphasised. The net result is, however, satisfactory, though it is possible that Fethi Bey may suggest at Geneva a plebiscite as the most suitable means of settling the difficulty...

8. The Turkish Government has hitherto shown little disposition to expedite the nomination of their representatives to the different commissions to be set up under the treaty. Possibly they have been waiting for the communication of the *procès-verbaux*. I am continually urging Nusret Bey to stir up his Government in this respects, but so far I have met with nothing but evasion on some ground or other. For instance, as regards the Thracian Frontier Commission, he has told me that the Turkish member cannot be appointed until an agreement has been reached with the Bulgarian Government about certain small frontier rectifications. I insisted upon the impropriety of delay, the comparative unimportance, so far as a demilitarised zone was concerned, of a minor frontier rectification and on the fact that Bulgaria, though equally affected, had not hesitated to appoint her representative and to facilitate on her side of the frontier the work of demarcation, which is actually in progress, of that zone. Nusret Bey merely adopted an attitude of passive resistance, accompanied by the assurance that the rectification would shortly be settled. If there be really an intention to rectify, of which I was unaware, nor argument to that effect is likely to take place before the Bulgarian representative returns to Angora, probably next month, and continues his interrupted negotiations for the conclusion of a general treaty with Turkey. (Please see my despatch No. 623 of the 19th ultimo).

9. In the same way I have so far failed to get the Turks to select their representative to the Graves Commission (article 130 of the treaty), to the demilitarised Straits Zone Commission (article 5 of the Straits Convention), or even to express an opinion as to the amount of salary to be paid to the neutral President or to the secretary-general of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to be set up under article 92 of the treaty. In fact, the only representative whom they have so far nominated is Admiral Vassif Pasha as President of the International Straits Commission.

10. On the other hand, they have appointed, as successor to Yusuf Kemal Bey, who preferred under the recent regulations to remain a Deputy rather than an Ambassador or Minister abroad, a new Turkish representative to London in the person of Zekiai Bey, the Minister for Agriculture, and

consequently also a Deputy, but one who presumably does not set equal store on his deputyship. I cannot say that I regard him as an eminently suitable choice. In fact I am a loss to explain why he was selected; whether it was because the Government preferred to see him abroad, or whether it was simply for lack of a more suitable candidate, or whether it was that they thought him qualified for a particular object, such as, owing to his connection with the representatives of the Board of Trade at Lausanne, the development of economic relations with Great Britain. Whatever be the reason, I do not anticipate that his tenure of the office in London will be long. He has, however, already left for his post and been succeeded as Minister for Agriculture by Shukri Kaya Bey, Deputy for Smyrna.

11. In this latter connection it is worth mentioning that the press reported with insistence that the Government contemplated offering, or had actually offered, that Cabinet post to Rahmi Bey. The latter, equally a Deputy for Smyrna, is well known as one of the most prominent members of the old Committee of Union and Progress, as one of the leaders of the so-called "Opposition" and for his friendship with Reouf Bey. It is at least significant that his possible inclusion in Government should even have been mooted. There are two possible explanations: Firstly, that it was an attempt on the part of the Government to conciliate and thus weaken the Opposition, or, secondly, that Mustafa Kemal himself put forward Rahmi Bey's name. There are many who believe that the President of the Republic, whose own position is, in my opinion, unassailable, would find no difficulty in working with the Opposition, should the latter develop sufficient strength during the next session to defeat the present Government. In that event Mustafa Kemal would presumably ask Reouf Bey, who is now living very quietly and unostentatiously in Constantinople, to form a Government.

12. To turn to more parochial matters, there have been during the past three weeks several events which have aroused considerable local interest. The most sensational has been the fate of Rachid Bey, the Vali of Constantinople. Some ten days ago the latter, after dining and supping "not wisely, but too well," took it into his head to order at about 2. A. M. A surprise mobilisation of all the armed forces of the republic in the city. All traffic was consequently stopped, and all the gendarmerie and the police, as well as the fire brigades and a portion at least of the military garrison, turned out into the streets under arms. The perturbation of the peaceable civil population, who believed in the possibility of a Communist rising, was considerable, though no real harm was done. As the result of the complaints raised in the press, an official enquiry was instituted and definitely established that Rachid Bey's zeal, though perhaps not in principle unjustifiable, particularly in view of the aforesaid Communist

danger, about which there has been some talk recently - arms having been discovered and a secret Communist committee arrested in the town - was due in the case in point solely to the influence of intoxicants. He was consequently summarily dismissed by the Minister of the Interior....

14. Of more importance has been the purification of the Turkish bar in Constantinople. A commission instituted for this purpose has been sitting here for some time past and making searching enquiries into the antecedents and morality of Constantinople barristers. As the result of its investigations, over 530 out of 960 members of the Turkish bar here have been prohibited from further practice in the Turkish courts. Of the 430 who survive, 313 are Turks, 42 Greeks, 39 Armenians and 34 Jews. The victims have been disqualified either on moral grounds (a very wide net) or for not having furnished the necessary documents, or for being engaged in business incompatible with the profession of a barrister...

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

F.O. 371/10172/ E. 8121

F.O. 424/261, p. 44-48, No. 63

No. 220

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson

No. 96

SMYRNA, September 20, 1924

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on the 17th instant I had a conversation with Muammer Bey, the mayor of Smyrna and father-in-law of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, about the possibilities of economic revival. Muammer Bey is bluff and sanguine merchant who knows French and English, has frequently visited the Continent and has European business connections. As he has only recently returned from Angora his remarks may be of some interest as reflecting either the President's genuine views or the views he desires to be credited with.

2. Muammer Bey recognised that to turn to proper account the natural resources of Turkey there are three principal requirements - populations, capital and technical skill. He said that the Ghazi believed the population of Turkish race to have been reduced by 8 millions since 1908. But Mustafa Kemal

Pasha contended, he said, that, if Turkey had five years of peace, the present population would become properly established, and that, if she were fortunate enough to have fifteen or twenty years of peace, the population would double. Muammer Bey's own idea of the present population of Turkey was 12-14 million, an estimate which would seem to be as grossly exaggerated as the replies given by Turks in any locality where enquiries are made.

3. Capital, Muammer Bey said, would come into Turkey as soon as the country's credit were restored. Even now confidence in the country was slowly returning. The Government's intention was first of all to settle the Mosul question and then to deal with the debt coupons. Settlement of latter question would, he thought, do more than anything else to bring capital into the country. I hinted that it was also of some importance whether the attitude of the administration to invested capital was helpful or vexatious, but he did not respond.

4. As regard technical skill Muammer Bey freely recognised that it would take many years and perhaps a generation before Turks acquired the proficiency which local industries demanded. The country would employ skilled labour from abroad. For example he was himself going to employ Italians on roadmaking.

5. I asked him how much he thought the country would be handicapped by the disappearance of the Greek and Armenian bankers, brokers, commission agents and middlemen of all sorts. He thought not at all, because Turks themselves were entering into direct relations with European business houses. Indeed one of their aim was to eliminate the Levantine who remains interposed between the Turkish and the European business man. Like most other educated Turks he did not seem to suspect that a business man needs training.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS

F.O. 371/ 10228

No. 221

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson

No. 99

SMYRNA, September 26, 1924

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 96 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report that a week ago a local cinema caught fires and about twenty

five people including some women and children were burnt to death or severely injured. A great agitation has followed in the press and elsewhere, and Muammer Bey Ushakizadeh, who as mayor was theoretically responsible for seeing that the building was fit for public use, has resigned office.

2. Although the agitation is genuine in that many families are affected by the tragedy, it is interpreted, in view of its unusual violence rather as an indirect attack on Muammer Bey's son-in-law, Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS

F.O. 371/10228

No. 222

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 720

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 1, 1924
(Received October 6)

Sir,

During the past fortnight the local press has devoted much space to chronicling the details of the tour of the President of the Republic, who, as reported in Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 685 of the 16th instant, passed through the Bosphorus on the 12th September *en route* for Trebizond. Contrary to expectation, his stay in the latter town, which he reached on the 15th September, only extended to four days, during which he visited the port of Rizé as well as other places in the immediate vicinity. He then proceeded to Ordu, Samsun (where he remained two days), Havza, Amassia, Tokat and Sivas (where the first Nationalist congress was held in 1919). Two days ago he left Sivas on his way to Erzeroum.

2. Although it has been officially announced that the motive underlying the visit of Erzeroum is the President's desire to witness for himself the damage done by a series of recent earthquake shocks in that area, it now seems certain that the real object of the tour, which was doubtless fully, though secretly, planned in advance, is to enable Mustafa Kemal to take stock of the situation actually prevailing in the eastern provinces.

3. It seems scarcely necessary to state that, according to the press reports, the utmost enthusiasm prevailed at every point visited by the President. Moreover, the fact that he was traversing, as head of the Turkish State, practically the same route as that followed by him five years ago, when he left Constantinople alone for Anatolia to found the Nationalist movement, has served as an excellent text for the speeches which it was but natural that he should deliver. Apart from one, all these speeches have been in the usual strain, a comparison between the free and independent Turkey of to-day and Turkey of 1919 which groaned under the oppression of foreign foes, aided and abetted by a traitor Sultan and his servile Government in Constantinople. At a banquet given on his honour by the People's party organisation at Trebizond, however, the President took the opportunity to answer those of his critics who have for some time been contending that the head of the State should be above party. The People's party was, he said, a sacred association which had created a force by which the foreign invaders had been expelled and the enemies at home crushed, it had laid the foundations of the free republic, had introduced Turkey to the civilised world and was continually striving to elevate her position in that world. Of such a party the President announced himself proud to be the leader, and added that for him there could be no neutrality, as he was an out-and-out partisan of the republic and he felt sure that by remaining at the head of the party he would be best serving the needs of the young republic. It is not without interest that Mustafa Kemal should have chosen to deliver himself of this important pronouncement at the place where, during the elections just over a year ago, the utmost difficulty was encountered in securing the nomination of the Kemalist candidates, a result which, as will be remembered, was only attained after the so-called headquarters of the People's party in Trebizond had been forcibly closed. Moreover, in a speech a few days later at Samsun, he further warned his hearers that the real salvation of the country lay in the realisation of the ideals of the People's party, and that the formation of other groups could only damage the nation's highest interests.

4. Where everything appears to have savoured of adulation and hero-worship, at least one small incident occurred to mar the otherwise general harmony. This was at the port of Rize, where two muftis submitted to Mustafa Kemal a petition, in which they begged for the reopening of the Moslem religious schools ("medreses"). This request seems to have roused the anger of the President, for he at once addressed the assemblage and enquired whether they were not aware that the "medreses" had been the real cause of the Turkish decline, and concluded: "No, the 'medreses' will not be reopened." The incident is significant as showing that, while the lay republic has been established without active opposition, there remain elements

discontented with the Government on religious grounds, though powerless effectively to oppose it.

5. As has already been stated, the President's immediate objective is now Erzeroum, beyond which his itinerary has not yet been made public. It seems probable, however, that he will eventually return to Angora by road, and so escape the necessity of again passing through the Bosphorus. This is all the more probable as the cruiser "Hamidieh" has returned to Constantinople, where it is understood that she will undergo repairs. In this connection it is reported that during the voyage to Trebizond the officers drew the attention of the President to the grievances of the navy, whose interests have hitherto been almost entirely neglected by the Government, and extracted from him a promise that he would devote his personal attention to the much-needed reorganisation of the Turkish navy. He further sought to ingratiate himself with the latter by writing in the visitors' book of the "Hamidieh" a long eulogy of the navy in general and of the "Hamidieh" in particular, in which he expressed the hope that a further goal would soon be reached with Turkey in possession of a large and powerful navy in keeping with her great maritime interests.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10172/E. 8636

F.O. 424/261, p. 50-51, No. 67

No. 223

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 750

Confidential

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 8, 1924

(Received October 13)

Sir,

A few days ago the press of Constantinople began to publish reports to the effect that the Government was contemplating some sort of action against the Committee of Union and Progress at Smyrna. There seems to be little or no truth in these rumours, but the circumstances which gave rise to them transpired in a confidential conversation between the correspondent of the "Times" here, Mr. Macartney, and Hussein Jahid Bey, editor of the "Tanin" and a prominent member of the Union and Progress party.

2. Hussein Jahid said that it had now been definitely decided to start an Opposition party in Turkey, and that it might be expected to materialise soon, perhaps before, perhaps shortly after the meeting of the Assembly. The general dissatisfaction of educated opinion in and out of the Assembly at the mismanagement of affairs by the Government made such a development necessary. For five months the Government had been free from the annoyances of the elected Chamber, and so far from having utilised this period for reconstruction, they had done nothing. The administration was still in chaos, the hardships suffered by Mahometans exchanged from Greece were making a deep impression, and the abuses of the Abandoned Property Commission were flagrant, the more so as valuable properties, instead of affording shelter for incoming refugees as had been intended, were now to be found in the possession of Ministers and notables (of whom I fear Ismet Pasha is one). The movement towards secession was further stimulated by the close identification of the presidential office with the leadership of the People's party which Mustafa Kemal had recently emphasised in his speech at Trebizond (see my despatch No. 720 of 1st October).

3. Hussein Jahid was of opinion that the popularity of Mustafa Kemal was undoubtedly on the wane and still more that of Ismet Pasha and his Government. All accounts to the effect that the President's eastern tour was a quasi-military inspection of the north-east frontier should be discounted; its sole object was to beat up in the east some enthusiasm for the People's party, which had always been conspicuously absent, and especially since the murder of Chukri Bey in March 1923. Nor had the tour succeed in its objective; the reports of cordial receptions in the various towns published in the papers were, he said, exaggerated; the People's party in those regions usually considered one or two officials with no following; and the President's reception had been markedly cold.

4. It was not intended, Hussein Jahid said, to reconstitute the old Committee of Union and Progress as the new Opposition party, though undoubtedly many of old organisation would join it. Nor was it intended to afford cover to any anti-republican or other reactionary elements. The new party was to be an Opposition organised with the definite object of opposing the Government on constitutional and republican lines; and towards the President it would initiate no marked hostility, but reserve its attitude until the President's attitude toward it was more clearly defined.

5. In all that Hussein Jahid has said above there is some truth, and the fact that the Vali of Trebizond has just been removed from his post confirms the statement that the President has been coldly received in the east. Nevertheless, Hussein Bey is essentially a politician and a critic, and his declaration, taken as

a whole, certainly requires to be discounted somewhat. I am certainly of opinion that the President's position in the country at large is not materially shaken. As you know, he stands head and shoulders above any other of the governing personages of Turkey, certainly in ability and probably also in character, and I cannot help thinking that on any point of real importance he would find no difficulty still in having his own way.

6. An interesting feature of Hussein Jahid's statements is the indication it gives of Turkey's political evolution. It is an axiom that healthy political life can only exist where there is organised opposition to, and criticism of, the Government, and though there has been in Turkey much dissatisfaction at the maladministration of the country (especially of Constantinople) and bitter criticism of the acts of Ministers collectively and administratively, the opposition has not hitherto ventured openly to invest itself with a political character and has thus failed so far to fulfil its real function. There now seems to be a movement towards remedying this state of affairs, supported undoubtedly by the most intelligent of Turkish writers and politicians. Whether or not it will succeed, and whether or not Turkish politics really will now enter on a new phase is still doubtful; and it is sad to read in this morning's "Tanin" (Hussein Jahid's paper) a prominent paragraph denying the existence of any such movement. Reouf Bey had heard no more about the formation of an Opposition than what he has read in the papers; Refet has never discussed it with him at all; and Ismail Jamboulat regards the whole thing as a mere *ballon d'essai*. It is hard to imagine that those who faint so soon by the wayside will struggle through to the end of the race.

7. The true difficulty is the attitude the President has adopted in taking on himself the leadership of the People's party and the arrogance with which at Trebizond he claimed for it a monopoly of public virtue. There may have been good reasons to impel him when he founded the party also to become its head. The republican régime had to be consolidated and the serious work of laicisation was about to begin, culminating in the expulsion of the Caliph. Mustafa Kemal may well have thought a year ago that to carry through these tasks opposition must somehow be silenced, and that the best way would be to identify himself closely with the organisation which was to undertake the work. The misadvantages of his action are obvious and do not require to be laboured, and last spring, when affairs in the Assembly appeared to be rather critical, Mustafa Kemal seemed to appreciate them and to be seeking to extricate himself from a false position by holding himself aloof from the turmoil of the Assembly and above the difficulties of his Cabinet. His Trebizond speech puts things back where they were and condemns politics to a continuation of

principles that are essentially false. It is not easy to discern the motives of his action.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/ 10172/ E. 8863
F.O. 424/261, p. 52-53, No. 71

No. 224

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 770

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 15, 1924
(Received October 20)

Sir,

With reference to previous correspondence concerning sites for foreign mission buildings at Angora, I learn from the German Minister that he has now bought a site and paid for it. It will therefore be seen that Herr Nadolny has changed his mind since the date of Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 692. He told me that he was having to spend a large sum for storage of his wooden house at Haidar Pasha, and that he has made a formal reserve to the Turkish Government that he will expect them to repay him the purchase money if they grant sites gratis to any other mission. It is, however, obvious that by his action he has compromised the chances of all other foreign Governments of obtaining the grant of free sites.

2. The plot of land acquired by Herr Nadolny is 28,000 squire metres in area, and is situated on the road from Angora to Chankaya., the residence of the President of the Republic. It is 5 kilom. from the town and 3 from Chankaya. Her Nadolny says there is a good spring of water on the site, but not a single tree. The price he paid is LT. 16.000, and this works out to about 1s. 5d. Per squire metre, a rate for a bare hillside, in the remote and undeveloped suburb of a place like Angora, which I should regard as outrageous. I am, however, told by my Polish colleague that the President of the Republic pressed him and presses other foreign representatives also to settle on the Angora-Chankaya road, and that various persons of influence have therefore gone in far a speculation in this region and are holding all possible sites for high prices. There is thus no telling how mixed Herr Nadolny's motives may have been in agreeing to buy a site for his Government in this area.

3. The Polish Minister himself lives at a place 8 kilom. out of Angora in the opposite direction from Chankaya in a house he has on lease till this time next year. He is far from enthusiastic about his residence, but he says it is well removed from the malaria swamps. He has no spring, but he has a stream of running water, and a few trees.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10194/E. 9116

F.O. 424/261, p. 56, No. 76

No. 225

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 805

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 28, 1924

(Received November 3)

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the Grand National Assembly, which held its first meeting on the 18th instant, has continued its sittings on the regular days throughout the past week. The Mosul question, which caused its hurried convocation, has not again been mentioned, and interest has centred round matters of purely domestic concern, there being a good deal of discussion of the interpellations with which various Ministers are threatened. The principal attack is at present directed against Refet Bey, Minister of Reconstruction, on account of scandalous neglect of Mussulmans exchanged into Turkey from Greece, and the press of Constantinople is anticipating that this Ministry will be abolished altogether and its duties transferred to some other Department. It is quite certain that, faced with a task that might well tax the abilities of a far more highly organised administration, Refet Bey's Ministry has lamentably failed to do any serious work; but it is far more doubtful whether Ismet Pasha, who is loyal to his colleagues and reasserts at intervals the principle of Cabinet solidarity, is yet prepared to let him go.

2. On the 25th instant a meeting took place of the People's party, which still comprises - nominally, at any rate - of a regular all the Deputies. Ismet Pasha made a long statement as to the activities of the Government during the parliamentary recess, which, according to the press reports, was of a somewhat colourless nature; there was little discussion and little enthusiasm, and the proceedings are to be continued at another party meeting to be held later on this week.

3. So far the Opposition to the Government have either not yet consolidated themselves into a party, or they prefer not to unmask their batteries at once; indeed, one Constantinople adherent told an Englishman a few days ago that they intended to go ahead presently, provided that England did not send any more ultimatums. To-day, while there is every likelihood that the Government will be freely sniped, there is no indication of the formation and organisation of a regular parliamentary Opposition, and nothing resembling a constructive political programme has yet been put forward. All that has been accomplished so far is that the press has talked so much about opposition that the idea must have become familiar to the newspaper-reading public. It is usually said that some forty or fifty Deputies belong to the new group, and the leaders of it are mentioned almost every day as being Reouf, Refet, İsmail Jambolat and Dr. Adnan Beys. Yesterday a fifth is said to have been added. Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, Commander of the Eastern Army Corps, walked into the Assembly and said that, the country being no longer in danger, and because the army was perfect, he himself, having to choose between his military command and his post as Deputy, now definitely preferred to take up the latter. The event caused some sensation in the Assembly, but the general has so often in the last two or three years been talked about as a politician, and so little has come of it, that judgement as to the importance of his action had better wait awhile.

4. Though the surface of the parliamentary sea is thus at present fairly smooth, a good deal is probably going on under the surface, and I frequently hear rumours, always very indefinite, of sensational developments preparing for the near future. I find it impossible to say what importance should be attached to these rumours. There is certainly a widespread recognition of the fact that İsmet Pasha's Ministry has failed to accomplish any serious work of reconstruction. The Government is therefore unpopular, and a movement is taking place towards the formation of an Opposition. But it is equally certain that 80 Per cent. of the Deputies are either military men or carpet-beggars, with the mentality of pure placemen, and that the army will obey any orders that its commanders give it. Mustafa Kemal has probably lost some of his prestige, for some of the discredit attaching to the Government is reflected on himself, but he still keeps enough authority to hold the game in his own hand. To an observer in Constantinople the situation is as interesting as it is obscure. *

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10172/ E. 9537

F.O. 424/261, p. 59, No. 82

* *Bu raporun altına Foreign Office'de şu not düzelmiştir:*

" There is very little indication as yet of any serious threat to Mustafa Kemal's régime. The opposition is strengthened by the exchanged Moslems from Greece (who have been as badly treated as was to be expected), by the more religious Moslems of Anatolia, and by disappointed optimists and place-hunters, but there are no signs of its becoming a sufficiently powerful force to affect Turkish foreign policy - G. W. Rendel S. XI. 24."

No. 226

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald

No. 818

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 4, 1924

(Received November 10)

Sir,

Though the Grand National Assembly met a fortnight ago in connection with the difficulties on the Irak frontier, it was only on the 1st instant, the day originally fixed for its reopening, that Mustafa Kemal Pasha formally opened the session with a presidential speech. Considering how widespread is the dissatisfaction against the inefficiency of the Government, the tone of the address on internal affairs — one of calm optimism — was rather striking. He did, indeed, admit the existence of difficulties, and even of defects, but he always praised what had been accomplished, and expressed confidence in the success which would follow on renewed and continuous efforts. This fairly covers his remarks on the state of the army, finances, public health, instruction and justice. As regards the settlement of Moslems exchanged from Greece, he said that the immigrants had not received the satisfaction that they deserved, and that the Assembly would have to take urgent measures of relief. The navy, he said, would have to be seriously reformed, but within the limits of what was practically possible. Railways should be built, but out of Turkey's own resources only. The Assembly should provide a grant to help in the construction of Angora. In general, the path of civilisation and progress must be strenuously followed.

2. It may be thought that the President's language was rather far removed from the material realities of the situation in the country, but it is doubtless calculated to suit the political exigencies of the moment.

3. In the field of foreign affairs, besides the mention of the Irak frontier question (reported in my despatch No. 815 of to-day), he referred to the friendly relations with France, "the frontier incidents having been rapidly settled," with Italy, and with "our old friend" Russia, while a special mention is made of the favourable evolution of relations with Poland. As regards the public

debt, he said: "It is natural that we shall respect our engagements." Another passage worth quoting is that referring to the League of Nations, as follows: "As soon as the Treaty of Lausanne entered into force, Turkey began official relations with and reposed confidence in the League of Nations. We hope that this confidence will be justified by the justice of the decisions which will be rendered. It is certain that a sincere League will be regarded as a guarantee of security for nations."

4. The Assembly proceeded then to the election of its officers. Fethi Bey was re-elected President with substantial unanimity – a result not surprising, for in the session of last spring he got into a position of unavowed semi-opposition to the Government, and thus now meets with no opposition from anyone. For the three Vice-Presidencies, the Government candidates were all elected, but the rival list received the support of about sixty-five Deputies. This is of some interest, as showing what the voting strength of the Opposition at present amounts to. It is also interesting that one of the Vice-Presidents elected is Refet Bey, Minister of Reconstruction, against whom (as reported in my despatch No. 805 of the 28th October) the Opposition were directing their main attack in connection with the resettlement of Moslems exchanged from Greece. It thus appear that İsmet Pasha had been willing, after all, to part with his subordinate, though living him an ostensible promotion. Refet is the next few days to answer the interpellations on the management of his department now about to be addressed to the Government. When the debate is over, his Ministry is to be abolished and its affairs conducted as a branch of the Ministry of the Interior.

5. I mentioned in my above-quoted despatch that the resignation of Kiazim Karabekir Pasha of his military command and his assumption of his position as Deputy had created some sensation. This has been followed by quite a little series of similar events. Ali Fuad, Jevad and Jafer Tayar Pashas have all followed Kiazim Karabekir's example, while it was announced at the same time that Generals Fevzi, Fahreddin, İzzeddine, Ali Hikmet and Shukri Naili Pashas had decided to retain their military commands and to resign their Deputyships. In the elections to places on the Parliamentary Commissions party feeling has been strong enough to exclude Kiazim Karabekir and Refet Pashas from that of National Defence, in spite of their undoubted technical qualifications.

6. This development might at first sight be thought to indicate a split in the higher command of the army on political lines, but I should not care yet to draw so wide an inference, and it is possible that each commander may be actuated by a different motive. Kiazim Karabekir is, I am told, a man of some ambition, jealous of İsmet Pasha, who has passed over him in seniority, and discontented because he has had no chance of gathering laurels against the

Greeks. He is a great personality in the Turkish army, and his appearance on the political stage, especially in the Opposition, is therefore of some importance. It will certainly give the President of the Republic food for thought.

7. In a leading article in to-day's "Tanin," Hussein Jahid rather implies that these decisions by generals as to military or civilian and political service have been brought about by the Government requiring the officers to choose definitely which path they would wish to follow in the future. In a clever piece of journalism, the writer congratulates Turkey on the complete severance of the army from politics that has now been effected. How unfortunate it would have been if Turkey had come to resemble those South American States where the Republican form of Government serves merely as a cloak to a military dictatorship. There follows a long description of conditions prevailing in South America, every word of which is precisely applicable to the Turkey of to-day, and with scarcely concealed irony the article ends by exclaiming how the Turkish heart will beat with joy at the decisions now taken, and how Europe will respect the young republic whom she hitherto regarded as pure comedy. *

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10172/ E. 9738

F.O. 424/261, p. 66-67, No. 87

* *Bu rapor üzerine Foreign Office'de şu notlar düğünmü:*

"In the debates now proceeding the opposition to the Government has for the first time become articulate. The main... is the treatment of the exchanged Moslems. Criticism of the Minister responsible has become so outspoken that İsmet has announced that a question of confidence in the Government is...

The appearance on the political stage of the Turkish generals must be causing Kemal and İsmet some anxiety. It means that the army's unquestioning devotion to Kemal has not (? strong) the strain of the last year and it is upon the army's devotion that the present régime is ultimately based.- D.G. Osborne 10/11"

No. 227

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 834

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 11, 1924

(Received November 17)

Sir,

Since the 4th November, the date of my despatch No. 818, the time of the Grand National Assembly has been entirely taken up with the interpellations of

the Government of which there has been so much talk. The preliminary manoeuvres, aimed at embarrassing the Opposition, were brought into play by the Government. In the first place, they announced that the generals who have resigned their military positions must personally hand over their commands to their successors before they could take their seats as Deputies. In vain Kiazim Karabekir protested that he was no longer a soldier and that he had already been allowed to sit in the Assembly; he was answered that the law was formal, and back to Erzeroum he must travel to conform with its prescriptions. As a result of this, neither he nor Ali Fuad could take any part in the debate.

2. The second step by the Government was to refuse any interpellation of single Ministers and to require that the indictment must be of the whole Government: in other word, they put the question of confidence. This was strongly but vainly resisted by the Opposition, and the decision reached had considerable influence on the Deputies. It immediately became clear that many who were ready to snipe a Minister – especially one who had already been transferred to a higher and more serene atmosphere – were not prepared to vote out a whole Cabinet; and any hopes that the Opposition may have had of making a brave show in the final division disappeared from this moment.

3. The actual debates took place in the presence of the President of the Republic and Latife Hanoum, who occupied the presidential box. They were opened by Rejeb Bey, the Minister of the Interior, who, contrary to what had been announced, answered for Refet Bey, the ex-Minister of Reconstruction, on questions relating to exchange of populations. I hear Rejeb well spoken of as an intelligent, enlightened and energetic man, and he is far the best of Ismet Pasha's lieutenants. He certainly made a good fighting speech on the exchange question, full of facts and figures; whether they were accurate, or whether they partook of the nature of most Turkish statistics was comparatively immaterial for the purposes of the debate, for the Opposition do not seem to have got up their case with any care and were entirely unable to formulate precise charges of maladministration well supported by facts. Perhaps because of this parliamentary incompetence, perhaps because Reouf Bey, their most competent leader of the Opposition, was away ill for the last two days of the proceedings, and perhaps owing to the generalised nature of the debate, the discussions speedily dissipated themselves over a very wide field, thereby losing coherence and force. At one moment Deputies were soaring into the higher atmosphere of abstruse political theory, at the next they were indulging in acrimonious personalities; and Refet Pasha (the ex-general, not the ex-Minister) half-a-dozen times proclaimed the purity of his republicanism in a loud voice. The debate was wound up by speeches from all the Ministers in turn, each dealing with the activities of his own Department, and on the 8th November the

proceedings terminated when the vote of confidence in the Government was passed by 147 votes to 19.

4. On the 10th instant the centre of interest was transferred from the Chamber to the People's party, which was called together for an extraordinary meeting. The existence of a definite opposition to the Government has for some time been clear, but its formation into an organised party, though drawing near, has not yet been actually accomplished. According to the papers, it was proposing to call itself the Republican party. The first business of the People's party yesterday was, therefore, to accept the formal resignation of eighteen of its members. This is, of course, the nucleus of the new organisation. The next business was, on the motion Rejeb Bey, the Minister of the Interior, to change the name of the People's party to the "Republican People's party" – a move obviously intended to preserve the monopoly of republican virtue to these who at present claim it. After that the party proceeded to vote some new rules for its internal organisation. Put briefly, these ordain that interpellations of the Government must first be discussed within the party itself; that no interpellation can be put the Grand National Assembly, and no parliamentary question converted into an interpellation without the approval of the party; and that the declarations and writings of members must conform to the policy of the party. Surely it must be difficult to find more potent weapons of party discipline than these; and if the Opposition leaders have hitherto lacked a programme with which to attract adherents, surely this tyranny of a mere caucus over the individual legislator must achieve the object for them. This evening's papers say that some thirty to forty further resignations from the People's party are to be expected.

5. One further element in the political situation of the moment is worth mentioning – that is Ismet Pasha's health. I have no information beyond what I gather from the press, but again and again during the last couple of months he has been kept to his house by attacks of malaria, which is prevalent in Angora in a peculiarly virulent form. He has been absent from the Assembly throughout the past week and is said to be in a state of great debility, so that it is quite likely that he may have to give up work and leave the capital for a time. His disappearance would be a very serious loss both to the President and to the Government, and nature would thus achieve more at one stroke than all the efforts of the young Opposition.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10172/ E. 9966

F.O. 424/261, p. 77-78, No. 90

No. 228

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 850

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 19, 1924

(Received November 24)

Sir,

On Monday, the 17th November, the "Sonn Telegraph" published a telegram from its Angora correspondent saying that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had accepted an official invitation to visit France. He was to be accompanied by İsmet Pasha, would travel in the French warship "Edgar Quinet"; would stay some time in the south of France, and would witness military reviews. The journey was to take place as soon as Latife Hanım had recovered from an attack of malaria from which, in common with most people in Angora, she is now suffering. Other journals also had telegrams from Angora confirming this intelligence.

2. The "Aksham" of the same evening denied the truth of this news. The President's chief aide-de-camp was quoted as saying that there was no such project forward, and the report was "incredible." According to the correspondent the President had once said to some French statesman that if he undertook a journey to Europe he would begin with France; and a French journalist had done the rest. Since then the various papers have published contradictory news on the subject; but the "Tanin" to-day says that General Mougin has officially invited the President, who has promised to make the journey, but without fixing any date at all. "Stamboul," the French official organ, received the news on Monday with a paean of triumph, but has not printed a word about it to-day or yesterday.

3. It is one of the President's favourite gambits, when he is about to take some important step, to allow an indiscretion to appear in the press which can be immediately denied. It is also well known that General Mougin and the French Government are heavily courting Turkey at this moment. Very likely General Mougin has transmitted an invitation from his Government to Mustafa Kemal, but though perhaps it may not been refused. I very much doubt that any definite engagement has yet been contracted. I do not think the President or his Government are yet prepared to descend from their aloofness from the international field and commit themselves to a definite gesture of friendliness toward any foreign Government.

4. I shall not fail to report without delay any definite news I may gather on this subject.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/261, p. 78-79, No. 91

No. 229

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 859

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 24, 1924
(Received December 1)

Sir,

Sadik Khan, Sheikh Tabatabai, the new Persian Ambassador, who arrived here two months ago, went last week to Angora to present his credentials to the President of the Republic. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith translations of the formal speeches which were exchanged on the occasion.

2. The language of the Ambassador's speech, in the original, is unusually flowery, and the substance of it, as you will judge from the translation, rather effusive. Moreover it contains two references, though slight ones, to some sort of community of interest between Moslem nations. I can well imagine that these references may have been distasteful to the Turkish Government, who still emphasise the secular and laic character of the Republic and maintain its disinterestedness from Moslem affairs outside its own frontiers. Still I am surprised that the President should have thought it worth while to give expression to his feelings by making a reply to the Ambassador so curt that it amounts to a snub. I think it shows the continued acerbity of the Turkish Government who are thus ready on such trifling provocation to hurt the feelings of a neighbouring and friendly country.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10223/ E. 10611

ENCLOSURE IN No. 229

*Reception of Persian Ambassador by Mustafa Kemal Pasha
on November 17th, 1924.*

Speech of Persian Ambassador.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to present the letter of his Imperial Majesty the Shah setting forth that I have been chosen to be Ambassador to the Turkish Republic. My Government chose me for this high position because I have always entertained cordial feelings for and taken a warm interest in the country and people of Turkey, and because during my twenty years political career I have ever advocated the creation of a perfect accord between Turkey and Persia. My efforts have always been directed toward translation this principle into practice. Having lived in close touch with Turkey and the honourable Turkish people, and having spent some part of my life in this country, I have acquired considerable knowledge thereof. My life in Persia has been mostly devoted to national and political work in Parliament. I am therefore acquainted with the conditions and feelings of my country. These are the considerations which my Government has had in mind in appointing me Ambassador, in order to strengthen the bonds which exist between the two countries by giving effect on all occasions to the lofty and sacred principles of my Government. However cordial the relations between these two oriental Moslem nations may have been in the past, the two countries should now, as befits the time, be nearer and more united to one another than ever. My desire is to achieve this sacred object in the most appropriate manner and to strengthen and co-ordinate political, economic and national relations and fraternal inclinations. The achievement of this high object which is of the greatest importance to both countries will be possible with Your Excellency's help, for that, by the grace of Allah, Your Excellency is animated by such noble sentiments is proved by Your Excellency's great achievements and by the testimony of the world. I hope that the work which it falls to me to do in the service of both countries will be successful. The sympathy of my Government no less than that of the Persian people has been shown in many ways. May this sympathy bear further fruit so that both Governments and both peoples and indeed all Moslem countries may benefit thereby.

Reply of Mustafa Kemal Pasha

Your Excellency,

I am happy to receive the letter of credence by which your Government informs me that you have been appointed by His Majesty the Shah as Ambassador to me. I have been greatly touched by the cordial feelings and warm interests which you have manifested in regard to the Turkish Republic and the Turkish people. I earnestly hope that your efforts to translate into practice the principles which have led your appointment as Ambassador may be of advantage to the political and economic relations of the two peoples and countries.

I assure you that in this respect you will meet with entire sympathy both on the part of the Republican Government and upon my own part, and I wish Your Excellency a cordial welcome.

F.O. 371/10223/ E. 10611

No. 230

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 862

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 24, 1924
(Received December 1)

Sir,

On the 22nd November the newspapers informed the Turkish public that Ismet Pasha had handed in his resignation on grounds of ill-health and that the President had entrusted the Premiership to Fethi Bey. Considering how frequently Ismet has of late been incapacitated from work, nobody can have felt surprised. Other forces have, indeed, been working to undermine his position, but whether, without the element of health, he would have succumbed to them so soon is a question now of minor importance. Fethi Bey set to work at once to form his Cabinet, acting in close consultation with the President of the Republic, and his list was ready and published in the course of the day.

2. The new Ministry is composed as follows:

Ali Fethi Bey : Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Mehmed Redjeb Bey : Interior.

Mustafa Abdul Halik Bey : Finance.

Feizi Bey: Public Works.

Shukri Kaya Bey: Foreign Affairs.

Mahmud Essad Bey: Justice.

Shukri Bey Sarıajoglu: Public Instruction.

Dr. Mazhar Bey : Public Health.

Ali Jenani Bey : Commerce.

Hassan Fehmi Bey : Agriculture.

3. I enclose herewith short biographies of all the Ministers. Fethi I have met several times, but I expect that those who have dealt with him over the Irak question know him better than I do. My own impression is that he is far from intelligent, but that he has character and determination. He has a sense of honour, his interests extend beyond the things that daily and closely concern him, and he is probably about as decent a man as modern Turkey could produce. His wife is particularly charming. I met Feizi Bey last May when he sat at the Constantinople Conference on Irak, and he made a bad impression on me. He looks like a low-class ward politician, and fancy he has in fact constituted himself into the leader of fairly strong group of Deputies who are probably out to look after their own personal interests only. Mr. A. Parker, when he was negotiating here last spring about the Anatolian Railway, worked good deal with Feizi and though that if only he could become Minister of Public Works –as he now has – all difficulties would be rapidly overcome. Personally, I do not think Feizi is to be trusted, and if he remains long enough in office, I fear that Mr. Parker may find it out. Shukri Kaya Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was known to our delegation at Lausanne. He is a courteous, rather colourless, individual. My impressions of other Ministers are not definite enough to report. It is noticeable that there is no soldier in the Cabinet, and that Fethi himself takes the Ministry of Defence. Presumably, Fevzi Pasha is too great for a mere Ministry, and other military men in the Assembly and available now for office are too small; but, where the army is so highly esteemed as here, the omission constitutes a weakness and confirms the impression that Fethi's Cabinet is one of transition only. On the whole, it looks like the sort of Cabinet which Mustafa Kemal himself prefers, consisting of one right-hand man and a lot of dummies.

4. No member of the new Progressive party is included in the Government, and the Ministry depends still, nominally at any rate, on the old Republican People's party to a conclave, of which Fethi Bey submitted his list for approval and to which in a couple of days' time he will submit his programme. Yet it is well known that three at least of the Ministers (Feizi, Mahmud Essad and Sukri Sarrajoglu) were within the last few days at violent loggerheads with the party and on the point of leaving it. It might be thought that their inclusion in the Cabinet is an attempt to weld the party together once more, but I think the other reason suggested above is more likely to be the true one, namely, that the Cabinet of to-day is a transition to something else, and that something like a general reshuffle of parties is about to take place. Fethi Bey himself is not sufficiently enamoured of the People's party to lend himself to any scheme for rehabilitating it. Of the state of the party itself, I think Mr. Knoll's description is probably correct (see my despatch No. 588 of the 22nd November, paragraph 5), that it is mere empty shell with no intelligence left in it. It is noticeable that Hussein Jahid in the "Tanin" this morning extends a warm and cordial welcome to the new Government; and especially noticeable that in his detailed praise he confines himself to talking of Fethi Bey and not of his Ministers, commanding him for his observance of the decencies of parliamentary life and for a strong stand he made a few days ago in the Assembly against rowdy interruption of Opposition speakers, amounting to a denial of the liberty of debate.

5. Indeed, the new Progressive Republican party of opposition has been making considerable strides in influence if not in actual numbers. Only about thirty Deputies have actually resigned from the old People's party, and not at all of these belong to the Progressives (of the others, more hereafter), but the new Opposition certainly comprises the most intelligent men in Assembly, and it certainly has the sympathy of many who have not yet had the courage to avow it. The other day it produced a Constitution and a programme, and it is now an organised body duly recognised by law. Its programme contains much that would be commonplace in other countries, but it includes a strong denunciation of despotism and oligarchy in all their forms and of the undue predominance in the state of any individual. It is against sectarianism, advocates a broad spirit of toleration and the adaptation of the laws of the country to modern requirements, but without shaking the State. Both Adnan Bey and his wife have spoken to me of "things having gone too far," and the new party, while undoubtedly progressive, advocates progress at a pace and in a manner different from what has been recently practised. Comparatively speaking, the movement is conservative in character, and it is usually spoken of here as a movement to the Right. Perhaps the expression is specially apt if we talk of

Turkish politics in terms of manner rather than of substance, of decency rather than of abstract political opinion.

6. The other Deputies who have resigned from the People's party are in a very different category. They are typified by the Hoja of Erzerum, who in his letter of resignation stated quite frankly that his religious principles would not allow him to remain any longer in the party. This is open Kalifism, and is the most outspoken declaration of that I have yet seen. The Hoja does not stand alone, but he has not many adherents in the Assembly, and I do not think they amount to much at present, but there seems to be a geographical character in this movement – they all hail from the eastern provinces. Of course, the speakers of the People's party try to confuse these pure reactionaries with the Progressives and Reouf and Refet are freely accused of wishing to see the Khalif back again. I think the new party can be trusted to keep itself clear from any alliance with this element.

7. There is or at any rate has been, a third movement in progress. The draft constitution presented to the Assembly last spring contained clauses giving to the President considerable powers of vetoing legislation and of dissolving the Assembly. These provision were drastically excised in the debates of April, and much surprise was expressed at the silence with which the President accepted the curtailment of his powers. Many Deputies of the People's party have been anxious lately to restore them to him by a revision of the Constitution. The proposal has clearly aroused intense opposition, and has undoubtedly precipitated the formation of the Progressive party. It must have received a severe check in the fall of Ismet Pasha's Cabinet. The movement is, of course, essentially as reactionary as that dealt with in the preceeding paragraph, for while the one seeks to restore the religious functions of the old Sultanate and some close connection of Church and State, the other tends almost openly toward the civil absolutism of the past.

8. Mustafa Kemal has had to decide what he is to do, confronted by these three movements, all in a sense towards the Right and yet just as widely diferent from each other in character as it is possible to be. He may well have played with the idea of a revision of the Constitution in his favour, but he has found out in time that the ground is hollow and has not put his foot to it. Ismet Pasha's illness has enabled him without loss of dignity to turn in another direction, and the formation of Fethi Bey's Government is a first step. What the next will be remain to be seen; but it was interesting ro read a few days ago in two newspapers that, now that a new political party has been constituted, it was being felt that the President should be above all parties and that he was thinking of vacating the presidency of the People's party, which he has hitherto occupied. It is hard, however, to see how such a strong personality as he will

reconcile himself to working with Progressives who formally denounce the "undue predominance of any individual." Fortunately, the necessary transitions are easier in the east than in the west.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10172/ E. 10614

F.O. 424/261, p. 81-82, No. 93

ENCLOSURE IN No. 230

Information respecting members of new Turkish Cabinet. 24. 11. 1924

ALI FETHI BEY. Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Born at Ochrida (Macedonia) in 1877. Entered the Army and in 1907-9 was a member of the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress. From 1913 to 1917 he was Minister at Sofia where he had Mustafa Kemal as his military attaché. At time of armistice he violently attacked Talaat Pasha and was a member (Minister of Interior) of Izzet Pasha's Armistice Cabinet. Was later arrested and sent to Malta. Elected deputy for Constantinople in the summer of 1923, he succeeded Reouf Bey in August as President of the Council and also held the post of Minister of Interior. Resigned both posts on 27th October, 1923, and was a few days later elected President of the Assembly. Has been chief Turkish Delegate in Mosul discussions.

•

MEHMED REDJEB BEY. Minister of Interior (unchanged). Was elected deputy for Kutahia in 1923 and became Secretary of the People's Party from which he resigned in May, 1924, when he succeeded Ferid Bey as Minister of Interior.

•

MUSTAFA ABDUL HALIK BEY. Minister of Finance (unchanged). Age about 54. Born at Yanina. Was a member of the Secretariat of the Council of State till 1908 when he became a member of the Council. Was related by marriage with Talaat Pasha and became Vali of Uscub (1910-11), of Van (1914-15), of Bitlis (1915-16), and Aleppo (1916-17). Then became Under Secretary of Interior and after armistice was arrested and sent to Malta on charge of having committed atrocities at Aleppo. In summer of 1923 he was elected deputy for Kianghri and in January, 1924, succeeded Hassan Fehmi Bey as Minister of Finance. Vali of Smyrna summer 1923 and did fairly well as such. Got on well with Europeans. Plays bridge and a kind of tennis.

•

FEIZİ BEY. Public Works.

After the Armistice was arrested and deported to Malta on charge of complicity in Armenian Massacres. As one of the leading notables of Diarbekir which he represented in the old and present Assemblies but he is a Turk and not a Kurd. For a time in 1922 was Minister of Public Works and again held the post from August-October in Fethi Bey's first Cabinet. Was Minister responsible for the Chester Concession. In November (or December) 1923 was elected Vice-President of the People's Party to which he was recently re-elected. Was Second Turkish Delegate at Constantinople Conference on Mosul question in May-June, 1924.

•

SHUKRI KAYA BEY. Foreign Affairs.

In 1914 attached to International Commission of Enquiry into Greek deportations from Smyrna. Was a member of the Turkish Delegation to the first Lausanne Conference when he served on sub-committees for Minority and Nationality questions. He proved not unreasonable as a negotiator and seemed intelligent but rather weak. In summer of 1923 was elected deputy for Menteche. Negotiated Turco-Albanian Treaty in November, December, 1923. In March, 1924, went on Mission to Berne and Paris to deposit Turkish ratification of Turco-Polish and Lausanne Treaties. In same month, was elected President of Foreign Affairs Commission of Assembly. In August succeeded Zekai Bey as Minister of Agriculture. Is about 40 years of age. No use as Mayor of Smyrna in 1923.

•

MAHMUD ESSAD BEY. Justice.

Is a native of Smyrna and about 40 years of age. Is one of the leading Turkish specialists on Constitutional Law. Established himself in Smyrna as a lawyer in 1912 and remained there till the Greek occupation in 1919. Became Deputy for Smyrna in 1920 and published the "Yeni Gyun" at Angora in May, 1922. In June, 1922, he became Secretary of Foreign Affairs Commission of Assembly and in July became Minister of Economy. Was a failure in this post and resigned a few months later. Was however reappointed when Fethi formed his first Cabinet in August, 1923, but resigned in September owing to severe criticism. Retired to Smyrna and was understood to have become an oppositionist. Is a violent opponent of the grant of veto and dissolution powers to the President of the Republic.

•

SHUKRI BEY SARRAJOGLOU. Public Instruction.

Was educated in Europe. Elected deputy for Smyrna and the summer of 1923, in December he succeeded Yussuf Kemal Bey as President of Foreign Affairs Commission of Assembly. Is a vigorous opponent of grant of veto and dissolution powers to President of Republic.

•

DR. MAZHAR BEY. Health.

Has been deputy for Aidin in old and present National Assemblies. Nothing known about him.

•

ALI JENANI BEY. Commerce.

Has been a deputy since 1908 and has specialised in finance. Was, I think, one of the Malta deportees during the Armistice (there was an Ali Jenani among the deportees). Has been deputy for Aintab in both the old and the present Assemblies.

•

HASSAN FEHMI BEY. Agriculture.

Born at Gumush Hane in 1877. Entered Turkish Civil Service. Governor of Kerasund in 1910 and of Gumuljina in 1912. Became Deputy for Gumus Hane in 1913 and again in 1920 was elected to First National Assembly. Joined Mustafa Kemal early in 1920 and in June became Second Vice President and in September 1921 First Vice-President of Assembly. Became Minister of Finance in April, 1922, and held this post for a few months. Was reappointed to it in Fethi Bey's First Cabinet (August 1923) and again in Ismet's First Cabinet (October 1923). Resigned in January 1924, over, it was stated Anatolian Railway question. His character is not regarded as good and he was said to be merely a tool of Mustafa Kemal.

(Initialled) A.K.H.

24.11.24

F.O. 371/10172/ E. 10614

No. 231

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 868

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 25, 1924

*Confidential**(Received December 1)*

Sir,

When I was drafting my despatch No. 862 of yesterday, about the change of Government and the present political situation here, I could not help bearing in mind the news mentioned a few days ago in the local press, that on Friday, the 21st November, the President had received Mr. Macartney, the "Times" correspondent, and had talked to him for two hours. I thought how much it would help me to write if I knew what the President had said.

2. This morning, Mr. Macartney, back from Angora, called, and gave me a copy of his report of the interview as written for publication in his paper. He had promised to submit this report to the Ghazi before sending it to London; he had done so, and was now awaiting for approval, amendment, or whatever else might be decided. I must therefore beg that the report, which I enclose herewith, be treated as entirely confidential.

3. If I have been wondering what the President will do next, here is an answer for me in this very remarkable document. The Progressives are insincere in their republicanism, their programme is a fraud, and they are mere reactionaries. Everything reported implies that the President will have nothing to do with the new Opposition, and his language to Mr. Macartney, not reported, and the tone of his remarks indicated clearly that he meant war to the knife. The Gazi worked himself into a perfect frenzy; he turned red in the face as he ticked off each member of the Opposition in turn, characterising them as ungrateful to himself, to whom they owed all, and as traitors to their country. The Deputy who acted at the interview as introducer and half as interpreter interrupted more than once exclaiming: "Be calm Ghazi Pasha, do not be so indiscreet," but nothing could check the flood of indignation. Mr. Macartney has come away from Angora thinking that pistols will be going off in earnest in a very short time, and that Vassif and Nejati have left the Government in order to come down to Constantinople at the head of a more businesslike tribunal of independence which will decorate Galata Bridge with hanging corpses.

4. Perhaps this may be so, but, if in the meantime we analyse the President's utterances, we find them to be a peculiarly weak bit of special pleading. The Progressives may well have conservative tendencies, but they cannot fairly be regarded as reactionary Monarchists or Khalifists, and to call them so is the merest party politics. If their programme resembles that of the

Republican People's party, it is because the latter in the last three weeks has been busily adopting for itself every new idea the Progressives put forward, even down to the name of Republican. "What despotism are they opposed to?" cries the President, and the answer is, firstly, his own, and secondly that of the caucus. When the interpellations were in progress in the Assembly three weeks ago, the President himself sat throughout the debate in his box sending for Deputies, telling each one what to do and what to say, and directing the fight against the new Opposition like a general on the battlefield. As for the caucus, I have previously reported the new stringent rules which have been riveted on to the party to enforce discipline and prevent defections. It is fortunate, perhaps, that the President concludes his remarks by saying in substance that circumstances alter cases.

5. But if Mustafa Kemal is really contemplating a vigorous offensive against the new Opposition, what about Fethi Bey and the newly-appointed Cabinet? If the President was personally directing the uproar in the Assembly during the debate on the interpellations, it was Fethi a very few days later who from the Presidential Chair expressed his strong disapproval of it. Fethi is much nearer to the Progressive party than the President, and I very much doubt his being prepared for war to the knife with them.

6. I thus find myself still wondering what the President will do next. If the interview ever appears in the "Times," I should surmise that he would be seeking to cover a retreat behind a cloud of big words. If, on second thoughts, the President asks Mr. Macartney not to publish his statement, then I should infer that, knowing how well acquainted Mr. Macartney is with Refet, Reouf, Hussein Jahid and other Opposition leaders, the President just wants Mr. Macartney to frighten them a little.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

P.S. —November 26 — Mr. Macartney has just called to show me a letter he has received from Hamdullah Suphi, the Deputy who introduced him to the President. The latter is considerably put out at the manner in which he has been reported —both as to omissions of what he did say and as to language about persons and politics of Mr. Macartney, therefore, to withhold the interview from publication until it has been considerably modified.

Mr. Macartney tells me he did, indeed, omit a tremendous exordium on the past history and present principles of the Popular party, simply because it would be of no interest to readers of the "Times." He maintains, however, that the President did actually use the language quoted in the report, and informs me that he had a Turkish journalist with him at the interview taking notes of

the Ghazi's words. I have no doubt that they have been reproduced with substantial accuracy by Mr. Macartney. He has already been round to Hussein Jahid, urging him in his own interest to moderate the tone of his criticisms, and I have little doubt that the President's purpose in granting the interview has been served. Mustafa Kemal wants to move in the direction of the Opposition, and he wants them to make easy for him.- R. C. L.

F.O. 371/10172/ E. 10619

F.O. 424/261, p. 83-84, No. 94

ENCLOSURE IN No. 231

Report by Mr. Macartney

We are in for a lively, and perhaps even a tempestuous, time in Turkish politics.

When the other day the new Opposition were beaten on the vote of confidence demanded by Ismet Pasha, they comforted themselves with the reflection that a bare 50 per cent. of the total membership of the Assembly had been present to vote for the Government at the end of the debate, and, after a few days' anxious deliberation among themselves, they announced their formation as the Progressive Republican party, and published to the nation their principles and programme as submitted to the Ministry of the Interior. If, however, the Opposition thought that, in thus complying with the technical formalities demanded by Turkish law of every new association on formation, they were now free to pursue their campaign as an accepted political party in the Assembly, in the country and in the press, they were perhaps unduly optimistic. Strong and uncompromising as had been the terms of the Samsun and Trebizond speeches, wherein Mustafa Kemal Pasha had reasserted the principles and ideals of the Popular Republican party, it was thought by many Deputies and others with whom I have spoken here that, when once he was faced by a new party, the Ghazi would quickly modify his attitude and would take an early opportunity of saying that, since the system of a single party sitting now as a party and now as the Assembly had become actually obsolete, he, as President of the Republic, must now relinquish even the titular presidency of the Popular party and put himself once for all above all parties now existing or yet to be formed.

This may yet come about with time, but there are little indications at present that this wish, already the subject of tendentious reports in the press, will immediately be fulfilled. The Ghazi Pasha, who has been kind enough to

receive me and to give me some explanations on the political situation, cut at once the root of these hopes with the statement that he had not yet decided whether he could regard the Progressives as forming a new party in the strict meaning of the term. "Every party," he said, "must be formed on definite principles and ideals. If the new party had come out with a definitely conservative programme, I could have accepted them as a new party and could have believed in their sincerity. But I am not yet convinced for the sincerity of the Progressives. I am not yet satisfied that the programme which they have published expresses their real aims and ambitions. An analysis of the personalities composing the party shows that in their ranks are persons who cannot be true republicans. I cannot forget statements made by Reouf Bey in the Assembly about the Caliphate, or, again, what he said to the Constantinople press after the proclamation of the Republic. Kiazim Karabekir Pasha also was at no pains to conceal his dislike of the proclamation of the republic. Sabit Bey, again, who is one of the leaders of the new party, protested in the Assembly against the republic being proclaimed so soon, and asked in the words of Turkish proverb: "Why do you put our two feet in one shoe?"

"But," continued the Ghazi, "let us assume for a moment that their programme is sincere. In what does it then differ in its broad outlines from the fundamental principles of the Popular party? They profess to be republicans. So are we. They wish to safeguard the national sovereignty. That is the essential basis of the Popular party and of the republic. If such is really their faith, why then, have they left us?"

"But let us examine their programme more in detail. There are several points which to my mind are obscure and illogical. One of the points is the demand for direct suffrage. This principle has already been admitted as an ideal, and, as a matter of fact, the question how it may be possible to give effect to this principle has come up before the Popular party during the last days and is now under discussion. The Progressives again are in favour of the presidential right of veto being abolished. But the unqualified right of veto was rejected by the Assembly last year just it rejected also the proposal to give the President the right of dissolution. If then the qualified right of veto which was left to the President was accepted by the Assembly and was duly incorporated in the Constitution for which they profess to have such a high regard, how do the Progressives propose to effect its abolition, seeing that they are such a small minority in the Assembly? It would appear from their programme that they propose to achieve this end, not by working in the Assembly, but by making an appeal to the people. And one is forced to the further conclusion that the Opposition would not be content with this, but that they might easily take the

opportunity of consulting the people also on the very constitution of the republic in the hope that the people would pronounce against it.

"Yet another point. The Opposition say that they are against personal despotism. Such a statement implies that such a despotism exists. But their programme contains nothing to show how they propose to sweep away this despotism. Personally I disbelieve in the existence of this despotism. But even if this despotism does exist, it exists simply and solely in order to protect the national sovereignty and the principles of the Popular party. In any case," added the Ghazi, with a dry smile, as he relaxed for a moment the seriousness with which he had hitherto spoken and waved a cigarette round the gorgeously furnished room in the Assembly in which we were talking, "why should there be so much outcry against this alleged despotism seeing that only a year ago several members of the Opposition were so much against the republic and were anxious for the preservation of the despotic family of Osman?"

"It must not be forgotten," the President went on again in his serious tone, "that the republic is still in its first stages and that though the principles of the Popular party have been applied the system will no doubt undergo many modifications in detail in the course of years.

"There are many different types of republics and it cannot be expected that we in Turkey should achieve at a single bound all the political experience and privileges that you have acquired in England in the course of centuries. The National Pact, for example, which made mention of the Caliphate remaining at Constantinople, was only a political pact adapted to the needs of the moment. If I had then made public my ambition to found the republic, I know well that Reouf and his colleagues, who were supporting me in the struggle for national independence, would have left me at once. It would have been impossible for me to carry on simultaneously a fight with our enemies and also an internal political struggle of this kind."

That these criticism will irritate the Opposition goes without saying. But the President has no doubt in his own mind that the mass of the people will be on his side. One of the very first questions which he put to me was how long I had been in Turkey, and when I had told him, he replied that in that case I had lived long enough in the country to know that one could not get a true picture of the feelings of the country from the Constantinople press. "The Constantinople press," he said, "is nothing but a relic of the Ottoman Empire. I assure you that the press has no influence whatever on the people, which pays no heed to it and has for it only one feeling, the feeling of disdain. The editors are, in general, men who represent no opinion except their own, and they do

not always even do that, because they do not always write in their newspapers what is really at the bottom of their minds."

It is, of course, in no way the part of a foreign journalist to take sides in the important issue which has now been joined, and which, it is quite clear, will be fought out to a finish. Mustafa Kemal Pasha in fact did not conceal his belief that the vigorous debate to which the new Opposition have already given rise will be followed shortly by others, in the course of which the Progressives will be challenged to come out into the open and to explain more clearly what their real intention are. From my personal acquaintance with several of these Deputies I do not suppose that they will shrink from the challenge. Indeed, matters have already gone too far there to be any question of a retreat on either side. It may be that the reconstruction of the Cabinet, brought about by the breakdown in health of İsmet Pasha, may help to build a bridge between the two parties and that the Opposition may succeed in convincing the President that they are not the reactionaries and anti-republicans that he fancies them to be. It would be a disaster for the young Turkish Republic if its attention were to be distracted from the vital work of internal reconstruction at this time, when there is still so much to be done, and if there were to be a permanent breach, even of personal relations between comrades who were so closely together in the darkest hours of the country. But it matters were ever to come to such an unfortunate extremity, one can safely prophesy that quarter will neither be asked nor granted by the Ghazi Pasha. One has only to look into those steady grey eyes and to note the authoritativeness of his every action and his every word to realise that in him Turkey has a ruler who, when it comes down to bed rock, will carry out his ideal or succumb in its defence.*

November 22, 1924.

F.O. 371/10172/ E. 10619

F.O. 424/261, p. 84, No. 94/1

* Üzerindeki kayıtlardan anlaşıldığına göre, bu belge, önemli görülerek İngiliz Kabine üyelerine ve Kralın kalemine sunulmuş ve Foreign Office'de belgenin altına şu not düşülmüştür:

"Very interesting. Mr Lindsay thinks the interview was intended to enable Kemal to come to terms with the Progressives. But from the latter's point of view it must a matter of dubious gesture."

D. G. Osborne 3/12 *

No. 232

Mr. Lindsay to Sir W. G. Tyrrell (Foreign Office)

No. 3913/30/1924

CONSTANTINOPLE, 3rd December, 1924

Dear Tyrrell,

When Fethi came to power, meditating that his Government is probably a step along the path of decency, and that he himself is due only prominent Angora Turk with whom I am on personal terms, I decided to send him a friendly message. I enclose my note, and his answer, which arrived last night. The last sentence in the two notes refers to a passage in the conversation I had with him here three weeks ago. He asked me when I would come to Angora, and I said in reply, as clearly as it could be expressed without putting it into so many words, that I could not do the journey until I presented my credentials because Mustafa Kemal does not receive unaccredited envoys.

2. Three days ago it went round the press that I had "chaleureusement" congratulated Fethi, and to-day all the Turkish papers publish the two notes, omitting, however, Fethi's phrase "I hope it will be as Ambassador." I therefore think it worth while mentioning of report in official despatch.

3. Still the affair has had more prominence than ever I expected and it confirms my view that the Turks are particularly anxious to be on friendly terms with us. I rather think that Fethi's real answer to my advance is to be found in the speech on Egypt which he made the day before-yesterday in the Assembly (see my despatch No. 891 of to-day).

Yours sincerely,

R. C. LINDSAY *

F.O. 371/10172/E. 11031

* Bu mektubun altına Foreign Office'de şu not düşülmüştü:

"Mr. Lindsay's telegram was a good idea.

I understand that he will pay his visit to Angora as Ambassador:- D. G. Osborne 9/2"

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 232

Mr. Lindsay à S.E. Fethi Bey, Président du Conseil de Turquie

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 24 novembre, 1924

Excellence,

A l'occasion de votre avènement au pouvoir en qualité de Président du Conseil de la République je m'empresse d'offrir à Votre Excellence mes plus sincères félicitations pour l'honneur qui vous incombe. Je me permets de souhaiter que les efforts de Votre Excellence et du Ministère que vous présidez amèneront le bonheur et la prospérité à la Nation Turque. J'ai la conviction qu'il en sera ainsi, et je m'attends avec plaisir à l'occasion où je pourrai exprimer mes sentiments à Votre Excellence de vive voix.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(Signé) R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10172/E. 11031

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 232

Fethi Bey, Président du Conseil, à M. Lindsay, Représentant Britannique

ANGORA, le 29 Novembre 1924

Excellence,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre très aimable lettre de félicitations à l'occasion de la constitution du cabinet sous ma présidence, et je me fais un agréable devoir de vous en remercier cordialement. Vos vœux pour le bonheur et la prospérité de la Nation Turque m'ont aussi très touché.

Je serais heureux si je pouvais vous recevoir sous peu à Angora et ce bonheur comptera certainement double si vous y arrivez comme Ambassadeur.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(Signé) A. FETHI

F.O. 371/10172/E. 11031

No. 233

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 909

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 12, 1924
(Received December 22)

Sir,

I have the honour to report certain remarks about conditions at Angora which my Hungarian colleague made to a member of my staff yesterday. M. Tahy returned from the capital some ten days ago. He has his residence and chancery here, but, like my American colleague, he has bought one of three houses newly built by the Evkaf Department in the most malarial part of Angora. Much though he dislikes the journey to and fro, he finds that he can get so little done, either through the secretary whom he leaves at Angora or through Nusret Bey here, that he is forced to pay occasional visits to the capital. Once there he finds, like most other foreigners, that his business is readily attended to. Nevertheless, he is most reluctant to contemplate permanent residence at Angora, and is anxiously awaiting the decision of ourselves and the French, which he would follow. Latîf Hanem told Mme. Tahy emphatically that the capital would never be moved to Constantinople while Mustafa Kemal Pasha was at the head of affairs.

2. When consul in Baghdad during the war M. Tahy knew Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha and Ali İhsan Pasha, and having spent several years in different parts of Turkey he has a large enough circle of Turkish acquaintances to make his views of some interest. The rivalry between Mustafa Kemal and Rauf Bey he regards as life-and-death struggle. Rauf, he thinks, found it prudent to leave Turkey for a cure last spring lest some misadventure should befall him. M. Tahy shares the common belief that the new Progressive party – of which Rauf is the most prominent member – is in close touch with Jahid, Javid and Rahmi Beys and other leaders of the old Committee of Union and Progress, whose attitude he describes as one of expectancy. The present Cabinet under Fethi Bey, M. Tahy believes, is not altogether agreeable, or indeed amenable, to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and he thinks that if İsmet Pasha recovers his health the President will endeavour to put him in office again with a Cabinet of nonentities.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10194/E. 11542

F.O. 424/261, p. 98-99, No. 99

No. 234

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 920

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 16, 1924
(Received December 22)

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 1240 of the 28th November, in which you enquire whether the Sheikh-es-Senussi may have been entrusted by the Turkish Government with some mission in Arabia. I regret to say that I have no direct and precise information on this point, but of course I shall not fail to report to you anything that may transpire in the future in regard to the seiksh's relationship to Angora.

2. Meanwhile, however, and arguing on purely general grounds of policy, I am disinclined to believe that any serious mission has been entrusted to Sayyid Ahmed. Since my return here this autumn I have had the impression that Turkish interest in affairs outside their own boundary has become of secondary importance only, and that Angora is contemplating itself almost exclusively with its own native politics. It is true that within the last few days your own harmonious conversations at Paris and at Rome have filled the press, and perhaps, too, Government circles, with the fear that a strong Allied front is to be re-established inimical to Turkish interests, but this has not yet, in my opinion, affected what I regard as present policy of Mustafa Kemal, namely, to keep aloof from any foreign complications. I will venture to quote in confirmation one or two remarks recently made to me. The Polish Minister, complaining from his own point of view of the torpor of Turkish foreign policy, illustrated his theme by saying that Angora had completely neglected all its interests in Transcaucasia, Persia, Arabia and Egypt. Dr. Adnan Bey, back for a few days in Constantinople, and talking to about his former connection with me through the delegation said: "Up in Angora now we take no interest in foreign affairs." M. Kral, the Austrian Minister, who has just spent a fortnight in the capital, recounting to me his experiences and impressions, said that Angora has completely dismissed from its mind all thought about Arabia and the Caliphate. Religious affairs, he said, interest them only from the secular point of view held by practical men dealing with an administrative problem, and just as politically they have thought much (though not deeply) of the French revolution, so in religious affairs they are thinking of Luther, Wycliffe and the Protestant reformation. M. Kral having spent much of his life in Turkey in the ex-Imperial Austrian consular service and speaking Turkish fluently, I rather value his opinion. Finally, I will quote Sir W. Brancker, Director of Civil Aviation, who

has just spent three days in Angora. Lots of people told him that pan-Islamism is as dead as Abdul Hamid, and that they were looking forward to a settlement of the Mosul question with pleasure in order to cultivate better relations with His Majesty's Government. This is the common stock in trade of Turks talking to Englishmen; but Yunus Nadi, a henchman of the President's, a violent Nationalist, and editor of the "Jumhuriyet," the organ of the extremists of the Popular party, took Sir William's breath away by saying that Turks do not care in the slightest for Irak; that they would accept the League's verdict, whatever it is; and that they were very glad to have the League at hand to extricate them from a painful position without any loss of face.

3. So much for Turkish policy of the moment in general; but I do not wish to convey an exaggerated impression. If it is as I surmise, it is because the Turkish authorities are conscious of their own weakness and of elements in the Arab situation still unfavourable to themselves. Do not suggest that they have abandoned definitely and finally all ambition to regain influence in some form or other over the Arab lands formerly subject to them, but they regard such ambition as a thing for the more or less remote future, to be thought of but not talked about or acted upon. Meanwhile, I think it likely that they would try to guard carefully but unostentatiously any outlying pawn in the Arab field, though they would hardly wish to push it on to an attack. When missions of disgruntled Mahometans from abroad come to Turkey, Angora, laik as it is, will be unwilling to turn them down completely, and rather than do so may allow itself to be drawn into a certain amount of minor intrigue. But this, I think, will for some time be in spite of, and not in accordance with, policy.

4. As to Sheikh Ahmed, I notice there are plenty of tales from Syria of his having been given a mission by Angora. Here a story is current that he was detected in treasonable correspondence with Prince Selim at Beirut, and that the Turkish Government gave him LT 2,000 and told him to clear out. Of the two I am rather inclined to believe the latter.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Jeddah, Jerusalem, Beirut and Bagdad.

Yours sincerely,

R. C. LINDSAY *

F.O. 371/10172/E. 11549

* Birer örneği Roma, Paris Büyükelçiliklerine ve Hindistan İşleri Bakanlığı ile Hava Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı'na da gönderilmiş olan bu rapor üzerine Londra'da, Foreign Office'de, uzun uzun notlar düğülmüş, yorumlar yapılmıştır. Bu notların birkaç bölümü aşağıya aktarılmıştır. Şöyle deniyor:

The main theories put forward to account for the Sheikh Semoussi's journey may be summarised thus:

a) He has been appointed by the Turkish Government to represent it at the Moslem Conference, summoned by Ibn Saud to settle the question of the custody of the Holy Places of Islam.

b) He has been instructed by the Turkish Government to coordinate the anti-mandatory movement in Iraq, Palestine and Syria and to arrange for an upheaval (to have a sympathetic reaction in Egypt) to take place when the Turks next attack Iraq (? Next spring?).

c) He has been expelled from Turkey on account of treasonable correspondence with Prince Selim.

d) He desires to return to Cyrenaica to resume the leadership of the Semussi.

e) He desires to assert his claims to the Caliphate.

f) He desires to make the pilgrimage.

All six theories can be reconciled one with another (...)

Mr Lindsay is disposed to believe that the Turks are too busy with internal politics to bother with a foreign policy. Personally I suspect that less would be said of their disinterest in foreign affairs if it were real. I cannot help feeling that the Turks are throwing dust in the eyes of the rest of us and are contemplating a coup next spring. Possibly they have not worked out the details and, as usual, are trusting largely to luck. Meanwhile they are using the Sheikh as a pawn.

Our counter to such a threat would, I suppose, be based largely on the maintenance of the 'united front' with French (fearing for Syria and much more for N. Africa) and Italy (alarmed at the possibility of repercussions in Libya)...

-23.xii.24"

No. 235

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 924

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 17, 1924
(Received December 22)

Sir,

I have the honour to report that since Fethi Bey's assumption of office the new Progressive party has scarcely added to its numbers. Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha has formally accepted the presidency of the party, but it was known from the beginning that he would lead it, and his formal acceptance was only delayed by technicalities. Among the later adherents to the party is Bekir Sami Bey, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora, who has been little heard of it in the last two years. The Progressive party, as such, has taken no action either in the Assembly or at by-elections. These have taken place here in four other districts. No Progressive candidate was put up here. The party explained that it had not had time for proper organisation. Ali Ihsan Pasha, the well-known general, who has recently left the army in order to join the Progressive party, stood as an independent; but the secondary electors, seeing the particular prominence given by the authorities to the name of the Government candidate

and mistrusting, perhaps, the supposed secrecy of the ballot, returned the nominee of the Popular party. At Broussa election, however, General Nureddin Pasha has easily beaten the Popular party's candidate, Dr. Emin Bey, the Prefect of Constantinople. This is interesting. Emin Bey was a fairly strong candidate. Nureddin Pasha, while appearing as an Independent, was known to be a leader of the Progressives and an opponent of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. For some unknown reason the Ghazi forced him to retire from the army shortly after the recapture of Smyrna, and since then the general has been inconspicuous but, it is believed, not inactive.

2. By calling Fethi Bey to office Mustafa Kemal Pasha seemed to have taken the wind out of the sails of the Progressives. The Constantinople press, which was full of criticism of Ismet Pasha, gave Fethi Bey its blessing on his advent to power, and has not yet found any thing to criticise in his administration. The tendency, however, still is to consider Fethi Bey's Cabinet one of transition. The return to Parliament of an avowed opponent like Nureddin may prompt Mustafa Kemal Pasha to take steps. If he decides on a strong line I think he may replace Fethi Bey by Rejeb Bey, the Minister of the Interior, who has shown himself a man of some force. Meanwhile, a draft Press Law, of somewhat Draconian character, has been put to the Assembly by a private member. It is very doubtful that a moderate man like Fethi Bey would accept it in its present form, but there are indications that it will be pressed by its extremists supporters, and thus a political crisis might be precipitated.

3. The part which Rauf Bey is likely to play in the near future is the subject of a good deal of speculation. That he is strongly opposed to Mustafa Kemal Pasha and is, indeed, the chief man in the Opposition, there is not much room to doubt. The strength behind him seems to be, firstly, the natural desire felt for the fruits of office by those who have been kept from them too long, and, secondly, conservative opinion, which is shocked at the irreligion of Mustafa Kemal and at his policy of secularisation. It is even suggested by those in touch with Reouf Bey that if he cannot moderate Mustafa Kemal Pasha's policy by constitutional means he will endeavour to bring back the late Sultan Vahid-ed-Din, perhaps not as Sultan but, at any rate, as Caliph. Meantime, Rauf Bey is here recuperating from Angora malaria, and I am glad to have good authority for stating that he bears no resentment against us for his internment at Malta, regarding it rather as a legitimate move in the game. In this connection I would refer to Fethi Bey's very reasonable tone despatch No. 891 of the 3rd instant.

4. It was perhaps to be expected that the press here – possibly under Bolshevik inspiration – would look for trouble in the meetings which you have recently had with the French and Italian Prime Ministers. One purpose of these meetings was said to be the adoption of a joint policy of oppression on Moslem

peoples. Western Imperialism was to be revived in North Africa, Syria and Mesopotamia; the Treaty of Sévres was to be put into force after all. These assertions have been most loudly uttered by the "Tevhid-i-Efkâr," the "Vâkıf" and the "Jumhuriyet," papers which are accustomed to indulge in diatribes against us. I do not attach much importance to the matter, and I hardly think there is more in it than the instinctive uneasiness of Turks when they see great Powers getting on friendly terms together.

5. What has found less prominence in the newspapers, but probably moves the Turkish Government and people much more, in the suggestion that a result of a Franco-Soviet treaty might be the restoration to Russia of the Wrangel fleet now interned at Bizerta. I do not suppose that measured by European standard this fleet, which I believe consists of some dozen vessels and includes a dreadnought and submarines, is of much fighting value. But if repaired, say in Italian yards, it would certainly eclipse the Turkish fleet. The anxiety which the Turks feel on this account may, I think, account for the friendly disposition of the Turkish naval authorities at Angora, which has lately been noticed both by His Majesty's commercial secretary and by the representative of Messrs. Armstrong-Vickers.

Yours sincerely,

R. C. LINDSAY *

F.O. 371/10172/E. 11553

* Foreign Office'de rapora şu not dâhilindir:

* The internal political situation seems to have settled down into a further period of stagnation, but the Pasha has received a distinct jolt and is likely to receive more.

D. G. Osborne 25/10 *

No. 236

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 17

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 7, 1925

(Received January 12)

Sir,

I have the honour to report that, since the 17th December, the date of my despatch No. 924, two changes in the Turkish Cabinet have taken place. In the first place it has been decided by the Assembly that a separate Ministry of Marine shall be constituted, and one İhsan Bey, Deputy for Djebel-i-Bereket, has been selected to fill the new post. Apart from technical side of this question,

on which I am reporting separately, the only political importance of this event is the personality of İhsan Bey. I am given to understand that one of the President's most devoted personal henchmen, and his appointment must indicate a strengthening in Fethi Bey's Government of those influences opposed to the liberalism which Fethi Bey himself seems to profess. The other, and the more important, change is the resignation of Rejeb Bey, Minister of Interior, which was announced on the 4th instant, and took the public somewhat by surprise. The reason alleged in the letter of resignation is that a majority of the Cabinet had decided that in future prefects of large towns such as Constantinople and Angora should be elected instead of being appointed by the Government. This was one of the items in the programme of the new Progressive party which was more or less adopted by the People's party, and, put shortly, it means that Constantinople shall be allowed to manage her own municipal affairs instead of having them managed for by Angora. To this measure Rejeb cannot assent, and he therefore resigns. As he is most capable of Fethi's lieutenants, his disappearance from office weakens the Government; probably also it means that Fethi's premiership is driving to its close and that Rejeb is preparing or being prepared to succeed him at the head of a new Cabinet more reactionary in character and readier to adopt the vigorous methods which are favoured by Mustafa Kemal. Jemil Bey, Deputy for Rodosto and hitherto secretary general of the People's party, succeeds Rejeb at the Interior. I have as yet no information as to his personality worth reporting.

2. That Fethi himself is being pushed in the direction of reaction is shown by the decision taken a week ago to close the two small newspapers, the "Tok Seuz" and the English "Orient News." Concerning the latter I have reported to you separately. The article of the press law in virtue of which these journals are closed authorises the Council of Ministers temporarily to suspend papers whose writings are of nature to imperil the internal or external security of the State. Intrinsically the Government's action is of minor importance, but it is clearly regarded by the papers of Constantinople as a serious menace for the future liberty of the press. Editorial articles criticise the Government severely and express disappointment that Fethi, whom they regarded as a moderate man, should have allowed himself to be driven into the path of repression. In the Assembly on the 4th January Fethi made a speech in reply to an interpellation on the subject in which, so far as the "Tok Seuz" is concerned, he covered the action taken by pointing to the strict legality, strongly disavowing at the same time any ulterior aims against the liberty of the press. A considerable part of his speech was devoted to the case of the "Orient News," in which he made the point that from foreign journals who enjoy the hospitality of Turkish soil the courtesy may be expected of avoiding the use of immoderate language. The speech made a good impression on the Deputies, but, on the whole, it rather

confirmed the view that the closing of the insignificant "Orient News" was only meant to cover with anti-foreign, and therefore rather popular, appearance a menace rally addressed to the Opposition press of Constantinople in general.

3. From the first it was clear that Fethi's Cabinet was transitional in character, and it then looked as if the President, alarmed at the defection from his own party, was trying to draw nearer to the new Opposition. This view is probably erroneous. Mustafa Kemal, by appointing Fethi to the Premiership, took pressure off the Progressives with the result that they have made little or no apparent progress in the last weeks and their sail are hanging limp in the air. He is now preparing again to follow courses which he has really never abandoned, and I can only feel surprised that he should be readjusting his policy soon.

4. The Assembly continues its regular sittings which, from the newspaper accounts, are of exemplary dullness. Occasionally there is some tub-thumping over Greek misdemeanours in Western Thrace, but more usually the subjects for discussion are of parochial interest only - provision of school books, the Fresco bar incident, a grant-in-aid to some calamity-stricken town, or the disposal of the furniture from the ex-Imperial palaces. There is an atmosphere of unreality in these proceedings when one thinks of the vast legislative work of reconstruction and readaptation that has for months past been urgently necessary. The fiscal, educational and judicial systems all require remodelling, and a new code of family law must be created; doubtless, projects are under preparation, but my colleagues from Angora tell me that they never hear them spoken of.

5. The President of the Republic, accompanied by Latife Hanum, has left Angora and is now making a stay in Koniah. How the journey will be extended, if at all, and what its object is, are questions wrapt in mystery, on which the press has exhausted its speculations. One theory, for which I cannot vouch, is that the Government intends to appropriate to the use of the State the very considerable properties of the Bektashi and Mevlevi Dervishes, whose centre has always been at Koniah and in that part of Anatolia.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/262, p.5-6, No. 5

No. 237

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 47

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 20, 1925
(Received January 26)

Sir,

I reported in my despatch No. 17 of the 7th instant that Rifat Bey had resigned from the post of Minister of the Interior. Two or three days later it became evident that an acute Cabinet crisis had broken out in Angora as a result of Rejeb's withdrawal. The question at issue, you will recollect, was whether the prefects (*Anglicé* mayors) of Constantinople and Angora should, as now, be appointed by the Government, or, as the Prime Minister desired, be elected in some manner. Reference to a meeting of the People's party was necessary, and it was clear that Rejeb, who is a fine fighting politician, had the bulk of the party behind him and would be able to secure a decision in favour of his own view and against that of his late chief, Fethi Bey. For twenty-four hours it seemed as if Fethi would have to resign at once, and that a further split in the People's party might take place, this time over the definite issue of the prefects. Prolonged meetings of the Cabinet took place, and there was an incessant exchange of telegrams with the President, who was then at Koniah. What passed is of course not known, but in the end the Ghazi called a halt on the extremists of the Popular party, and it was forthwith decided that there should be no crisis. At the meeting of the party the proceedings passed off in a quiet manner; both Fethi and Rejeb explained their points of view, and the former announced that as a compromise measure the Government had decided to pass a law providing that prefects should be appointed by the Government from among the elected members of the municipal councils, a solution of the question which is probably distasteful to Fethi, and certainly entirely unsatisfactory to Constantinople and to the Opposition party in the Assembly. As to the President, he may have been unwilling to face the risk of a further disintegration of the Popular party, or he may have felt unready just yet to find a successor to Fethi Bey. Perhaps he was actuated by both motives; and as a result Fethi gets another lease of life as Prime Minister.

2. Mustafa Kemal himself is still on tour. He remained for ten days or so at Koniah, and as he took occasion to throw some bouquets at the Büyük Chelebi (the hereditary head of the Mevlevi Dervishes) it may be inferred that there is no present intention of secularising the properties of the Dervish orders. From Koniah he has proceeded to Adana, and beyond it to Deurt Yol. There is still no indication of any definite reason for the journey, and there is no ground for

regarding this visit to the Syrian frontier as in any sense an anti-French demonstration. Perhaps like that of last summer to the eastern provinces, it is an electioneering tour, the pleasure of which would be enhanced by the prospect of escaping from Angora at a particularly inclement season.

3. I reported in my despatch No. 924 of the 17 December that Nureddin Pasha, a reactionary, had been elected Deputy for Broussa, beating the official candidate of the Popular party, and that the validity of the election was disputed on the ground that the Pasha had not duly resigned from his position as general in the army. The question came up for decision in the Assembly on the 18 January, and it turns on the interpellation of laws obscure in their meaning, as only Turkish laws can be. The serious lawyers of the Popular party took no part in the debate, and the progressives mostly spoke in favour of Nureddin's election, though he is a reactionary and by no means one of them. Finally, however, the back benchers of the Popular party took charge of the proceedings, and the vote went for invalidation by 130 odd to 56. The figures seem to show that there was some cross voting, and though the big battalions did win, it is creditable that some effort was made to settle the issue on non-party lines.

4. On the whole the past fortnight has been quite and uneventful, and the press of the town has mainly occupied itself with the questions of how precisely Constantinople will get rid of her present prefect, and whether or not Mustafa Kemal's brother-in-law, when in a state of intoxication, did insult the wife of the Hungarian Minister at the "Rose Noire." These, however, are matters engrossing indeed, but not sufficiently august to occupy space in an official despatch.

5. Two or three weeks ago Ismet Pasha came down from Angora and established himself in Halki, one of the Prinkipo islands, to convalesce. I asked Nusret Bey at the time whether the Pasha received visitors, and said I would like to call on him if he did. A couple of days ago an appointment was made, and yesterday I paid my visit, accompanied by Mr. Forbes Adam who had known the Pasha at Lausanne. His Excellency received us with great affability, and was clearly anxious to be friendly; we chatted very pleasantly for half an hour, but though more than once I brought the talk to the verge of politics he was not anxious to follow, and I did not care to force the pace; so that nothing passed worth repeating. After what I had heard of his health I was surprised to find him so alert and looking so well. Mr. Forbes Adam thinks that his deafness is not perceptibly worse. The Pasha himself said he has suffered only from overwork, and that the rest and the change of climate were working wonders with him. The doctors came twice a week, consulted over him, and told him he

would have to stay some months in Halki, but he was thinking of rebelling against them.

6. A reliable Turk who lives on the island tells me that the Pasha was visibly weak when he arrived, that the improvement in his appearance is striking, and that he has put on 5 kilos, in weight. I think he is making a fine recovery, and that he should be ready to resume office by the time the President is ready to part with Fethi Bey.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/262, p.17-18, No. 16

No. 238

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 67

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 28, 1925
(Received February 2)

Sir,

I have the honour to report that a number of Hungarian students have just paid a ten days' visit to this town as guests of the Turkish Government. Although money is so hard to find for things of seemingly greater importance, a handsome credit was forthcoming, and the students, in the intervals of visiting schools, hospitals and the usual sights, were entertained without stint at lunches, dinners and teas. Altogether, the visit seems to have been a great success. The students arrived able to sing Turkish patriotic songs, and at least one of their number was capable of giving expression in a public speech in Turkish to his admiration for the recent struggle of the Turkish people, which, he said, he and his companions had come to study and which they hope to imitate. As a trophy they brought a shield of their own contrivance for presentation to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, but, as the Ghazi is still touring in Cilicia, they had to leave it with the prefect of the city for delivery.

2. The visit, so far as I am aware, had no object more specific than to keep alive a tradition of sympathy between two peoples, which has of late years been fostered by the exchange of such courtesies and by the war. Both sides like to dwell on their Turanian connection, distant though it is; and the Turks, having no supporters at present, are no doubt glad to cultivate a friendship

which may serve them in the event of any Balkan disturbance. My Hungarian colleague, M. De Taly who is an active man, has thrown himself with some zest into these festivities, and I think the visit will have some small effect in strengthening relations between the two countries.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/262, p. 21, No. 25

No. 239

Consul Hough to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 18
Confidential

ALEPPO, January 28, 1925
(Received February 11)

Sir,

I am indebted to the French Intelligence Department for the material of the following notes on Mustafa Kemal Pasha's recent visit to Cilicia.

2. Mustafa Kemal and his wife arrived at Konia on the 3rd January. The municipality of Adana telegraphed inviting him to be present at the ceremonies in honour of deliverance of Cilicia on the 5th January. Mustafa Kemal declined, saying that he could not arrive in time, but arrived in Adana on the 8th. The "Yeni Adana" reports that he had abandoned his intention of making a trip to Europe.

3. On the 15th he arrived at Deurtyol, on the 16th he was at Osmanieh. The object of his journey was said to be to maintain his popularity. He was accompanied by his wife, his secretary-general, Taufik Bey, his private secretary, Hassan Riza Bey, two aides-de-camp and Commandant Ismail Hakki. At Deurtyol he was received by an enthusiastic crowd, to whom he made a short speech of thanks for the warmth of their welcome. He spent the morning shooting, and in the afternoon received notables, including two ex-chefe leaders, Kara Hassan and Moustek. A merchant of Alexandretta was introduced to Mustafa Kemal, who asked him whether Turks living in Syria were not oppressed, and showed some surprise on hearing that the population was satisfied with the mandatory Powers.

4. On the 17th he is reported to have continued his journey from Osmanieh to Islahieh, but there is no detailed information about his movement for the next few days. Mr. Vice-Consul Catoni reports that on the 21st he was at Mersina, and that the town was decorated in his honour.

I have, &c.

W. HOUGH

F.O. 424/262, p. 57-58, No. 63

No. 240

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 37
Telegraphic.

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 23, 1925
(Received February 24)

My despatch No. 134: Kurdish unrest.

According to telegrams from Angora, movement is more serious than was at first represented.

After occupying village of Drakhen (unidentified), residence of Vali of Ghenj (20 miles west of Mush), Sheikh Said is reported to have sent out two columns, one in direction of Lijeh and the other towards Piran. These columns are stated to have been routed by Turkish forces and to have fled to Drakhen, where they are at present besieged. Turkish reinforcements sent against rebels are expected to arrive on the scene in a few days.

According to one report, Sheikh Said has proclaimed that he has a divine mission to establish Moslem religious law (the Sheri) in Turkey. According to other reports he is a tool of British, and Ghenj affair is merely a spectre of Hakkari incident of last autumn.

Ismet Pasha, who proceeded rather unexpectedly to Angora at the 20th instant, is reported to have conferred on the situation with President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the Grand National Assembly and the Minister of Interior. In addition to inevitable crop of rumours as to the Cabinet crisis, there is talk of proclaiming martial law.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 12)

F.O. 424/262, p. 80, No. 81

No. 241

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 154

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 24, 1925
(Received March 2)

Sir,

Constantinople was surprised to learn on Thursday last from papers that Ismet Pasha had been summoned to Angora from his retirement at Halki; and he was to start the next day. Everyone lost himself in conjectures as to the reason of the journey and the prevalent opinion was that some sort of Cabinet crisis had broken out. The Pasha reached the capital on Saturday the 21st and was met at the station with unusual demonstrations of affection by the President of the Republic, who took him straight off to Chankaya to a conference. Some significance was attached to the fact that Fethi Bey, the Prime Minister, and some of his Cabinet colleagues were not present to meet Ismet Pasha at the station.

2. The true reason of the sudden journey was that the President wished to consult his ex-Prime Minister about the insurrection of Genj, in regard to which the Government had observed great reticence, only giving out sufficient news to arouse interest and excite the suspicion that affairs might be more serious than was admitted. Even now official news regarding the movement is in general of a reassuring nature and it is always stated that the military dispositions taken are such that the suppression of the revolt within a few days is certain. Be that as it may, martial law for one month has been declared in the south-eastern vilayets of Turkey (Genj, Mush, Arghana, Dersim, Diarbekr, Mardin, Urfa, Siverek, Segher, Bitlis, Van and the Kighi and Khinis Cazas of Erzerum and Hakkiari). The Assembly's ratification of this action is certain.

3. The movement has taken place in a remote region in the very centre of Asia Minor, and in default of any reliable official information as to what has really happened, I attach a note summarising the various reports printed in the Turkish press. It is clear from these that Sheikh Said's movement has assumed considerable dimensions and that it is quite beyond the powers of the local forces to master it - indeed, some of the gendarmerie have joined the rebels. As to its causes, the papers freely state that foreign intrigue (meaning British) has been at work, but it is also clear from their reports that the mainspring of action is religion and Kurdish nationalism. I hear a story of Sheikh Said having said that Islam has been the sole bond of union between Turk and Kurd, and that the Turks having broken it, the Kurds must now ensure their own future.

4. This is the first open movement by other than mere individuals against the "laic" tendencies of the Present Turkish régime, and as such it has made a deep impression on the opinion in general. There is, however, no indication as yet that the revolt will have any far-reaching political consequences. It has been said that Ismet Pasha wished martial law to be extended to Constantinople and to Trebizond and that Fethi Bey was opposed to this, but the report that a Cabinet crisis was impending is denied. In such a matter as this the difference between the two would only be as to how far things should be pushed on the one path of repression. With the exception of the handful of reactionaries in the Assembly the politicians of modern Turkey too little touched by any personal feelings of religion to feel any sympathy with Sheikh Said's insurrection. It is said that the leaders of the Progressive party have been in conversation with the Government and it is likely that their support of the Government's measures has been secured in some way. It is noticeable also that the "Tevhid-i Efkâr," the Conservative and Islamic newspaper, though it sympathises always with cause of religion, has deplored the effort to re-establish it by way of revolt. Sheikh Said's movement is probably already a source of embarrassment to the Government, but however widespread the sympathy, with his idea may be among individuals, the general direction of Turkish internal politics cannot be expected to change unless the revolt assumes an even wider extension than now appears probable, and unless serious disaffection shows itself in the army.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/262, p.91, No. 92

No. 242

Lord Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 95
Telegraphic.

PARIS, March 1st, 1925
(Received March 2)

Press has this morning published a communiqué reporting that Monsieur Franklin Bouillon has refused the offer of the "Angora Embassy" (sic) owing to the political situation "specially as regards the questions of security and

interallied debts" which necessitate his remaining at his post in parliament as President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. Monsieur Franklin Bouillon is stated to have telegraphed to Mustafa Kemal expressing his regret, but it is added that he will visit Angora for a short time, leaving Paris about a week hence when he will engage in "private conversations with his friends of the Angora Government" in order to smooth away some of the difficulties in the way of a settlement of such outstanding questions as the Turco-Syrian frontier, the Turco-Syrian customs convention and the payment of Ottoman debt coupons.

It is worth remarking that in the communiqué which is published announcing these facts the post is described as that of ambassador at Angora and not Constantinople.

F.O. 371/10862/ E. 1209

F.O. 424/262, p. 94, No. 94

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No. 243

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 49

Telegraphic.

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 2nd, 1925

(Received March 3rd)

Your telegram No. 45.

I informed Nusret yesterday of intention of His Majesty's Government to appoint Ambassador to Constantinople, I also told him that I had just received my credentials. He suggested I should at once ask to be received by the President for their presentation. I replied that I could not do so without first consulting my allied colleagues with whom as he knew I had always acted in concert.

Yesterday evening my Italian colleagues informed me that he had asked formally for an audience to present his letters of credence having received instructions to do so that very morning. I was not surprised at his communication as I had suspected he would do so even before I saw Turkish delegate.

I to-day explained situation to my French colleague and invited his observations. He did not think I could now well do otherwise than ask for an audience at Angora but said he would like to telegraph to Paris. I told him that I should probably take no step for two or three days.

F.O. 371/10862/E.1260

No. 244

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain*No. 52
*Telegraphic.*CONSTANTINOPLE, March 3, 1925
(Received March 5)

Prime Minister resigned yesterday after prolonged party meeting, at which President of the Republic was present and took an active part. Issue was the extension to other parts of Turkey of repressive measures applied in area of rebellion. It is understood that İsmet now becomes Premier.

F.O. 424/262, p. 95-96, No. 98

No. 245

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain*No. 178
*Confidential*CONSTANTINOPLE, March 3, 1925
(Received March 9)

Sir,

In my despatch No. 154 of the 24th February I had the honour to report the development of the Kurdish rebellion which, breaking out at Genj, had suddenly assumed important proportions. It extremely difficult to state exactly what is happening. All news comes from Angora, and as there are no correspondents in the eastern provinces, it all originates from official sources, and can hardly command confidence, and of course there are countless rumours afloat, the value of which it is still more difficult to assess. It is clear that the centre of the rebellion lies along the valley of Murad Su and throughout the mountainous region to the south (Dijeh, Haini, Piran, Arghana). North of valley, Khinis and Ghenj are in revolt, and there is fighting at Chimishghezek further west. The important Kurdish sheikhs of Dersim are said to have sent loyal assurances, but the report, or the sincerity of the protestations may be doubted. Kharput, in the western bend of the Murad Su, was certainly entered by the rebels; apparently the authorities fled, but the tribesmen began to loot, and the townsmen, headed by a man who is bitterly opposed to the present régime, expelled the invaders. Turning further east, there is very little news from Mush, and now whatever from Bitlis and Van; one can only suppose that communication of any sort with these regions is impossible. Further north, on the Black Sea coast, it is known that the

Government has no friends in the Trebizond region; an outbreak there would be a very serious matter; but though there is no news of anything having happened, there has been pressure on the Government to proclaim martial law in the district as a precautionary measure. At the moment of writing this has not been decided on definitely, though the change of Cabinet makes it more likely.

2. Every day almost the papers report the activities of aeroplanes against the insurgents, and a considerable movement of troops is in progress against them. Five divisions are to attack the rebellion from the south, and from the north the Sivas and Erzinjan corps are to move as soon as the weather allows. I beg to enclose herewith a report by Major Harenc, military attaché to this mission, giving full details both of the rebellion and of the military measures taken with a view to its suppression.

3. As regards the causes and nature of the rising, there is at present no reason to modify the suggestion put forward in my despatch No. 154. The movement is religious, national and anti-republican, though it cannot be said how much each of these contributes to the general result. It is widely said here, and generally believed at Angora, that Selim Effendi, a son of Sultan Abdul Hamid and now in exile at Beirut, is put forward by the Kurds as the head of the movement, or even as a prospective King of Kurdistan. Another cause of the insurrection mentioned frequently is the deterioration in the general standard of administration brought about by the change of system which the Nationalist Government has introduced. The large vilayets of olden days have been broken up and each sandjak has become a separate province, the vali of which receives his orders direct from Angora. The extra centralisation thus produced causes added delay, and the new type of vali is said to be more tyrannical, inefficient and incapable of controlling the population than the old Governors-General.

4. In the political field the first action of the Government, simultaneously with the proclamation of martial law, was to introduce into the Assembly new draft articles to the law of treason, and they have duly been enacted. They make any person liable to penalties varying from death to two years's imprisonment, who shall exploit religious sentiment for political purposes. Administrative measures have also been taken possible excesses of language of preachers in the mosques. The preaching licences of the hojas in Constantinople (and probably elsewhere too) have been called in and reviewed, and some well-known imams here have been forbidden to preach any more. As regards the press, there are threats from Angora that any paper publishing false news designed to encourage the rebelliously minded will be dealt with drastically. No new legislation on this subject has been passed, the existing law which dates from Hamidian days being strong enough to enable the Government to control the press by "temporarily" suspending any journal whose publications are

displeasing. Under the shadow of this threat, the paper will be in no hurry to publish disagreeable items of news.

5. It is clear that on the 23rd and 24th February Angora was in a panic over the rebellion. The best proof of it is to be found in the almost desperate efforts that were made to reach an immediate settlement with the Greeks over the patriarchy question. Since then the authorities have somewhat recovered their equanimity, and their constant theme has been that the rebels are being repulsed everywhere, that many Kurdish districts are entirely loyal, and that as soon as the troops reach their stations the suppression of the whole affair will be rapid. Nevertheless, the last three or four days have brought about interesting political developments at Angora.

6. The Progressive party, which constitutes the Opposition, has behaved with exemplary loyalty during the crises of the last week; their leaders have uncompromisingly denounced the rebellion, and, however much they may disapprove of the violent and headstrong courses favoured by the majority of the People's party, there is no reason to believe that they sympathise in any way with the strongly reactionary tendencies of Kurdistan. Fethi Bey has received their general support during the past three months on account of the generally conciliatory attitude he adopts. He was, as is known, put into office partly to allow İsmet Pasha to recover his health partly to take the wind out of the sails of the Opposition, and to stop the disintegration of the Popular party, but his position has been difficult, for he was always dependent on the People's party to support him, of which the head is İsmet, his predecessor, and the secretary-general for the last two months has been Rejeb, who formed a cave against him in the beginning of January. I rather expect that latterly İsmet Pasha, who is reported to have attended Cabinet meetings, has been *de facto* in control of affairs, with Mustafa Kemal at his elbow.

7. Fethi Bey has been subjected to strong pressure by the wild men of the People's party, both to take more drastic action against rebellion by proclaiming martial law at once in Trebizond and Constantinople – perhaps even over the whole extent of the country – and to seize the opportunity of taking strong action against the Progressive party, with a view to its suppression. To the latter form of pressure he seems to have yielded so far as to request the progressive leaders to close down their provincial branches, but he met with a refusal, and does not seem to have been inclined to persist.

8. The crisis came yesterday, the 2nd March, when a meeting of the People's party was called and continued for ten hours. The attack on the Government was led by Rejeb, and the moderate policy was defended by Fethi, who was supported by the majority only of his own Cabinet (6 against 4). The

proceedings were only very summarily reported in the press, but they were extremely stormy. The President of the Republic was present in person, and at the request of Kilij Ali, one of his favourite henchmen, consented to answer the questions of Deputies and to make them a speech. Finally a motion was passed by 90 votes to 60, the terms of which have not transpired, but which Fethi regarded as a vote of censure on himself. He accordingly handed in his resignation. This evening it is reported that Ismet Pasha has resumed the Premiership, and it is supposed that he is prepared to carry the policy of repression all round just as far as the Ghazi can wish.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/262, p.99-101, No. 103

No. 246

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 181

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 6, 1925
(Received March 18)

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 52 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a list of the members of Ismet Pasha's new Cabinet, together with such details of their careers as are in my possession.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/262, p.106, No. 108

ENCLOSURE IN No. 246

Notes on Members of Ismet Pasha's Third Cabinet, formed on March 4, 1925

President of Council.....	Ismet Pasha
Interior.....	Jemil Bey
Foreign Affairs.....	Tevfik Rushdi Bey
National Defence.....	Rejeb Bey
Justice.....	Mahmud Essad Bey
Public Work.....	Suleiman Sirri Bey
Finance.....	Hassan Bey
Commerce.....	Ali Jenani Bey
Health.....	Dr. Refik Bey
Marine.....	Ihsan Bey
Public Instruction.....	Hamdullah Subhi Bey
Agriculture.....	Sabri Bey

Jemil Bey (Interior).

Unchanged. Staff lieutenant-colonel. During armistice was in command of defence forces against the Greeks at Chatalja. Elected Deputy for Rodosto in 1923; he was appointed general secretary of the People's party in May 1924. He succeeded Rejeb Bey as Minister of Interior in January 1925, his appointment being criticised because of his youth and inexperience.

Tevfik Rushdi Bey (Foreign Affairs).

Elected Deputy for Smyrna in 1923. Was secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission which considered the Lausanne Treaty. In the autumn of the same year was appointed chief Turkish delegate on the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations, a post which, in spite of repeated resignation, he has held ever since. His activities in this connection are well known. Is stated to be unscrupulous and ambitious.

Rejeb Bey (National Defence).

One of the leading extremists in the People's party, and closely in touch with Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas. Elected Deputy for Kutahia in 1923, he is immediately became general secretary of the People's arty. Became Minister of Interior in May 1924 and continued to hold this post till January 1925, when he resigned from the Fethi Bey Cabinet. Has for some time been regarded as a possible alternative to Ismet Pasha as Prime Minister.

Mahmud Essad Bey (Justice).

Unchanged. Native of Smyrna, and about 40 years of age. Is one of the leading Turkish specialists on constitutional law. Established himself in Smyrna as a lawyer in 1912, and remained there till the Greek occupation in 1919. Became Deputy for Smyrna in 1920 and published the "Yeni Gyun" at Angora in May 1922. In June 1922 became Secretary for Foreign Affairs Commission, and in July Minister of Economy. Was a failure in this post, and resigned a few months later. Held the same post August-September 1923, when he resigned owing to severe criticism. Retired to Smyrna, and was believed to have become an Oppositionist, though Mustafa Kemal made a point of seeing him when he visited Smyrna in December 1923. Became Minister of Justice in November 1924.

Suleiman Sirri Bey (Public Works).

An engineer and an ex-official of the Ministry of Public Works in Constantinople. In 1923 was elected Deputy for Constantinople. In January 1924 he became Minister of Public Works, a post he held till the fall of Ismet Pasha in November, when he was succeeded by Feizi Bey.

Hassan Bey (Finance).

About 40 years of age. Native of Trebizond, and is of Laz origin. Studied in Constantinople and Paris. Was Director of the Economic Section of the Food Ministry during the war. Elected Deputy for Trebizond in 1919. Joined the Nationalist movement early in 1920. Became Minister of Finance in May 1921, and held that post till April, 1922. Was accused of being very pro-Bolshevik. Minister of Economy and Public Works, May-July 1922; Turkish financial expert at Lausanne Conference, 1922-23; again Minister of Economy, September 1923-March 1924; and Minister of Commerce, March-November 1924. Speaks French fairly well, is a man of private means, and is well-versed in financial matters.

Ali Şenani Bey (Commerce).

Unchanged. Was a Malta deportee, being accused of having taken a prominent part in the Armenian massacres. Is one of the leading business men of the Aintab area. In business is considered honest and go-ahead. Has represented Aintab since 1920. Became Minister of Commerce on the formation of Fethi Bey's second Cabinet in November 1924.

Refik Bey, Dr. (Health).

Elected Deputy for Constantinople in summer of 1923, he was Minister of Health in İsmet Pasha's first and second Cabinets from October 1923 till November 1924.

İhsan Bey (Marine).

Unchanged. One of the extremists of the People's party, and one of the most devoted of Mustafa Kemal's personal henchmen. Was elected deputy for Jebeli Bereket in 1923, and has always been noted for his violent utterances in the Assembly. Was President of the Independence Tribunal sent to Constantinople in December 1923 for the trial of the three newspaper proprietors. Became first Minister of Marine in December 1924.

Hamdullah Suphi Bey (Public Instruction).

Turkish man of letters. Has for some time been one of the leading lights of Mustafa Kemal's entourage. Since 1910 has been one of the chief propagandists of the pan-Turanian movement, and has of recent years particularly identified himself with the organisation of the *foyers turcs*. Was believed during the armistice to have Italian sympathies. Joined the Nationalist movement early in 1920, and was specially identified with secret service work. Became deputy for Adalia in January 1921, and Minister of Public Instruction two months later. Resigned in December 1921, and in March 1922 was sent on a mission to Bokhara, but was turned back by the Bolsheviks. Was elected Deputy for Constantinople in 1923, and in the Assembly itself has been noted for his violent speeches. Was one of the chief critics of the Treaty of Lausanne when it was submitted to the Assembly for approval. Is 44 years of age.

Sabri Bey (Agriculture).

Another of the extremists of the People's party, and Deputy for Sarukhan. In August 1923 was elected one of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. Is noted for his violent speeches, and attracted attention in November 1923 when an incident arose in the Assembly between him and Hussein Reouf Bey.

No. 247

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 199

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 10, 1925
(Received March 16)

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 178 of the 3rd instant relating to the fall of Fethi Bey's Cabinet, I have the honour to report that the terms of the actual motion in the People's party meeting, over which the voting went against him have not been made public. It is, however, generally believed that the decisive factor which turned the scales against him was the intervention in the debate of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. This throws a curious light on the Turkish politics. The voting within the party was 90 against 60; add to the latter figure some 30 or 40 avowed members of the Opposition, make some allowance for the influence exerted by the President, and it becomes clear that the Government of Ismet Pasha must really be supported only by a minority of convinced politicians in the Assembly. I may add that nobody for one moment imagines that it has any material support in the real sentiments of the country at large.

2. These considerations make no difference to its procedure, and as members of the Popular party, whatever their individual convictions, have to vote according to the dictates of the party caucus, the present Cabinet, backed as it is by the President, give more impression of stability than its predecessor. Mustafa Kemal himself has apparently been impelled by the crisis to abandon the attitude of qualified reserve which he has observed during the last few months and may be expected to figure more openly as the real ruler of the country. Not only has he personally ejected Fethi, his Prime Minister, but, as will be seen below (paragraph 4), he has to give his official approval to all measures taken under the new extraordinary law for the reinforcement of order and will thus for two years to come bear the responsibility for the administration of a Turkish D.O.R.A.

3. On the 4th March the party held its meeting in the morning, when the new Government's programme was announced and approved. In the afternoon of the same day it was revealed to the Assembly. Ismet stated the usual intentions of all Governments: to cultivate friendly relations abroad and usual reforms at home. For the special needs of the moment two measures were announced – the first, a law for the "stabilisation of tranquillity"; the second, the establishment of two tribunals of independence. Both measures were stoutly

opposed by the Progressive party, but quite in vain, and both became law the same day. The Opposition pointed out that only a week before Fevzi Bey had been given a unanimous vote of confidence, and asked what could have happened since to justify its reversal. İsmet Paşa's answer was reserved, and announced to little more than that more energetic treatment yet of the crisis was necessary.

4. The independence tribunals are two in number, one at Angora and the other with no fixed seat, but intended to work in the area of the rebellion. Sentences of death pronounced by the latter are to be executed immediately, while those of the Angora court are to be subject to the approval of the Assembly. The law for re-enforcing order is to be valid for two years. Under it the Government, subject to the approval of the President of the Republic, may, by administrative procedure, prohibit any organisation, or any incitement to reaction of revolt of the nature to disturb social order, public tranquillity or general security. Those guilty of such offences can be sent before an independence tribunal.

5. The law was, of course, opposed in the Assembly on ground its vagueness, and, indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the net of repression could have been thrown out more widely, for it virtually gives the Government a free hand to do what it will for two years. The debate was marked by a violent outburst by Reşid Bey against the press of Constantinople, to whom, he said, the conception of the law was due. The press was a nest of serpents, who must be destroyed, silenced, cleared out, and until this was done the country would know no peace. Indeed, the most marked effect of the law so far has been on the press; the Government has said that there is no censorship, but under the most rigorous censorship papers could hardly say less than they now dare, under the menace of such elastic legislation backed by the prospect of trial, with elastic procedure before an independence tribunal sitting in the prejudiced atmosphere of Angora. On the 6th March, the day after the law was passed, three Constantinople papers were suppressed, viz., the "Tevhid-i Efkâr," the Conservative Islamic organ, probably with the biggest circulation in the country, and two smaller evening papers, the "Son Telegraph" and the "İstiklâl." Two papers in Trebizond have also gone under—one in Eskişehir, one in Adana, and three or four periodicals and reviews. The journals still printed refrain from all serious comment, and hardly dared for the first two or three days publish any news at all from the eastern vilayets. Hussein Jahid, of the "Tanin"—the only real journalist of Turkey—has announced that he will attempt no more political articles at all, and his leading column is filled with reminiscences of his deportation to Malta, which, be it said in passing, are not, so far, at all anti-British.

6. In other respects no marked change is visible so far as a result of the new régime, but it is difficult to believe that the town and country organisation of the Progressive party will be left to work in peace, even if it has not already been wrecked. The tribunal of independence have been established and the judges named. All are well-known extremist supporters of Mustafa Kemal, but the President Kildj Ali, is the only one whose name has been mentioned in previous despatches. At the moment of writing no cases have come before the new courts.

7. Of the actual rebellion there is plenty of rumour with so little authority behind it that it cannot well be reproduced. For two or three days the papers had literally nothing to say except that the forces of repression would soon be at work. To-day they have taken heart of grace, and with one accord all report on attack on Diarbekir, in which 5,000 rebels participated and were repulsed. Either the news and the figure have been given out by the Government, or, I presume, all the papers of Constantinople will vanish to-morrow. In the hope of getting some news I have sent Mr. Knight to take up his duties at Trebizond immediately. What is available now is summarised in the report from Major Harenc, military attaché to this embassy.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/262, p.112-114, No. 113

No. 248

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received March 23)

No. 213

His Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith the text of the speeches made on the occasion of the presentation of my credentials to the President of the Turkish Republic at Angora on the 16th March, 1925.

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 18, 1925

F.O. 424/262, p.119, No. 121

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 248

Speech by Mr. Lindsay, British Ambassador

M. le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de remettre entre les mains de votre Excellence la lettre par laquelle Sa Majesté le Roi m'a accrédité comme son Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire auprès de la République turque.

J'estime hautement le privilège et l'honneur de pouvoir aujourd'hui renouer, pleinement et formellement, les relations diplomatiques entre la Turquie et l'Empire britannique, interrompues depuis tant d'années. Je m'adresserai avec énergie et avec plaisir à la tâche de cultiver les meilleures relations entre les deux pays et entre les deux Gouvernements, et il est le désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté que ces relations puissent rapidement revêtir un caractère de cordialité et de confiance. Dans la tâche qui m'incombe j'espère rencontrer les bonnes dispositions et l'appui favorable de votre Excellence et du Gouvernement de la République, et dans cet espoir, les yeux tournés vers l'avenir, j'envisagerai avec calme le développement future de ma mission.

F.O. 424/262, p. 120, No. 121/1

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 248

Speech by Turkish President

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Je reçois avec plaisir les lettres de créances par lesquelles Sa Majesté britannique accrédite votre Excellence auprès de moi en qualité d'Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire.

Je considère avec satisfaction la désignation de votre Excellence en vue de rétablir pleinement et formellement les relations diplomatiques interrompues depuis tant d'années entre la Turquie et la Grande Bretagne.

J'envisage avec plaisir le désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de voir ces relations revêtir rapidement un caractère de cordialité et de confiance. Le Gouvernement turc désire également que les relations susmentionnées deviennent plus cordiales et plus confiantes. Il n'y a pas de doute que vous aurez à ce sujet mon appui et l'aide entière du Gouvernement de la République.

Je souhaite que vous réussissiez dans vos efforts en vue de développer favorablement les relations de deux pays.

F.O. 424/262, p. 120, No. 121/2

No. 249

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 217

ANGORA, March 20, 1925
(Received March 30)

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I arrived here on the 15th instant and was received on the following day by the President of the Republic for the presentation of the King's letter accrediting me as Ambassador to the Turkish Republic. I had a short interview with the Minister for Foreign affairs, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the evening of my arrival, at which his Excellency explained to me the ceremonial to be observed. The President, he said, would make his speech in Turkish, which would be interpreted to me in French, and as it was an Ambassador who was being received, he himself the Minister would act as interpreter. I myself, he said, could speak in English or in French, as I liked. I had looked up precedents and found that for the last thirty years at least British Ambassador's speeches on these occasions had been made in French, and for this reason I had prepared my speech in that language and forwarded it officially to the Turkish Government beforehand. I thought it would be difficult now to change round at the last moment and speak in English, and I therefore told Tewfik Rushdi that I would address the President precisely in the terms which I had already communicated to him.

2. On the morning of the 16th Tewfik Rushdi Bey sent round to me copies in French and in Turkish of the speech which Mustafa Kemal Pasha would deliver to me that afternoon. The text of these speeches were enclosed in my despatch No. 213 of the 18th March, 1925.

3. That afternoon we were taken in motor cars provided by the Turkish authorities to Tchankaya for the ceremony. I was accompanied in the first car by Kiamil Bey, "conseiller politique" of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who apparently also acts as a sort of "chef du protocole." The staff accompanying me were Major R. E. Harenc, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Edmonds, Colonel H. Woods and Mr. Helm.

4. On arrival at Tchankaya we found the Guards' band and a company of infantry drawn up; "God save the King" was played as we alighted, and the troops saluted as we entered the house. We were received by the President's household, civil and military, headed by Colonel Tewfik Bey, his "chef de cabinet," and after a minute or two of conversation I was taken alone across the entrance hall into the small room where the President received me. Only Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and one member of the household, were present. The President said to me "Soyez le bienvenu, M. l'Ambassadeur," we shook hands, and exchanged speeches, the Minister interpreting each, according to schedule. When I had handed over my credentials I asked leave to introduce my staff. The President addressed us in Turkish, saying that he was glad to welcome the members of the British Embassy to Angora and that he hoped that the personal contact so established would be continued. He then shook hands with them once again and they withdrew. Left alone once more, the President immediately asked me, in French, what I thought of Angora, and I replied with my regular *cliché* by saying that I admired the courage of any people who chose to transfer the site of their capital. He then expressed the hope that I would speedily establish myself definitely here, to which I replied that the first thing for me to do was to find a site, about which I had already spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This evoked a brief and abrupt question in Turkish to Tewfik Rushdi, who replied hurriedly in the same language. We exchanged a few sentences about situations for a house and about what I proposed to do and to see during my present visit to the capital, and the audience ended. Throughout the President's demeanour was dignified and courteous, but also friendly and smiling.

5. Once more the band played "God save the King" and the troops saluted, and we returned to our railway cars in Angora station after an absence from them of just fifty minutes, of which thirty-five to forty must have been taken up by the drive to Tchankaya and back. Nevertheless, I do not wish to create the impression that the ceremony was in any way to be criticised on the ground of being unduly hurried. It was indeed very simple, but it was efficiently arranged and nothing was slipshod. The President's house is rather like a small suburban villa, pleasantly situated 5 miles south of the town near the summit of a long sloping hill and enjoying a fine view of the wide plain in the centre of which Angora rises abruptly on its rock. The rooms are, of course, small, and the furniture is rather too rich and "presidential"; but on the whole the ceremony was invested with an air of simple dignity was not displeasing.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10862/ E. 1932

F.O. 424/262, p.123-124, No. 126

No. 250

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 226

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 24, 1925
(Received March 30)

Sir,

Perhaps I should offer some general observation on our recent experiences in Angora.

2. We spent six days in the town, from the afternoon of the 15th to noon 21st, lodging in two railway cars at the station. They were moderately clean — but only moderately — and we were fairly comfortable. In summer, of course, they would be intolerably hot. Nature was unusually kind to us; the weather was cool and dry, there was neither dust nor mud and no mosquitoes, and we had our full share of sunshine. We were thus privileged to see Angora at its very best.

3. Apart from its citadel and monuments of undoubtedly archeological interest, the town itself is just as poor a place as all accounts lead to believe. There is but one road which, judging by Constantinople standards only, can be regarded as descent; it runs from the station some 400 yards across the famous marsh, and about the same distance beyond into the heart of the city; the other streets of the place are execrable and there is nothing like them here. The general style of building is miserable, and there is nothing in Western Europe to which the town can be compared. If in politics Angora is about as much ahead of Turkey as Kurdistan is behind, so in "ædility" (if I may coin the word) it is about as much behind the dilapidated Constantinople of to-day as Constantinople is behind, say, Marseilles. I understand that progress has been made in the last four years, and there is a certain amount of Government building of offices going on which represents quite an effort for an impoverished State like Turkey, but progress is very slow. It is particularly noteworthy that there is absolutely no private building going on, though the overcrowding is such that rents are preposterously high. Private persons do not feel secure enough to invest capital in new dwelling-houses, and this is the most telling testimony of all against the permanent use of the city as the capital. In the way of diversion Angora is endowed with a restaurant, said to be "nearly as good as Tokatlian's" (but it is not), and one cinema. The latter is unventilated and always thick with smoke. Both owe their existence in some way to Government help.

4. In spite of these depressing surroundings the predominant tone of the people we encountered was one of incredible and unbounded optimism, not merely as regards the town itself, but also as regards the politics of the future. I heard it solemnly stated that, the credit having been granted, the marsh would be drained and turned into a forest, and that there would be no mosquitoes this summer - and this from an intelligent, well-educated young Deputy, who I feel sure was sincere and was only deceiving himself. If these people were capable of being undeceived they would be truly pathetic. Those who are in the swim of politics, with whom mostly we came in contact, live in a fool's paradise, and the only one heard by any of us to say what Angora really is was Rejeb Bey, the Minister of Defence; but then I have the impression that Rejeb is a remarkable man. Among the small fry, living two and three in one rotten room, separated from their wives and families and paying high prices for food imported from Constantinople, there is none of the jubilant spirit of the governing class.

5. From Constantinople we had gathered the impression that the State and the Ghazi Pasha are one and the same thing, but it has been greatly deepened by our visit, and it is difficult to overstate the extent to which his personality seems to dominate the whole direction of affairs. It is who has planted the capital where it is, and his will-power has brought people to persuade themselves that it is an ideal site, and his magnetism that has filled them with such optimism that they reject the evidence of their senses. So long as he maintains his position, there is no possibility of Angora being deserted. If he vanished to-morrow I think the thing would crumble at once; but if he remains with us some years it is quite a question whether, with his force of character, he will not have been able to give his institution some degree of semi-permanence.

6. We visited the Assembly two or three times, and, if you were to take off the Deputies' kalpaks and fezzes and leave out some of the hojas, you might think yourself in any Central European Parliament. The proceeding were interesting and perfectly decorous, though outside, in the entrance by the front door, we could see the marks of the bullets that killed Halid Pasha six weeks ago. People work industriously in their offices in Angora, though judging by the standards of, say, a small provincial town in Italy, they are squalid and untidy; but the fat old pashas are things of the past, and Ministers are young and can be found in their offices early or late. They tell you rather pathetically that they have nothing else to do.

7. On the whole, I think I may say that we found out little in Angora, about it or about its general atmosphere, that we had not already realised from Constantinople, except that on some points our impressions have perhaps been

deepened; and I really think that the political situation in Turkey can be adequately, if not perfectly, observed from the old capital. It is to keep in contact with Ministers and to conduct ordinary business that visits to Angora are necessary. Verbal communication is the very essence of diplomacy, and it is difficult to understand without actual experience how it feels to conduct conversations with the capital through the uncertain medium of Nusret Bey. It is like fighting with one hand tied to your back. I still think, though with regret, that His Majesty's representative in Turkey, whatever his future rank may be, will have to go to Angora frequently, and to be able to go there at a moment's notice. I find that it is just a year ago that I first expressed this view to your predecessor.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10862/ E. 1910

F.O. 424/262, p.132-133, No. 131

No. 251

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 225

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 24, 1925

(Received March 30)

Sir,

I have the honour to report that Fethi Bey, late Prime Minister, has been appointed Turkish Ambassador at Paris, and that Jevad Bey, who has occupied that post for some weeks, is to be transferred to some other mission, probably Vienna, which is a Legation only.

2. When Jevad presented his letters at Paris he made a long and rather foolish speech, full of gush and flowery phrases, to which President replied in a discourse containing, indeed, the usual courtesies but ending with a paragraph which bluntly impressed on the Turks the necessity of observing their engagements. The two speeches were printed in the local papers, which, after two or three days of silent horror, burst into a storm of attack on Jevad Bey for his indiscreet utterances. It was clear that Jevad's term at Paris would be a short one, and that he would receive the punishment that M. Doumergue's words had earned for him as soon as it was convenient to nominate his successor.

3. Fethi, who used to be regarded as very advanced in politics, is now called in Angora "the man of obsolete ideas." He was put into office only to serve the turn of the moment according to President's ideas, and I think he has hardly had a fair chance from the first. His views are so much more moderate than those of İsmet Pasha and the President that he almost belongs to a different school of politics, yet he had to depend in Parliament on the People's party, of whom İsmet Pasha remained the active chairman. Then, as the moderate element was still strong in the Cabinet, a new Ministry (that of Marine) was created, and a hot extremist, İhsan Bey, put into it. Later again Rejeb, his Minister of the Interior, organised a cave against him, and when it failed of its purpose and he had to resign he was made secretary-general of the People's party. Now Fethi himself is ejected as the result of an adverse vote in the People's party, to bring about which the Ghazi himself had to intervene actively in the debate. Yet now, whether from a dog-like fidelity to Mustafa Kemal's person or from lack of political perception, Fethi shows no resentment whatever at his treatment, and is as happy as a sand-boy at the prospect of Paris. His glee at getting out of hot place is the only sign of pessimism which I observed among Turks during my visit to Angora. Were he now to remain as a Deputy in Turkey he would have an ideal opportunity (judging purely from the parliamentary point of view) of forming what Turkey most wants, a strong Centre party, supported by the Progressives and by the moderate members of the People's party, and leaving on the Right the small band of religious-minded reactionaries and on the Left the more numerous and very active extremist supporters of Mustafa Kemal. The latter must assuredly be glad to see this danger removed; as for Fethi, I am uncertain whether he is now blindly throwing away a heaven-sent opportunity or prudently reserving himself for a later and less dangerous occasion.

4. Fethi Bey is thus a moderate sensible, fairly straightforward man, with the Turkish sense of humour, some interest in outside things and a lot of loyalty, but he is not intelligent. He was one of the Malta deportees, but he has said in the Assembly that in the discharge of official duties he regards it as necessary to put aside any feelings of personal resentment he may feel on that score. Mme. Fethi Bey (Ghalibe Hanum, as she is called here) is young, pretty and very pleasant to meet. She was brought up in France, her father having been Turkish consul-general at Marseilles, and she speaks English and French. She is looking forward to leaving Angora and to buying herself pretty new frocks in Paris.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.*

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10862/ E. 1909

F.O. 424/262, p.131-132, No. 130

*Bu raporun altına İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığında şu not düşülmüştür:

"I think that Fevzi is a very wise man to embrace the opportunity of getting out of Angora. The Kurdish rising is said to be due to his failure to pay due regard to warnings of Kurdish discontent and, however true this may be, he cannot avoid a fair share of responsibility for a situation that may develop very unpleasantly.

And as Kemal has clearly shown his determination to stifle all political opposition and has provided himself with the legislative and other means of doing so, it is clearly not a propitious moment in Turkey to set about crystallizing around himself a Centre Party comprising all the elements of opposition to the present absolutist régime.

D. G. Osborne

30/3"

No. 252

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Oliphant (Foreign Office)

(Private)

· CONSTANTINOPLE, March 25, 1925

(Received April 4)

Dear Oliphant,

Latife Hanum (wife of Mustafa Kemal) is far too great to put in the mere corner of an official despatch, so I place her in the forefront of a private letter. She is small, not pretty, black hair, which was uncovered —this considered rather advanced in Constantinople —intelligent, and speaking first-rate English. She was a year at a school at Chisclhurst and has spent besides six months in England since the war. We talked about women's rights. I was, of course, asked if I liked Angora. I said the Turkish Government intended to give us a site. "I should jolly well think they would," said she. Demeanour *poise* and dignified, withal agreeable. Dress rich, but not gaudy; curtains drawn and lights lighted; we burst into French now and then for the benefit of Colonel Tewfik Bey, the massive head of the household, who was present. It was no ceremony, for Tchankaya has learned things since the Hungarian Minister went up last spring to present his letters and was later received by the lady with presidential ceremony —uniforms, evening dress, band and troops. It is a simple affairs

now. I told her my very best comic story, stayed twenty minutes agreeably enough, bowed, smirked, and took my leave.

Still to my Italian colleague "elle a montré le bout de l'oreille." For when he started talking about knowing her family in Constantinople she dryly answered that she was far too busy to think of her family. But then he had put her back up over the question of women's rights. Women, he said, can be mothers, and that is enough for them.

I have never before seen Montagna at work on Turks and it was rather a surprise to me. He is extraordinarily tactless and makes the mistakes, fatal with Orientals, of being sarcastic. It made me quite uncomfortable at a dinner to hear him gibing at Tewfik Rushdi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. From Angora he telegraphed *en clair* to his wife "Angora horrible comme toujours," and all Constantinople is ringing with it. Result is that he is making a bad impression upon there. He is a nervous fellow, straining for results, with an eye always on the effect he is producing on Mussolini at Rome. His staff take their cue from him and make it worse. Mussolini has a fatal influence on his diplomats abroad. They are all expecting the sack any moment, and they cannot be natural.

Montagna is staying behind till to-morrow at Angora, nominally to chase some wretched cases through the dirty offices of the place, really to see what Franklin-Bouillon is up to. Perhaps I shall hear something when he comes back, for I have not a notion what the fellow is out for. Coupons, frontier, concessions, anything is possible, but something anti-British is probable. He has with him Mougin of course, and Sarrou, a man of the same kidney, who nearly got taken on by the Turks in about 1921 to reorganise their forces and gendarmerie of something of that sort. From a good source, I am told that he (Sarrou) said on his way through here "nous ne pouvons pas rester inactifs pendant que la suprématie anglaise s'établit partout ici." I wonder if he did; and if it is. Balancing budgets to make a difference, and those who can afford to wait doggedly in the East may reap a late but rich harvest; but I have seen no signs of its coming yet.

I should like to think that our visit to Angora has done some serious good, but it is very difficult to know. Certainly we, who behaved with ordinary amiability, gained in comparison with Italians, and we received many fulsome compliments which of course, only roused one's suspicions. The Turks are now risking any rapprochement that has been effected by their silly note about the transfer to Angora. I did my very best to get them to answer nothing at all, but I am afraid we have touched up the Ghazi himself and we failed to get any real improvement. There is one little sentence in the middle of the Turkish note

that stands out like Angora in its plain. It is just as if the Ghazi had spatchcocked it in with blue chalk. Observe that the French of the rest of the note is quite good, and that of the one little sentence is really bad grammar. The affair is very tiresome and dangerous, for decisions on it will be pregnant with consequences; and if take a wrong turning we shall get further and further away from the right path and may find it difficult to get straight again.

One thing we did at Angora was to find quite a nice site for a house, as per description in official despatch; and yet I wonder if we shall get it for it lies just outside the boundary of the Ghazi's private estate, and I have an uncanny feeling that we may be snatching a Naboth's vineyard from a covetous Ahab. However, in asking for the land, we have only done what they suggested we should do, and if we do not get the land we shall at any rate have a grievance, and on public grounds a little delay in the affair of the house does not much matter if it is caused by the Turks. The whole controversy is about a comparatively remote issue, for how can any of us remove our Embassies within measurable time to the mountain top? On private grounds delay means a lot to me, for it makes me shudder to think how I am going to exist a few days at Angora at other seasons than the middle of March. How about tents? Would the Office of Works lend me a few decent ones? I could establish a bit of a camp on some dry waste ground perhaps. I should have thought the War Office would have dozens to spare. Somehow or other I shall have to go up to Angora at intervals; but even Tewfik Rushdi puts the completion of the new hotel only at the end of the summer, and that means the Kalends of Greece. Even then they are likely to commandeer it for a Government office. I am rather tickled at the idea of posing as a monument of protest in a tent.

He is a loathsome fellow is Tewfik Rushdi; and I counted him drink six glasses of raki at one dinner. Lord only knows how many he swallowed that I did not count. On the way home he upset in his car and pitched on his head. We passed the same way half an hour later and saw the overturned car, but in this country when you see an overturned car you merely pass by on the other side, "*comme si rien n'était*."

By the way, one of the prospective horrors of Angora will be the society. Seventeen men and two women; the pleasures of the table immoderately prolonged, and nobody can go home till midnight without being rude. Tehran as we knew it twenty years ago, but infinitely worse. Tehran, anyhow, is a far better place than Angora. Its European quarter was well laid out by someone, and nature is far kinder. Of course, as the man on the spot, I am necessarily biased in favour of following lines of least resistance here, and letting Turks keep their Embassies somehow, but honestly I cannot say that the dignity of Angora deserves the honour. Whether or not other considerations, *e. g.*, the

importance of the post or the importance of keeping on terms with the Turks, outweigh the indignity of the situation, you can judge in the Foreign Office better than I can here.

Yours ever,

RONALD LINDSAY

F.O. 424/262, p. 135-136, No. 136

No. 253

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 258

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 31, 1925
(Received April 6)

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 199 of the 10th March, I have the honour to report that the political situation in Turkey during the past three weeks has remained in a state of subdued inertia. The Grand Assembly at Angora continues debating, principally the budget; the Opposition as such shows practically no signs of life either in the Chamber or in the country, and if has not been absolutely crushed, it certainly has been reduced to silence. The movement discernible last winter towards the development of a real parliamentary régime has received on abrupt check, and, with the predominance in the State of one individual less disguised than ever, it is not easy to see how it could now resume its progress without a recourse to violence, itself the very antithesis of constitutionalism. However sceptically one may have regarded the strivings towards political development in the past, it is impossible to withhold sympathy at contemplating the hopeless blind alley into which Turkish politics have now entered.

2. The Angora Independence Tribunal has set to work and has had offenders brought before it from various regions in Turkey, but so far chiefly from Cilicia. Two newspaper men from Adana have been sentenced to seven and to three years' imprisonment for reactionary language and for disloyal propaganda among mobilised soldiers, while the Vali, for remissness in producing witnesses, was fined LT. 250. The tribunal for action in the eastern vilayets has not yet been started on its journeys, but, lest time be lost, one possibly dubious point was settled this week at a meeting of the People's party, viz., that sentences of death pronounced by courts-martial in the area of the

rebellion may be executed on approval by the army corps and divisional commanders.

3. In this stifling atmosphere serious comment on public affairs in the press has wilted away. Hussein Jahid, in the "Tanin," keeps silence even from good words, and fills his columns with reminiscences of his internment at Malta, which, I am sorry to say, consist mainly of rather bitter complaints against the restrictions imposed in the islands on himself and his fellow-prisoners. Other papers write about aviation, the Turkish theatre, Ramazan fasting, anything but internal politics. Even the Prefect of Constantinople enjoys an unaccustomed respite from attack.

4. As to the actual revolt, there are certain indications that things are not proceeding quite as well as official communiqués would have us believe. There has been fighting at Varto, in the north-east, and at Silvan, north-east of Diarbekr; there seems to have been a considerable killing of loyalists by rebels. Melasgird was reported one day in the papers to be in the hands of the rebels and the telegraph between Mush and Bitlis to have been cut. My Italian colleague yesterday received a telegram from his consular agent at Tiflis reproducing local rumours to the effect that the revolt has spread to Erzerum and Van, and that Russian troops were being moved to the frontier to help the Turks. The agent expressed the view that Bolshevik Armenians were not unconcerned in the Kurdish revolt "in order to show the necessity of rectifying the Turco-Russian frontier." These are but rumours of uncertain credibility; more serious is an article in the "Hakimiet-i-Millî," the semi-official organ printed in Angora. The article regrets that pacification cannot yet be spoken of. The rebels are active between Diarbekr and Siverek; there is strong propaganda round Mush and Varto; Dersim is worked on by religious chiefs; and the situation remains uncertain. The Republic has taken all necessary measures to suppress rebellion and will succeed, but it must not neglect the further duty of cutting at the root of the ill by introducing wise measures of administrative and social reform on the heels of the armies of repression, and doubtless it has already laid its plans to that effect. This article could not have been written without approval by the Government, and has a certain importance. In contradiction to the daily communiqués, which always imply that, the necessary concentration having been effected, the revolt will now be suppressed, a pessimistic note is struck and the public is prepared for reform—even, perhaps, concessions to local sentiment, the nature of which is not hinted at in the "Hakimiet-i Millî" or in any other paper.

5. There can be little doubt that the revolt is serious and that it is constituting already a serious strain on the Turkish State. A credit of LT. 10,000,000 has been voted for its suppression, which brings the deficit in

the budget for 1925 up to the acknowledged figure of LT. 30,000,000, and that many urgent public works, such as railway construction, are already being curtailed. If the revolt cannot be mastered quickly the sum allotted must surely be exceeded; if it is mastered and reforms are introduced, as suggested in the "Hakimiet-i-Millî," further expenditure yet will become necessary. These financial difficulties, with the considerable military effort put forth, must surely have a weakening effect, and it becomes almost impossible to believe that the revolt can have been engineered or precipitated by the Government to serve its own purposes. As to the instigation from outside, I think it is hardly necessary to seek for it; suspicion could fall on the Russians on the argument of *cui bono*? But the only confirmation I have received is the rather flimsy one of the Italian telegram from Tiflis quoted above.

6. Now that the revolt has broken out the Turks have exploited it probably to crush the opposition that was growing throughout the country against the radical autocracy of Mustafa Kemal; this is the incidental advantage arising out of an otherwise bad situation. Would they exploit it still further to the point of turning their troops round, once the revolt is crushed, and menacing the northern frontier of Irak, or even, Major Herenc suggests in the closing paragraph of his despatch No. 5, to the point of attempting a military *coup* against Mosul? To make either of these threats it will be necessary for Turkey first to crush completely the revolt pretty quickly, and our information at present it is so scanty and so uncertain, both as to the extent of the revolt and as to the efficacy of the measures taken against it, that I hesitate to pronounce a decided judgement. Granted the complete suppression of the revolt by the time the League renders a Mosul verdict thoroughly adverse to Turkey, and granted that the necessary concentration had then been effected, I imagine that a *coup* against Mosul would, from the military point of view, be possible, and therefore may require consideration beforehand. All political aspects of the question are against any such likelihood, for it would be necessary for Turkey to set the League of Nations at defiance and to undertake hostilities against Great Britain single handed at a moment when, as she knows, she would meet with sympathy from Russia only, and that of a character highly distasteful to her. Though individual Turks may find some satisfaction from talking big on such lines, I cannot now persuade myself that the governors of the country will seriously contemplate incurring such formidable risks.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 254

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 285

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 7th, 1925
(Received April 14)

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 269 of the 3rd instant I have the honour to report that Monsieur Franklin Bouillon on the 4th instant received the journalists of Constantinople and gave them an interview. His declarations were lengthy and consisted largely of what is usually called "flapdoodle". He declared that he had no mission to fulfil at Angora, and the object of his journey was to explain and to excuse himself for his refusal to accept the Embassy to Turkey. This, he said, was due to the situation of politics in France where the question of security so much overshadowed every other that he could not remain away from Paris. For this however, he could offer his Turkish friends two consolations; the first that he himself would be able to do in Paris ten times as much for a Franco-Turkish rapprochement as he could do in Turkey; and the second that he would be replaced here by Monsieur Sarraut, whose name he himself had put forward for the post, and who had been one of the first in France to rise in opposition to the Treaty of Sévres. To such hands Monsieur Franklin Bouillon felt he could confidently entrust the safeguarding of Franco-Turkish relations; and he also congratulated himself on leaving behind him two friends, General Mougin and Colonel Sarrou.

2. That same evening Monsieur Frankin Bouillon left for Paris direct; he had intended to proceed via Bucharest, but gave out that Monsieur Briand had summoned him to Paris by telegram in connection with the political crisis.

3. I learn on good authority that while at Angora Monsieur Frankin Bouillon's activities were seriously curtailed by illness; he was considerably troubled by an attack of angina. He saw the Ghazi Pasha on arrival, and on departure only; he had several talks with Tewfik Rushdi Bey, but with Ismet Pasha only one. I have heard a tale that at Mudania Monsieur Frankin Bouillon obtained some concession from Ismet on giving a formal pledge that he himself would represent France at the Peace Conference and would there give the strongest support to Turkish pretensions, and that Ismet has never forgiven him for failing to redeem this pledge. This tale is perhaps confirmed by something Franklin Bouillon himself said here, to the effect that the two men of the future in Turkey are Fethi and Reouf Beys.

4. It remain to be seen whether General Mougin and Colonel Sarrou will form part of Monsieur Sarraut's staff. From the pretensions of the former it is to be doubted whether he will consent to sacrifice his present position of independence and subordinate himself entirely to his Ambassador in Constantinople; and it is equally hard to believe that Monsieur Sarraut, an ex-Minister, coming out as Ambassador, can allow the present state of affairs to continue. If Mougin leave, French policy in Turkey may be loyal or disloyal to His Majesty's Government, but at any rate it will lose some of its present ambiguity.

5. As to the Colonel Sarrou, I understand that he is being put forward for the post of Military Attaché, which General Mougin declines on the ground that he already practically has the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. Colonel Sarrou I believe is of a somewhat unsavoury reputation in connection with concession hunting schemes, and he does not possess the high technical qualifications which the French Ministry of War usually requires from the officers it nominates for Military Attachéship abroad.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10862/E. 2192

F.O. 424/262, p.138-139, No. 130

No. 255

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 313

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 21st, 1925
(Received April 27)

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of note from Nusret Bey enclosing a copy of the credentials which Zekia Bey will present on his appointment as Ambassador.

2. I asked Nusret to-day why he had sent me this document. He replied that he had been instructed to do so by Angora and that it was done as a measure of precaution - to make sure that no fault would be found with the letter in London. I said to Nusret Bey that I would forward the copy to you, and about the document itself I said nothing; but I could not help meditating that just as had wondered if the Turks would raise some unheard of objection to the

form of my letters of credence, so now they are entertaining precisely the same speculations as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. *

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 371/10862/E. 2490

* Bu yazı üzerine İngiltere Dışişleri Bakanlığı yetkililerinden Oliphant, Zekai (Apaydın) Beyin Londra Büyükelçiliğine atanmasıyla ilgili olarak şunları not etmiştir:

"This man is a miserable selection, but I fear that I cannot suggest the name of a less unsuitable candidate. Moreover, he is already accredited here (though discredited in view of his grossly inaccurate report of his conversation with the Secretary of State.)

"If the Turks persist in holding out for Embassies at Angora, it may be necessary to degrade our representative in Turkey in a simple Minister, and in that case the presence here of a Turkish Ambassador will have to be dealt with. It seems unnecessary to meet this trouble half way.

L. Oliphant

28 Apr. "

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 255

Nusret Bey to Sir Lindsay

No. 9844/55

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 18 Avril 1925

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Je m'empresse de transmettre, sous ce pli, à Votre Excellence la traduction en français des lettres de créance que Son Excellence Zékai Bey, en sa nouvelle qualité d'Ambassadeur, sera l'honneur de remettre à Sa Majesté Britannique et de saisir cette occasion pour vous renouveler, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, les assurances de ma haute considération.

F.O. 371/10862/E. 2490

(S.) M. NOUSRET

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 255

*Ghazi Moustafa Kemal
Président de la République Turque
à Sa Majesté George V
Roi de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Possessions Britanniques
au delà des mers, Empereur des Indes, etc., etc., etc.*

Animé du désir sincère d'établir des relations d'amitié entre la Turquie et l'Empire Britannique, j'ai décidé d'accréditer auprès de Votre Majesté Zékiaï Bey, en qualité d'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire.

Les talents et qualité qui le distinguent ne me laisse aucun doute qu'il remplira ses fonctions avec plein succès.

Dans cette conviction, je prie Votre Majesté de vouloir bien l'accueillir avec bienveillance et ajouter foi et créance à toutes le communications qu'il aura l'honneur de Lui faire au nom de la République Turque. *

F.O. 371/10862/E. 2490

* Zekai (Apaydin) Bey, Büyükelçi olarak bu güven mektubunu İngiliz Kralına sunmağa vakit bulamamıştır, sanıyorum. Çünkü, bu yazımların hemen ardından Ahmet Ferit (Tek) Bey Londra Büyükelçiliğine atanmış ve 11 Mayıs 1925 günü onun için İngiltere'den agreman istenmiştir. - B.N.Ş.

No. 256

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 317

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 22, 1925
(Received April 27)

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that Baron de Villenfagne de Sorinnes, the Belgian Minister to Turkey, was received in audience by the President of the Republic on the 15th instant * and presented to him his letters of credence.

* Belçika Elçisi 15 Nisanda değil, 14 Nisan 1925 günü Atatürk'e güven mektubunu sunmuştur. B.N.Ş.

2. I have the honour to enclose herein a translation from the Turkish of the speeches exchanged on this occasion. As you will observe, particular stress was laid on the commercial relations between the two countries. The Belgian Minister hints in no uncertain fashion at the desirability of concluding a commercial convention, the President, in his reply, while saying that wheat and cotton abound in Turkey—a statement which is entirely untrue—adopts a very reserved tone towards the substance of M. De Villanfange's suggestions.

Not the Belgian only are anxious to have a commercial treaty with the Turks. My German, Netherlands, Hungarian, Swedish and other colleagues have endeavoured to persuade the Turkish Government to negotiate, but quite in vain. The Turks have always informed them that they are quite willing to accord to their subjects the treatment stipulated in the Commercial Convention attached to the Lausanne Treaty in favour of Allied subjects, but Angora, though it has signed treaties with Austria and Poland, has recently refused to bind itself further by signatures even to this much, stating that a "gentleman's agreement" must suffice, and forgetting that for such an agreement two gentlemen are requisite. The Turkish Ministers state quite openly that the Commercial Convention of Lausanne was wrung out of them as the price of peace; that they intend to denounce it at the earliest permissible moment, and thereafter have all foreign Governments on the same footing.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/262, p.152, No. 155

ENCLOSURE IN No. 256

Extract from the "Hakimiet-i-Millieh" of April 15, 1925

(Translation)

His Excellency the President of the Republic received the Belgian Minister, M. Villenfagne, at Chan-Kaya to-day with the customary ceremonial. The Minister presented his letter of credence and made the following speech:

"Mr. President,

"I feel highly honoured in presenting the letter of credence, by which the King, my august Sovereign, accredits me to your Excellency (literally 'the Asylum of the Presidency'). You are the head of a nation which we esteem greatly for its sincerity, valour, clemency and magnanimity. Under your

enlightened administration, the Turkish nation is adding to these virtues an *état* of progress which astonishes Belgium.

"I beg your permission to following matter: We Belgians are a peace-loving nation. Our ambition is to develop our industries. Our geographical situation compels us to increase our industrial output in order that we may be able to procure the necessary wheat for our food, the necessary cotton for our clothes, and so forth. Our country, which has a dense population, is far from assuring this population's material requirements. We shall be glad if the Turks will discuss the means of effecting commercial exchanges profitable to both parties. Such commercial relations can only be discussed in an atmosphere of mutual goodwill. As representative to your Excellency of a nation which loves Turkey greatly, I shall direct all my endeavours to making Turkey love us we love her.

"I trust I shall enjoy your goodwill to facilitate this task."

His Excellency the President of the Republic made the following speech in reply:

"I receive with pleasure the letter of credence by which His Majesty the King of Belgium (*sic*) accredits you to me. I particularly thank you for the sentiments of esteem which you bear towards the Turkish nation, and for the expressions which you have used in this connection. The Turkish nation greatly appreciate the qualities of magnanimity, valour, patriotism and application displayed by the Belgians. I am especially touched and pleased that your clear statements give proof of sincerity and truth. In effect, the wheat and cotton desired by Belgium exist in our country in abundance.

"The Turks, who, like the Belgians, have adopted peace and economic development as their greatest objectives, desire that the commercial and economic relations, which have existed between the two countries for long years and which are in harmony with the interests of both countries, should be developed in mutual good relationship and affection. There is no doubt that your endeavours in this direction will have the full support both of mee and of the Government of the Republic." *

F.O. 424/262, p.152-153, No. 155

* Bu nutukların Türkçe ve Fransızca asılları için bkz. : Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Yabancı Devlet Başkanları*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını, Ankara: 1995, Cilt I, s.417-420.

No. 257

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)*No. 78 Telegraphic.
UrgentFOREIGN OFFICE, May 11th, 1925

Turkish Chargé d'Affaires has informed me of recall of Zekiai Bey and desire of Turkish Government to appoint as Ambassador here Ferid Bey, who has been two years in Paris as Turkish unofficial representative and was formerly Minister of the Interior and Minister of Finance.

Please telegraph urgently your observations regarding his suitability. *

F.O. 371/10862/E. 2768

* Bu telgrafın dayanağı olarak, Foreign Office'de Türkiye işlerine bakan Mr. Oliphant'ın aşağıdaki servis notu dayanağı yer almaktadır:

"The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires called to-day to inform us that Zekiai Bey had been definitely removed from his post as Minister in London and had been recalled to Angora. Moukbil Bey added that he was instructed to enquire whether the appointment of Ferid Bey as Turkish Ambassador in London would be agreeable to the King and His Majesty's Government. He emphasised the fact that his Government had decided that their representative should be an Ambassador."

Moukbil Bey explained that the number of suitable candidates with adequate experience was limited at the present time. Ismet Pasha is too tired from heavy work and his Government hoped that their present selection would be suitable.

Ferid Bey was Minister of the Interior and previously Minister of Finance. At one time, he was Deputy for Kutahia, but resigned his seat on being appointed Turkish representative at Moscow. He did not, however, proceed to his post. He has recently spent two years in Paris as Turkish unofficial representative and was also at the Lausanne Conference.

I assured Moukbil Bey that he should hear the decision of his Majesty's Government as soon as possible.

I think we should telegraph to Sir R. Lindsay for his observations as regards the man's suitability. A draft is annexed. I have spoken to some members of our Delegation at Lausanne who know nothing against Ferid Bey..."

L. Oliphant*

No. 258

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 636. Confidential

THERAPIA, August 18, 1925

(Received August 24)

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 106 of 13th instant, I have the honour to report that the announcement of the President's divorce was conveyed to the public by means of an official communiqué issued by the Council of Ministers. This announcement merely stated that the President had informed the Cabinet that he had decided to separate from Latife Hanum and that they had been divorced on August 5th.

2. It is only natural that in the present circumstances no newspaper should make any comment on this announcement. At the same time rumours have been prevalent for the last few weeks that relations between the two were strained. It was announced on 25th July that Latife Hanum had left for Smyrna, and I am informed that it was then remarked that although the leading members of the Government were present at the station the President himself was absent.

3. It is equally hard to give any reason for the divorce. Rumours have long been current that life at Tchankaya was not conducted within the usual bounds of moderation and that the President had taken to drink again. On the other hand, I am informed by the Dutch Minister, who presented his letters of credence on the very day on which the divorce took place, that the President's appearance showed no indication of an immoderate life.

4. Without any proof of the alleged excesses I should therefore be more inclined to say that lack of an heir was the primary cause of the separation.

5. When the cause are merely a subject of speculation it is hard to say what, if any, the effect on the President himself will be. If my assumption in paragraph 4 are correct there is no reason why any change should take place. If, on the other hand, his methods of life have become so immoderate that his wife found it impossible to remain with him, the possibility should not be excluded that his firm grip on the State will gradually be relaxed. At the present there are no signs of this. *

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE

F.O. 371/10870/ E.5027

* Bu rapor üzerine Foreign Office'de şu not dâğılmıy:

"Perhaps Latife Hanım was not sufficiently docile for an autocrat's wife. At any rate Kemal has disposed of her as swiftly and effectively as he did of his political opposition. - D.G. Osborne, 25/8"

No. 259

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 678

THIERAPIA, September 1, 1925
(Received September 8)

Sir,

I have the honour to offer some observation on the internal political situation in Turkey at the present moment.

2. Weeks ago the Opposition party was crushed, and now it is not only talked about, but it may be suppressed almost not to exist. Ali İhsans, Kiazim Karabekirs, Refets and Reoufs certainly still have being, but their names are almost forgotten. If they ever move, which to my mind is doubtful, their movements are veiled behind curtains of impenetrable privacy, and certainly impart no impulse to the body of the State. Political comment in the press is almost completely silenced and survives only in the Government-controlled "Hakimiet-i-Millî," whose vigorous articles printed at Angora are subserviently echoed by the journals of Constantinople. When on the 20th of August the Government not only closed the Bourse here but also forbade all foreign exchange operations, the boldest observation made was that of the "Journal d'Orient," which wrote: "it goes without saying that this energetic gesture of the Government can only meet with approval"; and yet this gesture has rendered all business at Constantinople impossible just at the moment when Turkey's most important crops are coming forward for export.

3. Indeed, the Government's determination to maintain the present régime of repression shows no sign of abating and the Tribunal of Independence continue to print out sentences, mostly political, though occasionally a case of common law crime is also taken, and accused persons continue to be arrested in Constantinople and the provinces and forwarded to the seat of the courts. The Public Prosecutor has a vast number of dossiers ready or in preparation for trial, and it is clear that they will not have been disposed of by December, when the period for which the courts have been constituted terminates. Many think that the court's life will be prolonged; some suggest that when the Assembly meets again in November a dissolution and new election will be ordered. This would automatically abolish parliamentary

immunity an enable the Government to prosecute Deputies of the ex-Opposition in comfort.

4. The President of the Republic has spent the last ten days in a tour through the Castamouni region to Ineboli on the Black Sea and back to Angora. He has taken the opportunity to make a number of speeches, which are not lacking in interest, and of which the most important was delivered at Ineboli. The general purport of these utterances is somewhat as follows: he glorifies the army and extols the innate civilisation and alertness of the Turkish nation; what has so far been accomplished towards liberating and renovating the country has been achieved by the army, but only under the inspiration of the nation. Just as the army, therefore, must be kept in the highest state of efficiency, so the nation must be modernised and kept alert, bright and free from rust. The laic and secular spirit is emphasised in a short but rather violent diatribe against dervish orders and their "tekkés" (convents) and the Caliphate, but the speaker has been laying most stress on dress, a subject which for some week has excited the interest of a press, unable to occupy itself with more immediately important topics. The Ghazi's pronouncements are very uncompromising: "our costume is neither national nor international", "the Turkish nation is like a diamond in a setting of mud"; "the proper dress of civilisation consists of boots, trousers, shirt, collar and tie, waistcoat and jacket, and on the head a covering with a brim, which is called 'chapeau,' just as the other garments are called 'la redingote,' 'le bonjour,' 'le smoking' and 'le frac.' " He rated women for still veiling themselves, pointing out that the family is the heart of civilisation, and some hojas for wearing turbans, which, he said, could only be worn by those employed at the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The result is said to be a run on the hat shops (though no great revolution is yet noticeable here in Constantinople) and the authorities are talking of controlling prices to save the public from exploitation.

5. The Ghazi, however, is no idle talker, and his speeches are usually found afterwards to have been good pointers and the direction in which he means to move. I could surmise that, having disembarassed himself of the Opposition, he means to devote the political campaign of the coming winter to a process of intensive modernisation. He is said often model himself on Napoleon, and he may now be taking a page out of the history of Peter the Great, who sheared off the boyars' beards and dragged the women of Russia willy-nilly into society. His efforts deserve an equal meed of praise, and I doubt not they will be extended to wider fields than that of mere costume.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 260

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 694

THERAPIA, September 9, 1925
(Received September 14)

Sir,

I mentioned in my despatch No. 678 of the 1st instant, that in his speech at Ineboli the President of the Republic, besides advocating the use of modern dress, had indulged in a diatribe against Dervish orders and monasteries. He had scarcely returned to Angora when a Council of Ministers met under his presidency, and three decrees were promulgated by which Dervish orders are dissolved and their property confiscated to the State, and the dress of the clerical and official classes is regulated. I have had careful translations made of these important decrees, and I enclose them to you herewith.*

2. The first observation that occurs to one is that these decrees, while they recite certain reasons for the action taken, quote no constitutional authority on which it is based, and I am at loss to surmise what article of the Constitution authorises the Council of Ministers, without any sanction from the Assembly, to take such far-reaching action as the dissolution of religious bodies and the disposal of their property. The question may conceivably in the future have importance, but for the present it is entirely academic; for it is not to be imagined that any person or journal will openly question or any law court refuse to apply a decision to which the Ghazi has set his signature.

3. Even in January of this year when Mustafa Kemal spent a few days at Konia, it was reported that the Turkish Government was thinking of laying hands on the valuable properties of the Mevlevi order of Dervishes; and when I was in the same town in May, I heard that the Buyuk Chelebi, the head of the order, though he liked seeing visitors, preferred that they should stay away because their visits could only have the result of exciting the suspicions of the civil authorities. The blow that has now fallen, though sudden, is hardly surprising. As to the cause of the action taken, the decree itself mentions the observations of the Independence Tribunals made after the Kurdish insurrection, and doubtless the Dervish orders, the tekkes and zavieh, constituting as they do rallying points for the religiously minded, have contributed somewhat to the movement of last spring; but they are not political

* Anılan kararnamelelerin metinleri veya çevirileri İngiliz arşivlerinde bulunamadi-B.N.Ş.

organisations properly so-called; and if in the East religion and politics could be divorced, I have no doubt that the Büyük Chelebi himself would have welcomed a decree of divorce. The Government in its passion for secularisation has had good reason for action it has taken if it can afford to despise the possible by-products of that action, and mere police considerations have doubtless reinforced its determination; for apart from the regular and unrolled members of the orders there are waste numbers of unorganised adepts all over the country, inscribed on no lists and bound by no fixed formula or obligation, yet held together by a vague kind of *esprit de corps* and mutual sympathy. To a policeman the whole affairs must be redolent of secret societies.

4. I need hardly dilate on the pecuniary attraction of the policy adopted. For its programme the Government cannot have too much money; and even if much of the lot passes to education, some will be left over for railways and other purposes.

5. I have heard of no reaction against this decree. None could possibly be expected at the present moment.

6. As to the hat and coat decrees, they are of less importance, but enable the press to print columns about the measures taken by the authorities to provide hats cheap and about the persons who are wearing them. Officials have to incline the head, *volens volens*, and Nusret Bey looks sheepish in a natty little felt *couvre-chef*, as it is called here. Careful observation in the streets of Pera fails to disclose any perceptible change in the habits of the people, except perhaps that a number of cloth caps of villainous cut have made their appearance. The hat movement here may be compared to the more majestic movement in England towards Oxford trousers.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/263, p.25, No. 28

No. 261

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 704

Therapia, September 14, 1925
(Received September 21)

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 692 of the 8th instant regarding the Irak frontier question, I have the honour to report that the general tone of the

Turkish press remains to-day much the same as therein described. Perhaps the volume of comment may have diminished in the last two or three days, but its substance is still entirely uncompromising. I need hardly say that the anti-Irak articles in the "Daily Mail," "Daily Express" and other London journals of the same way of thinking are freely reproduced. They lead the Turkish public to believe that His Majesty's Government are not serious in pressing their claims at Geneva; but I also think that without them the expressions of opinion in the Turkish press would be quite strong enough to induce undesirable excitement.

2. I admit to some surprise that the Turkish authorities should have allowed the public to be brought to its present state of exaltation, and I attribute this, in the main, to two forces at work. They are probably connected with each other, and both are at present somewhat obscure. The first is the growth of Russian influence at Angora. I can quote no definite incident, and no single action by either Government in illustration of the closer relations that have come into being between the two States; and, in particular, I am unaware that any of the outstanding questions between them, such as the commercial conversation or the treatment of shipping, have received solution; and from this fact we may perhaps draw comfort in the hope that the rapprochement is brought about by the circumstances of the moment and has not been allowed by the Turks to compromise the future. It is, indeed, not surprising that the Turkish Government, preparing for a contest with His Majesty's Government, should draw closer to Russia; and it is equally natural that any desire Turkey may evince in that direction should meet with a ready response from Moscow. All my colleagues, therefore, who have been at Angora lately tell me that Comrade Suritz has never been as influential in the capital as he is to-day, and that Russia is occupying the position of a guide, comforter and friend.

3. The second reason is connected with internal politics of Angora, and is a good deal more obscure - possibly more important if it tends, as apparently is the case, to weaken the position of İsmet Pasha. I write of it only with diffidence, as my information is vague and even contradictory, and I hardly venture to do more than point hesitatingly at the direction in which movement may be taking place.

4. It cannot be said that anyone at Angora is really pro-British or pro-Russian, or, indeed, anything but pro-Turk, and in internal politics, too all active politicians alike are pledged to a policy of uncompromising secularisation, "Turkification," and nationalism, with repression all round as the principal means of carrying that policy through. Yet, roughly speaking, and with many reservations which I need not develop, there do exist two more or less distinct groups in Angora, which we call the Moderate and the Extremists, and these, while they follow identical specific aims, differ from each other, not

in opinion, but in the degree of violence with which they hold their views and with which they are prepared to carry them into execution; so that it is more the quality rather than the substance of opinion that separates men from each other. Roughly speaking, and again with reservations, the dividing line between Moderates and Extremists tends to coincide with that between pro-British and pro-Russians; or, as Turks call it, between the western and eastern orientation of policy. Now, İsmet Pasha is classed as a Moderate, and he has the further advantage of possessing some ideas of statesmanship. I heard rumours last spring that some distrust was growing up between him and the President of the Republic, and it is suggested to me now that he is still further losing influence. I have heard that he used to find an important ally in Latife Hanum, and that her divorce has shaken his position. It is not necessary to suggest that the lady concerned herself too closely with politics, or that she identified herself in any way with this or that politician; but she certainly created in the Ghazi's household an atmosphere of sanity and moderation, and her influence was all in favour of those normal habits of life and of thought which are wanted for facing the problems arising from day to day. If the division between parties here is to be found so much in men's political tenets as in the quality of their mental processes, then the disappearance of Latife Hanum is a distressing symptom, for the Ghazi's mental processes will deteriorate and his natural inclination to violent and arbitrary courses will increase. The matter is the more important if, as I have been told, İsmet advocated studious moderation at Geneva in the pleading of Turkey's cause, and it was Tewfik Rushdi who won the day for no compromise. If the latter wins a real success before the League, İsmet's position may become still more difficult. These are developments which must be welcome at the Russian Embassy.

5. Yet, I have not thought that, with a League decision in favour even of the Brussels line, things would come to an actual breach. It has seemed to me that a "war that is no war" —somewhat similar to the condition of affairs that prevailed for some years between Poland and Lithuania over the Vilna business—represent the utmost limit to which either Russia or Turkey would be prepared to push matters for some time to come. The situation would be highly unpleasant, not to say dangerous, at times, but I think that, with patience and firmness, things might get better rather than worse, and the Turks might in time forget their grievance. Looking at things from the point of view of Anglo-Turkish relations, I think that something resembling the Brussels line was the best thing we could hope for.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/263, p.26-27, No. 29

No. 262

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 717

THIRAPIA, September 16, 1925
(Received September 21)

Sir,

There has been signs in the last few days that the Turkish Government is somewhat diminishing the severity of its repressive policy.

2. Firstly, the journalists who were put on trial before the Independence Tribunal of the East for having by their writings encouraged the Kurdish rebellion have, with one exception, been acquitted. The exception is the editor of the Adana "Tok Seuz," who, the court rather tardily discovers, should have been brought before the Angora Tribunal, to which his case is now transferred. As to the other journalists, it transpires that, in the early days of their arrest, four of their leaders telegraphed to the President of the Republic a long appeal, amount in almost, though not quite, to a confession. With sycophantic flattery of the Ghazi they protested the purity of their republicanism and of their devotion to the Government; they admitted the misguided nature of some of their writings, and protested that if they had realised the truth at the time they would not have so written; they declared their intention of abandoning journalism. This telegram nevertheless, had no effect, and the trial proceeded for several days, during which the accused were questioned and cross-questioned as to their thoughts and writings in the usual manner. Just as the trial was drawing to close, the journalists despatched a second telegram to the Ghazi, signed this time by all ten of them. It is much shorter and contains far less in the way of admission than the first telegram, and, indeed, in one respect runs counter to it; the signatories declare themselves faithful workmen and servants of the Republic, they appeal to the President's nobility and generosity in order that, with vigilance and pure intentions, they may resume their duties, and they protest that the acquittal that is doubtless about to be pronounced will be

imperfect without his Excellency's grace and favour. The acquittal was pronounced forthwith.

3. Now, for the most interesting of these ten journalist is Velid Ebuazade, editor of the suppressed "Tevhid-i-Efkâr," the former Conservative, Islamic, Nationalist paper; he is stubborn fellow, and there is bad blood between him and the President, for it may be remembered that in January 1924, when Mustafa Kemal, preparing to expel the Caliph, summoned all the journalists of Turkey to meet him at Smyrna, Velid alone was excluded because "he refused to ask to be received." Velid signed the second shorter telegram mentioned above, but did not sign the first. I would surmise that the Government had been anxious to acquit these journalists, but it insisted on having first some kind of recantation. The first telegram was deemed inadequate because Velid's signature was lacking. In the second Velid's name was attached and the Government overlooked the absence of aroma in the incense. Velid himself doubtless was unwilling to involve his fellow prisoners in a common fate with himself by displaying too much obstinacy.

4. The other *cause célèbre* of the day, the trial of the members of the Arab Charitable Society, has also resulted in wholesale acquittals. The details of this case are as obscure as those of all others, and we here cannot understand them, though the press filled columns with the questions and answers. Nothing of great interest was allowed to transpire.

5. Kildj Ali has produced a curious article in the "Hakimiet-i-Millie." He is swashbuckling friend of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a member of the Angora Independence Tribunal, and is known as the "Hero of Aintab," though I suspect he has caused more deaths by the gallows than by the sword. He now roars like any sucking dove, and tells the press of Turkey that they are maintaining an unnatural calm - an undesirable hesitation. Avoiding blackmail and personalities, they must nevertheless follow the social and administrative life of the country, and especially expose abuses by individual Government officials. Of course, the tribunals must see that the path of progress is not blocked, but about the little affairs of every day the press has been too silent.

6. The Government's tendency to moderation is just sufficiently marked to merit passing notice, though at the moment its importance cannot be assessed. Perhaps they think that a sedative is required after the strong medicine of closing the tekkes; perhaps they are now forgiving enemies in order not to appear too vindictive if when the Assembly meets they decide to prosecute the leaders of the defunct Progressive party. Only the future can show the truth.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 263

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received September 28)

No. 720

His Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a report by Mr. Helm on his visit to Angora.

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 22, 1925

F.O. 424/263, p.31, No. 37

ENCLOSURE IN No. 263

General Notes on a Visit to Angora, September 16-17, 1925

Foreign Ministry.—Tevfik Kiamil Bey will not go to Geneva for the Red Cross Conference, though he wished to do so. It is expected that he will give up his present post about the end of the year. He told me that he intends to take a rest. Yussuf Hikmet Bey has been succeeded as Director of Political Affairs by Nusret Saadullah Bey, for long Turkish Minister at The Hague. He is stated to be very pleasant to deal with. Jelal Bey is now "chef du protocole." He was aide-de-camp to the Caliph before the latter's departure. He is a tall man with good manners and speaks English well.

Cabinet —Nothing apparently known about alleged differences between Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas. Said that a group in the Cabinet led by Tewfik Rushdi Bey is seeking to undermine Ismet's position, but no sign of a break between him and the Ghazi; though it is believed that Ismet made every effort to effect a reconciliation between the latter and Latife Hanum. Ismet still very popular. Jemil Bey (Interior) has made a good name for himself, and Ali Jenani Bey (Commerce) is said to be influential.

The President and his Entourage — Mustafa Kemal absented himself on the day of Latife Hanum's departure. Ismet Pasha saw her off at the station, and Mme. Ismet accompanied her to Smyrna. The Ghazi is said to be more powerful than ever. Divorce of Latife Hanum said to have been due to her persistent interference in political affairs. The President now attends nearly every Cabinet meeting, and even the most trivial affairs must be referred to the Cabinet. It is stated that a certain lady, whose name I could not ascertain, is

much in the Ghazi's company, *e. g.* she has several times accompanied him on visits to his model farm. One of the most powerful men outside the Cabinet is said to be Safvet Bey, secretary of the People's party. After him come men like Rushen Eshref, Kilij Ali, &c.

Mosul —Practically nothing was heard about Mosul, with which Angora is tired. Nobody regards the threat of war as serious. (Information obtained from Mr. Treat, the American embassy's liaison officer at Angora.)

Wireless —According to Mr. Lander, a LT. 1 million contract has been signed with a French company. It is reported that a transmitting station will be built on the Kalejik road about two hours distance from Angora, and a receiving station on the Kirshehr road.

Building and Reconstruction—Building operations are everywhere in progress. A large building has been completed at the station to house the Angora-Sivas Line Administration. Seven new Evkaf houses, larger than the four old ones, but situated near to them, are nearing completion, as is also the new office, which is next to the Ministry of National Defence. The workmen of this building only spoke German. Committee rooms are being added to the Assembly building. The houses along the street running up to the burnt-out area have all been demolished and are being rebuilt, leaving a wider street which is being paved. The street in front of the Assembly is also being paved, its level being raised 2 feet in the process, but the supply of stones has given out. A number of new shops and houses has been built on the left of Tchan Kaya road, about a mile from the town. No arrangements have been made for water or drainage. About a dozen houses are being built on the Tchan Kaya slopes. The marsh on the left of the road between the town and the station has been partially drained and is to become a public park. A number of tracks have been made across it, and about sixty men are engaged in digging and other operations. Work on the Ghazi's model farm and village, about 10 kilom. from Angora, is actively in progress under German supervision.

Health —There is still no system of drainage, but I noticed few mosquitoes. This may be partly due to the fact that Angora has had a hot summer and no rain since May. The majority of the houses now have mosquito screens on the windows.

Climatic Conditions — The journey to Angora was very hot, the temperature in the wagon-lits all afternoon being from 93° to 95° Fahr. Also very hot at Angora on the 16th, with clouds of dust everywhere. On the 17th there were again dust clouds, but the temperature was much lower. The nights were cool

No. 264

*Notes on Mustafa Kemal and the New Turkey,
dated Foreign Office (London), September 23, 1925*

1. About the middle of August a report was received to the effect that the Majority Party was contemplating the dissolution of the Grand National Assembly at the opening of the autumn session and the holding of fresh elections with the object of eliminating entirely all that remains of the Opposition.

2. Information just received tends to confirm this report in so far as there are to be important changes this autumn as regards both the National Assembly and the Government. While the National Assembly is to be purged of all undesirable elements there is also to be a certain reconstruction of the Cabinet. According to the present plan İsmet Pasha, who is feeling very tired and has been advised by his doctors to take a thorough rest, is to be replaced as President of the Council of Ministers by Redjeb Bey, and Dr. Emin Bey, the Prefect of Constantinople, —who on this occasion will not fail to be elected deputy—is to receive a portfolio in the reconstructed Cabinet.

3. The proposed purging of the National Assembly - though it would seem rather unnecessary in view of the present down-and-out condition of the Opposition - is a natural corollary to the political views expressed by Mustafa Kemal himself to a friend in a conversation held about the middle of August:

"Our people is not ready for a constitutional and democratic regime. It has to be trained for that by us, the founders of the Republic. No others but us must concern themselves with affairs of state for a period of from 10 to 15 years. After that the Turkish people will be permitted to form political parties and to discuss freely both domestic and foreign affairs. But, in the meantime, let it confine itself to agriculture, commerce, and industry and for diversion it would be well-advised to turn rather to the pleasures of the body than to the dangerous game of politics."

4. Notwithstanding this, the ostensible "westernisation" of Turkey continues. This policy was touched on by Rıza Nour in a confidential exposé that he made in January of this year: "Our aim is to make of Turkey a second Japan by modernising her on the lines of Western civilisation..." The introduction of the hat in place of the fez, the abandonment by women of the veil, the proposed abolition of the Friday holiday in favour of Sunday, the closing of tekkes, etc., are among a number of reforms tending in this direction - to the breaking down of old traditions, to the crushing of the conservatives and clericals and to the building up of an appearance of Western culture.

5. Among other reforms at present under consideration is a reform of marriage on lines, however, which show rather the influence of Soviet Russia than that of Western Europe. The object of the measure, which apparently is to provide for temporary alliances, is - - of course - - to increase the population.

6. It is also proposed to introduce an innovation which some time ago was widely discussed in the press—the change from Arabic to Latin characters for the writing of Turkish. This reform, too, is at present the object of special study.

7. But it is generally felt that the keystone of the whole of this new Turkey is the personality of the President and that were the keystone to break or be dislodged the whole edifice would fall to pieces. It was his realisation of this that led Ismet Pasha to associate himself with Latife Hanum in an effort to exercise a moderating influence on the President, for they feared the effects on his heart, which is not very strong, of his habits of heavy drinking. But, though Ismet Pasha did all he could to prevent the divorce and even after the departure of Latife Hanum for Smyrna still tried to gain time in the hopes of reconciliation at the eleventh hour, all he was able to do was to postpone temporarily its publication.

8. Mustafa Kemal, therefore, remains master of the situation and, in the absence for the time being of any effectively organised opposition, there exist only two factors which should be taken into account—the risk of a breakdown in his health as a result of his mode of life and the risk of assassination by political or personal enemies.

F.O. 371/10863/E. 6028

No. 265

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 734

*THERAPIA, September 28, 1925
(Received October 5)*

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 704, paragraph 4, regarding the internal politics of Turkey, I have the honour to report to you that the President is becoming more and more clearly the absolute Dictator of the State, and the decisions taken, even in matters of the highest importance, are ever more likely to be in accordance with his personal wishes. The elements of uncertainty as to State policy which are inseparable from any dictatorship

become very strongly marked. The Ghazi's health is thus a matter of importance, and I happen to know that he has just had quite a severe bout of fever. The danger of assassination is ever present, and I cannot help remembering that a prominent ex-Minister of the Republic once told me that the Ghazi would never visit Constantinople, "because in Turkey we do our politics too much with Browning pistols." These are danger which, as things are here, may almost be said to menace the structure of the State; but of more immediate importance to His Majesty's Government is the question of how the Ghazi's way of thinking is affected by his immediate surroundings, and I greatly regret to be unable to give you any very definite and certain information on this point.

2. I feel pretty sure that Ghazi is naturally an unusually strong, determined man and endowed with a mixture of courage and caution which leads him to strike hard, but only to strike when he is confident that his blow will go home and achieve his object. He is inspired by a very genuine patriotism, and is earnestly desirous of building up his country's strength and prosperity, and at the same time convinced that he alone is fit to carry out the great task of reconstruction. The only check now on the excesses to which the mind of such an autocrat may be carried is the influence of İsmet Pasha, and I should clearly love to know much it has been shaken. I cannot help hoping that the influence of Tewfik Rushdi may be effected by the course of events at Geneva. He has been allowed to indulge in every extravagance, and yet it must be clear at Angora that he has only succeeded in bringing about a few weeks' delay.

3. I see that Rejeb is named as a possible successor to İsmet, and I think the appointment quite likely if İsmet were to go. Rejeb, whom I made a point of seeing at Angora last spring, is a burly, round-headed man, fairly alert and businesslike with more common-sense than intelligence, and with no sentiment whatever. I fancy he is terribly rough, brutal and ruthless, and, so far as internal politics are concerned, would be an extremist of the extremists, but I do not think he has any predilections in favour of Russia. Though he has long stood close to the Ghazi, I doubt if he would exercise much restrained influence, at any rate, until he had had time to make sure of his position.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 266

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 773

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 13, 1925
(Received October 19)

Sir,

The President of the Republic has been absent from Angora for the past three weeks on a tour in Western Anatolia, beginning with Brussa, where he remained about a fortnight; he seems to have led rather a quiet life there, and perhaps he was recuperating from an attack of fever he had at the capital. He saw during this time a certain amount of Abbas Hilmi Pasha, ex-Khedive of Egypt; possibly they may have political dealings but the more natural thing to suppose is that the link between them is one business, as the Ghazi has a large part of his private fortune invested in the "Ish-Bankassi" (the Banque d'Affaires), which Abbas Hilmi founded early this year, and the papers were written about the further investments of capital which the ex-Khedive is about to make at Brussa. In one of his speeches the President expressed the wish that he might see Brussa endowed with as many factories as she now had mausoleums, and likely enough Abbas Hilmi will have to contribute part of his fortune towards that admirable end. Anyhow, his yacht, the "Nimetullah," was had out, and President and all took a trip on her in the Marmora. Returning to Mudania late in the evening, they ran ashore and spent the chief part of the night on the mud.

2. After excursions in the neighbourhood of Brussa, the President proceeded via Panderma, Balikessri and Magnesia to Smyrna, where he is now staying. There have been enthusiastic demonstrations of affection wherever he has been and many speeches have been uttered. The Ghazi's have struck the note of modernism combined, as, for instance, at Smyrna, where he referred to that town's old appellation of "Giaour Ismir," and said that the reproach had been removed and would never again be allowed to sully the city. The striking feature in the addresses made to the President is the tone of almost incredible flattery which runs through them all. At Balikessri the mayor said: "If God had not told us in the Koran that Mohammed was the last of the prophets, I should say, 'Thou, O Ghazi, thou art a prophet.' Christ raised the dead and gave sight to the blind, but thou hast given life and self-expression to the Turkish people; thou art the grandiose dome towards which all hearts turn." The Ghazi receives these tributes with pleasure and emotion, and the papers reproduce them in columns and columns of print.

3. The political object of the Pasha's tour is doubtless to advance the campaign of modernism, with especial reference to the substitution of hats for fezzes, which now, perhaps unfortunately, has come to typify the whole movement. Wherever the Ghazi has passed there have been holocausts of fezzes, and in Constantinople even the change is marked. You can see little but European head-gear to-day in Pera, and the diplomats are beginning to talk to each other of putting their cavasses into hats. Stamboul is more conservative and lags behind.

4. The Grand National Assembly is to meet again on the 23rd October, and as the day draws near some interest in politics reawakens. In the first place there are a number of elections to be held to fill up parliamentary vacancies, and, needless to say, none but the purest Populists will be elected. At Constantinople there were two places to be filled, and to the general surprise two obscure and unknown individuals appeared as independent candidates against the official nominees of the People's party. The poll took place the day before yesterday, and showed 1,125 votes for the two official candidates against 6 abstentions. This can only be called inartistic. As electors came up to record their votes they were each invited to sign a summons addressed to Adnan, Raouf and Kiazim Karabekir, four members for Constantinople who were leaders of the now defunct Progressive party, calling on these gentlemen in vigorous and rather rude terms to resign their deputyships, as they no longer truly represented their constituents. About 800 electors only seem to have signed.

5. Angora seems to have been trying to coax the Progressives back into the fold, and I heard of a determined effort made on Ali Fuad Pasha, which, however, met with a very uncompromising answer. Refet, a few days ago, was saying that the Progressives — still eighteen or twenty in number — meant to go to Angora and attend Parliament as usual, not indeed, as a party, but as individuals entitled to hold and to express their own views. It rather looks to me as if they may get into trouble.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 267

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 827

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 4, 1925

(RECEIVED NOVEMBER 9)

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on the 1st November the National Assembly met for its new session and that proceedings were inaugurated by the annual address by the President of the Republic. The speech is of considerable length, and I will confine myself to giving you a summary only of its chief points.

2. *Kurdish Revolt* — It has been established that it was due to reactionary propaganda carefully organised beforehand. Successful and appropriate measures taken for its suppression have shown the nation's devotion to republicanism and to the cause of progress in the spirit and the letter. Nothing will stop the course of modernisation and no reaction to the conditions of the past is possible.

3. *Liberty of the Press* — The republican principle was to throw on a free press the duty and responsibility of checking its own abuses; but this gave rise to an unscrupulous press "brigandage" and the Assembly had to intervene with energy. As a result the incorrigible journalism of a past era stood naked and exposed and a new, pure and fertile republican press has arisen, under which alone the nation's task of civilisation can be facilitated. Until all citizens co-operate loyally in this task the Assembly must continue to apply necessary measures.

I may mention here that three or four days ago the Popular party, in one of its first caucuses, adopted the principle that sentences of the Independence Tribunals shall not be remitted without its own approval and that the party shall not support proposals for remissions.

4. *Economic* — The maintenance of public order has given security to the workers of the country; mention is made of good work done and to be done in sanitation, agriculture, ports, banking, mining, and especially in railway construction. As regards the latter, four times as much more effort is wanted, for social no less than for economic reasons.

5. *Justice*.—The ground has been cleared by the abrogation of old laws, and the Assembly is exhorted to vote urgently the newly prepared Penal, Civil and Commercial Codes, which are in harmony with civilised principles.

We have known that commissions have been at work on these codes, and it has recently been put about that the Swiss Civil Code has been adopted almost *en bloc*. Apparently now the work of the commission is to be brought before the Assembly. Formidable as the task may seem, it may nevertheless not be beyond the Assembly's power to enact three whole codes in a short time.

6. *Public Instruction*.—The speech makes a special reference to the education of orphans. There is also a curious reference to the necessity of maintaining discipline among scholars.

7. *Foreign Affairs*.—Turkey has shown in the past year that she is no negligible element in the community of nations. Reference is made to the Bulgarian and Yugoslav treaties:

(a) *Russia and other Countries*.—"Relations with our neighbour the Soviet Union are sincere; they are based on mutual confidence. In our relations with western countries we follow faithfully the prescriptions of the treaties. Questions in suspense follow the course laid down in the treaties."

(b) *Mosul*.—"Our legal position in this has again been demonstrated in the report of the League's sub-commission, yet the solution has again been delayed. Our rights are defined in the Treaty of Lausanne, won at the cost of the greatest sacrifices. We confidently await the execution of obligations undertaken and the recognition and justice."

This is as mild a reference to a burning question as could have been looked for.

(c.) *Locarno Pact*.—"The efforts put forth in the political world on the question of security deserves attention. Mutual security is a principle which all the nations of the world must desire; but so long as security, rather than guaranteeing general peace, is not extended to all nations, it must be regarded as ensuring freedom to one group of nations against another group whose field of action has been extended. This point of view is notably enforced by measures taken to submit the international arms traffic to the control of certain nations."

Since the conclusion of the Locarno Pact there has been a complete absence of all editorial comment on its meaning, and I had inferred that neither the Government nor the journalists had made up their minds what view to take of it. The natural Turkish reaction to any approximation of western Powers to each other is one of suspicion that plots against Turkey are being

hatched. I admit to having hoped that this view would not be adopted and to being now correspondingly disappointed at finding it voiced in its crudest, narrowest and most distorted form by the President of the Republic. It is obviously the result of Russian inspiration.

8. *Army*.—The usual laudatory notions of the republican army are uttered.

9. *Finance*.—The nation is congratulated that in a year when a wide mobilisation was necessary and an important tax like the tithe was established, it has yet been possible to carry on uninterruptedly a programme of reform and railway development. Old taxes, however, still require readjusting and readaptation, and it is intimated clearly that fresh sacrifices will be required from the taxpayer.

10. In general, it is to be noted that far the greater and more important part of the speech is devoted to internal affairs, and this shows once more how very much self-centred the nation is and how much preoccupied with its own concerns. The policy to be followed by the Government is to be one of intensive reform and modernisation, with repression as necessary to smooth the path of progress. I may mention in passing the extraordinary change that in the past few days has come over the outward appearance of this town. For forty-eight hours before the festival of the Republic on the 29th October a house-to-house campaign for hats took place, and with such thoroughness and success that on the day of the holiday not a fez was to be seen, even in Stamboul; nor does the old head-dress seem likely to reappear.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/263, p. 54-56, No. 58

No. 268

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 883

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 2, 1925
(Received December 7)

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report by Mr. R.A. Leeper on the recent visit to Angora, with special reference to what he ascertained as to

the political situation in general and the Mosul question in particular. I considered this information important enough to be telegraphed to you immediately, and I added a strong recommendation that you should strengthen the hands of the peace party at Angora by uttering plain warnings in Parliament and to the Turkish Ambassador that an invasion of Mosul will inevitably lead to the direst results. I trust you will have understood that to meet our purposes here the wording of your warnings could not possibly be too clear and unequivocal.

2. There are two or three elements in Mr. Leeper's analysis that more or less new to me and of very great importance. In the first place, the President of the Republic is not now as much of autocrat as I had imagined, and it is in some great questions after a struggle that he is able to have his way. When I was at Angora last month I did receive an indication in this sense, but only one, from the Greek Minister, and I pigeonholed it, to await the further confirmation that is now forthcoming. A second element is the forward part in affairs now being taken personally by Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of Staff. I had always heard that Fevzi kept himself very much aloof from politics and devoted himself entirely to looking after the army, though I have always known that he was generally looked on as the most likely person to succeed the Ghazi in the presidency in case of need. His position as Chief of Staff is particularly important in an essentially military country like Turkey, but the more so in virtue of the very peculiar and vague definition of his office and functions contained in the Constitution (see my despatch No. 308 of the 9th April, 1924). On account of his vague and independent position the Ghazi has always shown great deference and attention to him, with an obvious desire to secure his loyalty; and if Fevzi now has acquired active personal ambitions in the direction of the presidency, I should attribute them tentatively to the disorderly life which the Ghazi has leading in a degree so increasing lately as to constitute an open scandal; for Fevzi is an austere man, with strong religious principles. It has always puzzled me to know how he could reconcile his personal views with the strong laic tendencies of the present Government, and I had always imagined it could only be due to his loyalty to the Ghazi himself. If his loyalty is now sapped the President's position must indeed be threatened; for everything depends on the army, President and all; and if the corps of officers—naturally inclined to warlike courses—find in the Mosul question a popular rival leader who will lead them to such enterprises as they love, there is no saying what complications may ensue.

3. From what precedes it will be clear that Major Harenc was right in his report of the 9th November (my despatch No. 840), when he said that Turks were in earnest and not bluffing, and I have brought the point out in my

telegram No. 134 of the 30th November, urging you to send a flash of lightning from the top of Mount Olympus bright enough to illuminate the darkness of even Angora; for Mr. Leeper brings out again in his report the almost incredible remoteness of the capital from all considerations of European politics and the astounding ignorance which envelops the minds of the average Turkish Deputy. To us it is clear that if Turkey wished to make an aggression on the British Empire, she could hardly choose a moment more unfavourable from the diplomatic point of view or circumstances in which His Majesty's Government would be more favourably placed for resenting it. But these men have forgotten everything that has happened since the battle of the Sakaria, and the foolish manner in which the Turkish Government has fostered their illusions and encouraged their hopes during the last few months now recoils on itself, and creates a situation which really brings the present régime into some peril. The best hope of peace lies now in the great strength of the British Empire, for nothing but force can appeal to the Angora mind. Great Britain has seldom been more hated than she now is, but fortunately she is still feared, and this may avert disaster on a wide scale.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/263, p. 64-65, No. 66

ENCLOSURE IN No. 268

Report on a Visit to Angora.

I left Constantinople for Angora on the 26th November, accompanied by Colonel Woods and Mr. Eric Whittall, of Smyrna, and returned on the 30th November. This gave me two full days in Angora, and, as this was my first visit, any observations in this report (apart from actual facts) are merely the result of first impressions.

General Impressions.

The approach to Angora lies along a wide, treeless and unpopulated plateau. As the train crawls along this barren waste during the early hours of the morning one has the impression of immense distance from the civilised world. The monotony is suddenly broken by the sight of new buildings, cultivated land and motor-tractors. This unexpected activity is the direct result of the Ghazi's personal efforts to build a new capital in the wilds of Anatolia, and it is very fitting that the first view of Angora should be the Ghazi's model farm.

The town itself makes a strong impression at first sight, representing as it does a violent contrast between what Turkey was and what the Ghazi is determined it shall become. The hill which the old town is built is surrounded by a rapidly increasing number of new houses and public buildings in the European style. Motor omnibuses ply between the station and the town, and the bracing air of the plateau seems to have entered into the bones of the inhabitants, creating quite a different atmosphere from that of Constantinople.

I do not wish to exaggerate the progress that has been made. The town itself is still very primitive, and, in spite of the European veneer, there is, of course, much that remain Oriental. All that I wish to emphasise is the contrast between the wilderness outside and the very real activity of the town, as this contrast has, I believe, an important political effect. Isolation from the world and pride in what has already been achieved is creating a rabid form of nationalism, which is a real danger. I felt this from the first day that I arrived, and I found myself comparing Angora with another young capital — Kovno — which is developing out of a dirty provincial town on the same lines. Kovno, like Angora, has disputed frontier problem, and the talk of Angora Nationalists about Mosul is strangely reminiscent of what I have heard from Kovno Nationalists about Vilna. There are, of course, differences, but I cannot wondering whether a definite decision on Mosul would not produce the same result at Angora as the definite decision on Vilna has at Kovno. It is difficult to believe that the present nationalism can reconcile itself quickly to an unfavourable verdict.

The strength of this nationalism was quite a surprise to me. I had intended during my short stay to attempt to get into touch with a few Deputies, with whom I might discuss the new social reforms, such as the growth of education and the position of women. I soon found that this was impossible, especially when I learnt through a third party that quite a moderate man was unwilling to see me owing to the very acute position of the Mosul question. This individual had been spending the previous evening with the Ghazi and a number of officers, and was apparently much disturbed at the views he had there heard expressed. In the light of this information, I abandoned my previous intention and devoted myself entirely to finding out what decisions were being taken on the question of Mosul.

Course of Enquiries.

To give an accurate picture of the atmosphere in Angora, I will give a more or less chronological record of the enquiries I made. For the information I obtained I am mainly indebted to Mr. Whittall, who, through his many

Turkish acquaintances, was in excellent position for tapping many reliable sources.

On the first day I must confess to having been considerably disturbed. Two interview which I tried to arrange through Mr. Whittall fell through owing to the fear, quite freely expressed, of being seen in conversation with any member of His Majesty's Embassy. One of these individuals, Nejati Bey, a Deputy, and a close associate of the Ghazi, told Mr. Wittall that before agreeing to an interview he would have to consult the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Needless to say, the interview did not take place. Mr. Whittall, who before his visit had little real anxiety about the situation, admitted that he was amazed at the atmosphere of Angora, and was very much disturbed at the danger of an attack on Mosul. That same evening Colonel Woods and I saw M. Boggetti, the manager of the Ottoman Bank in Angora, who made no secret to us of his fear that an act of folly would be committed. He told us that, whereas the usual monthly advances he was called upon to make to the Turkish Government amounted to 300,000 liras, this last month he had to furnish 700,000 for the troops at Diarbekir, which now consisted of 80,000 men. He added that he thought the money was to be used immediately for transport of supplies before the winter set in. He told us that last week the situation had been extremely dangerous, but that he now thought that immediate danger had been averted.

The next day I did not succeed in obtaining any accurate information until the evening. During the morning I heard that the Ghazi had been ill, that he had had a fit a few days before as the result of his excesses, and that people had been visiting him to enquire after his health. This information was somewhat contradicted by what I saw with my own eyes. In the afternoon I attended a debate in the Assembly, and during the discussions the Ghazi himself entered his box. The unusual shininess of his face suggested late nights and heavy drinking, but he was very much master of himself and seemed full of energy and his eyes travelled round the Assembly. An interesting point, which both Colonel Woods and I noticed but which may have been mere chance, was that the uproar in the Assembly, which had been fairly vigorous, subsided entirely after Ghazi's arrival. It gave one the impression that he still had complete control over this body which he had himself created.

By the evening, therefore, I had arrived at the following conclusions: It was clear that the air was charged with electricity (I am quoting the words of a Turk who had spent the previous night carousing with the Ghazi), that the nationalism of the capital was more rabid than ever, that people not actually in the Government were afraid to speak to British officials, but the danger of an attack on Mosul was very real. I had put all this to Mr. Whittall during the afternoon and asked him to make an effort to piece together these loose

threads and endeavour to get a complete picture. Late at night he returned to the hotel with an analysis of the situation which appeared to me accurate and which supplemented what I had already heard and what His Majesty's Ambassador and military attaché had also gathered from different sources. Mr. Wittall's information was a young Turk, Ismail Bey, the secretary of the manager of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway, whom I had met at dinner and who had struck me as well-balanced and intelligent. I will set out this information under a separate paragraph as it deals with the general political situation with special reference to Mosul.

General Political Situation.

In internal politics the Ghazi and Ismet, who are on excellent terms politically, have far and away the greatest power. Amongst the Assembly they have from twenty to thirty Deputies who are prepared to vote blindly for any measure they propose and who also work actively amongst their fellow-Deputies to secure a majority. In internal politics Ismet is far from moderate. He is prepared to put down with an iron hand anything or anybody that threatens the supremacy of the People's party. Fortunately, in foreign affairs he has sufficient understanding to counsel moderation, but he has a difficult battle to fight. The Deputies, with little knowledge of foreign affairs, wish to give vent to their nationalism in that sphere as violently as they do in internal affairs.

The Mosul Question.

The present position is that the whole Assembly, with the exception of Mustafa Kemal's bodyguard of twenty to thirty, are in favour of an attack on Mosul to present His Majesty's Government with a *fait accompli*. In addition to this all the members of the Government, with the exception of Ismet Pasha and Tewfik Rushdi, are of the same mind. Outside the Assembly the whole of the army leaders under Fevzi Pasha are clamouring for action. The Ghazi, in spite of this, has so far given his full support to Ismet and has prevented any act of violence. A week ago matters came to a head. When the advice of the Hague Court became known Fevzi Pasha came forward with a report advocating an immediate attack on Mosul, which he guaranteed to occupy in forty-six hours. There was a meeting of the Cabinet to discuss this plan, and Mustafa Kemal and Ismet, acting together, succeeded in defeating it. This was the meeting which the newspapers reported to be concerned with question of the Bourse; it was really called solely to discuss Fevzi's report. It is common talk among Deputies and officers that there would be no real danger in occupying Mosul, as England would not go to war. Turkey, after the occupation, would be in a stronger position to negotiate with His Majesty's Government. It is clear that it would

assist İsmet and counteract this propaganda if His Majesty's Government could make their position absolutely clear before the meeting of the League.

As regards the Ghazi himself he is still in effective control and his health is still good owing to his robust construction. At the same time, one of his doctors has told him in writing that unless he changes his way of life he will break down completely. İsmet has also pleaded with him in the same sense. What is, of course, uncertain is how far the Ghazi would prepared to fight the opposition if the League took a decision unfavourable to Turkey. He would certainly find the task much easier if it were clear to Angora in advance that an attack on Mosul would mean war. The dangerous man at the present moment is Fevzi, who is looked upon as the successor of the Ghazi has to be careful because of Fevzi's influence in the army, but unless something unexpected happens the opinion is that the Ghazi and İsmet together will be too strong for the opposition.

R. A. LEEPER

F.O. 424/263, p. 65-67, No. 66/1

No. 269

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 908

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 15, 1925

(Received December 21)

Sir,

In my despatch No. 880 of the 1st instant I had the honour to report upon the internal situation. On the 12th instant İsmet Pasha made another long statement in the National Assembly, from which a little more information may be gathered.* The Prime Minister stated that as the revolts in the different areas were simultaneous, as the time chosen was when the Government was busy with the Mosul question, and as emissaries who had been caught had newly arrived in the different districts, he had come to the conclusion that the whole thing was one movement which had been worked "from abroad." He did not specify whether he meant that it had been instigated by a foreign country or by the ex-Sultan or ex-Caliph, but since he spoke of it as "a new manifestation of a reactionary system," I presume he meant to suggest that it originated from San

* Başbakan İsmet Paşa'nın 12 Aralık 1925 günü TBMM'de yaptığı konuşmanın tam metni için bkz.: *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları (1920-1973)*, Birinci Cilt (1920-1938), TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, Ankara: 1992, s. 232-245.

Remo. The Government would naturally seek to throw on the ex-Imperial family the blame for a situation which seems in nearly to have been produced by their own hasty measures.

2. The Pasha quoted various rumours which were current in the affected area —namely, that on the reopening of the Assembly in October there had been such indignation among the Deputies that the Opposition had risen from 20 to 170, that İsmet Pasha himself was dead, that another nakshbandi dervish had arisen as successor to Sheikh Said, and that Turkish widow women were being sent away to Russia. He also gave a few more details of the disturbances. In Erzerum two priests had led a mob to the Government House and threatened the Vali. At a village near Rizeh on the Black Sea, the inhabitants, led by a priest, had risen to the cry, "We are heading straight for irreligion. We must stop the Government from irreligion." These few admission of İsmet Pasha's suggest that the Government has had to deal, and is indeed still dealing, with a very nasty situation. The population of Eastern Turkey, being much less open to intercourse with Europeans, clings more grimly to religious custom and has naturally been more resentful at the introduction of the hat. Mr. Knight at Trebizond has found since the movement began that no one has dared to come near him, but such information as he has been able to obtain is to the same effect. He reports that it is the hat which has caused all the trouble in Erzerum and in Trebizond itself. The whole population, he says, resent deeply this attempt to civilise them, and even the army officers appear to be altogether against the emancipation of women. Fear of the Independence Tribunal — which, wherever it goes is welcomed with speeches and bouquets—alone keeps the people quite. Mr. Knight's information about the Rizeh district is that the Laz country seemed about to rise, and that the "Hamidieh," which was finally driven back by bad weather, bombarded the Laz villages to keep them quiet. According to the press the Lazes had planned an armed attack on Rizeh, and over 150 people are being tried there, although İsmet Pasha, who seems to have concealed the true dimensions of the various risings, only admitted that there were some thirty under arrest. There seems to have been trouble enough at Kerasund for the Independence Tribunal to propose to visit it shortly. At Marash the agitators appear to have by no means been a mere rabble, as the Prime Minister at first intimated, but to have included at least two ex-Deputies.

3. Information which I have received from another source confirms the report of general disaffection in North-East Anatolia. The placemen of the Government, the army officers, the spies and the agents of the Popular party are happy. The rest of the population is much more openly opposed to the

Government than in Constantinople or Smyrna. The disaffection is not only Kurdish in its origin but also Turkish.

4. Nearest home we hear that even in Panderma, which should be grateful to the Ghazi for elimination of its Greek majority, some twenty people have had to be arrested, while in Stambul the publication by a priest of a tract entitled: "Hats and imitating the Frank" has led to the arrest of the author, of an Armenian charged with printing it, and of about thirty other people, of whom some belong to the professional class. Constantinople is therefore threatened with a visit by the Independence Tribunal, but meanwhile preparations are being made to set up a colossal statue of the Ghazi on the most historic spot in Constantinople, Seraglio Point.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/263, p. 70-71, No. 70

No. 270

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain

No. 939

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 30, 1925
(Received January 4, 1926)

Sir,

Since my despatch No. 908 of the 15th instant was written there have been no further disturbances in the country, so far as is generally known, but the enquiries of the Independence Tribunal in the Black Sea towns and, more recently, here have led to a little more information being published. The incident at Rizeh was evidently serious. It is officially admitted that the countryside was up in arms under the leadership of a priest and the headman of a village. The villagers assembled at a place outside Rizeh, captured the gendarmerie post, and proposed to take possession of the town, but the "Hamidieh's" bombardment seems to have checked them in time. The "Hamidieh" is believed to have landed men, and lost fifty killed and fifty wounded. The rallying cry was, so it is said by the tribunal: "There is revolution in Angora. Mustafa Kemal Pasha has been wounded in three places and is in the

doctors's hands. Ismet Pasha is out of the way. The Government is in the hands of pashas who are religious. They are saving the sacred law. There is nothing to fear. Erzerum has done its bit. Let us do ours." As elsewhere, the rebels were repressed with vigour. Mr. Knight reported from Trebizond that eight men had been hanged and others sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. It is admitted that thousands of rifles and revolvers have been handed in, but as the whole population on the coast is armed, that proves nothing in particular.

2. At Kerasund, too, the movement was religious. Fifty or sixty people were arraigned in due course before the Independence Tribunal, and two sheiks were put to death and a number of priest and others were sent to prison.

3. Here the Independence Tribunal have just finished a happy week staying at Tokatlian's Hotel and sending to Angora for trial some scores of old-fashioned men, particularly priests and dervishes, who object to wearing hats. The members of the tribunal are rough customers, who enjoy posing as the apostles of civilisation in Turkey, and indeed they are the instrument with which the Government is forcing Westernism on the country. They were kind enough to express themselves as very satisfied with the attitude of the generality of Constantinopolitans towards "modernism." They have unearthed here pamphlets which, they claim, had a subversive influence at Rizeh, Erzerum and Kerasund, but the pamphlets seem to have been some time ago. One written by a priest, condemns the tendency to Westernism as meaning little more than the adoption of Western vices and the abandonment of Moslem virtues. Since the hat was mentioned incidentally as the symbol of Westernism, the author has been sent to Angora for trial. The incident is trivial in itself, but the pamphlet is a fair indication of the feeling of the bulk of the uneducated population. They resent deeply what seems to them like an attempt not merely to do away with their own religion, but to turn them into unbelievers and they cannot bear wearing the hat which has always been the mark of the infidel. This has been the cause of all the recent trouble. The Independence Tribunal has, however, come to the rescue of the authorities in dealing with awkward cases of totally different nature. The stabilisation of the Turkish pound has been proved an elusive task, and a Jewish member of the Bourse has now been sent to Angora on a charge of speculating with intent to depreciate Turkish currency. Similarly, two Greeks who were bold enough to oppose the demolition of a Greek church for the purpose of widening a street have been despatched for trial.

4. There have been two changes in the Cabinet. Hamdullah Suphi Bey has had a breakdown and has been obliged to give up the portfolio of Public Instruction. This is regrettable, as he is a man of some refinement and breadth of view. He has been the moving spirit of the Turkish "ojaks," of clubs, an organisation which the Government uses to spread not only political

propaganda, but ideas of citizenship in general. It has been a great factor in producing the present changing outlook. He is succeeded by Mustafa Nejatı Bey, a young lawyer from Smyrna. As a henchman of the Ghazi, Nejatı Bey has twice held office before. He has made a bad mess of the hopeless task of establishing the Moslem immigrants from Greece, as Minister of Reconstruction. As Minister of Justice last year, however, he put through some useful judicial reforms with a ruthlessness which was characteristic of himself, but upsetting to the older members of his profession. He is likely to stand for a forward policy in everything. The other change is at the Ministry of Public Works, and is due to the death of the Minister Süleiman Sırrı Bey. The late Minister, who had spent his career in the Ministry, was not a strong personality nor an influence in politics. He is succeeded by Behiç Bey, a retired colonel who has done well as manager of the Anatolian Railway and who will perhaps meddle in politics as his predecessor, but show more energy and ability, especially in railway construction which lies so near the heart of the Ghazi and İsmet Pasha.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

F.O. 424/264, p. 1-2, No. 2

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DR. BİLÂL N. ŞİMŞİR

Dr. Bilâl N. Şimşir, Büyükelçi, tarihçi ve araştırmacı yazardır. 1933 yılında Bulgaristan'da doğdu. 1957'de Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesinden mezun oldu. Aynı Fakültenin Diploması Tarihi Kürsüsünde üç yıl kadar asistan olarak görev yaptıktan sonra 1960'da Dışişleri Bakanlığına geçti. Bu Bakanlığın merkez ve dış teşkilâtının bütün kademelerinde 38 yıl görev yaptı. Büyükelçi olarak Arnavutluk'ta, Çin'de, Avustralya'da ve güney Pasifik ülkelerinde Türkiye'yi temsil etti. Devlete 41 küsur yıl hizmet verdikten sonra 1998'de emekli oldu ve kendisini bilimsel çalışmalara ve yazarlığa verdi.

1976 yılında Türk Tarih Kurumu üyeliğine seçilmiş olan Dr. Şimşir, İngiliz, Fransız, Amerikan ve Osmanlı-Türk arşivlerinde derin araştırmalar yapmış, on binlerce belge toplamış, kendi imkânlarıyla bir mikrofilm arşiv sistemi kurmuş ve gezginci mesleğine rağmen çok yoğun yayın yapmış bir tarihçi ve yazardır. Kendisini yakından tanıyanların belirttikleri gibi Şimşir, adeta bir ekoldür; başlıbaşına bir enstitü gibi çalışmakta ve üretmektedir. Bugüne kadar 71 cilt kitap ve 200 kadar bilimsel makale yayımlamıştır. İngiltere, Hollanda, Macaristan ve Pakistan'da da dört kitabı yayımlanmıştır. Şimşir, Atatürk üzerine en fazla eser vermiş olan tarihçilerden biridir; Atatürk konusunda altı ciltlik *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk* ve dört ciltlik *Atatürk ve Yabancı Devlet Başkanları* gibi birçok esere imza atmıştır. Balkanlar ve özellikle Bulgaristan Türk azınlığı üzerine bir düzine kitap yayımlamıştır. Birçok yabancı dil bilen Dr. Şimşir'in eserlerinin büyük bölümü yabancı dildedir ve dünya kitaplıklarında ve kataloglarında yer almıştır.

DR. BİLAL N. ŞİMŞİR'İN KİTAPLARI

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61. *Örmény terrorizmus az elmút évszadban (1878-1999) (Geçen Yüzyılda Ermeni Terörizmi, 1878-1999)*, Hungarian translation Tanádi Edit, Teksterebess No. 2. Terebess Kiado, Budapest: 2001
62. *Türkiye-Arnavutluk İlişkileri. Büyükelçilik Anıları (1985-1988)*, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara. 2001, 510 sayfa ve 24 sayfa fotoğraf
63. *Ankara'nın Başkent Oluşu*, Ankaralılar Vakfı Yayını, Ankara: 2001, 56 sayfa
64. *Atatürk ve Afganistan*, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara: 2002, XVI+ 448 sayfa ve metin içinde 14 fotoğraf
65. *AB, AKP ve KIBRIS*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara: 2003, 590 sayfa, 16 fotoğraf ve metin içinde 27 karikatür
66. *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk*, Cilt V, 1922-1925, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını, Ankara: (Basılıyor)
67. *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk*, Cilt VI, 1926-1929, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını, Ankara: (Basılıyor).
68. *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk*, Cilt VII, 1930-1933, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını, (Hazırlanıyor)
69. *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk*, Cilt VIII, 1934-1938, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını (Hazırlanıyor).
70. *Türk-İrak İlişkilerinde Türkmenler*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara: 2004.

TIPKIBASIMLAR

Government is being attacked in the rear by the combination of forces represented by labour, the "Daily Mail" and the politicians who imagine that the way to please Islam is to yield on every point to a militant Turkey. The spirit in which the Kemalists will approach the great issues is summed up in a sentence from a speech just delivered by the Egyptian Foreign Minister:—

"En attendant l'obtention de la signature de la Convention militaire de Mondouzi, nous nous adressons à nouveau au monde civilisé et lui disons: 'Nous nous battons pour obtenir nos droits légitimes; plus tard nous serons en Orient un important facteur de la paix, un facteur qui comptera aussi plus ou moins sur sa force.'"

4. The Treaty of Sèvres is dead, but it is only necessary to glance at some of its headings to see at how many points the Allies will come up against the National Pact. The frontiers of Turkey must be defined. It is the settled determination of the Kemalists to demand a plebiscite in Western Thrace. They will certainly demand the restoration of Mosul, and they may even ask for a further rectification of the Franklin-Rouille frontier between Turkey and Syria. On the Straits question, they will make every use of the clause in the Pact to the effect that the freedom of the Straits must be assured on lines compatible with the security of Constantinople. I shall be surprised if, in their present mood, they agree readily to any thorough plan for demilitarisation and non-fortification. They will fight harder than ever any proposal to give the minorities greater protection than is afforded by the minority clauses of European treaties. It will be difficult to get them to agree to definite limitations of their armed forces, and, if they do, they will stand out for much greater effectives than were contemplated at Paris last March. They will strive against any kind of financial or economic control, even in the form of security for reparations. There is no question now outstanding on which they will be more obdurate than that of the Capitulations. It is a settled principle with them that nothing must be done to go back on the fait accompli of September 1914, when their predecessors, the Young Turks, abolished the privileges of foreigners by a unilateral act. It is useless to talk to them of the necessity of a substitute for the Capitulations in the shape of safeguards without privileges for foreigners. Their one answer is that Turkey must be sovereign and independent.

7. It would be easy to make a list of minor points on which trouble must be expected at the conference. I have centred myself with indicating the attitude which the Kemalists will take up as regards the larger issues. In my opinion, no opportunity should be lost of educating public opinion at home on the importance of these issues, and of mobilising such foreign support as is possible for the points of view which His Majesty's Government will have to sustain. On such a question as the Capitulations even the weak-kneed French may be induced to help us. There is a very strong movement in the French colony here against the policy of the Quai d'Orsay and the big financiers, to which the ordinary Frenchman here considers his interest to have been sacrificed. The French High Commissioner is doing his best to stifle this movement, but an agitation has been started which cannot fail to have some repercussions in France. This question is also of great concern to the United States of America and all countries having any considerable colony here. On other questions, such as the Straits and minorities, it should be possible to secure the backing of public opinion and, perhaps, the Governments of the United States of America and other countries, and in dealing with minorities the support of the League of Nations should be valuable.

8. I have elsewhere pointed out to your Lordship the importance of in no way reducing the forces concentrated by His Majesty's Government in this part of the world pending the meeting of the conference, and of discreetly encouraging the Greeks to maintain their army in being in Western Thrace. Mudarra has shown that nothing but the possession of force and the will to use it impresses the Kemalists. This consideration will apply with infinitely greater force during the peace negotiations.

Tighehoun Firidkian

9. I have spoken throughout of the Kemalists. One of the inevitable consequences of the recent events, especially the decision to deliver Eastern Thrace to the Angora Government, has been to reduce the Constantinople Government to a still lower ebb of ineffectiveness than before. That Government is naturally pleased with the outcome of the Madania Conference. When Sıyina fell it made no official sign of resigning, but the Porte has been hedged for the signature of the recent convention. Tewfik Paşa and his colleagues nevertheless realize that their last hour is approaching. Meetings or consultations in their attitude towards Mustafa Kemal. They will doubtless linger on and hold solemn councils, but they count for so little that it is doubtful whether they will amount to more than a minor complication when the invitations to the conference are issued. Indeed, were it not that their disappearance would inevitably raise the grave question of the Sultan's position, it would probably be better that they should depart from the scene before the conference meets.

10. I have spoken of the realization of the National Plan as being the immediate object of the Kemalists. In steering the word "immediate" I wish once more to remind your Lordship that for many of them that is only the first step. It is a step at which they will pause, and there will not be the same union afterwards regarding a completely revolutionary policy at home and a policy of expansion abroad. Many of the leaders and the majority of ordinary Turks will wish them to preserve traditional institutions and to "cultivate their genius" in peaceful conditions. It would, however, be folly to forget that others among the leaders cherish the dream of reconstructing the Turkish Empire, if only on a federal basis, and establishing Turkey in a position of hegemony in a great Islamic coalition. For these Great Britain not only is, but will remain, the enemy. They desire nothing less than the collapse of our position, first in Mesopotamia, then in the East generally. The really vital issue at the Peace Conference will not be any of the questions enumerated above, important as they are, but whether Turkey is to be placed in such a position as to enable these men to dominate her internally and so carry forward their plan.

11. In conclusion, I would point out that the Kemalists at this moment hang more than ever between Bolshevik Russia and the Western Powers. I have always maintained that Mustafa Kemal adjusted the chessman of his relations with Russia to the necessities of his immediate situation, never going further in that direction than it was absolutely necessary to do, and that Russia has at no time acquired such influence as to be able to dictate the foreign policy of Angora. Recent events appear to me to have justified this theory. The Russians have been far more expansive about the victory of the Turks than the Turks have been about Russian assistance. I read between the lines of M. Karakhan's recent notes about the Straits question a great nervousness lest Turkey should try to leave Russia out in the cold now that the realization of her own immediate aims needs the Allies against the Turks. This situation may be turned to account either by using the Russians against the Turks or the Turks against the Russians; but in the latter alternative we should endeavour not to play too much in the hands of the aggressive type of Kemalist described in the last paragraph, whose ultimate ideal will be to make Turkey independent, on an Islamic basis, either of Russia or the Western Powers.

I have, Sir,
 HORACE RUNBOLD,
High Commissioner.

292
E 11654
461.26.522

Revised 11/20/10
Revised 08/20/10

Tobacco litigation.

I have received a letter dated October 1968 from Mrs. Winifred Frank signed by M. as President of Tamil National Assembly and O.T.N.C. It states to say "I wish to inform you that sincere sentiments of fraternal appreciation which reigned during the historic conference between yourself and Lenin Naidu have caused me great pleasure, and to ease of my mind I sincerely and earnestly hope that all the efforts made for peace may be crowned with success". A similar letter has been received by me from Lenin Naidu which concludes "I sincerely and ardently hope that what we did together may be a 'pride' leading to organisation of a unitarian to an eternal peace."

High Commissioner is being informed.

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

[illegible]

Testimonial 2

General Harrington den Sovjet-Betrügerei sel. Mustafa Kemal'den General Harrington'a
18 Ekim 1922 tarihli mektubun kopyası. (Belge 16'ya ait olup görünür.)

No. 2.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. (Received November 1.)

No. 839.

Telegraphic. R.

Constantinople, October 31, 1922.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me Constantinople Government telegraphed to Mustafa Kemal yesterday to say that it had been invited to Peace Conference.

Constantinople Government suggest that the two Governments should consult together with a view to unity of action. If this were not done prospect of peace might be endangered, and neither Government could afford to assume this responsibility. Constantinople Government was now awaiting reply. Mustafa Kemal might ignore telegram, in which case Constantinople Government would have to consider its position. It would let us have an answer in two or three days' time.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs what had passed between Sultan and Refet Paşa. He said he had not got detailed information, but that he understood from Grand Vizier that Refet Paşa had asked Sultan to dismiss his Government in order to allow Ankara Government to send a Governor-General here. Sultan is stated to have replied that he would consult his Ministers.

Teqibasi 3

Yüksək Komissar Rumbold' dan Lord Curzon'a 1st. İntisab Hükümeti, 10.11.1922 tarihinde (Londra'ya) gönderdiği Mustafa Kemal'e bildirgen. (Belge 17 no teqibasi)

Telegram from Viceroy dated 10.11.22.

Clear the line.

Private and personal. Your private and personal telegram of 8th November, 4355. Apart from being Caliph, Sultan commands little sympathy in India, where his personality is hardly known, and he is generally suspected of having been a tool in our hands during our occupation. Though public opinion is not yet crystallised, partly because telegrams (sic) do not command belief, and partly because issue is obscure, there seems to be general disposition to look forward to deposition with equanimity, and to belief in Mustapha Kemal as the proved saviour of his country and champion of Islam. So far as I can judge, and speaking generally, even although Mustapha Kemal's Khalifat proposals may be of revolutionary character, acquiescence in fait accompli - provided it is accomplished by Islam and is not brought about by non-Islam - which is innate in Islam, will prevail, even though current ideas have to be radically readjusted in order to be adapted to it.

Hence

Türkistan 2

Hindistan Genel Valisi'nden İngiltere Hükümetine 10 Kasım 1922 tarihli tel. Hindeki da. Osmanlı padişahına sempati beslediklerini. Mustafa Kemal ise kurtarıcı ve İslam sempiyasını idarek görüyor. Padişahın İngiltere'ye sığınması doğru yarıttır. (Belge 30'ın tepkisi)

2.

Hence I do not see how deposition can be used to our advantage. On the contrary, in my opinion our only safe course is to stand absolutely aloof and make it clear that question is domestic concern of Turkey and Moniem which is no business of ours. If we gave Sultan asylum, suspicion that he had been our willing tool against the National and religious movement would be reinforced by a belief that we meant to retain him as our pawn for future use. Any action or intrigue by the Sultan, or in his interest, whilst he is sheltering under our asylum, would inevitably be ascribed to our machination. If our hands are forced by his imminent personal danger, we should make it clear that asylum is purely temporary, and we should get rid of him as soon as possible; but even this would be dangerous and we should forestall such a contingency if possible. What we could safely do would be to pose as pacemakers between the Sultan and Kemalists at the Lausanne Conference; seeking to secure for him suitable arrangements for a life of retirement.

F.O. 371/7913

Türkmen 4'ün 1911

PARAGRAPHS TELEGRAM from the Governor of Malta to
the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 17th Nov.

(Received Colonial Office 1.20 a.m. 18th November 1922)

November 17.

Just received from Harington telegram saying
that Sultan of Turkey is en route for Malta on board
S.S. Malaya.

Have received no previous intimation of his
intended arrival here. What are the wishes of His
Majesty's Government as to his disposal.

It is very difficult to make any arrangements
or his here. Please Telegraph.

Addressed Colonial Office, General Harington.

P.O. 371/7914

Tipkbasım 5

Malta Valisinden Koloniler Bakanligına tel. 17.11.1922. Malta'ya gönderilmekte olduğu
bilgisiyle padişah hakkında hükümetin talimatı nedir? (Belge 35'te tipkbasım)

PARAMULDER VELSHAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors General of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and the Officer administering the Government of Newfoundland.

Sent 1.40.p.m. 17th November, 1922.

17th November. Secret.

Following message for your Prime Minister, begins:- Yesterday Sultan, on the ground that his life was in danger asked General Harington for protection in letter signed as Caliph. The necessary arrangements are being made for him to be embarked on His Majesty's Ship Malaya. Ende.

Tıpkıbasım 6

Koluniler Bakanından Koluniler Başbakanlarına 17 Kasım 1922 günlü mesaj. Fadiyah İngilizce'ye atılmış. Malaya gemisiyle Malta'ya gönderiliyor. (Belge 36'nın tıpkıbasımı)

Langhew, Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
December 9th, 1922.

D. 8.15 p.m. December 9th, 1922.

E. 11.15 p.m. December 9th, 1922.

No. 100.

There appears to have been an incident a few days ago in Grand National Assembly in connection with proposed modification of electoral law, whereby only persons born within Turkish national frontiers or having resided five years in an electoral district can be elected deputies.

Modification, if accepted, would have excluded Mustafa Kemal, who treated proposal as direct attack on himself.

I learn from Beyrta that all deputies in that district have been urgently recalled to Ankara until conclusion of peace. Deputies in Constantinople area have similarly been recalled.

It is alleged possibly in view of coincidence, that their recall is due to opposition to Mustafa Kemal having grown to serious proportions. It would be equally reasonable to think, however, that they have been recalled in view of importance of decisions to be taken in connection with peace conference.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 100, sent to Lusarna No. 58.

P.O. 17/17/22 (1922)

Tipikhan ?

İngiliz Yüksek Komiser Vekili Henderson dan Foreign Office ad. Türkiye de seçilen Komiserler ile ilgili olarak Mustafa Kemal'ın seçilmiş meclis üyeleriyle görüşmelerini (Belge 47 de tipikhanı)

British High Commission
Constantinople,
December 11th, 1922.

No. 1111.



Sir,

Challenge.

With reference to my telegram No. 760 of the 8th instant I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith an extract from the 'Journal d'Orient' of December 8th, giving an account of the proceedings of a recent session of the Grand National Assembly at which it was proposed to modify the electoral law, in such manner as to render ineligible for election persons born outside the frontier fixed by the National Pact, or who had not resided in the same constituency for a period of five years. This proposal, if it were adopted, would entail the exclusion from the Assembly of Mustafa Kemal, who satisfied neither requirement.

It is difficult here in Constantinople to gauge the possible consequences of this incident. Much depends on Mustafa Kemal's capacity for resistance which I have no reason to believe is in any way fundamentally diminished. It certainly furnished him with a brilliant opportunity for glorifying his own great services to his country. He did not fail to profit by it and the debate closed with energetic protests, possibly intemperate but also fervent, that the amendment was not directed against him, and with loud expressions of the veneration in which he was held by the entire Turkish Nation.

Y/.....

The Most Honourable,

The Imperial German Legation, T.C., C.O.

etc.,

etc.,

etc.

Tıpkıbasım 8

Henderson'dan Lord Curzon'a rapor, 11.12.1922. TBMM'de unanilikle, Meclis-i Milli amirleri dışında doğmuş diye Mustafa Kemal'ın milliyetkârlı seçilmesini engellemek niyetinde. Saltanatın kaldırılması mahalefeti güçleşmiştir. (Belge 44'ün tıpkıbasımı)

2. At the same time there can be no doubt that the attack on Mustafa Kemal was deliberate and insidious and that he has since more seriously to reckon with a growing opposition consisting principally of the adherents of the old Committee of Union and Progress Party and of his personal enemies, but probably supported also by the members of what is known as the Clerical Group. It is even confidently asserted that all the deputies absent from Angora have been urgently recalled there in order to counter this opposition. Certainly the deputies from the Smyrna district and the Kemalist delegation that recently visited Constantinople to congratulate the new Caliph on his succession returned to Angora a few days ago. A sufficient cause for this would however have been the importance of the present deliberations of the Grand National Assembly in connection with the peace negotiations at Lausanne.

3. In various ways Mustafa Kemal has hitherto been able to keep the opposition in check and he will probably be able to do so even more by intensifying his methods. The last occasion on which that opposition appeared to be menacing was a few weeks before the offensive in Anatolia. The successful result of that campaign rendered the opposition for the time being ~~irrelevant~~ ^{irrelevant}; but the subsequent abolition of the Sultanate and the novel manner of election of the new Caliph, have afforded an opportunity for the opposition to revive and to add to its numbers. The abolition of the Sultan and the relegation of the Caliph to a purely religious and utterly ineffective figurehead might appear to have removed from the path of Mustafa Kemal the last obstacle in the way of supreme power. But a feature of the Grand National Assembly has always been its persistent determination that all power shall be vested in the Assembly and not in the hands of a Government or of an individual. Mustafa Kemal may therefore find that the jealousy of the Assembly is a greater obstacle to his ambitions than

Topkassam 8' in devamı

There was a Witten-Elips.

3. It is certainly improbable that without considerable confidence in his own strength, the opposition would ever have dared to make so obvious a personal attack on Mustafa Kemal. The possibility of some weakening of his position in consequence cannot therefore be altogether excluded, though as I have said above, it may on the other hand induce him to make special efforts with a view to strengthening that position and securing it beyond all doubt. Either result might well produce a considerable effect on the attitude adopted by his Representatives at the Conference at Louzanne and especially on Enver Pasha, who is said to be his most intimate friend.

4. The danger of any weakening of his position lies in the possibility of encouragement being thereby afforded to the position in the Assembly which, if not actually in the pay of Hussein and Arslanoff, is in favour of a Russian alliance. I am inclined to think however that it may tend to induce Mustafa Kemal to count more on the support of the National element in the Assembly, and thereby possibly enhance the influence of Kocaf Bey, who is certainly one of those who are the most anxious for peace. Nevertheless I do not think any party would be strong enough in that intractable Assembly to be less firm than Mustafa Kemal has hitherto been in insisting on the integral acceptance of the National Pact, or that any individual, other than Kemal himself, could be able to persuade the Assembly to agree to any limitation of that Pact.

I have the honor to be,
My Lord,
With the highest respect,
Your Majesty's most obedient,
Wife's Servant,

(Signed) Neville Henderson
British High Commissioner.

Telegrams & Telegrams

No. 1111

British High Commission,
Constantinople.

10th December, 1922.

My Lord,

11/12/22 (1) - E

With reference to my despatch No. 1111 (2294/50) of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that the local Press of the 10th December announces that the people of Angora, in order to mark their disapproval of the debate in the Grand National Assembly respecting the proposed modification of Article 14 of the electoral law, have decided that the name of His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Yasha be inscribed in the register of the citizens of Angora in grateful appreciation of the services which he has rendered the country. On the application of the Councils of Muhittar, the Municipal Council and the other Corporate Bodies, Mustafa Kemal Yasha was registered in the Hadji Batram Veli Quarter of Angora, and a certificate to that effect, drawn up in Kufic script by the calligrapher, El-Hastani Mustafa Effendi, was presented to him by Hadji Atif Effendi, Deputy for Angora who spoke of the pride of the people of Angora in having the Yasha's name in their registers.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

With the highest respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient

humble servant,

Nenik Hadji

ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER.

at Constantinople,
he Marabout Sirson of Kadiztion, E.O., F.O.,
etc., etc., etc.

Turkistan 9

Hindus'un Lord Curzon'a 18.12.1922 günde ist. Secim kumanda yapilnak istenon
dusgunkile tpeki ve Gazi'ye yikim. Mustafa Kemal Papa. Ankara'na Haci Bayram Veli
ninin kutlugun luydush. (Belge 45'te turkibasi)

Sir,

Please find enclosed herewith copies of two proclamations in Turkish, issued by the Circassians, and destined to be distributed on the opposite coast, where they intend to land three or four days hence. One bears the reproduction of a photograph of MUSTAPHA KEMAL with his wife, and speaks against him.

The Greek Military Authorities are training about 1,400 men, mostly Circassians, with the object of sending them into Asia Minor, in order to incite the population there to rise against MUSTAPHA KEMAL. In three or four days time some 600 of them will be sent over to Anicolia by the Greek destroyer "Aspis".

The present head of this movement is a certain Circassian, ex-major of the Turkish army, ISHAK BEY COTTUOZ LARI who arrived here 6 month ago, from Berlin where they say they have their head-office. He is a well educated man. After Rahmet comes

Ex-Colonel MUIN BEY KUTU at the head of.....	720 men, whom
MALIK BEY TARTAN, a well known brigand of the	
Alvaly district with.....	320 men
KADRI BEY, son of ASHAYUCH, and wife is Camp of	
them say with.....	120 men
It is this Kadri Bey that is about to be sent to	
the opposite coast with the abovesmentioned 600 men	
DACHE BEY with.....	170 men
AMERHAN TARKIDZI with.....	50 men.

The men get 3 drachmas a day besides their food while the chiefs get the pay of Greek officers.

About four months ago a Circassian named CEMAL BEY with 20 men, landed at Samussaki (Alvaly district) and went

into

Tipkismun 10

Ingiltere'nin Middel Viskonsolosi Haskinson'dan Aina Elçisi Bestinck'e rapor. Yunan makamları Mithin'de Çerkez çetelerini eğniyor ve bunları Mustafa Kemal'e karşı ayaklanma çıkarmaları için peyderep Anadolu'ya çıkartıyorlar. Çete başlarına Yunan subayları gibi maaş ödeniyor. Çetecilere de günlük 3 drakmi veriliyor. (Belge 107'nin tipkismunu)

into the interior where he mustered a force of 1,700 men who are now fighting against KEMAL'S forces. The Turkish papers in Constantinople often write about his doings, and lately they reported that he has destroyed two bridges, one between TIGRAN NISSAN and OUSHAH and another between PANDERMO and BALUKISSERN. He reports to various of his friends here that 70% of the whole Turkish population of Asia Minor are against Kemal, and that he can easily make up a force of 10,000 men, if he is provided with the means.

Three or four days ago 35 Circassians were landed by the "ARFIS" close to Sarmoussaki. These men will signal here when the right time comes for the said 600 to join them.

The whole force will be divided into four parties; one will advance from ADALIA, the second from OUSHAHOMONIA, the third from BALUKISSERN BROUSSEA, and the fourth from AIVADYIK GIOUNEN.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

(SD.) F. HADJIMISCU.

C.M. BENTINCK ESQ.,
British Legation,
Athens.

Tipkhatum 10'un son asyfas

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decypher. Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
26th May 1923.

D. 3.05 p.m. 26th May 1923.

E. 4.10 p.m. 26th May 1923.

No. 315.

E 5104
28 MAY 1923

PRIVATE AND SECRET.

Reouf telegraphed urgently yesterday that cabinet under presidency of Mustafa Kemal took following decision.

If any sacrifice is made in Greek reparations question this must conduce to attainment of peace by settlement of outstanding important questions in favour of Turks.

Question of interest on public debt, early evacuation of occupied areas, judicial régime and compensation of allied companies should be coupled with that of Greek reparations and only in the event of settlement of these questions in favour of Turkey being guaranteed could a sacrifice be made in regard to reparations.

Council of ministers, convinced that protracted negotiations could not give Turkey a good peace, which can only be attained in manner proposed, instructs Imet to make this final proposal to conference reporting result.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 315. Re-

mitted to Lausanne No. 126.



Tipkışın 11.

İstanbul'daki İngilizler Ankara'dan Londra'ya gönderilen şifre telgrafı karşısında İngiliz Lord Curzon'a tebliğ ediyor. Mustafa Kemal başkanlığında toplanan Hükümet. Yürüm kararını. Önemli kararlar. Bu kararlarında kararlar almıştır.

(Belge 123'ün tipkışması)

Mr. Henderson (No. 383) to Sir H. Rumbold — (Repeated to Foreign Office:
Received May 30.)

(No 321. Personal and Secret)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, May 30, 1923.

INTERCEPTED telegram from Mustafa Kemal to Ismet makes it clear that Council of Vekala is greatly perturbed by Ismet's action in settling Greek reparations question in defiance of its orders. In a personal telegram he says: "Your position is serious and critical; be careful."

Renewed instructions are that sacrifice in regard to Greek reparations is to be made conditional on prompt settlement in favour of Turks of following questions: interest on public debt, early evacuation of occupied territories, judicial regime and compensation to companies. Ismet is instructed to make a final and definite proposal to conference on these lines.

Prevailing view of Cabinet is that rupture brought about by a Greek attack owing to failure to reach agreement on reparations question would be better received both in Turkey and abroad than rupture with Allies in general since a question of world-wide interest. It is added that a rupture which was not followed by operations would suit Allies' best.

Cabinet are particularly anxious for reports on atmosphere prevailing at Lausanne after Turkish sacrifice "on account of new hopes which Allies may cherish as a result of success secured by threats."

Orders from Fevzi Pasha to Refet and Constantinople command, issued on the 26th in anticipation of rupture, say that all officers must rejoin their units and prepare for war. The western command will be ready to attack Straits, Ismid and Chanaq zones. The Thrace and Constantinople command are to stand by to act on their instructions. Operations to be undertaken against Irak and French in Syria are described in detail.

Tıpkıbasım-12

Henderson'dan Curzon'a tel. 30.5.1923. Mustafa Kemal'den Lüzan'da Ismet Paşa'ya çekilen (ve İngilizlerce açılan) şifre telgrafi. Yunan tutumuna ilişkin hükümet kaudimiyatı: "Dünahatma ciddi ve nazikdir. Eskişahı olunuz". Fevzi Paşa'dan komutanlara tel: "Savaşçı haat olunuz". (Belge 128'nin tıpkıbasımı)

PAID

J. B. P. M. 1111.



1914-1915
WESTMINSTER

177

CHICHESTER, SUSSEX.

SECRET.

2nd June, 1925.

By Air Mail.

Sir,

W. C. G. 1 - 2

In continuation of Mr. Farver's letter of the 2nd March, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Harquest Bureau of Reflection, a copy of a letter from the Government of India dated the 10th May, regarding the letter from Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Lord Curzon, the President of the Central Executive Committee in London, expressing thanks for past assistance from Mohammedans in India and asking for further help. It will be observed that the letter had been published in India a month before it was republished in the Constantinople papers and that in the opinion of the Government of India it had practically no effect either in producing further subscriptions or in exciting the Indian Moslems against the Government.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

Türkçesim 13

Hindistan İşleri Bakanlığundan Foreign Office'e yazı: 26.1913. Mustafa Kemal'den Hindistan'da Osmanlı'ya gönderilen ve Hindistan'da yayımlanmış mektup (Belge 127 nın ekidir).

2544

Mr. Lewis.

Continued on page 16, 1973

At this London conference, Kemal Pasha confined himself to a large extent to a recital of past achievements. The old Assembly and the army were his principal support and therefore his strength. It is not difficult to see the last link in the chain of command. Of the new Turkish Government, he was only directing the hand of Mustafa Kemal himself. It seemed that the reforms were particularly important to him and it is interesting to note that at every point he linked the work of the Sultan with the new Turkish Government, thereby seeking further to discredit the former by showing that the new Government was willing and in it not the instigator of all the repressive measures taken during the earlier days of the Nationalist movement. This idea is indeed further developed than at any previous time, as Mustafa Kemal accused the regular forces employed in 1920 by the Sultan's Government and not the irregular Kurdish tribes, of the rebellion, *i.e.* against the nation.

It is not surprising, however, that the basic features of the speech, which, as in the case of nearly all Mustafa Kemal's pronouncements, is of well-worn type, are the reference to the army and the absence of any allusion to the constitutional question, which, as we have seen, was then and has been the universal subject of discussion in Turkey. The first line was taken by Field Marshal Kemal, President of the Council. In the second line, the speaker was taken by his speech, and would seem to indicate that Mustafa Kemal had instinctively and spontaneously used the idea of a Government on democratic and constitutional principles. He decided to put his trust in the army which he knows rather than to take the responsibility as regards his personal position which might result from a revision of the Constitution. The latter may well have been feasible, since the Constitutional Reform party made no attempt to take time to organize and perfect its organization, whereas the opposing supporters of the Military party was a more immediate danger. A born organizer, Mustafa Kemal himself hopes that, if and when this opposition develops, the change in his speech, the point of dealing with it, is the necessary the Ghazi Pasha might be right, and that the army will not be overruling that opposition shows that independence of Turkey. The future machine must therefore, he says, be developed and organized. If his intention be to set up a military dictatorship, he would certainly have expressed himself differently.

From the time the document of the "League of non-institutional reform" would appear to have been drafted, since at a meeting of the People's party held on the eve of the opening of the final assembly when it was first drafted and discussed (and only awaited indefinitely postponed), it is not improbable that it was this issue which finally brought reformers, but who may not have felt himself strong enough to be strongly in favour of "League of Minnesota Reform". This theory is indeed advanced at present to show that the reformer states that House's resignation was due to his inability to work with his former friends, whose views he had sought to bring to reasonably with him, and with some little success in the Assembly. In the meantime he has been directed three and a half times to resign from the Assembly, but shows no inclination to break his connection with the Assembly, and it is the probability of the coming session. Affairs of the State of Minnesota, and it is the "League" that he has (the "League" of Minnesota Reform).

2. The defendant, who is at London while the above-named person is in New York, is charged with conspiring with the latter to prevent the shipment of Polish goods to the United States, and to obstruct the efforts of the American Government to obtain information as to the location of the defendant's Communist contacts. Several persons are charged with conspiring with the defendant to prevent the shipment of Polish goods to the United States, and to obstruct the efforts of the American Government to obtain information as to the location of the defendant's Communist contacts. Several persons are charged with conspiring with the defendant to prevent the shipment of Polish goods to the United States, and to obstruct the efforts of the American Government to obtain information as to the location of the defendant's Communist contacts.

1 Year on 400

NEW LINE THEATRE COMPANY

Systemic lupus erythematosus

Tetrahymen 5.3

Holothurus dan *Leontiscus* a 18 Agustus 1972 masih tipis, *Mentha* banyak di 13 Agustus 1972 pada Brachy Mecher sudah banyak tetapi *Leontiscus* sudah banyak tumbuh (diikuti 147 in karkabawani).

SECRET.

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

28/9/23, dated 18.10.23.
14.

An Attack on Ismet Pasha.

The following is the text of a secret despatch from Mustapha Kemal to Adnan Bey, for transmission to Selaheddin Adil and Rafet Pasha only:-

"On the 30th September at 3.30, Ismet Pasha, accompanied by the Director General of Mines, Kenan Bey, his servant Bekir Isuri, and his chauffeur, were proceeding from Ismet's house in the country to the town, where a private sitting of the Council of Ministers was to be held. When passing the 'Place de Mines', (Haidan Cejaklari) several individuals appeared from both sides of the road and fired at the car with revolvers. Fortunately the car was travelling at considerable speed and, although the glass windows were broken, and the chauffeur slightly wounded, Ismet and Kenan were unhurt.

"Enquiries have been made, but so far without results. It is believed that the would-be assassins mistook Ismet's car for my own. This incident has produced a sensation in Angora. This despatch is to be communicated to Rafet and Selaheddin only, for their information. No one else is to be informed."

It is noteworthy that a brief reference to this attack appeared in the Turkish press, which, however, attributed no special importance to the occurrence.

EX 324943E.10072

Typiksom 15

Ingiliz Gah Etilahat Serresimdar Daxilari Bakanligina rapis: 20 Eylul 1923 yilida Ismet Pasa nas arbasima atildi -shahar shahar - Sahibni ashinda Mustafa Kemal'e kargi shaharshahar. (Shahar 152 min tipikshom)

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 683.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 17, 1923.

THE outstanding event of the past week has been the acceptance by the Grand National Assembly of a motion submitted by İsmet Paşa for the inclusion in the Constitutional Charter of a special clause fixing Angora as the seat of the Government of the new Turkey. After having been fully discussed in committee and at secret party meetings, the draft clause was finally submitted at a plenary session of the Assembly on the 15th instant. Few voices were raised in favour of Constantinople, and the speakers who did so were subjected to frequent interruption. The debate was therefore brought to a speedy conclusion, and, though some twenty deputies abstained from voting, the motion was accepted by a large majority. It may, however, be noted as one more proof of the control still exercised by Mustafa Kemal over the present Assembly, that at the close of the sitting one of the Deputies who had declared himself opposed to the return of the capital to Constantinople is reported in the press as having announced that at least everyone was in favour of the former capital, but that they had to conform to the decision taken at the secret party meeting.

2. The Assembly's decision was greeted with scenes of great rejoicing in the new capital. The town was beflagged, and torchlight processions took place. In honour of the occasion the 15th October has been created a public holiday and is to be known as "Angora Day." In Constantinople, on the other hand, the decision is not regarded as final since the Constitutional Charter as a whole has still to be submitted to and accepted by the Assembly.

3. Although undoubtedly growing bolder, the Opposing groups are, however, still walking with considerable wariness. Beaufort Bay, around whom so much interest and sympathy centres, has arrived in Constantinople from Smyrna, and is at present the guest of İsmet Paşa. Both are stated to be closely watched by Government agents. Nevertheless, Beaufort is reported to be about to proceed to Angora, and since his arrival here has been received by the leading officials. He has abstained from making any public declaration, and no reliable estimate can yet be formed as to the rôle which he may play in the future.

4. Rumour continues to play with the idea of co-operation between Mustafa Kemal and the remnants of the Committee of Union and Progress, with whom İsmet is supposed to be closely in touch. Much interest has been aroused in this connection by an article published some days ago in the Angora newspaper "Yeni İhtisap," from the pen of Yunus Nadi, after stating that no difference exists between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Popular party, and that Mustafa Kemal is the greatest and the leader of the Unionists. This article, which was possibly nothing more than a hollow flourish, has, if so, achieved its object, as it has been taken up by the entire Turkish political world. The exception accorded to it by the local press line of course varied according to the particular complexion of each newspaper, but in general the comments tend to demonstrate that a reconciliation is regarded by both parties as a very remote possibility. Indeed, the general secretary of the Popular party in Constantinople went so far as to state publicly that, if Mustafa Kemal was in fact a Unionist, he would at once completely sever his connection with the Popular party.

5. Meanwhile, as a result of the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by both Greece and Turkey, diplomatic relations are about to be re-established between the two countries. This will be done by means of Charges d'Affaires, but it is announced that as the Greek Government have expressed the desire that their representative should reside at Constantinople, the Turkish Charge d'Affaires will establish himself at Nikosia.

6. The resumption of direct diplomatic relations will facilitate the arrangements for the exchange of the Greek and Muslim populations of Turkey and Greece. This operation actually commenced with the dispatch, on the 14th instant, from Mitylene to Aivalik of 3,000 Muslims, and with the release, including from Constantinople of ships which had arrived here some days ago from the Black Sea ports with some 5,000 Greek refugees on board. The transfer is being effected under the supervision of the international commission appointed for the purpose, assisted by the personnel of the American Near East Relief Commission.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON,

Acting High Commissioner.

FD-371/9152E-10568

FD-324/251, p. 36-37, No. 24

Topkibayım 16

Henderson dan Curzon a 17 Ekim 1923 günlü yazı. Ankara, resmen Türkiye'nin başkenti oldu. 17 Ekim günü "Ankara günü" adıyla resmi tatil olarak kutlandı. İzmir Anlaşması Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasındaki emyalları bitiren antlaşma olarak başladı...

(Belge 154 in topkibayım)

CONFIDENTIAL
(12115)

TURKEY.

Annual Report: 1922

(E 10937/10937/44)

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston—(Received: November 12.)

(No. 720.)

Constantinople, November 7, 1922.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the annual report on Turkey for 1922. I much regret that it was not found possible to complete it earlier.

I am indebted to Colonel Baird and Commander Mackenzie for the sections dealing with military events and the Turkish navy respectively; to Mr. Knox for the section on the Christian minorities in Turkey and the Russian refugees in Constantinople; to Mr. Waugh for that on judicial matters; to Mr. Helm for the sections dealing with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, pan-Islamism, and that portion of the section on Turkey's foreign relations which deals with Modern economies; and to Colonel Woods for the economic survey and the article on labour.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON.

Enclosure

Report on Turkey for 1922

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Tıpkıbaşı 37

İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliğince hazırlanan 1922 Türkiye Yıllık Raporu nun tıpkıbaşı yarısı ve bu sayfa. (Bünye 159 un tıpkıbaşıdır.)

OL/0022, dated 17.12.23.
18.

58

7

SECRET.

Mr. Noon.
India Office.

Opposition to Turkish Khalifate policy.

It has been ascertained at first-hand that Huss Khafik Khalidi, Said Hussein and Sheikh Hifa'at, Moslem leaders of the Arab Nationalist Movement in Palestine, recently addressed letters to Mustapha Kemal Pasha on the subject of the Khalifate question.

In these letters Mustapha Kemal was warned of the danger of depriving the Khalifate of that position upon which its prestige depended, and the writers urged that the Khalif should be accorded a position in consonance with the dignity of his office. Otherwise, the writers stated, the prestige of the Turkish Khalif would disappear and the Islamic World might turn to another candidate for the office, such as King Hussein, with the result that Islam would fall again under foreign influence.

More recently it was ascertained, from an independent informant in Cairo who had received such a notification from the Ankara Government, that that Government, apparently as the result of warnings of this nature from Palestine and from the Egyptian Ulema and elsewhere, had notified Islamic Associations abroad that the conception of an Islamic Congress was no longer considered to be necessary, because Abdul Wajid had been acknowledged as Khalif by the whole Islamic World with the exception of Morocco. The congratulations addressed to the Khalif upon his accession from all parts of the Moslem World, and the mention of his name at prayers in most Islamic countries, were cited by the Turkish Government as proof of their contention.

Tepkibasi 18

17 Aralık 1923 tarihli İngiliz Gizli İstihbarat raporu: Filistin Araplarının üç lideri Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya mektup yazmışlar ve Halifemize (ibare) kurulumazsa Kral Hüseyin'in halife seçileceğini bildirmişlerdir. (Belge 163'ün tepkibasiını)

我們

Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law

Received 7 June 1994

2004

I have the honor to invite reference to the despatch from His Majesty's Foreign Office No. 98 of November 24th last (E 10760/10345/54), forwarding copy of a despatch from the Acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople relative to the suggested despatch to British India and Java of a delegation of the Red Crescent Society, in connection with the Commission formed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to collect subscriptions on behalf of the Greek Maimons. Nos are to be also changed for Turkish Civilians.

None of the members of this delegation has been current in native circles here for some time past and has acquired no little interests. In such cases Lord Curzon alone has not about proposing a reception for the mission, which, it is said, is being regarded by the ignorant as a diplomatic one, having for its object the investigation of complaints by Mohammedans in Java as to their treatment by the Dutch authorities.

From the Dutch Police authorities I learnt in confidence that the mission is expected to take leave after visiting British India and that it will consist of three persons from Constantinople. It is thought that, while these persons will ostensibly be engaged in collecting subscriptions for charitable purposes,

1994

4. *Wright, A. Summary article*

E. Ramsey MacDonald P.O., M.P.

www.elsevier.com/locate/jmb

Tephrosia 19

İngilizce ve Batıya Çıkarma Başlangıcı: Çarşba den İngilizce Batıya Çıkarma başlangıcı 1998 yılında, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Türkiye'ye gelmesiyle başladı. Bu tarihten itibaren Batıya Çıkarma başlangıcı olarak kabul edilir.

(18) λ is a λ -term.

the first purpose of their tour will be to indulge in pan-Islamic propaganda.

In this connection, it may perhaps be relevant to note that, in the middle of October last, a British Indian subject named Mohamed Ali was collecting money at Padang (West Sumatra) for what was called the "Angora Fund". In return for donations received he issued receipts or tickets printed in Arabic characters and in a British Indian script. I have been supplied by the Dutch Police with photographs of one such receipt or ticket, and a copy is enclosed herewith. I am told that the Arabic characters include the words "Holy War". Mohammed Ali did not collect many subscriptions at Padang, and he left shortly afterwards for Singapore.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,


Consul-General.

Copies to:-

The Secretary to the Government of India, in the
Foreign and Political Department, Delhi,
H.M. Minister at The Hague.
The Director of the Political Intelligence Bureau,
Singapore.

Tpikhaum 19'um wam

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 168. Confidential.)

Constantinople, February 27, 1924.

1. VENTURE to suggest that my telegram No. 35 of the 25th February, relative to the position of the Caliph, should be read in conjunction with paragraphs 7 and 8 of my despatch No. 142 of the 29th February, and with paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 162 of the 26th February, in which I have drawn attention to the silence of the proposed new Constitution of Turkey regarding the relations between the Caliph and the Turkish Republic.

2. Just before I called on Adnan Bey on the 25th February, Sir Adam Block told me that he had heard from Fatiha Bey that the Angora leaders had decided to get rid of the Caliph. I had already heard from a very secret source, which I believe to be independent, that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had decided that the Caliph and all the members of his family, except a few old ladies, must be banished, and that the Pasha's conferences with journalists and military officers at Smyrna were intended to prepare the way for this. I was therefore not surprised for the substance of Adnan Bey's statement, but I was astonished at his comparative outspokenness. It was my first business interview with him, and even with persons whom he knows better he is, as a rule, discreet to the point of reserve.

3. The "laissez-faire" tendency on which Mr. Henderson laid stress in his despatch No. 38 of the 9th January, manifests itself more and more openly. It renders easy the task of those who feel, like Mustafa Kemal Pasha, that the republic must divorce itself entirely from religious conceptions, and that it cannot be secure so long as the House of Osman retains even a vestige of its former authority and prestige. I was much struck at the frankness with which Yusuf Kemal Bey elaborated this theme to me in a conversation I had with him before leaving London.

[19042]

1 2

F (D) 424 / 280 p. 54, No. 45.

Typharium 20

Ingiliz Typharium Lashay den Emvireti Buhari MacDonald'a. 27/6 1924. Fiki Malye Nasyi Cavit Bey. Ankara Idarichisim Hattiyi kovacaklari Ingilizlere haber veriyor. Lashay qylym tatta tatta velya qlym. Mustafa Kemal i Murt komonaryunda tatta velya qlym. (Belge 162 sin typharium)

1. The press now abounds in suggestions that not only the Caliphate but other religious institutions bound up with the fabric of the old Turkish State must be dealt with in a radical fashion by the republican régime. It is openly stated that the Caliphate is a useless burden on the finances of Turkey; that it should be maintained in a simpler and less costly style; and that, indeed, there is no reason why Turkey should alone be responsible for the expense entailed. The last of these suggestions is one which has been ventilated during the last few days. It is particularly tendentious, for while it helps to discredit the Caliphate as being a drain on the resources of the country, it is difficult to conceive any practical plan by which a Turkish Caliph could be made to rely on the contributions of the Moslem world without a complete alteration of his status. It is urged at the same time that religious tribunals and religious schools as at present constituted are anomalous and anachronistic in a modern republic, and that it is equally absurd to retain a Minister of Moslem Religious Affairs (corresponding to the former Sheikh-ul-Islam) in the Cabinet.

2. These indications and tendencies make it very probable that when Mustafa Kemal makes his statement of policy in the Grand National Assembly on the 1st March, he will outline some definite scheme for asserting the lay character of the republic. There is a widespread feeling that he will not confine himself to religious tribunals and schools, or to the elimination of the Minister of Religious Affairs from the Government, but will tackle once for all the problem of excluding the Caliph from any possibility of intervention in State affairs. Should this be his intention, it is difficult to see how it can be realised without some sort of coup.

3. I may mention, in conclusion, that, according to the secret sources already mentioned, Ismet Pasha told the generals assembled at Smyrna that he hoped that the liquidation of the Caliphal family and the nationalisation of the ex-Imperial property (which is also said to be part of the plan) would allay British suspicions of pan-Islamism, and would tend to make His Majesty's Government less intractable on the question of Mosul.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Typewritten 20 lines from original

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 166. Confidential.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 27, 1924.

I VENTURE to suggest that my telegram No. 33 of the 25th February, relative to the position of the Caliph, should be read in conjunction with paragraphs 7 and 8 of my despatch No. 142 of the 20th February, and with paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 162 of the 26th February, in which I have drawn attention to the silence of the proposed new Constitution of Turkey regarding the relations between the Caliph and the Turkish Republic.

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3. The "laic" tendency on which Mr. Henderson laid stress in his despatch No. 30 of the 9th January, manifests itself more and more openly. It renders easy the task of those who feel, like Mustafa Kemal Pasha, that the republic must divorce itself entirely from religious conceptions, and that it cannot be secure so long as the House of Osman retains even a vestige of its former authority and prestige. I was much struck at the frankness with which Yusef Kemal Bey elaborated this theme to me in a conversation I had with him before leaving London.

[12042]

12

F.O. 424 / 260. p 59, No.45

Tıpkıbasını 20

İngiliz Temsilcisi Lindsay'den Dışişleri Bakanı MacDonald'a gizli yazı. Eski Maliye Nazırı Cavit Bey, Ankara liderlerinin Halifeyi kovacaklarını İngilizlere haber veriyor. Laiklik eğilimi daha fazla ortaya çıkıyor. Mustafa Kemal 1 Mart konuşmasında bunu vurgulayacaktır. (Belge 182'nin tıpkıbasını)

2000

Contributions: November 4, 1999

[illegible]

It must be thought that the President's biography was pulled far removed from the national memory of the activities in the country, but it is this I am alluding to.

3. In the next 10 years, the Commission will continue to monitor the situation in the Tsimbucua region, and will continue to work with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure that the region is free from armed conflict and that the population is able to live in peace and stability. The Commission will continue to work with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure that the region is free from armed conflict and that the population is able to live in peace and stability.

[illegible]

4. Another problem is the almost open demand that the integration of Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina be completed and the acceptance of all its parties as an integral entity. All kind of social and Jewish factor parties have a little more to say about this, however, which is also expressed at the same time that Generalle, Mrs. Puhovski, Landlitz, Ali Hoxha and Shaban Wali Fatah had decided to

Tipikrony 32

Limboş den MafKavul'da 4.11.1924 günü rapor Türkiye ile ilgili olduğunu.

Mayor Ingilab Dikenderi Khondroo da socialmentary

(Boeing 737-400 not applicable)

retain their military commands and to resign their Deputations. In the elections to power in the Parliamentary Commission party feeling has been strong enough to exclude Kuvem Karabekir and Refik Fehri from that of National Defense, in spite of their undoubted technical qualifications.

6. This development might at first sight be thought to indicate a split in the higher command of the army on political lines, but I should not care yet to draw so wide an inference, and it is possible that each commander may be actuated by a different motive. Kuvem Karabekir is, I am told, a man of some ambition, jealous of Ismet Pasha, who has passed over him in seniority, and discontented because he has had no chance of gathering laurels against the Greeks. He is a great personality on the Turkish army, and his appearance on the political stage, especially in the Opposition, is therefore of some importance. It will certainly give the President of the Republic food for thought.

7. In a leading article in to-day's "Tarih" Hussein Jalut rather implies that how distant as generals as to military or civilian and political service have been sought about by the Government requiring the officers to choose definitely which with they would wish to follow in the future. In a clever piece of journalism, the writer congratulates Turkey on the complete severance of the army from politics that has now been effected. How unfortunate it would have been if Turkey had come a resemblance these South American States where the Republican form of Government over merely as a cloak to a military dictatorship. There follows a long description of conditions prevailing in South America, every word of which is precisely applicable to the Turkey of to-day, and with warmly concealed irony the article ends by exclaiming how the Turkish heart will beat with joy at the decision now taken, and how Europe will respect the young republic when she has hitherto regarded as an anachronism.

I am, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

Tipakham 27 mar 1919

TURKEY.

[March 30, 1925.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

E 1932/129/46]

No. 1.

On Landing to Mr. Austin Chamberlain. — (Received March 30.)

(No. 212)

Sir,

Ankara, March 30, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived here on the 16th instant and was received on the following day by the President of the Republic for the presentation of His Highness's letter accrediting me as Ambassador to the Turkish Republic. I had a short interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tewfik Raskhi Bey, the evening of my arrival, at which his Excellency explained to me the essentials to be observed. The President, he said, would make his speech in Turkish, which would be interpreted to me in French, and as it was an Ambassador who was being received, he himself the Minister would act as interpreter. I myself, he said, could speak in English or in French as I liked. I had looked up periodically and found that for the last thirty years or so most British Ambassadors speaking on these occasions had been made in French, and for this reason I had prepared my speech in that language and interpreted it orally to the Turkish Government Subsecretary. I thought it would be difficult now to change round at the last moment and speak in English, and I therefore told Tewfik Raskhi that I would address the President precisely in the terms which I had already communicated to him.

2. On the morning of the 17th Tewfik Raskhi Bey sent round to me copies in French and in Turkish of the speech which Mustafa Kemal Pascha would deliver to me that afternoon. The text of these speeches were enclosed in my despatch No. 212 of the 16th March, 1925.

3. That afternoon we were taken in motor cars provided by the Turkish authorities to Yelkenkaya for the ceremony. I was accompanied in the first car by Raskhi Bey, "consul-general" of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who apparently also was a member of the cabinet. The staff accompanying me were Major R. C. French, Mr. Thomas Adams, Mr. Edmunds, Colonel H. Woods and his Aide.

4. On arrival at Yelkenkaya we found the Guards' band and a company of infantry drawn up. "God save the King" was played as we alighted, and the troops saluted as we entered the house. We were received by the President's kioskchali, civil and military, headed by Colonel Tewfik Bey, an "chief de cabinet," and after a minute or two of conversation I was taken alone across the entrance hall into the small parlour where the President received me. Only Tewfik Raskhi Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the member of the kioskchali were present. The President said to me, "Before I begin, Mr. Ambassador, we shook hands and exchanged speeches, the Minister interpreting such, according to schedule. When I had handed over my message I asked leave to introduce my staff. The President addressed us in Turkish, saying that he was glad to welcome the members of the British Embassy to Ankara and that he hoped that the personal contact so established would be continued. He then shook hands with them once again and they withdrew. Left alone once more, the President immediately asked me, in French, what I thought of Ankara, and I replied with my regular aloof by saying that I admired the courage of my people who chose to transfer the seat of their capital. He then expressed the hope that I would speedily establish myself definitely here, to which I replied that the first thing for me to do was to find a site about which I had already spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This evoked a brief and abrupt question in Turkish to Tewfik Raskhi, who replied hurriedly in the same language. We then exchanged a few sentences about situations for a house and about what I proposed to do and to see during my present visit to the capital, and the audience ended. Throughout the President's discourse was dignified and courteous, but also friendly and smiling.

5. Once more the band played "God save the King," and the troops withdrew, and we marched to our quarters here in Ankara station after an afternoon lunch from a just city restaurant, of which thirty-five to forty must have been taken up by the drive to Yelkenkaya and back. Nevertheless, I do not wish to convey the impression that the ceremony was in any way to be criticised on the ground of being unduly hurried. It was indeed very simple, but it was efficiently arranged and nothing was sloped. The

[511 pp.—2]

Tıpkıbasan 23

İngiliz Büyükelçisi Lindesay'den Dışişleri Bakanı Chamberlain'a 20 Mart 1925 günlü rapor. İngiliz Büyükelçisi, 16 Mart 1925 günü Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa'ya güven mektubunu sunuyor. Böylece 1914 yılında kesilmiş olan Türk-İngiliz diplomatik ilişkileri Büyükelçilik düzeyinde yeniden kuruluyor. (Belge 749'un tıpkıbasımı)

President's house is rather like a small suburban villa, pleasantly situated 5 miles south of the town near the summit of a long sloping hill and enjoying a fine view of the wide plain in the centre of which Angora rises abruptly on its rock. The rooms are, of course, small, and the furniture is rather too rich and "presidential"; but on the whole the ceremony was invested with an air of simple dignity which was not unpleasant.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

Topkibaron 21'00'000

No. 222.

12700/62/10151.
Confidential.

British Embassy,
Ankara.

12th August, 1925.

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 106 of 12th instant, I have the honour to report that the announcement of the President's divorce was conveyed to the public by means of an official communique issued by the Council of Ministers. This announcement merely stated that the President had informed the Cabinet that he had decided to separate from Latife Hanım, and that they had been divorced on August 8th.

2. It is only natural that in the present circumstances no newspaper should make any comment on this announcement. At the same time rumours have been prevalent for the last few weeks that relations between the two were strained. It was announced on 28th July that Latife Hanım had left for Samsun, and I am informed that it was then remarked that although the leading members of the Government were present at the station the President himself was absent.

3. It is equally hard to give any reason for the divorce. Rumours have long been current that life at Tekirköy was not conducted within the usual bounds of moderation and that the President had taken to drink again. On the other hand, I am informed by the Foreign Minister, who presented his letters of credence on the very day on which the divorce took place, that the President's appearance

showed ...

at Tekirköy,
with Chamberlain, N.D.,
etc., etc., etc.,

Tipkbasım 24

İngiliz Məsləhətgüzarı Houre'dan Dəyişləri Bakanı Chamberlain'e gizli yazı. 18.8.1925.
Cəmburbaşkanı Gazi Məstafa Kemal'in eşi Latife Hanım'dan boşandığı bir hökumət
açıqlamasıyla kəməryuna duyuruldu. Boşanma nədəni haqqında spekülasyonlar.
(Belge 258'in tipkbasımı)

showed no indications of an immoderate life.

4. Without any proof of the alleged excesses I should therefore be more inclined to say that the lack of an heir was the primary cause of the separation.

5. When the cause are merely a subject of speculation it is hard to say what, if any, the effect on the President himself will be. If my assumptions in paragraph 4 are correct there is no reason why any change should take place. If, on the other hand, his methods of life have become so immoderate that his wife found it impossible to remain with him, the possibility should not be excluded that his firm grip on the State will gradually be relaxed. At the present there are no signs of this.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

With the highest respect,

Your most obedient,

Humble Servant,

R. H. Howe

Tipikhasun 24'ün son sayfası

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 5)

(No. 734. Secret.)

Sir,

Thessalonica, September 29, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 704, paragraph 4, regarding the internal politics of Turkey, I have the honour to report to you that the President is becoming more and more clearly the absolute Dictator of the State, and the decisions taken, even in matters of the highest importance, are ever more likely to be in accordance with his personal wishes. The elements of uncertainty as to State policy which are inseparable from any dictatorship become very strongly marked. The Ghazi's health is thus a matter of importance, and I happen to know that he has just had quite a severe bout of fever. The danger of assassination is ever present, and I cannot help remembering that a prominent ex-Minister of the republic once told me that the Ghazi would never visit Constantinople, "because in Turkey we do our politics too much with Browning pistols." These are dangers which, as things are here, may almost be said to menace the structure of the State; but of more immediate importance to His Majesty's Government is the question of how the Ghazi's way of thinking is affected by his immediate surroundings, and I greatly regret to be unable to give you any very definite and certain information on this point.

2. I feel pretty sure that the Ghazi is naturally an unusually strong, determined man and endowed with a mixture of courage and caution which leads him to strike hard, but only to strike when he is confident that his blow will go home and achieve his object. He is inspired by a very genuine patriotism, and is earnestly desirous of building up his country's strength and prosperity, and at the same time convinced that he alone is fit to carry out the great task of reconstruction. The only check now on the excesses to which the mind of such an autocrat may be carried is the influence of Ismet Pasha, and I should dearly love to know how much it has been shaken. I cannot help hoping that the influence of Tefik Rushdi, who, of course, is a mere Pandar, may be affected by the course of events at Geneva. He has been allowed to indulge in every extravagance, and yet it must be clear at Angora that he has only succeeded in bringing about a few weeks' delay.

3. I see that Rejeb is named as a possible successor to Ismet, and I think the appointment quite likely if Ismet were to go. Rejeb, whom I made a point of seeing at Angora last spring, is a burly, round-headed man, fairly alert and businesslike with more common sense than intelligence, and with no sentiment whatever. I fancy he is terribly rough, brutal and ruthless, and, so far as internal politics are concerned, would be an extremist of the extremists, but I do not think he has any predilections in favour of Russia. Though he has long stood close to the Ghazi, I doubt if he would exercise much restraining influence, at any rate, until he had had time to make sure of his position.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

Tıpkıbasım 25

Büyükelçi Lindsay'den Chamberlain'a gizli yazı. 28.9.1925 Cumhurbaşkanı Gazi Mustafa Kemal günde devletle ödeşiyor. Bu nedenle onun sağlığı ve hayatı önem kazanıyor.

Kendisine karşı suikast tehlikesi her zaman mevcut.

(Belge 265'in tıpkıbasımı)

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